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Editorial

Another Development and the Third Development Decade

The four conferences discussed in the last issue of this journal—UNCTAD IV, Habitat, World Employment and the Colombo Non-aligned Summit—can be considered as interrelated elements of the global strategy required for the New International Order. Habitat and World Employment dealt primarily with national problems; UNCTAD IV was concerned with the process of negotiation; and the focus at Colombo was on the self-reliance of the non-aligned countries.

A survey of the progress made at the four conferences, through their reports, indicates that they support each other and are in broad agreement in three respects: that development should be need-oriented, self-reliant and based on an autonomous technological capacity.

With respect to *need-oriented development*, Habitat declared that the 'improvement of the quality of life of human beings' was the first objective and that in 'the satisfaction of the basic needs . . . priority must be given to the needs of the most disadvantaged'. The World Employment Conference concurred in recognizing that 'one of the primary objectives . . . must be to achieve full employment and to satisfy the basic needs of all people . . .'. At Colombo the non-aligned countries affirmed that the focal point of the process of self-reliant growth should be 'the eradication of unemployment and poverty . . . satisfying the basic minimum needs of the population of the developing world'.

With respect to *self-reliance*, the World Employment Conference Programme of Action advocated national and collective self-reliance and the Habitat Recommendations particularly stressed local self-reliance and the recognition of the informal sector and 'spontaneous settlements', advising that efforts should be made to define what people 'can decide and do better for themselves'. At Colombo, self-reliance was a central theme affirmed by the Heads of State or Government, in the belief that only a 'confident spirit of collective self-reliance' could guarantee the emergence of the new international economic order. This was reinforced at Colombo by a number of concrete decisions: to study the feasibility of a Third World bank to work for a 'countervailing currency'; to convene a meeting of representatives of finance ministers and central banks to consider the establishment of a developing countries payment union; to invite countries to ratify the convention establishing the Solidarity Fund for economic and social development; to initiate action for the implementation of a global system of trade preferences among Third World countries; to launch the Plan of Action for food and agricultural production, in order to attain a more balanced and self-reliant agriculture, by achieving a target of a 4 per cent increase per annum over the next five years.

The concept of *autonomous technological capacity* was reflected in an

UNCTAD resolution to strengthen 'the technological capacity of developing countries' expressing the conviction that 'national technological capacity is a cornerstone of economic development'. For Habitat, as stressed throughout its recommendations for action, the need was felt for appropriate and endogenous technology better suited to people's participation, and for the use of local skills and building materials. The Employment conference recognized the 'urgent need for appropriate and optimal technology . . . suited to the resource and future development potential of developing countries' and noted the priority need of research to increase national technological capacity within the Third World and to reduce its dependence on industrialized countries.

In addition to these three concerns of the conferences, other themes that can only be touched on cursorily here included: the need for endogenous development models (Habitat); change in the pattern of growth and access to productive resources by the low-income groups, with frequent recourse to social transformations and redistribution of assets, notably land (Employment); the transformation of past patterns of ownership rights and redirection of land-value increases for the benefit of society as a whole and the encouragement of public participation in human settlements, in particular through organizations of workers, farmers, landless labourers and tenants (Habitat); effective mass participation of the rural population in the political process, safeguarded by governments (Employment); the enforcement of minimum and maximum standards—qualitative and quantitative targets for the supply of safe water by a certain date (Habitat); the determined pursuit of full-employment policies and the provision of adjustment assistance (Employment).

True, there is nothing new in the substance of the development doctrine that seems to emerge from the various texts considered above. Nevertheless, the advance appears clearly when they are compared with the elements of the Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade, and this is critical. For the real achievement is that such concepts have now moved from the level of reports and studies to that of intergovernmental consensus. They have been officially legitimized.

True again, these are only words, and there remains a formidable implementation gap. Nevertheless, these concepts, now legitimized and made known all over the world, can be used by those actually in charge of development as guidelines for action, when circumstances permit, or as ideological weapons when circumstances have to be changed. They have already had considerable impact on some of those who participated in the preparations for Habitat and Employment.

The implementation of these principles, which implies the abolition of 'internal colonialism', as the President of Mexico Luis Echeverría strikingly put it in his Vancouver address, cannot be isolated from the international environment. Working towards change in that environment was essentially the task of UNCTAD IV and the Non-aligned Summit.

Any assessment of UNCTAD IV depends, of course, largely on the expectations one had. The Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States have mapped the contours and substance of the new international economic order. However, as the Colombo Economic Declaration observed, 'no indication of their implementation is apparent'. It would have been naive indeed to expect from UNCTAD IV the final settlement of any problem: the establishment of the new international economic order implies major changes in present international economic relations, and there is no reason to expect the transnational power structure, the *centre*, to yield easily or quickly. What is on the global agenda, at this stage, is the initiation of a process of real negotiation and the provision of the necessary machinery. This was the task of UNCTAD IV, and any realistic assessment would have to recognize that it did achieve this. Nothing dramatic happened, but a door was opened.

Clearly, UNCTAD IV did not achieve much progress on a number of topics which had been on its agenda for years. Further, and this should not be glossed over, it failed on the question of the debt of the Third World and hardly touched the indexation of the prices of imported manufactures to those of exported commodities. However, something new occurred in the field of commodities. One may, of course, ask whether commodities were the best subject for negotiation at this stage, and claim that producer countries can and should act unilaterally, as the OPEC countries did—a possibility not to be excluded, and still very much alive, as will be seen below. Still, UNCTAD IV adopted 'without dissent' an 'integrated programme for commodities'—which is, rather, an approach to such a programme—with the intention of 'improving the terms of trade of developing countries' and eliminating 'the economic imbalance between developed and developing countries', which is initially to cover eighteen commodities. What really matters, beyond the limitations, qualifications and 'difference of views' duly recorded in the resolution and in the report, is that the conference 'agreed that steps will be taken towards the negotiation of a common fund' for the financing of international commodity stock and that the Secretary-General of UNCTAD was requested to convene, first, a negotiating conference on a common fund no later than March 1977, second, preparatory meetings for international negotiations on individual products,

whose work should be completed no later than February 1978, and, third, on the basis of the above, commodity negotiating conferences to be concluded by the end of 1978.

This does constitute a qualitative change, because there is a commitment to negotiate in a determined period of time in this key area. UNCTAD seems thus to have moved from a negotiation on words to a negotiation on concrete and binding measures. Nothing has been settled, but a process has been initiated. This does not prejudice the preparedness of those who run the world economy to accept change, but it gives those who need and want change an opportunity to go ahead on the basis of their organization, unity and cohesiveness, which manifested themselves clearly at Nairobi and were further strengthened in Colombo.

The Colombo Non-aligned Summit, noting in this respect that 'it is the economic issues in international negotiations that will be now the major concern of international politics' recognized that the UNCTAD resolution mentioned above would 'provide an opportunity for non-aligned and other developing countries through collective action, mutual support and negotiating skill to obtain significant changes in prevailing structures and economic relationships'. Self-reliance, declared the Heads of State, 'implies a firm determination on the part of the developing nations to secure their legitimate economic rights in international dealings through the use of their collective bargaining strength'. They reaffirmed their determination to pursue their common efforts to achieve these objectives in particular through the formation of producer/exporters' associations and other means, despite threats and repressive economic sanctions. Thus, among other things, the plenipotentiary conferences will, first, complete and approve the statutes establishing a Council of Producers' Associations and, second, finalize and sign the agreement establishing the Special Fund for the financing of the buffer stocks of commodities, 'if the UNCTAD common fund fails to yield satisfactory results by March 1977'.

The Non-aligned Summit further entrusted a number of countries to act as coordinating countries for the tasks to be undertaken on the various items included in its Programme of Action. These countries will meet and report to the coordinating bureau so that progress achieved may be reviewed annually and submitted to the Conference of Foreign Ministers.

If the success of the negotiations which are about to start largely depends on the full exercise of the collective bargaining power of the Third World, it also depends on the attitude of the industrialized countries. In this connexion, the Colombo Summit expressed its appreciation for the 'continued support given to the cause of development' by what it called 'a few for-

ward-looking industrialized countries'. The three UN conferences should also be considered from this angle. As a whole, the overall political pattern confirmed the solidarity of the Third World countries as well as a trend already noticed at the Seventh Special Session and in other meetings, i.e. the convergence, on many important subjects, of the positions of the Third World and of a few medium-scale or small industrialized countries. It was particularly clear in Nairobi where the Netherlands and Norway (the latter especially when it announced its preparedness to contribute to the common fund, if established) did contribute to the emergence of the new international order and preserved the chances of a genuine cooperation. At the same time, the growing isolation of the USA was underlined by its failure to have its proposal to consider an 'International Resources Bank' accepted by the conference.

At the Employment Conference, the Group of 77 appeared formally for the first time in the ILO context, and it was significant that on a number of rather divisive issues—such as the new international economic order and the transnational corporations—its views coincided with those not only of the 'forward-looking industrialized countries' but also of the workers' group.

Governments of the industrialized countries, forward-looking or not, are subject to the influence of the public opinion in their countries. Non-governmental organizations were quite active in both Vancouver and Nairobi. At UNCTAD IV, they proved, with the newly formed International Coalition for Development Action and the journal *Cosmos*, a most useful link with the opinion in the industrialized countries. As far as the press is concerned, finally, the least which could be said—and this is related to a general problem which figures prominently in this issue with the papers of the Seminar on the Role of Information in the New International Order—is that both Habitat and Employment were poorly covered (at Habitat, in spite of the presence of some 1,500 journalists, who showed a vicious interest in non-substantive matters and contributed to the poor image this innovative conference had in western opinion). The situation was quite different in Nairobi, perhaps because immediate interests were at stake, or better preparation was ensured, including an important effort on the part of such countries as the Netherlands and Sweden.

Steps have been taken in the right direction. This would appear more clearly if the brief analysis offered above could be expanded to reflect, for instance, the evolution under way, as far as health needs are concerned, in the World Health Organization or the new ground broken by Unesco in its *Moving Towards Change* or in the approach underlying its 1977–82 medium-term planning.

Other steps will probably be taken soon. When this issue of *DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE* is published, two other conferences will have been completed, the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Third World Conference on Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, in Mexico. The latter will be complemented by a UNDP-sponsored Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (Buenos Aires, September 1977), while two other UN conferences, dealing with more technical subjects, will meet in 1977, that on Water (Mar del Plata, March) and Desertification (Nairobi, probably in September). Further, the UN will convene in 1979 a Conference on Science and Technology, and it is highly likely that, following the Non-aligned Summit which put much emphasis on this aspect of the 'great disorder under heaven', a Special Session of the UN General Assembly will be organized no later than 1978 to examine disarmament—whose link with the new international economic order is perhaps best illustrated by the fact, underlined in Colombo, that annual military expenditures absorb fifteen times the total flow of resources to the Third World. . . . Further, it seems that the time is coming to start the conceptual preparations for the Strategy for the Third UN Development Decade, and to complete the discussions under way concerning restructuring of the UN development system.

This is no small agenda. But further efforts could now build on the results of the conferences held this year. As far as the restructuring of the UN system is concerned, for instance—a theme which is discussed further in this issue in relation to the US sanctions against Unesco—the Employment Conference made a significant contribution when it urged the ILO Governing Body 'to recommend the review of research programmes, operational activities and organisational structures of the UN family, so as to focus them more sharply on the contribution they can make to meeting the basic needs target'. The UNCTAD IV resolution on institutional arrangements, which essentially implies a sharper focus on the negotiating function of the organization and the streamlining of its machinery so as to make it an effective negotiating arm of the system, should also be an important element in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restructuring.

Finally, the conceptual and political advances marked by the recent conferences, added to those on the Environment, Population, Food and Women, which took place since 1972, provide important building blocks for the UN Development Strategy of the 1980s. Again, the Employment conference helped significantly when it requested that 'policies required to meet basic needs . . . form the core of the Third Development Decade Strategy'. Whether ILO is the organization best suited to perform the job or not, it made headway when it recommended that Member States should supply the

organization with information describing their policies for the implication of the basic needs strategy, and that the organization prepare 'an analysis of the national situations with respect to the level of basic needs as well as policies to attain them', a bold proposal which was significantly endorsed by the Non-aligned Summit when it recommended 'joint approaches to implement the decisions of the World Employment Conference', including the exchange of information on 'comparative experience in the implementation of basic needs strategies'.

The Third Development Decade Strategy will, however, not limit itself to the basic needs, and as the rapid analysis offered above suggests, the recent conferences included much more. The immediate task ahead thus seems to include a detailed and systematic analysis of the declarations, recommendations and resolutions of the major UN conferences which have taken place since 1972 with a view to identifying and consolidating their common elements, assessing their compatibility or contradictions at the level of both the principles and the measures envisaged to give effect to them and to expose the gaps. Thus the Strategy for the Third Development Decade could build on the emerging international doctrine which, we believe, is that of *another development* seen as the national content of the new international order.

While negotiations on the most immediate international problems proceed at the intergovernmental level on the basis of the renewed determination of the non-aligned countries to rely on their collective strength and the commitment of a few forward-looking industrialized countries, work should start at the conceptual level to prepare for a consolidated Strategy. As experience shows, the role of concerned citizens and committed non-governmental organizations can be of some importance in such an endeavour. It is our hope that more of them will now join those who have been the pioneers in this endeavour so that the Third Development Decade Strategy should really be the Charter of another development and that, through citizen involvement, the new international order may be given its full human dimension.

Moving Towards a New International Information Order

Are the Third World nations moving 'towards a more restricted press' as an emerging international campaign would have us believe?

Statements of this effect have been prompted by *inter alia* the conference in New Delhi, in July, of the ministers of information of non-aligned countries, at which agreement was reached on the constitution of a pool of the press agencies of the non-aligned countries.

In fact, this is only one of the recent examples of a reaction to a process which has been noticeable for quite some time at both intergovernmental and non-governmental levels. In the early seventies some Third World countries began to express in Unesco their concern that the principle of the 'free flow of information' was being used as an ideological smokescreen to cover a one-way flow of information, that information was in fact a vehicle to bring about cultural and political dependence on the models prevailing in the centre. 'Free' information, in this sense, it was argued, was not different from other mystifying concepts, such as the 'free market' or 'free enterprise', which signify the freedom of those who are powerful to exploit those who are powerless.

The movement towards a changing concept of information acquired political momentum as a result of the September 1973 Algiers Non-aligned Summit, which pointed out that 'developing countries should take concerted action to... reorganize existing communication channels which are a legacy of the colonial past and have hampered free, direct and fast communication between them'. The non-aligned movement followed up this directive at the Lima meeting of foreign ministers (August 1975) and at the Tunis symposium on international information (March 1976), which prepared, at the technical level, the New Delhi conference referred to above. Building on the service organized since early 1975 through Tanjug, the national press agency of Yugoslavia, the New Delhi conference decided on the constitution of the press-agency pool and this decision was endorsed by the Colombo Summit.

At the non-governmental level, and parallel to these intergovernmental actions, the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report (*What Now: Another Development*) devoted one of its ten main points to the need to improve public information:

Citizens have a right to inform and be informed about the facts of development, its inherent conflicts and the changes it will bring about, locally and internationally.

Under present conditions, information and education are only too often monopolized by the power structure, which manipulates public opinion to its own ends and tends to perpetuate preconceived ideas, ignorance and alienation.

A global effort should be made to give the new international relations their human dimension and to promote the establishment of genuine cooperation between

peoples on the basis of equality and recognition of their cultural, political, social and economic diversity. The image of the Other should reach each of us, stripped of the prevailing ethnocentric prejudices, which are the characteristic feature of most of the messages currently transmitted.

Such an effort should be concerned both with information and with education in the broadest sense of the word; it should be directed towards 'conscientization' of citizens to ensure their full participation in the decision-making process.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Third World Journalists' Seminar which met in New York during the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly (September 1975) in turn insisted that 'for the new international economic order to emerge, peoples of both industrialized and Third World countries must be given the opportunity of understanding that they share a common interest in creating international conditions that will permit *another development* of societies in all parts of the world' (the full text is printed in *DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE*, 1976:1).

In October, the Centre International pour le Développement held in Nice a meeting of journalists on world public information and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, at which it was agreed that reporting on Third World realities was not adequate and at which were listed a number of obstacles to a 'fuller and more balanced information'.

In the context of these discussions and decisions, the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET), in cooperation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and under the auspices of the Third World Forum, organized in Mexico City, from 24 to 28 May, a seminar on 'The Role of Information in the New International Order', whose main objectives were to develop further the conceptual framework within which these questions should be analysed and to examine practical solutions for the improvement of existing information channels and to develop new ones in the spirit of self-reliance. The present issue of *DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE* carries a number of the papers arising out of the Mexico seminar.

The effects of cultural domination and dependence fostered by most of the prevailing information patterns are much more penetrating than those of purely economic domination and dependence. Many and strong vested interests, those of the transnational power structure and of the local élites—in terms of power, finance and professional complacency—stand in the way. Therefore the battle will be a fierce one. It will be all the harder for those who need and want change in that the chief vehicle for alerting and mobilizing public consciousness to the realities of information subservience

—the press—is itself the tool and the principal exemplification of this subservience. The nascent campaign suggests that mystification and distortion of the facts and positions will be used as weapons in this ‘discussion’. It is therefore important, as a preface to the research and political work which has to be pursued—and to which this issue is a contribution—to emphasize three fundamental points:

1. Just as *another development*, centred on the satisfaction of peoples’ needs, endogenous, self-reliant and ecologically minded and based on a profound transformation of the social structures at the national level, is the only justification of the New International Order, any new International Information Order will be legitimized only in so far as it contributes to the promotion of *another information*, one which will fight preconceived ideas, ignorance and alienation, and facilitate the ‘conscientization’ of citizens to ensure their control over decision-making. Change will require major conceptual and practical advances in both the content and methods of information, since the relationship between the ‘professionals’ of information and the ‘public’ is also one of subservience.

2. The present situation in the field of information is largely a legacy of the past and of the continued oligopolistic position of four transnational news agencies. The scope for self-reliance in this field is, however, vast. In addition to the creation of the news agency pool and the implementation of a Third World feature service and other indispensable practical measures, it requires a change of mind on the part of many journalists, who do not perceive critically or are unable to resist an information model permeating cultural, political and economic behaviour. Self-reliance in the field of information implies a higher degree of political awareness on the part of those who produce news.

3. *Another information* requires that the principle of free flow of information be given its full, meaningful and democratic content. This means that the domination of the transnational news agencies over the media should be curbed, but this is not conterminous with governmental control over information. While it cannot be said that there is no role for governments in information, a role that is as varied as the circumstances, it should be remembered that societies are permanent, and governments—though they may be devoted to the public good—are transient. Societies and the individ-

uals who constitute them are richer in their diversity, needs and aspirations than the states and their bureaucratic machineries—which should only be their servants. A New Information Order and *another information* are not designed to replace the domination of the transnationals by that of national bureaucracies, however well intentioned; they are not a move towards ‘a more restricted press’, but towards a freer one, which would really meet the need to inform and to be informed—one of the fundamental human needs.



courtesy of Algérie Presse Service

The Role of Information in the New International Order

Seminar organized by the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, in cooperation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation under the auspices of the Third World Forum, Mexico City, 24 to 28 May 1976

The 1976 Mexico Seminar on the Role of Information in the New International Order was held at the Mexican Foreign Trade Institute and attended by a number of leading journalists, specialized researchers, social scientists and government officials in the field of information, predominantly from the Third World (a list of participants and seminar papers is printed below on page 76).

The seminar was organized on the initiative of the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET), in accordance with its mandate to conduct action-oriented research on, inter alia, the activities of the transnational corporations and on the related questions of information and dependence. In view of the key role played by the transnational news agencies in the relationship of domination and dependence between centre and periphery countries, it was felt that their origins, nature, means of operation and influence should be closely studied.

For this purpose, two basic documents were prepared by ILET. The first was on the historical evolution of the transnational news agencies. The second, by Juan Somavía, the director of ILET and also the director of the seminar, dealing with the transnational power structure and international information, is published here in a form amplified to take into consideration many of the views expressed in the seminar and also recent developments in the discussion of these issues in the Third World. In addition, an analysis of the international information available in Latin America, on the basis of a sample of Latin American newspapers, was made by Fernando Reyes Matta, the coordinator of activities on information and dependence of ILET, and this is also published here.

The broad agreement of views of three Third World journalists from Asia and Africa is reflected in a further three papers printed here. These papers include a plea for a new international communication and information structure, free of governmental and bureaucratic controls; a proposal for a Third World Feature Service; and an exposé of a centre language as a vehicle of dependence. A final paper in this section of the journal is devoted to an alternative UN information model.

The seminar dealt at length with the issues of information and the transnational power structure, in particular through the role of the international news agencies, and considered the elements involved and specific measures desirable in restructuring links between the centre and the periphery and in establishing alternative channels of information, especially for



the Third World. A number of valuable suggestions were made for future research to be carried out by ILET and other organizations concerned with these matters. Final discussions aiming at elaborating a summary analysis and conclusions are available from the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, Apartado 85-025, Mexico 20, D.F., Mexico.

The seminar was officially inaugurated on behalf of the President of the Republic of Mexico, Luis Echeverría, by the Under-Secretary of the Presidency, Lic. Mauro Jiménez Lazcano. It concluded with a visit to the President, on which occasion he affirmed his belief that the problem of information should constitute a fundamental element in the context of the new international order, as defined by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, expressed his full support for the seminar initiative, and also underlined the need for practical measures.

The Transnational Power Structure and International Information

Elements of a Third World Policy for Transnational News Agencies

By Juan Somavía

A few transnational news agencies have a de facto near monopoly of the flow of international information, including information on and between Third World countries. Although most countries in the Third World have achieved their political independence, they are still not economically independent and in the field of information they are almost totally dependent on the news provided by the transnational agencies, which is often of a biased and distorted nature, serving predominantly the interests of the transnational power structure. Juan Somavía in this paper analyses the causes of this continued dependence and outlines the elements of a Third World policy aimed at the establishment of a framework of legal and social accountability for the activities of the agencies. The author, who is director of the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales and served as director of the Mexico Seminar, was formerly permanent representative of Chile to the Andean Group, president of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement and chairman of the board of the Andean Development Corporation. He was the rapporteur for the 'Group of Eminent Persons' appointed by the United Nations to study the transnational corporations.



The context: world communications control by the transnational power structure

Most Third World countries are inserted in a world system whose rationale has been laid down by the industrialized countries and whose operation inevitably favours the latter. Its origins are to be found in the various forms of colonial domination and exploitation that historically characterized relations between the centre and the periphery. Today the system is operated according to a set of principles and practices that were elaborated after the Second World War, in the global and regional organizations created during that

period, with the explicit or tacit approval of the small group of countries that made up the 'world' community at the time. This arrangement has been perfected and adapted over the last thirty years to form a cohesive whole, in which the central instrument of domination emerges clearly, namely, the transnational power structure, which acts internationally and operates internally in nearly every Third World country.

The transnational power structure manifests itself through operational forms with different functions which, taken together, constitute a complex apparatus whose central objective is

to consolidate and expand its capacity to act and exert influence throughout the world. As its letter of introduction it invokes a combination of values and aspirations which it is supposed to stand for: political stability, economic efficiency, technological creativity, the 'logic' of the market, the virtues of consumerism, the defence of freedom, and others.

In practice, the way in which the transnational power structure actually behaves is quite different from what it claims. In the name of political stability, it defends the *status quo* and those régimes, the most conservative, which are most active in thwarting vital structural changes in Third World societies; in the name of efficiency, it promotes the expansion of transnational enterprises, originating in the centre, as the 'technically' ideal solution to the problems of growth and economic development, promoting a 'homogenization' of consumption patterns that often critically disregard both basic needs and local cultural realities; in the name of technological creativity, it concentrates vast resources on research and development related to the requirements of its industrial-military apparatus and the interests of its transnational enterprises, which have little to do with the real needs of the Third World; in the name of the 'logic' of the market, it advocates abdication by governments of their basic responsibility, that of setting the guidelines for and orienting national development in favour of the majorities, implicitly promoting forms of social organization that leave decisions on what, how much, and for whom to produce in the hands of large private enterprises; in the name of the virtues of consumerism, it directs production only towards

those who have the income available to consume, thereby consolidating development styles associated with the most privileged sectors of society and relegating the great majorities of the Third World to the margin of the economic and social process; and in the name of freedom, it blocks, intervenes in and destabilizes the actions, policies and programmes of progressive governments, by weakening or supplanting them and by backing régimes based on systematic repression and the violation of human rights.

To attain these objectives it disposes of an arsenal of diverse but converging instruments which reflect the various dimensions of the transnational power structure.

1. The *political-military-intelligence service dimension* (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, links between intelligence services, etc.), expressing itself in overt and covert threats, in attempts to promote changes in its interest or prevent changes adverse to its interest in power relations within Third World countries, in different forms of military intervention and political penetration, and in the implementation of policies to ostracize certain progressive governments internationally.
2. The *economic-industrial-trade dimension* (promotion of transnational enterprises, strengthening of structures and agreements favourable to the system, such as GATT, the IMF, the World Bank; efforts to weaken instruments that challenge aspects of the system, such as UNCTAD, producers' associations, measures to con-

trol transnational enterprises, and regional organizations; encouragement of 'mimetic' development models; use of economic instruments to block and weaken policies of progressive governments).

3. It is only recently that the *communications-advertising-culture dimension* has begun to make itself evident as an integral part of the transnational instrumentality. It is becoming increasingly clear that the transnational communications system has developed with the support and at the service of the transnational power structure. It is an integral part of the system which affords the control of that key instrument of contemporary society: information. It is the vehicle for transmitting values and life styles to Third World countries which stimulate the type of consumption and the type of society necessary to the transnational system as a whole.

Politically, it defends the *status quo*, where this is in its own interest; economically, it creates the conditions for the transnational expansion of capital. Loss of control over the communications structure by the transnational system would mean the loss of one of its most powerful weapons; this is why it is so difficult to bring about change in this field.

The transnational communications system is a whole, comprising news agencies, advertising agencies and data banks, and supplying information retrieval services, radio and television programmes, films, radiophotos, magazines, books, novelettes and comic papers with world-wide circulation. The various components, originating mainly in the industrialized countries, reinforce each other, stim-

ulating *in toto* the consumers' desire to attain forms of social organization and life styles imitative of the industrialized capitalist countries, which, experience has shown, can only be applied in the Third World on the basis of high and increasing concentration of income in the hands of a few and of untenable social inequality. At the same time, the 'information pressure' from so many seemingly unrelated yet substantively coherent different sources gradually vitiates the ability to react to the message, slowly converting the individual into a passive receptor without critical judgement. The communications process almost becomes for people something like 'theatre watching'. The public thus becomes convinced that the transnational consumption and development model is historically inevitable. In this manner, the communications system fulfils its main function: the cultural penetration of the human being, to condition him or her to accept the political, economic and cultural values of the transnational power structure.

It is for these reasons that communications policies are an integral part of development policies. If information is communicated in the interest and at the service of the transnational power structure, the sovereign capacity to determine and implement national development policy is shackled, because the international communications structure directly conditions and determines individual and social reactions within a country.

Within the complex ramifications of the transnational communications system, the news agencies of greatest penetration in the Third World play a special role and deserve particular study. Although there is conceptual

awareness of the structural dependence of the Third World in this area, it is important to study quite closely the many expressions and the empirical nature of the phenomenon, in order to draw up counterpart policies to develop alternative and complementary channels of information on the basis of national and collective self-reliance.

Transnational news agencies

The purpose of this paper is to bring together and develop existing analysis on the activities of the large transnational news agencies with major influence in the Third World, for use in drawing up the counterpart policies. The summary of the structural characteristics of the agencies and of their resulting conduct is intended as background material for determining policy.

Structural characteristics

The main agencies of importance in Third World countries, to which we refer, such as United Press International (UPI), Associated Press (AP), Reuters and Agence France-Presse (AFP), are not in any real sense 'international' enterprises; they are transnational enterprises, each operating out of its headquarters in an industrialized capitalist country. By definition their ownership structure is totally vested in their home countries. All the members of the boards of directors of UPI and AP, for example, are nationals of the United States of America, as well as most of the bureau chiefs, at least throughout Latin America. AFP and Reuters have ownership and con-

trol structures that link them to their own governments. Their form of organization closely resembles that of commercial enterprises with world-wide interests to prime and defend. The nature of their activities is such that they have to operate outside their own country, with an immense impact and influence on the very many countries in which they operate. Their operations are interlinked with other branches of the transnational production system—advertising, magazine and television-programme production in particular—and also with transnational enterprises. For this reason the conceptual framework developed for analysing and formulating policy towards the operation of transnationals is applicable, with certain changes, to news agencies. They are, however, one of the least-studied features of the transnational phenomenon.

Their structure and links with the rest of the transnational system, their ownership, their private-enterprise rationale of seeking constant expansion and long-term optimization of profits, together with the values that govern the present training of communicators, lead these agencies to treat information as a commodity and to regard their main aim as that of selling their product more successfully than their competitors. The 'logic' of the market becomes the criterion for their conduct.

In order to assure their expansion and growth with absolute freedom of action throughout the world, the United States news agencies, in particular, with the full support of their government, postulated in the late forties the international application of the principle of the 'free flow' of information, for which the approval of the world community was ob-

tained.¹ This concept has been used as the conceptual cornerstone to justify the 'independence' of the news agencies and to enable them to carry on their activities without national or international social accountability of any kind. In this way, the seal of legitimacy has been placed on their right to act exclusively in their own interest, transmitting their particular view of events according to the political and economic determinants of the transnational system of which they form part. As a result of the failure to question in practical and conceptual terms the manner in which the principle of 'free flow' has been applied, the agencies are currently neither socially nor juridically responsible for their acts either to the foreign countries in which they operate or to the international community.

In practice, the principle of 'free flow' means that the agencies can determine what is news. They have been accorded the right to select from among the various national and international events what shall be transmitted for the world to know. They are thus made into arbiters of existing reality.

Because of their background and structure, the criteria they apply to news selection often reflect neither the interests nor the social realities of many Third World countries. This is most strikingly evident in the reporting of events in which progressive governments or movements are seeking to change dominant structures or to question the traditional *status quo*. Compared with other transnational enterprises, the transnational news agencies are small. The UPI operational budget in 1972 was US\$55 million and that for AP in 1973 was US\$78 million.² Their power resides not in

their financial capacity but in the way they 'handle' the basic variable, information, in contemporary society. It is for this purpose that they are to be found operating throughout the world. Their role within the transnational system may be compared to that of the headlights on an automobile: to light up the road, pick out the danger signals and changes in the route, inform those steering the system about everything that concerns their interests, and help find a sound and stable road to follow. Like the headlights, they are small but decisive; without their valuable information the system loses operativeness and efficiency and runs the risk of crashing into unforeseen obstacles.

The current situation is such that a few agencies have a *de facto* near monopoly of the flow of international information, including information on and between Third World countries. This has its origin in historical continuities the effects of which, in other related areas, in international trade, development financing, exploitation of raw materials, management of the monetary system, and control of technology, have been denounced internationally by the Third World. However, prior to the recent formal approval of a pool of news agencies of non-aligned countries, there has not been a similar degree of conceptual awareness of or an in-depth political reaction to the phenomenon of information dependence.

Behaviour

As a result of this structural situation the behaviour of the transnational news agencies is characterized by a variety of practices that run

contrary to the needs and interests of Third World countries; in particular, those countries trying to carry out basic structural changes internally. This is equally shown in the nature of the reporting on the activities of national groups that are struggling to change conservative or repressive régimes. Some of the ways in which this is done are described below.

Criteria for selecting the news are consciously or instinctively based on the political and economic interests of the transnational system and the countries in which this system has its roots. They have become a central mechanism of the national and international instruments deployed to maintain the *status quo* and prevent real changes. Politically, information that tends to show that the crucial elements of the system really 'function' is highlighted while that which implies criticism or need for changes in the existing state of affairs is played down. The best recent example of this, at the international level, has been the way in which the actions of the OPEC countries have been presented (as responsible for world inflation, as wrecking the international economic system, as irresponsible in the use of power conferred by the possession of oil) with scarcely any substantive description of the true global dimension and historic implications of the OPEC decisions for the balance of world forces. For anybody relying exclusively on international dispatches, OPEC actions have practically no positive elements in them and much transnational reporting of this theme has the flavour of anti-OPEC propaganda. The same is the case with information about Third World rifts and contradictions, which are played up by the cultivation of minor cul-

tural differences or quarrels that have their origin in the colonialist past. The dissemination of concepts such as the 'fourth' and 'fifth' world goes in the same direction.

The use of 'labels', adjectives and persuasive definitions to stigmatize targets of the system is another political method that is employed. Reference is made to the 'marxist' President, Salvador Allende, without any agency thinking or willing to speak of the 'capitalist' President Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford. Progressive political leaders in the Third World are described as 'extremists' or 'rebels' but conservative or reactionary politicians are unlabelled. The international negotiators of progressive countries are 'rhetorical' while those of the industrialized world are 'pragmatic'. Semantics serve to evoke the image of what is 'normal' from the standpoint of the 'order' the agencies represent. Anything that departs from this normality is treated in such a way that by inference it becomes obvious that it must be rejected. The alleged objectivity of news presentation is belied by an arbitrary use of language.

Distortion of the news has become a regular device of international information. Distortion does not necessarily mean a false presentation of events but rather an arbitrary selection and a slanted evaluation of reality. Such distortion has various forms of expression:

1. *Overemphasizing events that have no real importance.* The anecdotal, the irrelevant and what the centre countries consider picturesque is woven into the transmission, giving it an unwarranted appearance of national significance.

2. *Putting isolated facts together and presenting them as a whole without this 'whole' ever having existed ('making' news).* A sum of partial truths is presented in such a way that it appears to constitute an overall truth.

3. *Misrepresentation by 'implication', characterized by the presentation of facts in such a way that the implicit conclusions to be drawn from them are favourable to the interests of the transnational system.* For example, the negative aspects of events in progressive countries are stressed and their achievements are minimized, while at the same time the virtues of the key instruments of the system, such as transnational enterprises, are subtly extolled.

The widespread and repeated dissemination throughout the Andean Group of the negative reaction of the 'Council of the Americas' (an organization of private United States companies with headquarters in New York) to Decision 24, establishing common regulations on foreign investment in the region, resulted in the creation of the implicit image that the Andean governments had made a 'mistake', that the flow of foreign investment would contract 'drastically', and that nationalistic and liberating attitudes in the economic area led to economic stagnation.³

4. *Distortion by 'preconditioning' of events.* Facts having a specific dimension are presented in such a way that unfounded fears and misgivings are created, conditioning future action on the part of individuals, companies, social groups and governments. UPI filed the following dispatch on 27 February 1974:

New York, February 27, (UPI).—A meeting of a number of the main bauxite-producing countries scheduled tentatively for March 5 in Conakry (Guinea) has caused understandable concern in Washington. Some experts feel that the conference could be the first step in the establishment of a series of international cartels for controlling raw materials essential to the industrialized nations which could set the United States' economy back more than 40 years.

Cables like this create the image in industrialized countries that the increasing organizational capacity of raw-material-producing countries is a 'threat' to their own development.

It is inferred that it is 'legitimate' for the industrialized countries to defend themselves and to seek by all the means at their disposal to obstruct the organizational capacity of the Third World. At the same time, the cable warns the countries meeting in Conakry that Washington's concern is 'understandable' and that, consequently, if they should come to an agreement on bauxite, it would be logical that reprisals might be forthcoming.

5. *Distortion also by silence, by failure to report on situations that are no longer of interest to the agencies' home countries.* Viet-Nam ceased to be news (except for sporadic articles) after the United States was defeated, despite the fact that its reunification and efforts to develop, following such a devastating war, are of worldwide significance. It cannot even be argued, as is sometimes the case, that this is a little-known country in which there is not much interest; on the contrary—even in purely commercial terms—the years of struggle created a 'market' in an interested public.

Elements for determining policy

The formulation of policy regarding the agencies calls for action at various levels, beginning by a critical examination of the conceptual basis of their activities.

Information is a social good not a commodity

International information today is a commodity sold on the market. The agencies deal in the observation and evaluation of events. In a sense they 'appropriate' reality and its characteristics, simply because only they possess the infrastructure and technical know-how for its publicization. Their 'marketing' modifies the nature and relative importance of events, which do not in fact 'happen' for the wider public unless they are chosen for publication by news outlets. The agency thus takes an event, whose scope and specific meaning are given by its context and the circumstances surrounding it, and converts it into 'news', which to be such requires a presentation that will make it a saleable commodity. There is thus, in the commercial concept of news, a built-in systematic discrimination against those events that cannot be 'sold', which therefore, in accordance with this rationale, are not 'news', because the controlling market has no interest in them. At the same time, there is a tendency to distortion by the projection of those aspects of events that make them more marketable. In this process, the social nature of the occurrence and its proper significance, deriving from its historical and cultural background, are completely lost sight of, giving way to an out-of-context message whose content is determined by the 'logic' of the market.

The selection and adaptation of events for the market means that information is directed to meet the 'demand' of such a market. We need to determine what makes up that demand and who decides what the market wants. The answer directly links the news agencies to the dominant transnational power structure.

The first element is that a large number of 'users' of the agency services are in the industrialized capitalist world, logically requiring information in accordance with the rationale of that system. Second, there are the primary users (newspapers, magazines, television and radio) in the Third World, most of which are connected with the local bourgeoisies which, in turn, are related to the transnational power structure through a variety of links. The third element is advertising. The communication structure in the centre as well as at the periphery is such that the primary users of information depend upon it for their existence. Advertising, in turn, is guided by the values and practices of the large transnational advertising agencies and is subject to their direct influence. Moreover, the advertising placed by the transnational enterprises is an important percentage, often the lion's share, of the income obtained by primary users of information in this area. Therefore, advertising presented as being merely a commercial requirement is, in fact, an instrument of financial and, often, political control of the means of communication. That there is a direct relation between the political orientation of the communication media and the volume of advertising they receive is borne out by the experience of the more progressive television channels, radio stations, newspapers or magazines, which are

usually avoided as outlets by the advertising agencies and transnational enterprises. Fourth, there is the fact that the primary users of international information, in most Third World countries, operate in the context of development policies that follow closely the consumption patterns of the industrialized world. As a result the contents of the 'package' (news, advertising, entertainment, political analysis, cultural aspects) offered by the primary users are, in one way or another, influenced by the consumerist pressures of the model and the needs and opinions of the sectors in which the highest incomes are concentrated.

So the circle is closed. Information originates in a few agencies, all from the industrialized world, is received in the Third World mainly by primary users, who are related to the transnational power structure and is, finally, placed on a market dominated by consumption styles defined by the needs of only a minority of the population. In the process, information as a social good, significant in terms of its roots and framework of origin, is lost and it becomes a commodity stripped of all social value. Even the capacity for 'political participation' is affected because information caters also to a sort of 'entertainment' model by which people are distracted, but not informed. The need to understand events against the background of their own reality is replaced by the need to sell and to ensure that the product is accepted by the market. This situation for the most part prevents the large agencies, those with greatest penetration in the Third World, from satisfactorily fulfilling the social function of providing information.

Framework of responsibility for the activities of the agencies

Providing information is a social function; it should not be a business transaction. Like all other social functions carried out on behalf of and for the service of the community, its exercise should not be left to the exclusive judgement of those involved in the activity in question. For the transmission of information confers power and every society should be organized so that those holding power are socially responsible for its use. Guidelines have been developed for this purpose in other human activities to define the responsibility of those with power. Sufficient justification exists for applying similar social criteria to the transnational news agencies.

Transnational news agencies are foreign organizations to the country they are operating in. Every country has the sovereign right to establish a framework of responsibility for the activities of 'foreign entities' operating on its territory. No foreign institution has the right *per se* to act, work or produce in another country; this right is granted because its presence is thought to be of value to the country and to international understanding. This holds true even for foreign institutions enjoying extraterritoriality, such as embassies, because a service is rendered by them to the international relations of the two countries, but whose rights are automatically abrogated when diplomatic relations are broken off. With respect to the agencies, the nature of the mutual benefits their activity confers should be better defined; this should be understood in the broad sense of creating the conditions for secure and

responsible information to flow both ways, towards and from a given country and not exclusively according to the views of a particular government. The legal framework should recognize the agency's freedom of action but, at the same time, orient the exercise of the freedom of information within a context of standards that will make it possible to eliminate or redress the sort of harmful conduct that has been described.

The right to establish a framework of responsibility for the activities of the agencies, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, has an even broader context; the process of political, economic and cultural liberation in which by varying means and at different rates of progress a large number of Third World countries are currently involved. The process of decolonization which began towards the end of the Second World War has gone through a number of stages, in which the specific content of the struggle has changed as new areas of confrontation have emerged successively in the fight to reduce external dependence and increase self-reliance.

At first, the struggle was a purely political one. In Africa and Asia, it was a struggle for territorial independence. In Latin America, the objective was the establishment of legal structures that would put a stop to the direct military interventions that have characterized the policy of the hegemonic power in the hemisphere. A political framework was created for universal acceptance of the principle of the self-determination of peoples and non-intervention into their affairs; both were consecrated as central guidelines of international relations by the Charter of the United

Nations. This was an attempt to establish minimum conditions of political security.

In spite of its evident flaws, this development nevertheless somewhat obliged the European colonial powers and the United States to pursue the exercise of power indirectly through economic levers rather than directly through political and military actions, although there were still many flagrant instances of these (in Algeria, in the Dominican Republic, in Egypt over the Suez Canal, and in Vietnam, among others). Progressively this shifted the main confrontation between the centre and the periphery to the economic field. It has ranged from the denunciation of the GATT principles and the Bretton Woods agreements, to a qualitatively different level with the OPEC actions, the approval of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order and the creation of initial mechanisms to negotiate the new economic order (such as the conference on international economic cooperation and UNCTAD IV). This experience has progressively led to the conviction that it is necessary for Third World countries to strengthen their economic security, nationally and collectively, in order to be able to exercise effectively their political sovereignty. This battle for political and economic security is aimed primarily at ensuring conditions that will put an end to situations in which Third World countries are compelled to act according to the will of major powers.

In this context, there is increasing evidence that in addition to force or economic pressure, a supplementary instrument exists which is less contentious and more subtle, but equally

effective. This is the capacity for cultural domination and transfer of consumption and development styles which incorporate the peoples of the Third World, both psychologically and practically, into the value system of the transnational power structure. Without apparent political or economic pressure these countries are made to act in the interest of the transnational system out of 'their own free will' by means of cultural penetration that offers them life styles that will transform them into 'developed peoples', liberated from the stigma of 'underdevelopment'. In this task there is an alliance of interests between Third World internal bourgeoisies and the transnational system. The complicity derives from the fact that both are equally motivated in promoting styles of consumerist development that conform to the transnational model. Minor contradictions arise as to how the market should be divided but not with respect to the need for creating it. For this operation to function efficiently it is essential to control the instruments of social communication, and this has been accomplished. In this framework, the international communications media and their local appendices practically become Trojan horses for the transnational styles of consumption.

Today we find ourselves in the third phase of the struggle for liberation (which is still clearly tied up, however, with the two previous ones): to establish conditions for the cultural security of information. Such security is as yet impossible because of the way transnational news agencies apply and utilize the principle of the free flow of information for their own benefit.

The need to challenge the current application of 'free flow of information'

The need to satisfy the social criteria described above—information considered as a social good, the responsible exercise of social power by the agencies, and the efforts to guarantee security of information—inevitably lead to the question of establishing a framework for the responsible exercise of the activities of news agencies. This will require, in turn, acceptance of the idea that what is needed is an equilibrated free flow of responsible information.

The link between US transnational interests and the heavy pressure brought to bear in the post Second World War years by the United States to have 'free flow' accepted as the guiding principle in world communication have been clearly and precisely delineated by Schiller.⁴

The operational practices of the agencies show that, in the main, they have placed their ability and professional know-how at the service of the transnational power structure and this points to the need to demonstrate conceptually the limitations, implicit discriminations and flaws in the principle of 'free flow' as it is now applied.

As implemented by the transnationals, the principle of 'free flow' is the formal consecration of *laissez-faire* in the information field. Under its cover a news agency can abuse its power to provide information without responsibility to anybody for the excesses, omissions or distortions of which it may have been guilty. 'Free flow' gives *carte-blanche* for information to be slanted in the form most conve-

nient or of most interest for a news agency, with the sole proviso that it should satisfy the demand of the news-agency market. The unilateral vision of the agencies is legitimized as the correct one, since it is the only one that is made known throughout the world. Socially, free flow insures the impunity of misrepresentation and the preponderance of the strong over the weak in the area of international information. The result is patent: the monopolistic concentration and consolidation of four transnational news agencies in control of the flow of information from, to and within the Third World. Acceptance of continued exploitation of the principle of 'free flow' in its present form would be equivalent to acknowledging the free use of economic power to put pressure on Third World countries as a legitimate guiding principle in international relations.

'Free flow' in the cultural and information spheres is the key instrument in the structure of transnational domination in the area of communications and it cannot remain viable if it continues to be put into practice as it has been up to now. We are not advocating its elimination, rather its incorporation into a context in which the information role of the agencies is governed by certain social standards of conduct. In this context the following issues should be given particular consideration:

1. Establishment of a framework of legal and social accountability for the information activities of the agencies.
2. Presentation by agencies of information regarding:

Their standards of professional conduct, operational practices and journalistic cri-

teria on the basis of which they intend to carry on their work.

Their central ownership and control structure, and the nature of the operational policy orientation received from the main office.

Their overall financial and commercial structure, giving sources of income, banking connexions, links with advertising and transnational communications enterprises.

Their desire to cooperate in a positive way in studies undertaken by official or academic organizations with respect to the content, forms and characteristics of their activities.

3. Recognition of the right of the agencies to a critical analysis—positive or negative—of national events, linked to the establishment of the right to reply similar to that already accepted in national legislation.

Final remarks

The conceptual approach in this paper is focused upon the implications of the activities of the transnational news agencies in the Third World. It should also be pointed out that many of the medium-size and small industrialized countries are in a similar situation of information dependence regarding the large agencies referred to here. This means that in some respects there is no clear-cut North/South or centre/periphery dichotomy in this field but rather, on the contrary, that some areas of common interest exist between the countries of the Third World and a number of industrialized countries. This is a significant political

pointer to innovative forms of cooperation that would be of mutual benefit.

The practical political application of these ideas will not be easy and there are abundant pitfalls ahead. We are not advocating government control over the agencies' news flow. We are against the ethnocentric monopoly of news flows and the lack of social accountability of news agencies for their actions. We believe that between these two extremes policies will emerge in which it is recognized that access to secure and responsible information, together with a substantive participation by the individual receptor in the communication process, are an integral part of the exercise of human rights. If access to information is a human right, then the social function of communicating it must be considered a service to which individuals and the community are entitled, and the function cannot be exercised solely according to the exclusive interests or values of the owners of the media or journalists or governments. In this context, a social function must respond to social criteria. As with development strategies, diversity and pluralism will characterize information models and the manner in which they respond to national needs.

The foregoing analysis is conceived as a contribution to the delineation of a conceptual framework to focus on the activity of transnational news agencies. The general proposals presented—particularly the proposal to establish a structure of legal and social accountability for the information activity of the agencies—should be supplemented by other measures aimed at creating and perfecting complementary alternative information channels

and strengthening collective self-reliance in this field among the Third World countries. Actions of this nature were proposed in the declaration of the non-aligned countries at the conference of Heads of State in Algeria (1973), and at the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Lima (1975), in the recent symposium on information in Tunis (1976), in the New Delhi meeting of ministers of information (1976), and fundamental decisions were taken at Colombo by the Heads of State of the non-aligned countries (August 1976).

The Colombo summit represents a fundamental, political and conceptual breakthrough in the appreciation of the international communications structure. As in the past with other issues, the non-aligned countries have brought forcefully to the international negotiating tables a subject for too long forgotten: information dependence.

Decisions taken will set the political framework for the work of elaborating further a sound empirical and conceptual basis on which to build future proposals and policy actions. Thus, Colombo will have a fundamental impact on Third World research institutes active in this area. It will serve to highlight the political importance of the issue and spur intellectual analysis in order to develop the conceptual tools to counter, in all its manifestations, present information dependence.

Many concepts will have to be refined and elaborated further, such as: cultural sovereignty, security of information, information as a social good not as a merchandise, new principles to govern international information flows, development of a juridical framework to orient international information, the right to informa-

tion as an exercise of basic human rights, development of different 'information models' (participation, velocity, selection, qualification criteria), the role of information at the service of the transnational power structure, and forms and forums in which to negotiate a new information order.

This is a new area of interaction between political decision-makers and research institutes. As was stated in the analysis and conclusions to the Mexico seminar, 'a key element in achieving a new international order in the field of information is the generation of autonomous thinking. No changes will take place without concepts that will bring about a confrontation with predominant ideas and practices. Methodologically and intellectually innovative formulations are required.'

Colombo has reaffirmed and stimulated the need for such autonomous thinking. It is also a challenge to Third World researchers.

Notes and references

1. Cf. the United Nations conference on freedom of information, held from 25 March to 21 April 1948, in Geneva, under the auspices of Unesco.
2. Al Hester, 'International News Agencies', in Allan Wells (ed.), *Mass Communications: A World View*, p. 208.
3. Decision 24 was approved in December 1970 and has constituted up to now the political backbone of the Andean Group. It is at present under very strong attack by conservative elements linked to the transnational power structure within the Andean region.
4. Herbert Schiller, 'La Libre Circulation de l'Information et la Domination Mondiale', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1975.

Two related books by Stig Lindholm

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The Information Bedazzlement of Latin America

A Study of World News in the Region

By *Fernando Reyes Matta**

Tuesday, 25 November 1975 was the date of birth of a new independent state in Latin America, Surinam. The event went largely unnoticed in the major Latin American newspapers. This, and many other examples in the following study of a representative sample of sixteen Latin American newspapers during part of a week in November 1975, reveal that apart from the domination of the information market by a few transnational news agencies, those who actually make the newspapers are still the prisoners of an alien information model that bears no relationship to the development information needs of the continent and indeed contributes to the persistence of dependence. Political awareness is the beginning of self-reliance in this field. Fernando Reyes Matta, who has been both a journalist and an academic, is coordinator of activities on information and dependence at the Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales.



In spite of technological advances and research carried out in the theory of communication, Latin America continues to be dependent in the field of international information services. Transnational press agencies—particularly UPI and AP—set the trends of knowledge for public opinion in the region. In addition, there continue to be signs of *information inertia* in the presentation of events. By this we mean that certain regions, countries and personalities assume the dominant role in generating an information framework for reports on international relations that determines which information on foreign affairs shall be made available to the public everywhere.

These conclusions emerge from the analysis

* The author is indebted to the sociologists Sra. Alicia Espinosa and Srta. Perla de la Parra for the statistical calculations.

of a sample of sixteen Latin American newspapers from fourteen countries published during a four-day period in November 1975. The research results are still substantially the same as those obtained in studies carried out in the 1960s. If some progress has been made in the handling of international information, it has been the result of using a greater variety of sources and of the use of articles from such internationally influential newspapers as the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*. These are reproduced in either news or editorial pages. In addition, some newspapers have significantly increased the use of their own correspondents.

Two main approaches to the problem of international information may be said to characterize this study. The first is a quantitative and percentile analysis of activity by transnational

press agencies and international media in Latin America, together with some assessments of the importance in the region of news from the Third World and from industrialized countries. The second is an evaluation of the information, analysing its characteristics and drawing attention to the way in which some of the news is overemphasized while other news is played down or simply not reported at all.

The criteria utilized in this analysis are based on a commitment to the positions of the Third World as developed over the last few years. That is why the conclusions of this paper could not remain exclusively quantitative. The paper also attempts to present a political interpretation of the context in which Latin American newspapers select and present the news. The actual consequences for Latin America of the practical application of the principle of 'free flow of information', for example, has meant that, whereas the region is significantly ignorant of its own realities, it is flooded by information which either is irrelevant or has little bearing on its future. Similarly, there is much ignorance about what is happening in other Third World regions, particularly about events, recorded in the industrialized world, that are of special importance to the struggle for self-reliant development in Third World countries.

The character of the period chosen

The period studied was from 24 to 27 November 1975. Two events in Europe were the most noteworthy news during the week: the funeral of Franco and the accession to the throne and first acts of King Juan Carlos, including the

amnesty decree that provoked opposition both inside and outside Spain; and the left-wing military revolt in Portugal which was crushed between Wednesday and Thursday of the week.

Both events can distort the overall analysis since the information, mainly that from Madrid, has an exaggerated importance when compared with the usual international news value of events in Spain. This has been taken into consideration in Table 2, in order to obtain percentages that in content and balance are nearer a normal news week.

In Latin America, the week is noteworthy for the birth of a new republic on the continent, Surinam. In addition, during this week, there was the US decision not to apply to Venezuela and Ecuador the tariff preferences for Third World products. Among other external events were the international coffee agreement, reached in London, which affected Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and other Latin American countries, and the announcement in Washington of some relaxation in the restrictions on trade with Cuba. In the region a number of events occurred which are reflected in the media in a cursory or minor way. Among them we find the ministerial contacts between Peru and Bolivia, and between Venezuela and Argentina, as well as the strong attitude taken in Panama by the Torrijos government to the negotiations with the USA about the future of the Panama canal.

News of the Third World was mostly about the Angola situation, the conflict over the Western Sahara, the crisis in Lebanon and the Middle East conflict. But apart from these events, which were reported, events of direct

interest to the Third World were recorded in New York, Geneva and other capitals that, though reported, received a *low-profile treatment* hardly matching their importance for the development of Latin American and Third World countries—which will be reverted to later.

Selecting the newspapers

The basis of the study was a representative selection of South and Central American newspapers, along the lines of previous studies, and in the light of the personal experience of the author of the evolution of the Latin American press in its treatment of international news. This meant the inclusion of newspapers that retain a traditional attitude to the treatment of international information, as in the straight reproduction of news cables largely derived from the transnational agencies that have most influence in the region. In addition, newspapers are represented that have developed a more flexible treatment of international news by using a variety of sources, cables from different information agencies, material from various internationally influential newspapers or, more important, by printing the dispatches of their own correspondents. This is the case of newspapers like the *Excelsior* in Mexico, the Brazilian *O Estado* (São Paulo), and to some extent *El Nacional* in Caracas and *Clarín* in Buenos Aires.

To complement these, there are two newspapers whose ideological posture could be expected to reveal a different approach to the treatment of international news, in their sources for it and in the likelihood of a more

careful processing of the press material that comes into their offices. These are Lima's *La Prensa*, whose ownership had recently been transferred from the private to the public sector, and *La Crítica* of Panama.

Thus the final list of newspapers for the study was as follows: *La Prensa* and *Clarín*, Buenos Aires (Argentina); *El Diario*, La Paz (Bolivia); *O Estado*, São Paulo (Brazil); *La Nación*, San José (Costa Rica); *El Nacional*, Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic); *El Comercio*, Quito (Ecuador); *El Imparcial*, Guatemala City (Guatemala); *El Tiempo*, Tegucigalpa (Honduras); *Excelsior* and *El Heraldo*, Mexico City (Mexico); *La Prensa*, Managua (Nicaragua); *La Crítica*, Panama City (Panama); *La Prensa*, Lima (Peru); *El Día*, Montevideo (Uruguay); *El Nacional*, Caracas (Venezuela).

Sources of international news

The study shows that the international information available to Latin American newspapers today offers more possibilities of choice than was the case in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the predominance of certain news agencies, particularly of North American origin, is still very clear.

Out of 1,308 news items, we found that 506 came from UPI, 39 per cent of the international news in the study. In second place came AP, with 270 news items, some 21 per cent of the total news quantified. Thus the two agencies supplied 60 per cent of all the world news published in the sixteen Latin American journals during the period studied (see Table 1).

Table 1 Sources of news items studied

Agency, newspaper, etc.	Number of items	Percentage
UPI	506	39
AP	270	21
AFP	132	10
Reuter-Latin	123	9
EFE (Spain)	111	8
ANSA (Italy)	55	4
LATIN ¹	49	4
<i>New York Times</i>	31	2
<i>Le Monde</i>	12	1
<i>Washington Post</i>	7	0.5
Prensa Latina (Cuba)	4	0.3
Others	8	0.5
Total	1,308	

1. An agency of large Latin American newspapers.

The figures show some progress since the CIESPAL study was made in the 1960s, which revealed a dependence on these agencies of nearly 80 per cent. However, there is no significant shift in the preponderance of foreign criteria, as may be seen from the way in which the UPI and AP operations analyse, rate and quantify the news. Next in order comes Agence France-Presse (AFP) with 132 news items, 10 per cent of the total. Reuter-Latin follows with 123 news items (9 per cent). Irrespective of the events in Spain during the period under study it is worth noting that, compared with previous studies, the Spanish agency EFE has gained some weight in the total information studied. It contributes 8 per cent of the total recorded news items, more than ANSA's 4 per cent and the 4 per cent of LATIN.

Other agencies of more independent character and showing a better understanding of Third World problems are the Cuban agency Prensa Latina and Inter-Press Service of Rome. They have very little significant impact

upon total international news in spite of the fact that they have made big efforts, for more than a decade, to enter the Latin American market for information.

A new element on the Latin American international news scene, compared with earlier studies, is the reproduction of material from newspapers that are internationally influential. The *New York Times* in particular has an important role among those newspapers that are qualified as 'big' in Latin America. Although it is true that, of the news studied, the *New York Times* contributed only 31 news items (2 per cent), these were concerned with important events and were given some prominence in newspapers like *Excelsior* (Mexico), *La Prensa* (Managua), *O Estado* (São Paulo) and *El Nacional* (Caracas). For example, the Madrid news concerning the coronation of Juan Carlos and the circumstances of General Pinochet's visit from Chile, with the lack of sympathy that the Spanish monarchy showed for it, were published by the *New York Times* and prominently reproduced in *O Estado* (São Paulo) and *La Prensa* (Managua). In the latter newspaper the news appeared on the first page, supported by a wire-photo and a banner headline.

The number of agency and other news items published on 24 November 1975 on the front page of the newspapers studied was as follows:

UPI	20
AP	14
Reuter-Latin	4
AFP	3
EFE	1
ANSA	1
<i>New York Times</i>	1

Among the variety of sources for international information, *Le Monde* (Paris) should be noted, with 1 per cent of the total news reproduced, and also the *Washington Post*.

It is true, in spite of earlier qualifications, that there has been some progress in the search for greater diversity in world news sources. Dailies like *O Estado* (São Paulo), print a note like the following one on their front page: 'The international news service of *O Estado* is produced with cables from AFP, ANSA, AP, DPA, LATIN, Reuter and UPI.' These agency sources are complemented by material from newspapers and magazines of international influence. Mexico City's *Excelsior* also acknowledged seven sources in a rather better balance of news agencies and newspapers for its news, from Madrid, of Wednesday, 26 November: 'Information from the *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *Washington Post*, AFP, AP, ANSA and Reuter-Latin.'

The analysis reveals the existence of certain journalistic methods that provide a more rounded and better balanced picture of the news, drawing on the different perspectives of the various news agencies at work in the region. This seems to be the normal approach of newspapers like the *Excelsior* and *El Heraldo* from Mexico, *Clarín* from Buenos Aires, and occasionally Lima's *La Prensa* and the Caracas daily, *El Nacional*. There are two styles in this approach: (a) the world news is rewritten by the newspaper in its own perspective, drawing on the accounts of earlier events, quotations and figures provided by a variety of news agencies; (b) the dispatches and news bulletins are accumulated in sequence and published without being reworked.

The difference in these two techniques can be appreciated by comparing, for example, the editing of international affairs by *Clarín* and *O Estado*. In the latter all the material is clearly rewritten using a wide range of techniques, giving it a particular editorial and ideological tone; in *Clarín* we find a tendency to accumulate the dispatches, using in most cases two or three international agencies as sources.

In contrast to this picture of new techniques and innovations for a broader view of international events, we find *old shortcomings of dependence* still persisting in the rest of the press. This is almost the general rule throughout Latin America. Newspapers that come into this category are of two types: (a) those that simply reproduce news bulletins from the agencies, selecting from the output of two or more teletype machines; and (b) those that reproduce cables sent by a single agency, thus depending absolutely on that agency's viewpoint on current international situations.

Examples of the first type are newspapers like *El Comercio* (Quito), *El Día* (Montevideo), *La Nación* (San José), *El Diario* (La Paz), *La Prensa* (Lima) and, to a large extent, *El Nacional* (Caracas).

Newspapers of the second, even more dependent type include the long-standing and influential conservative newspaper *La Prensa* of Buenos Aires, whose sole source of foreign news is UPI. (*La Prensa* was the first link in the chain of penetration of UPI in Latin America, when the latter managed to break the monopoly cartel of European agencies in the 1920s, getting its first contract in Buenos Aires.) Guatemala's *El Imparcial* and *El Tiempo* of Honduras are also exclusively de-

pendent on UPI. This sort of information dependence is quite common in the news outlets of small towns and cities in Latin America. There are hundreds of examples of local newspapers that are the prime source of news in their area. They paint a one-sided picture of world affairs and they have a powerful influence on the local community, which they shape into an ideologically conformist mould. It should also be noted that, even after changes in ownership structure, information dependence lingers on. *La Prensa*, the Lima daily, illustrates this. Despite recent changes in control, as mentioned above, and working within the ideological framework developed in Peru, it is strongly dependent on UPI, choosing UPI cables for its main reports and selecting themes that reflect the character that the transnational news agencies give to reality.

Chile's experience during the Unidad Popular period provided further confirmation of this. In spite of the atmosphere of change prevailing in the country and the efforts to break with economic dependence, the old methods were continued. It is surprising, and disappointing, that newspapers which gave militant support to the movement led by President Allende, like *Puro Chile*, *Clarín* and *Ultima Hora*, continued to draw most of their world news material from the transnational agencies, UPI in particular, without any processing or real perspective. Both the choice of important news themes and the focus on the facts have followed the market-inspired criteria laid down by the agencies that for decades have dominated information in the region.

The journalists and cable editors, in spite of their personal ideological commitment to the

process under way in the country, were unable to escape from the behavioural inertia generated by the information model imposed by the agencies.

The geographical bedazzlement

Years of news supply from the dominant agencies have created a pattern in which certain place names turn up in the news again and again. What happens in these places determines the importance and choice of news.

In the period studied, examples are provided by New York's financial crisis, a big fire in Los Angeles and the transport strike in Tokyo, which receive considerable attention in the Latin American press. Such is the inertia created by the dominant information system that New York events—the launching of a balloon in a demonstration organized by municipal employees, for example—are prominently featured. This draws the Latin American reader and journalist away from local news, about his own affairs, as well as away from the major trends underlying international events.

The news classified in the study (items running to 10 or more column/centimetres) made reference to eighty-four different geographical locations. Eighty-three per cent of the total news flow concerned twenty-one of these places (see Table 2).

Madrid plays an important part in this week, as mentioned earlier, because of the funeral of Franco and the coronation of Juan Carlos. Table 2 also includes the percentages of news obtained by omitting Madrid, in order to obtain a geographically 'normal' distribution. The first twenty places account for 79 per cent of the total news, in this adjustment.

Table 2 Places receiving most attention in the news studied (including and excluding Madrid)

Place	Amount of news (in column/ centimetres)	Percentage of news		Number of news items printed	Average length of item (in column/ centimetres)
		Including Madrid	Excluding Madrid		
Madrid	4,182	18		103	40.6
Lisbon	2,538	11	14	54	47.0
Washington	2,462	11	13	89	27.6
New York	1,043	4.5	6	32	32.5
Beirut	1,028	4.5	5.5	34	30.2
London	879	4	5	33	26.6
Buenos Aires	816	3.5	4	29	28.0
Moscow	656	3	3.5	25	26.2
Paramaribo	629	3	3	23	27.3
Rome	505	2	3	19	26.5
Santiago, Chile	500	2	3	21	23.8
UN, Geneva	474	2	2.5	22	21.5
Detroit	472	2	2.5	16	29.5
Jerusalem-Tel Aviv	459	2	2.5	16	28.6
Bogotá	431	2	2	20	21.5
Paris	429	2	2	16	26.8
Lima	369	1.5	2	14	26.3
La Paz	366	1.5	2	8	45.7
California	276	1	1.5	14	19.7
Hong Kong	185	1	1	8	23.1
Dallas	174	1	1	6	29.0
Subtotal	18,873	82.5	79		
Others	3,958	17.5	21		
TOTAL	22,831	100	100		

The figures confirm the pattern of dependence revealed by other studies during the past decade. The importance of Madrid and Lisbon is understandable in view of the news originating there, which was typically good sales material in the information market. But the week in the USA was not any more or less newsworthy than any other. Nevertheless, out of the total news from eighty-four different places, over 20 per cent was from the USA, chiefly from Washington, New York, Detroit, California and Dallas.

The significance of Detroit resulted from the speech there in which the US Secretary of State admonished Cuba and the USSR for

their participation in the Angola conflict. Dallas was present because of one saleable news item: it was twelve years since the assassination there of President Kennedy. This was accompanied by long news dispatches assessing the investigation, continuing the debate about the circumstances of the assassination and its authors, following up an affair that continues to be attractive news material for the Latin American press which, because of the influence of the dominant culture/information system continues to be fascinated by the Kennedys.

These main US news centres are representative of others habitually reported, making up

an information whole in which events in the USA take priority, thus distorting what should be a balanced view of world affairs. Such distortion is not only present in the material coming over the teletype, but also in the total volume that the news media supply to their public, with the effect that the persistent journalistic bombardment has had on the behaviour of those in charge of selecting and handling the international news in Latin American newspapers.

This situation is further exemplified by the fact that the 779 items under study, which add up to 22,831 column/centimetres, are geographically distributed as follows:

Region reported	Column/centimetres of news	Percentage of total
Western Europe	9,264	40.5
USA	4,634	20.2
Latin America	4,479	19.6
Middle East	1,579	6.9
Asia	837	3.6
Africa	806	3.5
Eastern Europe	701	3.0
UNECLA	531	2.3

We need to recall that the news of Western Europe is overweighted by the events of Madrid and Lisbon. The table brings out clearly the weight of news originating in the USA, the total flow of which is even greater than that originating in Latin America. The poor news standing of Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia are equally eloquent. Asia is low down because Viet-Nam is 'no longer news'.

Surinam, a glaring example

During the period under study, there was one episode which dramatically exposed the distorted character of internal information and the lack of political awareness on the part of

those in charge of selecting what should be published in the continent's newspapers: the birth of the Surinam Republic on 25 November 1975.

How is it that the declaration of independence of a country as large as Uruguay or Ecuador and the world's third largest producer of bauxite, a neighbour of Brazil and near neighbour of Venezuela, received so little attention in the Latin American press?

Why did none of the newspapers surveyed consider it important enough to send a special correspondent to cover the news and why did they all limit themselves to the news-agency bulletins, mostly UPI, once again?

Underlying such behaviour is an information model that needs to be totally changed. The Surinam case exposes the continent's inability to look at itself, and its failure at self-interpretation. The easy option was taken, to reproduce a version of the news whose political character was obviously different from that which motivates the Third World countries.

On 24 November, some newspapers published cables giving background information on the new country. Most bore the stamp of UPI, as the following figures show:

	Agency used	Column/centimetres	Number of columns	Which page
<i>La Prensa</i> (Argentina)	UPI	56	3	2
<i>El Imparcial</i> (Guatemala)	UPI	38	2	1
<i>La Prensa</i> (Nicaragua)	Reuter-Latin	27	5	3
<i>La Nacion</i> (Costa Rica)	UPI	27	1	25
<i>La Prensa</i> (Peru)	UPI	24	4	15
<i>El Día</i> (Uruguay)	UPI	20	1	2
<i>La Crítica</i> (Panama)	UPI	15	3	2

In the other newspapers studied, there was *no information whatsoever* on the new country about to be born in Latin America. Could this be explained by the fact that according to the

dominant information practice there is little interest in providing 'advance news'? Let us see what the picture was on the day after the event. On Wednesday, 26 November, among the newspapers studied, the picture, as far as Surinam was concerned, was as follows:

Clarín (Argentina): The Surinam news was given relatively moderate importance; the same coverage as the news of cooling relations between Pinochet and Costa Rica.

La Prensa (Argentina): Two columns of UPI news, inside page.

El Diario (Bolivia): AP news, reduced to 6 cm although on the front page (at the bottom). Given the same importance as a disaster in Tijuana, Mexico, in which twenty houses were destroyed by fire.

O Estado (Brazil): Rewritten news but with evident preponderance of Reuter and UPI; three columns on an inside page of minor importance. An item reprinted from the *New York Times* gives much more importance to programmes in the USSR for developing its eastern territories. Similarly, news of a New York jewel robbery is given greater importance, as well as the Western Sahara situation. Yet Brazil is one of the immediate neighbours of Surinam.

La Nación (Costa Rica): AP news on an inside page, over three columns.

El Comercio (Ecuador): UPI news, front page, 45 cm.

El Tiempo (Honduras): News from UPI over five columns, but on page 16, an unimportant page in the newspaper.

El Herald (Mexico): AP news cable over 2 columns (15 cm). Obviously a low-tone item. News about the murder of the Oregon

chief of police is given more importance. On another page, a wire-photo from The Hague, showing Queen Juliana signing the decree of independence. The same photograph appeared in some of the other newspapers.

Excelsior (Mexico): Publishes an AP wire-photo on page 1. Inside is a good news summary, based on Reuter, AFP and AP. The only newspaper to report the Third World content of Premier Henk Arron's speech.

La Prensa (Peru): UPI and AFP news on inside pages.

El Día (Uruguay): Two columns of UPI material with a picture, but of relatively less importance than e.g. a warning cable from Israel to Syria.

El Nacional (Venezuela): The cable sent by President Carlos Andrés Pérez appears as home information on the first page. Page 2 carries an average piece, with AP news and a UPI wire-photo.

El Nacional (Dominican Republic), *El Imparcial* (Guatemala), *La Prensa* (Nicaragua) and *La Crítica* (Panama): No news.

In these circumstances, we must ask ourselves how long will it take for Latin American public opinion to realize the importance and implications of the existence of another sovereign country on the continent. Worse still, maybe those who have been informed will understand the event in the light of the views transmitted by the agencies.

On the one hand, in the search for conflict as news, the European agencies, especially AFP, stressed a 'racial tension that clouds the future of the new country'. On the other hand, however, an agreement between the govern-

ment and opposition regarding a political and electoral programme apparently did not have the same 'news value' as the theme of racial conflict on the doorstep. This confirms the persistence of colonial stereotypes in the treatment of the news.

For UPI, the racial question was a matter of 'some disquiet', but it put the accent on the country's main natural resource: bauxite. The stress was, of course, put on the interaction of North American interests with the Latin American reality. The result was the following text:

SURINAM'S ECONOMY RELIES MAINLY ON THE EXPORTATION OF 7 MILLION TONS OF BAUXITE A YEAR, WHICH REPRESENTS ONE-TENTH OF WORLD SUPPLIES AND PROVIDES THE GOVERNMENT WITH AN ESTIMATED YEARLY INCOME OF US \$30 MILLION IN TAXES PAID BY ALCOA ALUMINUM COMPANY AND OTHER PRODUCERS. ARRON'S GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED A LIBERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN SURINAM, MAINLY NORTH AMERICAN, WHICH TOTAL SOME US\$300 MILLION. NEVERTHELESS ARRON HAS INSISTED THAT ALL NEW ENTERPRISES MUST OBTAIN PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS.*

Again the classical stereotypes are reiterated. The activities of the North American company—not the work of the people of Surinam—constitute the basis of the economy because they 'provide the government' with a large income. The government's attitude towards foreign investments is described as 'liberal'.

This use of language is now so common that it is not rejected by the reader. It is taken as normal. But UPI, in its main bulletin, which is the most important, did not record the new

premier's statement that the new state would adopt a Third World policy with more direct consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, the following declaration was not recorded:

We shall not let the riches of our land serve to confer greater benefits on others and leave us poor. Our natural resources and our human energy, the capital we dispose of, will be used exclusively for the economic growth of the whole of the nation.

Paramaribo's place in the international geographical list with 629 column/centimetres of news (3 per cent of the total—see Table 2) should be seen in this light and also in terms of the content and form of its news, not merely the figures. Furthermore, since then Paramaribo has not appeared much in the international news.

This example serves to underline two elements in the present analysis: (a) the preponderance of the interpretation given by the transnational news agencies, particularly from North America, to current events; (b) a receptive and unreflecting attitude by the media, in general, towards the flow of news that the teletype pours out as international truth.

Ignorance of the Third World

In the circumstances, it is easy to understand why little or nothing is known about the various events, occurring during the four days, that were the expression of the dominant themes and preoccupations of the Third World.

Thus, for example, during the four days, the following news was released from UN headquarters in Europe:

* It should be noted that all quotations from news agencies have been retranslated from Spanish.

GENEVA (AFP).—THE MAJORITY OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS ON SALE IN THE WORLD ARE USELESS OR THEY IMITATE ONE ANOTHER, ACCORDING TO A REPORT PUBLISHED HERE BY THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD). THE REPORT, DRAWN UP AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNCTAD SECRETARY-GENERAL, WAS MADE BY DOCTOR SANJAYA LALL OF THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS.

This cable goes on to reveal that, although medical needs in India can be met by 116 medicines, as many as 15,000 are on sale there. It went on to report that in Brazil, a basic list of 116 products was made, of which only 52 were considered essential, whereas 14,000 were on sale.

The information is important. Besides AFP, Prensa Latina and AP take up the data from the document. AP presents the facts this way:

GENEVA (AP).—DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD COMBINE THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO SET UP A PHARMACEUTICAL TRADE OF THEIR OWN THAT CAN ADJUST TO THE HEALTH NEEDS—AND PURCHASING POWER—OF THE THIRD WORLD. PROPOSES A REPORT PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT.

Using the same basic document, the Cuban agency Prensa Latina transmits this:

GENEVA (PL).—TRANSNATIONAL MANUFACTURERS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS INUNDATE CAPITALIST MARKETS WITH 25,000 MEDICAL PRODUCTS OF WHICH ONLY ONE PER CENT IS REALLY USEFUL.

In different ways, the three news dispatches bring out the essential elements characterizing the market approach to health of the transnational laboratories. This is a subject of growing disquiet in the Third World; scientific and

technical dependence is here coupled with a cultural dependence through which consumption is stimulated by a strong advertising system.

What happened to this news in Latin American newspapers?

Except in Mexico, the statement went practically unnoticed. In Quito (Ecuador), *El Comercio* printed it over two columns which reproduce part of the AFP cable. In Lima, *La Prensa* gave it only a modest 14-cm column, printing the Prensa Latina cable in part.

In this case, the news agencies covered the story. The act of rejection came from the media, from those in charge of selecting international news. Possibly the story touched internal interests very strongly and they preferred to ignore it. This may explain why *O Estado* (São Paulo) did not report it, although this journal does use the AFP and AP services and the story referred directly to Brazil. In the other cases, the explanation can be commonplace: development themes are not 'news' and, therefore, they are not interesting. Because of this stereotype, however, stories that are directly linked to the situation of domination and dependence of centre and periphery are rejected for lack of 'colour'.

There were other cases of this type during the week in question.

The agency EFE transmitted on 23 November a cable, also from Geneva, about the negotiations between oil-producing and Third World countries. *La Prensa* (Nicaragua) published it on Monday the 24th. The text was as follows:

GENEVA (EFE).—THE REPRESENTATIVES OF 48 THIRD WORLD NATIONS ARE CARRYING OUT FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

TATIONS WITH OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS PALACE IN GENEVA. FIRST, THEY HAVE LAID DOWN THE FUNDAMENTAL TERMS OF COOPERATION WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT HAVE OIL RESOURCES. BY WHICH THEY WILL MAKE INTEREST-FREE LOANS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF CRUDE OIL, TO INSURE THEM FROM LACK OF SUPPLIES. IN ADDITION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL BE HELPED TO INTENSIFY THEIR EXPLORATIONS IN SEARCH OF OIL, AND ALSO IN THE REFINERY AND FUEL TRANSPORTATION SECTORS.

None of the other fifteen newspapers refers to this event. Possibly no other agency transmitted it—which is doubtful. Even if this were so, there are six newspapers in the study which make considerable use of EFE for their international pages. Once more, we have to blame traditional news criteria for this lack of information. With such criteria, the agency and media wire-men do not hesitate to give greater importance to the New York opening of an exhibition of eighty photographs by Caroline Kennedy than to the oil agreement.

The same news treatment is given to the meeting of the Group of 77 at the United Nations, organized as part of the preparations for UNCTAD IV. Among other things, it is at this meeting of the Group of 77 that the idea is put forward, by Mexico, of creating a Third World Economic System.

This is news of which Latin America remains ignorant.

The news about the International Coffee Agreement, signed in London during the week, finds some echo in the newspapers of the coffee-producing countries.

The news does not reach countries like Peru, Bolivia or Argentina, however, although the agreement is in harmony with the efforts made by other groups of raw-material-export-

ing countries to define a common stand in the international market. Because this dimension to the story is not understood, the news is not published; such is the effect of engrained attitudes.

The same thing happens upon the announcement and signature of the general system of tariff preferences made by the US President on 24 November. This excludes Ecuador and Venezuela, countries which, naturally, obtain a version of the fact through a news decision of the agencies, chiefly AP and UPI in New York. However, except for *Excelsior*, not a single newspaper in the study has its own correspondent's account of the matter.

Ignorance of Latin America

Examples of news dependence, like those illustrated above, are innumerable. Latin American countries, although territorial neighbours, communicate the news between themselves according to decisions made by international agencies outside the region.

The uneasiness expressed in 1972 by the Andean Pact countries, when pointing out their concern because the greater volume of international information circulating in their countries was processed outside the region, is still felt.

This is a problem which cannot be dealt with at the level of action and decision of the agencies that operate in Latin America. It has to be faced at a political level, with a serious attempt to break the atomization and dependence. For this reason, the start that has been made within the framework of the Latin American Common Market is important, as a point of

departure towards setting up an information system that will provide the content of 'another news', in harmony with what has been called 'another development', independent of the model that is imposed by the centre on the periphery.

To the examples given earlier, we may add some more events of the week that were disregarded in Latin America, receiving little or no coverage in the newspapers studied:

Costa Rica (San José). Meeting and expert seminar on problems of human rights, organized by the United Nations, attended by high-level judges, prosecutors and magistrates from the Third World and the USA.

Ecuador (Quito). Andean Group meeting on the protection of the artistic heritage, under the auspices of UNDP and Unesco, attended by officials and experts concerned.

Guatemala. Fifth conference of ministers of labour. On the agenda, a round table entitled: 'Transnational Enterprises and Their Impact on Labour Relations and the Role of Ministries of Labour.'

Panama. General Torrijo's declaration, telling US negotiator E. Bunker to bring a serious proposal 'or don't come back'. This news figured prominently in the Panamanian press.

Why was this news not reported in the Latin American press? Wasn't it transmitted by the agencies? This is doubtful, since much of it was newsworthy and of more than limited interest.

Two interpretations are possible:

1. The agency transmissions—especially those from the major transnationals—do

not give this sort of news the status or coverage that automatically indicates its importance to those who choose the cables: it has a 'low profile'; it doesn't figure in the headline statements periodically transmitted by teletype.

2. To those who are responsible for deciding what is to be printed, this sort of information is not 'news', as they know it, or else it contains material that they think they had better not make known, to avoid complications.

The conclusion is that there is an obvious manipulation of the international news made available throughout the continent, that serves only to perpetuate the dominant structure.

Professional shortcomings and distortions persist in this area of journalism more than in others, in spite of the importance that international news has for political attitudes which are necessary to the search for a more independent development. This external news domination is the common experience of Latin American countries.

In all but a few newspapers there is no capacity for an independent interpretation of world or regional affairs.

Few newspapers have correspondents of their own in key capitals or send reporters to cover important events.

There is no capacity for relating the many regional or international events. The atomization of information that the agencies have instituted is not questioned.

There is subjection to dominant models in the overemphasis of events of little or no importance to Latin America.

In short, if we consider the extent to which

the front page is dominated by agency material (see Table 1), or the monopoly of photographic news material by AP and UPI wire-photos, we must conclude that the pattern of information has changed very little.

There is a bedazzlement which conditions the practice of editors and wire-men. The old inertia makes them follow certain editorial pat-

terns. The persistence of this stereotyped behaviour confirms the news agencies in their belief that 'this is what the media want'. So the vicious circle of domination perpetuates itself, condemning Latin America to ignorance of its own affairs and cutting it off from the profound changes that are unfolding in the Third World.

[Translated from Spanish]

Nutrition ^{*}A Priority in African Development

Edited by Bo Vahlquist

'What is urgently needed is a kind of blue-print for a large-scale strategy in the struggle against malnutrition'

Based on the papers of the 1971 Dag Hammarskjöld Seminar on Nutrition as a Priority in African Development, Uppsala and Addis Ababa

Contents: I Problems of Human Nutrition, II Factors Involved in Problem Solutions, III The Necessity of Integration, IV Consensus. *With contributions by:* Ernst Michanek, Bo Vahlquist, Yngve Hofvander, Karl Eric Knutsson, Derrick B. Jelliffe, Ewert Åberg, Francis Aylward, Bo Wickström, Andreas Fuglesang, E. F. Patrice Jelliffe, Fred T. Sai, Kurt Savosnick, G. Ohlin, Godfrey A. Semiti, A. Omololu and Alan D. Berg.

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A New World Communication and Information Structure

By Chakravarti Raghavan

The importance and need for a new international communication and information structure transcends the needs of the new international economic order, writes Chakravarti Raghavan, the distinguished Indian journalist. The transnational news agencies and some of the leading organs of public opinion of the transnational power structure have misused their 'freedom of information' in the Third World to present a distorted picture of the Third World both to the industrialized countries and also to the Third World itself. The temptation will be for Third World governments to use the arguments against the abuse of the 'free flow of information' for their own ends. But the operation of providing 'another news' as the essential prerequisite to 'another development' will need to be completely professional and not politicized and bureaucratized. The author is a past president of the United Nations Correspondents' Association in New York and the former chief editor of the Press Trust of India, recently merged with Samachar. This paper was prepared for the Mexico Seminar on the Role of Information in the New International Order, which the author was unable to attend.



A new international economic order requires and entails a new world communication and information structure. The *raison d'être* for this is not argued at length here, as it has by now been generally accepted, at least among the Third World countries. However, there is no clear conceptualization and formulation of what is meant by a new communication and information structure and what its implications are. It is obviously intended that such a new structure should represent an improvement on the existing state of affairs in which the mass media are dominated by a few transnationals belonging to the western industrialized countries.

Basic to the present structure is the role of the mass media in a modern industrialized nation. Unprecedented in scope and power, because of technological advances, in their main function the mass media are the central channel through which we learn about what exists, what is important and what is right with the world.¹ They are part of our culture, and reflect and propagate it. And the basic culture of today's prevailing economic order is the emphasis on the individual as a distinct entity and repository of human values. However, and paradoxically, the mass media have created a false consciousness of this through a diminished view of human potential and worth in

general, while seeming to insist on the intrinsic value of each separate human being.

It has been pointed out that US television, for example,

is directed at a large but well-defined audience, and its symbolic function is the reinforcement of the conviction that the United States is a democracy (the leaders act in accordance with the wishes of the people), its economy is based on free market competition (governed by the laws of supply and demand), and most likely God is alive, White, Male and pro-American. The middle class is the message. The reality that these truths are (with the exception of the existence of God) demonstrably false is the reality which will not appear in the world of television. The reality of the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a white and male but very small élite; the reality of the vacuous irrelevance of the 'democratic' process in the determination of the most important political issues; the control and manipulation of consumption by the imperatives of endlessly expanding production; these are the realities which are not conveyed by the Communications Media.²

What is true of US television is even more true of the image that is created by the flow of information from the centre to the periphery. Within the industrialized world, North American society is depicted as the end objective and the most desirable; in the periphery the attainment of the state of western industrial society is the end objective to be achieved, through an imitative development process, and everything in the periphery that is different from that in the centre is a matter for ridicule.

This springs from the value system of that society and its yardsticks to judge merit and achievement.

In addition, the survival of the present order—the consumer society and an expanding industrial system—depends upon the cultivation of a false consciousness of social, economic and political realities. This falsehood is essential if the present order is to remain stable with constantly expanding production and consumption. Expectations must be held at a reasonable level and demand must be directed into appropriate channels. The *sine qua non* of such a system is an economically, socially and politically pliable population; the function of education and information within it is the creation and maintenance of such a population.

Complementary to the emphasis on the individual in the modern industrialized society is the concept of scarcity. What is scarce has a higher market value, is saleable and gives more profits. The individual or group that is able to control it is more successful and ultimately has more power. This concept applies to natural resources, goods and services, and even information and knowledge.

These concepts and modes of the industrialized society are also propagated in the periphery, through the present international communication and information structure. Within the nation, and among nations too, the emphasis is on individual ability. A skill that everyone possesses would not qualify as a measure of the individual's ability. The value system of the industrial society promotes those skills that differentiate rather than those that unite.

This is why, nationally and internationally, the present concept of information puts a premium not on what unites or is common but on what deviates or is scarce. Whence the belief

that men biting dogs are news but not dogs biting men.

This is so for a monocultural nation, and more so for the pluralistic cultures prevalent in the Third World nations.

The present structures of international communication and information, all controlled by the centre, perform two jobs. First, they propagate within the periphery the false consciousness or image of the centre. The fact that those who propagate it have themselves been brought up on it and therefore believe it does not make it any the less false. Second, they look for what is deviant in the cultures of the Third World—for that alone is saleable—and spread it to other parts of the Third World and to the centre.

There is also a third function that is performed; that of 'feedback' from the periphery to the centre. Modern power structures do not only channel a flow of information from the centre to the periphery, they also provide for the centre a flow of information on the reactions and changes or new situations in the periphery. This is a kind of 'surveillance of the environment' in the Third World—monitoring the various changes in conditions taking place that would have an impact on the power of the centre. This feedback is for the benefit of the governments and managements in the centre. A similar service from the centre to the periphery is not, however, available.

All this is conducted under the umbrella of 'freedom of information'.

In this context, the importance and need for a new international communication and information structure transcends the needs of the new international economic order. The new

structure is fundamental to the preservation of the pluralistic cultures of the world and to sustain and foster them rather than destroy and remould them in the monoculture of the western (industrialized) world.

The new international communication and information structure must perform several functions:

1. *The information function.* Individuals and groups of individuals, whatever their social unit, all require in today's interdependent world a constant flow of information, giving warning of imminent dangers and indications of rewarding opportunities, to enable them to take meaningful decisions in their everyday life.

The basic task of the new structure is to provide this information, and to recognize the importance of providing specialized or technical information in a language that is understandable to those who need it.

Such purveying of information must therefore be free from the temptations and opportunities of manipulation by an élite, whether governmental or non-governmental.

2. *The social function.* The primary emphasis here has to be on the promotion of basic common norms and values, to be understood and adopted. These have to be the concepts and norms of the new international economic order, which has both national and international dimensions.

This necessarily means that there are social responsibilities, and social norms and codes, to be observed by those in the communication and information structure.

3. *The cultural function.* The new structure

must help to preserve and foster traditions and cultures and recall the accomplishments of the past, and thus enhance national identity and social confidence. At the same time it must promote innovation.

It must foster international understanding by transmission of information on other cultural forms and styles, linking the national with the worldwide dimensions of the culture of man.

The new international communication and information structure also has other functions, such as that of encouraging governments to inform administrators and the public about policies and decisions and to provide for feedback to ensure public participation in government itself, and of promoting the supply of information to management (in administration, industry, trade and elsewhere), for economic affairs, in education and so on.

The first and foremost task of the new structure is to generate among those who function in and shape the mass media—and among policy-makers in general—the will to use the media to these ends.

There will undoubtedly be an outcry that all this would be management or control of news. There will be arguments that it will take away freedom of information—a shibboleth that was made part of global thinking in the immediate post-war era, when the dominant influence was that of the USA.

It may be pointed out to those who would raise such an outcry that even in the western industrialized societies, with their flaunted 'freedoms', the social mores of modern industrial culture have already brought about a (western) management and control of news by

the emphasis (from the cradle) on western values and norms.

At the same time, there would of course be a temptation, among Third World government leaders and élites, to use the arguments for a new structure to justify the much narrower objective of control, for the purpose of maintaining and exercising power for its own sake. This has to be resisted. Between a new communication and information structure—to bring about a new national and international egalitarian order—and control of communications to manipulate and hold power in an elitist order, the dividing line is thin but nevertheless sharp.

What is needed is a definition of the broad social and cultural milieu and its norms, and the creation of legal, administrative, political and economic instruments towards these ends. But within these norms, the widest freedom must be given to the practitioners. Attempts to control or manipulate the media, outside these norms and for extraneous purposes, whether overtly or covertly, are ultimately self-defeating and in the long run cause harm even to those wielding power. While broad social constraints for social purposes are justifiable, they cannot be the excuse for separating the media from the masses. 'In reality, whatever the excuse for the attacks made upon them, the amount of freedom which the media enjoy and manage to defend is a yardstick of the amount of genuine democracy which the people enjoy.'³ It is clear that without the willing participation, at every level, of the vast majority, no new economic order, whether nationally or internationally, can be established. Such participation is surely fundamental to the whole

concept of national and collective self-reliance.

The freedom of information and right to information have to be balanced with the right to communicate and the right of privacy. These individual rights are recognized within most societies, though there may be differences over where the balance should be struck. But what is true of individuals is equally true of societies and cultures and nations. Egalitarianism of the new international economic order is inseparable from egalitarianism nationally. Similarly, concepts applicable within countries in the field of communication and information also have validity internationally.

What does all this mean in practice? We may draw the following conclusions:

Both within and among nations, the present concepts and value systems in which the deviant is the news have to be changed. This goes beyond merely the communication and information structure and calls for changes to be brought about through the educational system, and, of course, by the mass media too, in so far as they also serve as a source of information, knowledge and continuing education.

For this, high professional skills, higher than ever before, will be needed to make this 'other news' interesting and not dull, and credible to the public.

In the Third World, because of massive illiteracy and semi-literacy, audio-visual media play a very important role. But the press and the other printed media, too, have an important role to play that should not be underrated. For they alone reach the middle classes and the ruling élite structures, who too have to be

converted. Moreover, the effect of the printed word is less ephemeral than are the effects of radio and television. And to the illiterate and the semi-literate, the literate is something better; what is printed and can be read by the literate has more value and authenticity than the audio-visual, that everyone can see, hear and, we hope, understand.

This need for education and reorientation for another news, true within the national scene, is equally true in the international sphere.

Changes must not only be made in the value system to bring about the presentation of such Other News, but this news must also be available internationally.

The existing channels for the flow of news across national frontiers do not serve these purposes.

It is now generally accepted that transnational economic enterprises have obligations not only to their countries of origin, but also to host countries; they are subject to the laws of host countries and must subserve the interests of those countries.

Since transnationals in the field of news deal with it like any other commodity in trade, surely the transnationals in this field, too, owe obligations to host countries.

The freedom of information has to be balanced with the right to communicate and the right of privacy. Like individuals, societies, nations and cultures too have a right of privacy. While a balance should be struck, internationally as well as within nations, the right of

freedom of information cannot overstep the obligations flowing from other people's right to privacy or right to communicate. Host governments are thus entitled to impose binding obligations on such transnationals.

The non-aligned countries at their meetings in Algiers and Lima have envisaged the creation of a non-aligned news pool to serve the purpose of an alternative channel for the flow of news across international frontiers. However, such a channel should not be an imitation or duplicate of the five major existing western agencies.

Thus the new international channel envisaged should provide the conceptually different type of news or, rather, the various national structures should provide this other news for exchange with or supply to the others and also foster and publish within their country such 'other news' about other countries. The new channel can only be a vehicle for the bilateral and multilateral exchange of this news.

The new international channel must of course have the support, both political and financial, of the Third World countries. But if it is to be effective, it must be freed from the governmental or bureaucratic controls, direct or indirect, that have come to characterize the inter-governmental institutions and structures of the UN system.

It must be run by professional men and women of competence, professional integrity and dedication. Only then will it be credible.

Apart from the conceptual impediments to the flow of 'other news', there are various

impediments in the technical and technological communication facilities and the present colonial dependency structures. These should be carefully studied and remedied to facilitate flow of information between the Third World countries and even from the Third World to the industrialized countries of the centre.

One of the characteristics of the present situation is that, even within the industrialized world, a number of countries have been as much at the mercy of the transnationals as the Third World, and have been equally ill served.

The naive idea in the past that understanding will be certain to follow better communication facilities is no longer accepted or prevalent. But while better communication may not necessarily lead to better understanding, there can be no understanding at all without communication. The structuring of the communication channels among Third World countries, and of the Third World with the centre, must be looked at from this viewpoint.

At present, as in trade in commodities, services and goods, flow of communication from the metropolitan centre to each of the periphery countries is cheaper and easier than *inter se* in the periphery or from the periphery to the other industrialized countries of the centre.

Cable costs, and particularly press cable costs between the Third World countries, inter- and intra-regionally, need to be brought down. Third World countries may even consider the introduction of some kind of mutually cheap cable-rate system like the former British Commonwealth penny-rate system.

However, as in the case of preferential

trading systems, such concessions should be available only to genuine Third World national and multinational outlets and not to developed transnationals or their regional subsidiaries. Alternatively, such concessions should be available to transnationals only in so far as they introduce qualitative changes in their coverage of the news of the Third World countries to the Third World and of the Third World to the centre.

For this purpose, regional communication channels linking each of the countries of the region to the others have to be organized and nationally or regionally owned and controlled. They have to be better than the existing situation in which country A is linked with country B in the same region only via a metropolitan centre. In the long run the creation of these new regional infrastructures will stimulate their own traffic to make them economic.

Similarly, the Third World can also provide direct intra-regional links for itself. No doubt in the long run the possibility of the Third World or of the non-aligned group having their own communication satellite or satellites could be envisaged and achieved, though existing Intelsat agreements may prove to be an obstacle.

However the adoption of such high-cost technologies has its own drawbacks.

Apart from communication channels, national structures (national news agencies, etc.) must be evolved in each country where there are none existing now or where the existing ones are really controlled by transnationals. Such

structures should become the vehicles for the flow of information into and out of the country. Such structures should be free of governmental and bureaucratic controls and run professionally in such a manner that they evoke respect for their professional competence, integrity and credibility. They should not be vehicles of propaganda.

The present informal non-aligned news pool, run by Tanjug, would have to be considerably enlarged and changed, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The quality can be improved only when the participating national news agencies provide a meaningful contribution of 'other news' for the pool, without looking upon it as merely a vehicle to propagandize their leaders' speeches and statements. For example, in spite of the known handicaps, the pool could have done a much better job recently of covering the news from the Third World viewpoint, whether, for example, at the seventh special session of the United Nations or the Paris negotiations.

To be effective, there must be more diffusion points than there are now. A regional and intra-regional approach would perhaps better subserve the needs.

The whole operation should be professionalized and not politicized or bureaucratized. Perhaps an element of participatory financing, and the aid of a broad editorial advisory group drawn from various participating agencies, would make the project more useful and fruitful.

But the area where the 'other news' can make a real impact would be through its supply of

features and news 'situationers' rather than of the hitherto customary type of news. It might thereby also be possible to reach the industrialized world through selected media units of centre countries.

The operation would perhaps function more effectively with one or two regional centres (acting both as clearing house and translation centre) and also as intraregional centres.

Notes

1. G. Gerbner, 'Communication and Social Environment', *Scientific American*, Vol. 227, No. 3, 1972, pp. 153-60.
2. L. P. Gross and P. Messaris, 'The Reality of Television Fiction' (paper presented at a meeting of the International Communication Association, Montreal, April 1973) quoted by Gross in *Getting the Message Across*, Paris, Unesco, 1975, pp. 32-3.
3. John A. R. Lee, *Towards Realistic Communication Policies: Recent Trends and Ideas Compiled and Analysed*, Paris, Unesco, 1976, p. 13.

Technical Assistance Administration in East Africa

Edited by Yashpal Tandon

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has taken a particular interest in the problems of technical assistance and this book is therefore of special utility. The subjects covered are: 'Technical Assistance and Tanzanian Administration' (Reginald H. Green), 'Technical Assistance, High-level Manpower Training and Ideology in Tanzania' (John Loxley), 'Technical Assistance Administration in Kenya' (Laxman Bhandari), 'The Role of Technical Assistance in National Administration: The Kenyan Case' (Walter Ouma Oyugi), 'Technical Assistance Administration and High-level Manpower Requirements in Uganda' (Yashpal Tandon), 'Multilateral Technical Assistance in East Africa' (R. B. Stedman) and a final paper, by Susan Gitelson, deals with the question, 'Does the UNDP Really Help to Promote Development in Africa?' The book is edited by Professor Yashpal Tandon, former Reader in Political Science at Makerere University and now teaching at the Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam.

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A Third World Feature Service

By Alcino Louis Da Costa

The institutionalization of the non-aligned news pool represents a new hope, writes Alcino Louis Da Costa. However, he continues, let us beware of believing that with this the battle is over. The need is to diversify the means of action to achieve 'another information'. The author suggests one alternative, that of a Third World Feature Service, to supply regular, original material to news agencies, newspapers and radio and TV stations in the Third World and also in the industrialized countries. For the sake of efficiency this would not be a governmental venture. Alcino Louis Da Costa, who was a participant at the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Third World Journalists' Seminar (New York) and at the Mexico seminar, is a member of the executive committee of the Union Catholique Internationale de la Presse and the director of the West African weekly Afrique Nouvelle, published in Dakar.



Information, as we know, is part of development policy. By its very nature, it constitutes a powerful instrument for education and public awareness. However, in many Third World countries, there is as yet no general awareness of this role of information.

When imperialism is under discussion, the debate is too often restricted to the political and economic aspects of the phenomenon, overlooking the impact of the information system of the centre, on which we depend. This system belongs to the transnational power structure and the consequences of this are serious.

Thus, converting the Third World countries into consumers, this structure decides the news which are to be delivered to us; it chooses what needs to be transmitted; it fixes the priorities. In the name of the free flow of information, we are inundated with news; the

Third World is overwhelmed with it. Yet this quantitative wealth of information that reaches us conceals a qualitative poverty. A study of the impact of the transnational press agencies on the Third World information system leads to one conclusion: politico-cultural drugging. An imperative for liberation presents itself immediately: we need to envisage *another information* in seeking for *alternatives*. There are those who think that this struggle is utopian. It is true, as Armand Mattelart has emphasized, that the transnational enterprises assume a number of economic and ideological functions, that there is a network of political, military and geographical interests that has given birth to new alliances.

Nevertheless, the Third World countries can bring pressure to bear on the content of the message. They are able to exploit the competition between the agencies in order to

achieve some possibility of action. It is a matter of developing the political will to release the process of giving content to a new conception of information.

But the denunciation of the drugging effects of the transnational press agencies has alerted their attention and the struggle will be harsh. Harsh because this is a sensitive area of the transnational power structure and because each time that attempts have been made to bring about change they have struck against a wall. Very powerful interests are involved: yet we must of necessity manage to set up a new international order for information.

This transformation can only come from the Third World, which suffers most from the present situation; moreover it would be useless to seek a new international economic order if we do not manage to elaborate and gain acceptance for *another information*.

In reflecting on what needs to be done, we realize the importance of communal and concerted actions. Technological difficulties are often evoked as an insurmountable barrier. And yet, even in the Third World, there are examples of the mastery and utilization of advanced technology. These are the exceptions that confirm the rule of poverty. The aim therefore remains, as Fernando Reyes Matta has put it, 'to seek the technological level that will enable us to find at the horizontal level the means of developing an autonomous information'.

There are an increasing number of examples of efforts being made, with varying degrees of success. The Union of Arab Agencies and the Union of African News Agencies have not been models of regularity or efficiency. Con-

trariwise, the results achieved by Tunis Afrique Presse, of Algérie Presse Service, of Prensa Latina, of Interpress Service and of Maghreb Arabe Presse have been more striking, because these agencies have attempted, at the technical level, to set up a framework from which they may all benefit.

In spite of everything, the circulation of information among Third World countries is poor; interregional cooperation is lacking dynamism in this area. It does not go very far. If only the governments were to make it a point of honour to ensure the practical application of the bilateral information agreements, the situation would rapidly evolve.

The institutionalization of the non-aligned news pool represents a new hope. The fact that it has received approbation at a high level of decision-making suggests that a certain collective consciousness is being forged. It is an initiative that is going to accelerate the development of the concept of *another information*. However, let us beware of believing that with this the battle is over. The pool will not be able to exclude the transnational agencies. Many people tend to look upon imperialism in a simplified way, but imperialism is increasingly penetrating Third World institutions indirectly, through its accomplices.

Let us then diversify our means of action in trying to respond to certain elementary objectives, for the great misery of the Third World is that its members know so little about each other. To reinforce our solidarity, it is necessary to undertake a systematic campaign of reciprocal information. One means of choice is through *features*.

Unlike the pool or plans to set up regional or

continental agencies, the establishment of a Third World Feature Service does not require any major investment, nor does it depend on technology.

What does it consist of? Quite simply, it would be to supply regularly to the agencies, newspapers and radio and TV stations material that was immediately utilizable. This material would be, for the most part, original, because the information transnationals are not able to compete successfully in this field.

The creation of a feature service presupposes certain requirements. First, it calls for committed journalists. Those who are called to collaborate in this plan would thus be the militants of a *new information*, because they will have understood the breadth of the struggle and of the effort needed for a new international order in every sphere. This faith in action will be accompanied by a competence of almost scientific rigour so that the service will acquire its capital of *credibility*.

Then it will be necessary to give the service such scope that the whole of the Third World feels concerned. The common denominator is *objectivity*. Much can be done through vigilance.

The service should not give privileged treatment to certain sectors; it should embrace all areas of activity. Some examples may be given. Algeria will be the host for the third African Games during the summer of 1978. The service ought to be able to provide features on the history of the games, on the great athletes that have distinguished themselves in them, on the preparations made by Algeria, on the participating countries and the regulations foreseen. The International Coffee Organiza-

tion is organizing a high-level conference. The reaction of the service could be to prepare articles on the market situation, on the point of view of the producers and with analyses of earlier negotiations. A group of Third World states decides to create an economic union—the service would immediately prepare a background feature stressing the aspects that justify a close cooperation.

The examples that might be cited are endless and it should not be forgotten that the feature service would have a role to play in explaining the positions of the Third World in the major economic and political negotiations.

At the practical level, certain structures are necessary. First there would be need for a *coordinating centre*, directed by experienced and politically mature journalists. They would have the task of planning the articles to be written, in the light of the news as it breaks and also of the activities that are planned in the world. Translators would be employed at the centre. It would be necessary to envisage five languages: English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese. The distribution sector would have the function of supplying all clients according to demand.

Then there would be need for a *network of correspondents*. At the beginning, it would be difficult to cover systematically all the countries of the Third World, but priority would be given to certain capitals housing the headquarters of subregional, regional or continental institutions, and also to those capitals that play a major political role.

The setting up of the service would be preceded by an information campaign so that the press organs of the periphery would be aware

that they had at their disposal the means of publishing news about states on the periphery and that this news was coming from a source different from that of the transnational press agencies.

For the sake of efficiency, the Third World feature service would not be governmental, from fear that it would relapse into bureaucratic lethargy or suffer from political pressures. The idea will make its way among people of good will who are conscious of the extent to which the impact of the transnational agencies is injurious to our self-respect and our development.


This enterprise is so simple that it could be launched quickly enough already, on a small scale, in order to test the different mechanisms involved. We have a place to take here, for, after all, the press in the Third World is developing; the service will even help in this expansion in providing the material that readers, listeners and TV viewers have for so long been waiting for. Better still, the organs of the industrialized countries will also be interested, because their clients would like to know more about the Third World.

[Translated from French]

The Language of the Oracle: English as a Vehicle of Dependence

By Fred de Silva

This journal is published in English. A significant part of the international dialogue and discussion for another development is also conducted in this language, in the Third World as elsewhere. In a Third World country English is also, as Fred de Silva points out, the instrument used to maintain dominating positions. 'The internal communication gap in the country is likely to be further widened by the threat of modern satellite communications to transform the world into a single global village', he adds. It will be necessary, even if English, and other languages of the centre, are to continue to be used as an international communications bridge, to give more serious consideration to the translation into and from the languages of the world's many minorities of all those linguistic expressions that are the index to the cultural inheritance and vitality of dominated peoples everywhere. The Mexico seminar, for which this paper was prepared, was unfortunately unable to benefit from the presence of Fred de Silva, whose sudden death shocked all his many friends. Fred de Silva, who was a participant at the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Third World Journalists' Seminar, was editor of the Ceylon Daily News.



'Fleet Street was the model on which Sri Lanka journalism came to be based in the formative years. It was unfortunate but it was inevitable since it was from the early British owners of the press in this country that the national-minded leaders of opinion in their day had to wrest control of the newspapers against prohibitive odds. The part that this newspaper [the *Ceylon Daily News*] played in the ultimate liberation of the printed media from London's commercial apron strings will not be news to readers of an older generation but it is worth recalling today in the context of an even more crucial liberation movement that is now afoot in the Third World.

'This movement is towards the decolonisation of information. We take pride that the *Daily News* is once again in the forefront in the long and arduous campaign to gain control of the means to inform our own people of what is happening in the world around us, without falling prey to the insidious and insistent brainwashing to which a handful of monopolistic, western-based news sources daily subject us, of the Third World, by virtue of their immense technological and organisational superiority. It is pertinent to remind ourselves that this information dependence is also part of the linguistic hegemony which our erstwhile rulers established, and which unfortunately few

ex-colonial territories have been wholly able or willing to eradicate.

'The mythology of Fleet Street is one of the most colourful and durable remnants of that hegemony. Our pathetic eagerness to invest anything emanating from that inky incunabula with the virtues of free expression, objective reporting and even ultimate truth is a measure of our naivety in these matters. Not even a decade and more of inspired misinformation about what has been going on in Vietnam, Africa, China—to name only a few of the most exasperating examples—and even what is happening just across the Palk Strait in neighbouring India seems to have dented our faith in the infallibility of Reuter and the *Time* magazine.

'In recent months the newspaper you are reading has tried to wean its readers away from the habit of a lifetime by presenting other views than those emanating from these familiar sources, and giving utterance to authoritative voices of the Third World or to those of equally authoritative sympathisers with the aspirations of that neglected world. We believe that the cause of the developing countries which constitute that world will best be served by helping them to understand their present predicament and obtain control of their resources and eventually their own destiny. This we have been trying hard to do, because the trials and tribulations of development do not make the kind of exciting reading that Fleet Street standards have imposed on us.

'How refreshing, therefore, to come across the supporting views of a young Fleet Street aspirant like Michael Dobbs whose indictment of those self-same standards we reproduced on

this page yesterday. A Reuter man himself, he recounts the depressing experience of hawking around an award he won for a proposal to report on development in villages in Africa and Asia. His mission in that so-called Mecca of investigative journalism took him from one editorial door to another without finding a single taker. The general attitude seems to have been: "Yes, we know it affects the lives of millions of our fellow human beings—but it does not sell newspapers." The principal London *Times* wet blanket in the form of a Deputy Editor told him bluntly: "I think you will be wasting your time."

'If it is any consolation to defenders of the Fleet Street style of development coverage, it is worth recording that attitudes were no different in India in Gandhiji's time. Even some readers of his journal *Harijan* took exception to the way in which its columns were occupied with the development of village industries schemes and even accused it of dullness and monotony in presentation. The Mahatma replied: "The removal of untouchability is not a popular cause.... It is a mighty social reform. But it cannot furnish sensations. It is a plodder's work. And record of the work of plodders requires editorial gifts of a high order to make it interesting. Therefore the only way before those who are intimately connected with the *Harijan* movement is to continue to work with an ever increasing faith in the cause and leave the result to take care of itself.

'Michael Dobbs comes to much the same conclusion after his tour of Fleet Street which "has made me more conscious of the responsibility that falls on newspapers and journalists in creating interest. Development is thought to

be dull . . . in fact it is about people and conflict—two prime ingredients, I would have thought, for good journalism. Who knows? It might even sell a few newspapers.” ’

(*Ceylon Daily News* editorial, 16 March 1976)

This editorial is a good take-off point for any discussion of the situation about information in Sri Lanka, and particularly the aspect of the larger discussion which is the subject of this paper.

Since one of the principal aims of this seminar is to promote studies and discussions that will eventually extend the process of decolonization now taking place in the Third World to the totally neglected field of information, the editorial serves the dual purpose of showing that process in actual action, as well as of providing a rationale, as far as Sri Lanka is concerned, for such action.

Twenty-eight years after Sri Lanka achieved political independence from Britain and presumably started on a path of decolonization, our progress towards the liberation of information has been practically non-existent. The rapid development of modern communication media, culminating in the achievement of instant global coverage via the satellite network, threatens to entrench the old monopolistic information agencies more firmly than ever before in their almost unchallenged position. A recent Unesco survey of mass media in 200 countries (including Sri Lanka) revealed that there are five giant news agencies, which are no more than transnationals, dominating the world's information grid.

Sri Lanka's Press Trust (in collaboration with Reuters) is among ninety national agen-

cies which are ill-disguised branch offices linked in a subservient and colonial relationship to their dominant partner in the former imperial headquarters. Reuter of London still dictates the shape, substance and stress bestowed on every item of news flowing both inwards and outwards from Sri Lanka. Many studies could be devoted to examining the daily distortions of the information and comment that is supplied to our readers about events in the world for over half a century.

It is useful to recall briefly here why the process of brain-washing has been endured without resistance or protest for so long. Even today, it is surprising to note how passive and indifferent are our rulers to the need for decolonizing information services. By rulers, I mean both the political leadership (which has regularly changed hands between right- and left-wing parties) and the English-educated minority who inherited the infrastructure of power from the former British rulers, and now inherit it from each other.

The dominance of the English-educated community was due to the confidence which was placed in it by the few British administrators, the many British entrepreneurs in the country's biggest export industry, tea, and the British bank managers engaged in keeping a lucrative plantation economy in good order. Missionary schools (where even the use of the national language in conversation was taboo) produced over the years no more than the clerical help needed to run the government and mercantile services, watched over of course by British officials.

It is true that in recent years the Sinhala language, which is the repository of a cultural

tradition over 2000 years old and is spoken by the vast majority of the people, has been enthroned as the country's official language. Twenty years after the Sinhala-speaking masses elected a government, which for the first time (in 1956) rallied the progressive forces of the country, it is equally true that the English language and the English-speaking class have in each case suffered only token losses, without losing any ground as far as their true influence is concerned.

In a country whose population now approaches 14 millions, not even 5 per cent can be identified as English-educated or English-speaking. The numbers involved are small enough for every member of this exclusive 'club' to have heard of, if not to have actually met, a large cross section of these 'club' members in the country. The more senior members now in the public services, the professions and in top mercantile positions are the surviving members of the original clique which took over from the departing British rulers.

For the last two decades secondary education has been conducted in the national language. For a decade, university education too has followed suit. But the domination of the English language has continued as before, despite this change. The English-educated class has retained till very recently the advantage it always had in finding jobs for its youthful aspirants, especially outside the state sector. There are simply not enough books available in the Sinhala language for the needs of secondary education, not to speak of university and professional studies, so that it is still the trick of using the English language freely that counts.

The microscopic minority that speaks English swears by English-language textbooks, especially if they are of Anglo-Saxon origin. As long as it does so in the present context, it drags the entire national community into the same blind alley. Especially at the university, there is still the sorry spectacle of the new generations of Sinhala educated youth who are forced to learn by rote from well-thumbed translations of outdated British textbooks which are among the prized collections of every campus library. Nearly thirty years after the British went away and twenty years after Sinhala was restored as the medium of instruction, the English language therefore retains a grip on the higher-education system. The end products can be expected sooner or later to want to acquire some passing skill in the English language and to seek to 'complete' their education by reading the newspapers and magazines of Anglo-Saxon and United States origin.

The new literati thus find themselves in a subservient relationship not only to their former masters but to their present masters, who are able by virtue of their skill in the English language to retain every advantage. While it has remained tied to the apron strings of foreign information media, the English-speaking class has also failed to communicate meaningfully with the masses. The economic rewards which accrued to this class were so great that it lived a life totally alienated from the impoverished peasantry. The overwhelming majority of the big taxpayers were from this exclusive club and collectively wielded enormous power in the country, then as now.

The taxes have grown heavier and inflation

has pushed the cost of living to levels which could not have been imagined a few years ago. It is the English-educated class which has to take most of the blame for the ill-conceived and tremendously wasteful development adventures of the post-independence era. But this same class continues to be the least affected by the tragic present sequel of large-scale educated unemployment, the frightening backlog in housing, school equipment, transport and communication facilities and so on.

A substantial boom in the country's earnings from the export of rubber, tea and coconut during the Korean war was frittered away in a spending spree which allowed the English-educated class to live it up in the style of their erstwhile colonial masters. The millions which could have been used to develop the infrastructure necessary for the 'big leap' towards national self-reliance went down the drain. If the language barrier had not acted as a communication gap between the microscopic minority and the majority of the people, the story might have been different in some degree.

It is worth quoting at some length from an article I wrote several years ago, in 1967, when I examined the crisis in communication which keeps our English-educated apart from the masses:

'It is the crisis in communications, the fact that English is the language of the Oracle, which makes them a race apart, the master-race, for ever destined to take the head of the table, enjoy the fat of the land. By a process of mystification, they have been able to persuade the slaves that now the White Man has gone,

they are their own masters, they own the country, and they alone have the right to choose who shall run it for them.

'In the belief that they must choose wisely—and wisdom still being the monopoly of those who can read impressive foreign books on law, medicine, accounts, administration, engineering and a hundred other abstruse subjects which cannot be found in Sinhala—they return the élite to power. Nobody can deny that the English-educated class has indeed acquired the knowledge and techniques that are needed to manage the affairs of a modern country.

'But what they cannot do is to communicate this expertise, relate their knowledge to our backward country or tell the people precisely what they are doing. It is this failure to communicate which builds tensions, doubts and misgivings among the under-privileged. That, and the huge income gap between the Top People and the rest. Only some 125,000 persons are in the tax-paying class, and the overwhelming majority of returns are made in English by the English-educated élite.

'Then, there is the staggering disparity in salaries, the yawning gap between 6,000 rupees and 60. Economists will talk of wage rates and prices, the brain drain and all that, collective bargainers will retain highly paid lawyers to negotiate a settlement, labour will band itself into unions to fight for its rights, but how can such a staggering social chasm be bridged? It is the kind of social tension and dissatisfaction which led to 1956 and the formation of the so-called Pancha Maha Balavegaya, the joint front of Ceylon's under-privileged, representing the forces of Sangha, Veda, Guru, Govi

and Kamkaru (that is, the Buddhist clergy, the Ayurvedics, the village teachers, the peasants and of course the workers).

'Since 1956, the impact of those forces, sometimes in unison but more often each in its respective sector, has been pushing successive governments, now this way, now that, in search of palliatives to redress the balance. Can the balance ever be restored whilst knowledge remains the monopoly of so few, as long as English remains the language of the rulers?

'There has lately been a lot of airy talk about laying the foundations of national unity: is it possible to preach sermons on brotherhood in the very language that the colonialists used to divide and subjugate the people, and which, anyway, only the 5 per cent who are already converted are able to understand? Is it possible to set our people free with (instead of from) the shackles of the past?

'Think for a moment: how can the co-operation of the people be enlisted in the erstwhile language of command and coercion? Will it not be indiscipline and sabotage that such stupid tactics conjure up: a disobedient genie who will not do its master's bidding?'

All that is now part of the history of the colonies. I say history, because the colonial world had already moved on to another phase of its evolution: the phase of 'decolonization'. Everywhere in Africa and Asia where European expansion has been halted and wherever a simulacrum of independence has been achieved, the reaction is setting in, the colonizing process is being put into reverse gear.

The tactics of colonialism have been fully

exposed as a conscious policy of multiplying enmities and divisions, of creating new classes and fostering racial and other prejudices, of intensifying moral and spiritual fragmentation of the subjugated societies.

So-called tribal frictions and rivalries that are now being spotlighted in the world's headlines are a legacy of this policy in Africa. In its own way, Sri Lanka too is a classic example of this technique of national demoralization. Here as in colonial countries elsewhere, the art of 'divide and rule' which the colonialists practised so skilfully culminated in the creation of the English-speaking élite.

In a memorable diatribe he penned as an introduction to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*, Jean-Paul Sartre has described the process of 'manufacture' of the native élite. He writes:

They picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the principles of western culture; they stuffed their mouths full of high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to their teeth. After a short stay in the mother country they were sent home, white-washed. These walking lies had nothing to say to their brothers; they only echoed. From Paris, from London, from Amsterdam we would utter the words 'Parthenon! Brotherhood!' and somewhere in Asia or Africa lips would open '...thenon! ...therhood!'. It was the golden age.

It was indeed the golden age of our middle class, of apeing the west. It was the age of phoney accents and borrowed feathers. What a devastatingly candid picture of our proselytization. It was the age when Commercialism replaced Buddhism as the single biggest influence in our lives.

In many Asian and African countries, this golden age of mimicry is giving place to upheavals and violence. We pride ourselves that we are different. Perhaps we are: we make excellent clubmen, we know how to play the game. We can be relied on to make smooth transitions even in the most trying situations: a little ho-ha perhaps, nothing to write home about—but definitely no blood and only distant thunder.

'We' in the foregoing paragraph, needless to say, refers to the English-educated élite. The rest don't matter! This is a dangerous type of complacency. It leads to all kinds of stupid errors and omissions and takings for granted. It leads to double standards, imperceptible to those who apply them, of course, but likely to become intolerable if applied too blatantly.

A comparison of our legal procedure with the English system should suffice to make my meaning clear. The English have a strong sense of law and order. In a recent case which came up before a London judge, the defendant was a deaf person. In order that his disability might not handicap his defence, a hearing device was fitted up in the court room.

When in the course of the trial a technical hitch put the device out of action, the judge ordered that they adjourn to another court where the hearing aid would function normally again, remarking that 'justice must not only be seen to be done but also be heard to be done'.

Our admiration for the stout common sense and essential humanism of this ruling must, however, be tempered by nagging afterthoughts about the kind of facilities which colonial law-givers left as their legacy in some

colonial countries. I refer to the fact that non-English-educated offenders continue even to this day to be tried in these countries and sentenced—not merely without hearing very much of what is being said, but worse, without being able to understand even if they heard!

Perhaps it is time to adapt the learned English judge's obiter dictum with the final admonition that, above all, justice must be 'understood' to be done.

Few persons who think and work in English are in a position to notice these obvious discrepancies. Yet nothing underscores the privileges attached to a knowledge of English more ostentatiously than income differentials. An English education is looked upon as an investment, and it is certainly no less when it comes to the pay-off.

In a telling analysis of his problem which he made in Parliament in 1960 the late Philip Gunawardona put it this way:

The fact that new ideas and learning mostly come to our country through a foreign language creates new barriers between the educated élite and the unsophisticated people. The new ideas and learning do not naturally seep down; they fail to become part of the heritage and consciousness of the people, and they remain a monopoly of the few from which they draw 'rent'.

In Sri Lanka no less than in the African territories, the aftermath of colonialism has left a widening gap between the educated élite and the common people, which is certainly at its widest in respect of earning capacity. Brown Sahibs, trained and ready to replace the white man when he relinquishes his self-styled burden, do not directly inherit the commercial legacy which their old masters leave behind.

They are only trained to act as caretakers, middlemen and honest brokers. They do not initiate business, become captains of commerce in their turn.

They are happy—and indeed consider it a privilege—just to draw ‘rent’ from their intellectual and technical capital, which is the knowledge they acquired while going through college and university. They become lawyers, doctors, planters, engineers, agents for this, that and the other foreign product, accountants and administrators of one kind or another.

In these professional fields it would be no exaggeration to say that they collectively share up to 80 per cent of our earned income. In their new-found self-esteem, these representatives of the national élite are all too ready to be convinced that they have only to step into the boots of the repatriated rulers to draw the same dividends, enjoy equal privileges. Do they in fact? Or do they merely fulfil their historical function as the former Bossman’s business agent, the manager of his enterprises?

The dominance of the English language cannot be more complete. It must be said that, in the years since these words were written, the situation has not changed in essence. The ruling class in Sri Lanka and for that matter even the masses in the country have still to awaken to the crisis of intra-national communication and the language barrier which is at the bottom of the failure to decolonize our society. Meanwhile the internal communication gap in the country is likely to be further widened by the threat of modern satellite communications to transform the world into a single global village. In 1970, I wrote in the

Ceylon Daily News about ‘the threat they forgot’ at the Non-aligned Summit Conference in Lusaka as follows:

‘Soon—unless the seriousness of the threat is recognised and met in time—communications satellites will be dictating the pattern of the world’s culture, if not its thought. This is not a fanciful figure of speech or a deliberate over-exaggeration. Look what happened when the United States first landed men on the moon. Even the tremendous feat of computerisation which brought these modern heroes safely back to earth cannot quite match the terrifying implications of the kind of mass communications which brought every laboured step of their lunar explorations to hundreds of millions of earth watchers (and listeners) on five continents.

‘Thinking back soberly on this second feat—which has scarcely been paralleled in the history of human communication—one is struck at once by the extraordinary impact that such a mass concentration of human attention can have for good or ill. Glued to their television and other receiving sets for the duration of the Apollo 11 flight, men became part of a willingly captive audience.

‘Imagine the same resources for holding the world’s attention—or conversely, for diverting it from what is inconvenient—being used on the same mass scale to sell a particular political idea or, for that matter, branded consumer goods—Coca Cola for example! And believe me, the ubiquitous stuff is selling pretty well without it.’

An Alternative United Nations Information Model

By *András Biró*

For thirty years the United Nations has endeavoured to provide the general public with an understanding of the work and purposes of the organization, through its information activities. These efforts have not destroyed the common impression of the UN, which is one of inefficiency and poor achievement. But this may be related to the attention that has been devoted—unsuccessfully—to selling the image of the organization to its largest budget contributor and the failure to invest the information resources, instead, in an ‘in-depth, awareness-raising approach and activity’. The author proposes the establishment of an information mechanism of the UN that would integrate all the present, separate, empire-building information offices and roles into one linked but autonomous centre. András Biró, a participant at the Mexico seminar, has been an active journalist for many years; founding editor of Ceres, the development review of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), he is currently advising the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on information matters. The views expressed here are strictly personal.




Despite the size of the staffs in the different information divisions and sectors of the UN system, the billions of words printed or broadcast, and the thousands of miles of films shot in the last thirty years, there is general dissatisfaction with the results of the information effort of the UN organization. Both the leadership of the secretariat and the member states have officially and repeatedly expressed their concern, frustration, critical feelings and even despair at the way in which the UN information set-up functions. The attitudes that lie behind such strong reactions are often diametrically opposed and what is expected of

the system by different participants is often contradictory. It is sufficient to note here that, in the huge world market of information, the UN has not been able to play an important role. The reasons for this failure, and possible ways and means of overcoming it, are the object of this contribution.

Information is a sensitive area. It is not, as mass communication experts try to convince us, one more discipline among others which can be treated like, say, mathematics or biology. It is an area with profound political and cultural implications, an active factor in the relationship between the power structures and

Obbild?



THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

UNITED NATIONS PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITY HOW MANY STAFF AND HOW MUCH MONEY IN 1975?

The total 'population' of the UN system dealing with information numbers over 1,000 and the yearly budget expenditure is around US\$32-\$33 million. The figures opposite are the official figures for those units for which the information could be obtained.

The information staff numbers and budgets were not available or could not be ascertained for the following organs and agencies: UNRWA, WFP, UNITAR, UNIDO, UNU, UN Special Fund, WFC, regional commissions for Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, West Asia, UNFPA, ILO, ICAO, UPU, WMO, IMCO, WIPO, GATT, IFC and IMF. The 1975 figures have in some cases been obtained by taking half the relevant biennial figure.

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Budget (in million \$US)</i>
OPI ^a	596 ^b	12.9 ^b
Unicef	40 ^c	4.2 ^d
UNHCR	31	1.2
UNDP	36	1.1
UNEP	14	0.8 ^e
UNCTAD	—	0.1
IAEA	12	—
FAO	78	1.6
Unesco	132	4.1
WHO	64	1.2
ITU	21 ^f	—
IBRD/IDA	—	6.2 ^g

^a Includes CESI, the UNICs and the Geneva office.

^b In 1973 the yearly appropriation amounted to US\$6.57 million; the 1976-77 programme forecast is for a staff of 631 and a biennial budget of US\$31.09 million.

^c Based on non-official information.

^d Earmarked for 1977.

^e Staff costs excluded.

^f Based on promotion brochure of the division, in 1966 staff totalled 10. No budget figure is mentioned.

^g Under the heading 'External relations', which includes public information.

their constituencies inside and among societies.

There is one essential characteristic which is not talked about when mass communication is discussed: it is the unequal relationship between each and every medium and its public. The medium, whatever its ideological bias or stance, repeats in microcosm what has been described as the 'centre-periphery' relationship. Even a medium of protest that considers itself revolutionary does not involve its public in the planning and production of the product of the outlet. Round-table discussions, interviews of the man-in-the-street

and the broadcasting of controversial views do not limit (on the contrary, they enhance) the manipulative power of the decision-makers of the media.

The booming growth of the electronic media and the monopolization of broadcasting rights by a few have produced in the last twenty years or so what Enzensberger¹ calls the 'consciousness industry', an essential constituent element of the economic system, without which the consumer/industrial model of society would not have spread with such speed and intensity.

The dominant consumerist model is crossing

the frontiers of the industrial societies and penetrating the Third World, in which it has chosen the élite as its preferred target audience. We have to face the fact that this transfer has been extremely successful and that acceptance of the consumerist model constitutes one of the biggest obstacles for national and collective self-reliance. In those Third World societies in which market forces are predominant, the impact is even greater because mass media and entertainment outlets, radio in particular, have more opportunity to spread alien economic and cultural values, strengthening day by day a relationship of dependence by fostering unrealizable expectations in the minds of individuals. Such basic elements of the trend towards self-reliance as national economic independence, respect for the small nation's identity and social cohesion are being jeopardized by the individualist and consumerist ethos which is manifest in the life styles of so many élites of the Third World.

I believe it is necessary to emphasize this side of the coin if there is to be an innovative breakthrough in the search for alternatives to bring about the democratization of communication in both Third World and industrialized countries. Let us repeat a banal but nevertheless relevant slogan: there cannot be a new international order if there is not a new, more egalitarian, national order, in all countries.

These points are not without relevance to the UN information set-up. For one thing, the geographical composition of the information staff of the system is biased towards the English-speaking industrialized world. The sheer location of the different agencies of the

system (only one is sited in a Third World country) creates such a professional, psychological and technological environment for the staff, that, consciously or not, most UN information activity can be seen as a contribution to the 'consciousness industry'. That this activity has such a feeble impact may not be unrelated to this fact.

Policy and structure of the United Nations information set-up

The United Nations cannot achieve the purpose for which it has been created, unless the peoples of the world are fully informed of its aims and activities.²

This is the basic UN information principle, formulated thirty years ago by the General Assembly and twice reinforced since, in 1952 and 1971. The negative character of this formulation is revealing. The vague statement reflects also the spirit in which the founding 'fathers' of the UN had conceived the role of information. Implicit was the idea that the UN would have the same relationship with its subjects (the population of the planet) as national governments have with their own population, i.e. that the world public would automatically be as interested in the affairs of the UN as a national public is concerned by its government's activities. We all know what has happened to this dream.

Concerning the implementation of this policy, the same text continues as follows:

To this end the Department [of Public Information] should primarily assist and rely upon the co-operation of the established governmental and non-governmental agencies of information to provide

the public with information on the United Nations. . . . It should on its own engage in positive informational activities that will supplement the services of the existing agencies of information to the extent that these are insufficient to realize the purpose set forth above.

The activities of the Department of Public Information [now the Office of Public Information—OPI] should be so organized and directed as to promote, to the greatest possible extent, an informed understanding of the work and purposes of the United Nations among the peoples of the world.

But how could this 'greatest possible extent' of 'informed understanding' be achieved among the peoples of the world? The basic evolution was roughly as follows.

The four or five big agencies—UPI, AP, Reuters, AFP and Tass—on whose co-operation OPI was to rely are well known. But it was clear that national news agencies, particularly those of the economically poor countries, could ill afford to maintain correspondents at New York headquarters. This was one of the reasons for the establishment in fifty-six countries of the UN Information Centres (UNICs), whose task is to feed the local media with news about the organization. UN radio broadcasting,³ and later the film division, followed only after the expansion of the electronic media took place. The intention here was to supplement, as the document puts it, the agency's services 'in engaging in positive informational activities on its own'.

Co-operation with the news agencies means that each and every meeting within the system is followed by a house-produced press release.⁴ This has not, however, led to the creation of a positive image of the UN. Edi-

torial and national interests have given to the 'peoples of the world' an image of the United Nations which is one of inefficiency and poor achievement.

There is no better documentation of this than in the Medium-Term Plan for the period 1976–79, an official report of the General Assembly's thirtieth session, in connexion with the system's information work, part of which reads as follows:

The problems addressed

754. The problems in the field of information include the following:

- (a) There is inadequate coverage of United Nations activities in the world's mass media.
- (b) There is a need to make greater use of modern techniques of mass information to secure greater exposure for the United Nations in the media.
- (c) There is a great variation in sophistication of the target audiences.
- (d) The promotion of broad and complex themes such as the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade poses special problems.
- (e) There is a need to counter biased reporting in some areas.
- (f) Interagency co-ordination and consultation on public information requires strengthening.

Medium-term objectives

755. The principal objectives are the following:

- (a) To use a multimedia thematic approach to focus on major themes to which the United Nations is committed, such as international peace and security, disarmament, economic and social development, decolonization, eradication of racial discrimination, human rights, equal rights for women, emergency relief, and others;
- (b) To make increased use of modern techniques of mass information;
- (c) To strengthen the Information Centres;
- (d) To establish personal contacts with media re-

representatives at the editorial level to obtain more extensive and factual reporting on the United Nations activities;

- (e) To increase co-ordination with other agencies in the United Nations system and with the regional economic commissions;
- (f) To participate at a sufficiently early stage in the elaboration of work programmes of new activities of the Organization to promote the incorporation of meaningful information components;
- (g) To assess the size and composition of OPI's audience, and the acceptance and impact of its output, particularly in the Radio and Visual field.⁵

All these discoveries after thirty years?

With the virtual end of the decolonization process and the multiplication of national sovereignties, the political reality of the international community witnessed a dramatic change. The UN system could not but reflect this change in one way or another. During the sixties and early seventies, when the 'development decades' were started, new agencies and programmes proliferated in the social and economic sector of the family, further intensifying the inflationary tendency of the information system. To the specialized agencies, FAO, Unesco, WHO, ILO, WMO, etc. most of which were established soon after the UN itself, a series of new bodies and programmes were added such as UNDP, UNIDO, UNFPA, IAEA, etc. All these have set up information divisions (see table). Some of them have seen an intensive growth of their information staff.

Frustration with the ineffectiveness of UN information activity, particularly in the field of socio-economic development, resulted in the initiative in the early seventies of some West-

ern and Northern European countries to finance the creation of CESI (Centre for Economic and Social Information). Its role was to have been that of an aggressive information outfit of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ESA), to diffuse knowledge and information about the development process in the Third World. However, internal office-empire struggles removed CESI from the ambit of ESA and put it under the heavy weight of OPI, thereby destroying any possible effectiveness that it might have had.

The attempts to coordinate the information policies and activities of the different sister organizations have not been very successful either. The CCPI (Consultative Committee on Public Information) has given place lately to the JUNIC (Joint UN Information Committee) of which CESI is the dynamic activist, more because it has to find a function for itself—and in the traditional in-fighting characteristic of the system take over the leadership of this cooperative activity. The attempts to eliminate duplication of effort have not yet paid off. It is obvious that the overall restructuring of the social-economic sector of the system is the prerequisite for—at least in bureaucratic terms—a more rational coordination of the information activity.

In my view there are a number of reasons for the extraordinary expansion of the UN information apparatus.

Why the information activity keeps expanding

The bureaucratic reason. Since the growth in the staff numbers is the manifest sign of the importance of the organization's secretariat

(Parkinson's law), the secretariat is continuously pressing member governments to raise their contributions, but the governments resist this pressure.

In order to create public pressure on governments to comply with the secretariat's desire for growth, the organization strives to create and maintain a positive image of itself in the public view, hence information (or in more precise terms, public relations) activity has (in this light) to be reinforced, with a resulting pressure to hire more information staff.

It goes without saying that this policy is directed towards the rich countries, the biggest budget contributors, in which public opinion, but more especially the pleading of specialized pressure groups, can exert some influence on legislators. The biggest contributor being the USA (in spite of its decision to reduce its contribution from 33 to 25 per cent, the USA remains the biggest contributor in absolute terms), the greatest efforts have to be concentrated in that country. Those who know best how to 'sell' on this specific market are obviously US media people, and this partly explains why, as mentioned earlier, the information staff of the system's organizations are essentially English-speaking and thinking. (The majority of the agencies also maintain special information officers in Washington.)

But in spite of this special concentration of information activity, the biggest disillusionment about the UN is to be found in US public opinion, which has gladly accepted its government's cut in contribution to the system. In other words, the maximum failure of the information system has occurred precisely where the biggest effort has been made.

The ideological reasons. Representatives of the UN bureaucracies, firmly convinced that the basic principles of the Charter are still valid, believe even more firmly that their programme field or sector (food, health, environment, etc.) is the most likely to provide the solution to the world's problems. They believe, rather unrealistically, that 'their' programme—if it could only be got through to the public—would solve these problems. They have a global view on the sectoral field in which they act, a view which is only marginally relevant to the national socio-economic realities and even more marginal to the individuals who are part of this reality. In the meantime, it is these very individuals whom they want to reach or think that they have the mandate to try to reach. This sectoral blindness leads them to push for an aggressive information activity. But they use either the wrong media (essentially printing, and in English, in a world of growing illiteracy) or even more inadequate public relations methods for which they have neither the know-how nor the financial means to make them successful. Their main concern is press cuttings which mention their organization's name. You cannot hurt these committed UN *fonctionnaires* more than by telling them that you have never heard about their organization. Consequently, image selling becomes the main obsession.⁶

Because of the information gap, the man in the street may not know what all the UN 'initials' stands for, but there isn't even a uniform awareness of the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter among the staff 'population' of the system itself. In all fairness the blame for this state of affairs cannot be put

simply on OPI. If national educational and information institutions do not contribute strenuously to the creation of this awareness, no single agency is capable of motivating 4,000 million people.

The main contradictions

Shrinking budgets. Between 1948 and 1971, the share of information in the UN budget has gone down from 10.6 to 4.5 per cent. National and international civil servants are fundamentally not information-oriented. The internal logic of these bureaucracies is such that, when budgetary cuts have to be made, the first to be axed are those in the information sectors, considered to be non-productive. The hiring system of the UN is so protective that the budgets cover more and more the salaries (firing is unheard of) and less and less the information activities. Inflation has also helped to erode the value of operational resources. I have been told by a former UNIC director in an African country that his operational budget for a year amounted to US\$300. This example clearly exposes the lip service paid to the importance of information by the actual rating of it in practice.

One would expect that the two compelling reasons—bureaucratic growth and the need to sell the organization—would be impelling enough to ensure that the information activity of the system is given a big share of the budget. This is not the case.

The inherent contradiction. There are objective obstacles to efficient UN information

activities, whether the topic is political or socio-economic.

We mentioned the contradiction between image selling and awareness creation. It can be formulated also as two levels of information targets: the immediate, superficial and the background, in-depth approach.

The global and the specific form the second pair of opposites. To speak with one voice to the North and to the South, to rich and poor between and within societies exacerbates the credibility gap. The gap is also reinforced by the 'wooden language' of the information products, deriving from the internal clearance procedures that dehydrate the message of the conviction it should carry.

The subjective obstacles. The frustration at the lack of response by the professional media to the UN messages has stimulated the organizations to create their own information organs: magazines, booklets, book series, films, broadcasting series, and so on. By this approach they felt sure that the message would not be distorted by the professional media people. This sort of activity allows also for continuous empire building inside the organizations. With rare exceptions, the impact of these products is very limited because of: the above-mentioned credibility gap; the limited number of languages in which these products are produced; the unprofessional distribution set-up; the inadequacy of the choice of target audiences; the non-cooperation between agencies; the deprofessionalization of the staff; and finally the shrinking financial support (it is undoubtedly an expensive proposition to use several languages, not to speak of

the considerable problems entailed in making translations that are culturally acceptable to the receivers).

One of the main obstacles is the media choice. The printed word is the unquestioned king in the mind of the information bureaucrats. First, because it can be cleared beforehand; second, because it is the most traditional medium and most officials believe that they are born editors; third, because it may be checked once produced and personal responsibility may be located. Electronic media have only been considered in the past few years. In studying the information budgets of the organizations, one will find that only 10 to 15 per cent are devoted to more modern media (though lately this tendency has turned in favour of audio-visual outlets).

Some pluses

The UN information picture is not entirely negative. The new idea which the system has produced in the framework of institutional public-information activity is project (or development) support communication (PSC or DSC). The philosophy underlying this idea is simple: that no project will achieve its purpose, whatever its quantitative successes, if the people affected by it are not aware of its goals and do not participate actively in achieving them. This approach has for the first time tied in the necessity of mass mobilization in order to achieve socio-economic change.

Only a few of the agencies, to my knowledge, have attempted to put this philosophy into practice: UNDP in Asia, FAO in some Arab and Latin American countries, Unicef in

Africa. These attempts have remained marginal in spite of the enthusiasm of some of the information officers involved in them. Notwithstanding its progressive philosophy, this approach has created a number of problems at the receiving end. For one thing, communication specialists primarily trained in the west, and culturally alien to the host country (not knowing the local language), were involved in planning and executing the mobilization process. For another, essentially audio-visual means have been utilized to overcome the difficulties arising from illiteracy, with the effect of creating a technological dependency where the host country decides to continue the approach after the expatriate staff have left the project.

Occasionally, in cases where the host government has perceived the political advantage it can get from, say, an electronic media centre, the infrastructure of such centres has been planned and equipped by UN experts. This sort of technical assistance can be considered as the most positive one, although contributing to the 'over gadgeteering' of the communication process and the sale of more and more western technological products, to the country, whose working life is short-lived. (In one case a host country bought fifty video packs for motivation centres throughout the country. A year later, only five of them could be located.)

The correct approach in this very important motivation technique of project-support communication seems to be—particularly in the case of a predominantly rural population which has not been exposed to electronic media—the live spoken word, culturally the

universal medium, which has never received serious attention in either research or practice, probably because it is not expensive, does not depend on modern imported gadgets and means that local people are as expert as or more expert than the 'experts'.

Nowadays system-wide lip service is being paid to the inclusion of an information component at all levels of projects: local, national and regional. Evaluation of this new fashion is not yet possible for very few analyses of the application of this principle have been made. The approach, however, merits serious study, inasmuch as the participation of people in development projects is paramount for their success.

This brief overview of the system's information activities may sound over-critical. Here and there, one does find success stories. But what is the meaning of success? Which criteria must one use to determine success? It is generally accepted that Unicef's public-relations policy is successful. Indeed, it is a success in financial terms, in so far as this organization is based on effective charity. One may, of course, be concerned about the implications of the 'success', in the maintenance and reproduction of the donor/beggar relationship, but, in the meantime, it is true that Unicef has alleviated some misery in the Third World.

There are other seeming success stories like that of the Unesco *Courier*, published in fifteen languages and printed in several hundred thousand copies. What is not so clear is the message of this magazine: how, under the cover of 'culture', an uncritical Eurocentric orientation is transferred to a most important

sector of the community, the teachers and schoolchildren of the Third World.

In addition, there is *Ceres*, the FAO review on development, which has probably gone farthest in creating a free forum of critical analysis of the development process, in making a priority principle of its editorial policy the printing of views based on need-oriented development, self-reliance and interdependence, and in attracting about 50 per cent of its contributors from the Third World. The price of this success has been a series of compromises in the style and wording of the publication, in printing commercial advertisements for transnational corporations, and so on.

In conclusion, the following points need to be made:

1. The system has not been able to create a positive image of itself in world public opinion and to promote efficiently the spirit of international cooperation of equals.
2. It has contributed instead to the maintenance of the cultural-informational dominance of the industrialized world.
3. Although its statutory role should have been to become the principal agent of informational-educational dissemination of the Charter principles, its structural set-up, the composition of its personnel and its shrinking financial resources have resulted in the establishment of a primarily self-perpetuating, bureaucratic operation.

What now?

The restructuring of the developmental sector of the system, now under review, and the requirements of the new international order,

offer an opportunity and an obligation to review, for restructuring, the information set-up as well.

Before we try to sketch a possible new structure and orientation in this field, it should be observed that the main reason for past ineffectiveness lies in the lack of freedom for ideas *inside* the organization. If the message of the UN has failed to get through, it is not only because of extrinsic cultural and financial limitations, but also because of intrinsic structural and objective impediments. It is the irrelevance, the lack of credibility and the anaesthetic nature of the message which have prevented its acceptance by the public. The choice of the wrong media has been a lesser obstacle. There is consequently no point in any organizational restructuring if these obstacles are not overcome. The prerequisite for a qualitatively new and effective information set-up lies in the liberation of those who inform from the one-sided hierarchical 'musts' imposed on them by the system.

This means that, whatever form the restructuring takes, as long as the information set-up is locked within the present organizational framework, no real change will occur. The information activity, if it is to be alive and creative, needs to be as independent of the organization's rule-book 'manual' as possible. In the proposals that follow, the political sector is not dealt with and suggestions are addressed essentially to the restructured developmental sector of the system.

Restructuring-pooling

Even if a rational organizational integration is

achieved, it will still be necessary for the existing sectoral organizations to preserve their separate identity. This means that each organization will still require a skeleton information staff to produce information about its activities. What can and should be pooled is the development information activity, which I prefer to call the information-communication-education role of the system.

This role, that cannot now be fulfilled because of political and structural constraints, will have to be taken up by a multimedia-product financing organ or centre to be set up outside the UN system.

Organizationally, the centre should maintain its ideological links with the UN Charter; it should be a semi-independent, non-profit but market-related institution with a relationship to the UN development system similar to that which links the BBC to the British Government. Financially, it would rely on the pooling of that part of the information budgets which is now spent by the different organizations on development information. There are some progressive industrialized and Third World countries that would gladly contribute to an effective information mechanism of this nature (particularly in view of the disillusionment that they now feel with CESI). Eventually the centre would become substantially self-supporting.

Interdisciplinarity has to prevail if the concept of development is to be meaningful. The new centre, which would plan and finance development information, has to be interdisciplinary, multimedia and cross-cultural, in order to comply with its task. Drawing on the experience of the past, it would have to limit its

operations to some global priority issues, leaving to the regional subsectors the bulk of those activities that have a much greater relevance for the satisfaction of particular needs in terms of languages, topics and media.

A policy advisory board whose members would be chosen according to the criteria of interdisciplinarity, commitment to the Charter as well as to the development process, and adequate geographical distribution, elected by ECOSOC, would advise the appointed director on policy matters. The final decisions and the responsibility for the content, form and distribution of the centre's activities would be the director's.

The regional desks or subcentres, which would be adjacent to the regional commissions, would maintain the same relationship with regional UN bodies as the centre would with the UN headquarter organizations. Their directors would have the same authority in the regions as the centre's director enjoys at headquarters.

Some principles of activity

Although the centre would be a non-profit organization, it should endeavour, where possible (i.e. chiefly in the industrialized world), to recuperate the production costs of its information products. To this end saleable material should be produced for a financial return in order to enable the centre to build up its own resources to finance new features.

The main line of action should be in co-production, i.e. to initiate operations with existing publishing houses, radio and film producers, periodicals, etc., which work in-

side more or less established captive markets. This approach would mean that geographically determinable target audiences could be reached. The feasibility of any project has to start with distribution considerations and be built up from there, once the policy decision concerning the message is taken. House production should only be allowed in those exceptional cases in which it might be the most favourable choice. The house to co-production ratio should be around 20/80.

With co-production as the main line of action, only a small staff would be necessary to perform the catalytic role of the centre. The hiring and firing system should not follow the UN practice. The staff should be composed of committed people of high professional competence and practical experience and be allowed to participate effectively in the decision-making process. Geographical distribution has an important role to play, particularly at headquarters. At the regional level, this is self-evident.

A clearly formulated policy is necessary to define message orientation and media choice for the industrialized world, on the one hand, and the Third World, on the other.

The first priority would be for products combating stereotypes of cultural superiority towards the people of the Third World and to achieve this, entry into existing media and co-production of books, periodicals, films, TV and radio serials would be advisable. Interdependence and respect for the different cultures and information in depth about the development process should constitute the basis of this activity of the centre.

In the Third World, development and/or

project support communication and collaboration with national institutions should become the main line of action, with particular attention to culturally acceptable media choices. Financial and technical assistance should go to need-oriented development and self-reliance should receive priority, favouring participatory experiences in development communication.

Global issues, those which have provided the themes of the UN conferences during the past five years—environment, population, food, women, etc.—in one word the components of the development process, will constitute the backbone of the thematic programmes of the centre. The aim would be to replace the public relations campaign approach, now in favour, by an in-depth, awareness-raising approach and activity.

In no way would such an effort be sufficient to change the orientation of the 'consciousness industry' dominating the world market. Neither the UN nor a semi-independent information centre can ever perform the herculean task of creating a world-wide awareness of peaceful coexistence and interdependence. In the loud choir of the dominant professional mass media the information centre would offer alternative views and approaches to world events and trends, thus contributing to the erosion of ethnocentric stereotypes and the

reinforcement of solidarity among individuals and societies: essential prerequisites of a new international order.

Notes and references

1. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'The Consciousness Industry: Constituents of a Theory of the Media', *New Left Review*, No. 64, November-December 1970, pp. 13-36.
2. Preamble of the text of the technical advisory committee on information concerning the policies, function and organization of the Department of Public Information approved by the General Assembly in 1946.
3. 'The United Nations radio which broadcasts from New York has only the smallest chance of being listened to. It is the perfect case of a radio which screams out in the wilderness. Its maintenance costs a lot to the organization whereas its protectors in New York and Geneva are talking about *the capital role* it plays in the information of world public opinion. The truth is that nobody has ever listened to this radio of the United Nations.'—Alpha Amadou Diallo-Tayiré, *La Crise de l'Information et la Crise de Confiance des Nations Unies*, Fribourg, Editions Universitaires, 1971.
4. In 1972, OPI New York distributed 3,500 of its own press releases and redistributed 2,300 delegation and specialized agency releases, equivalent to 21.5 releases per working day.
5. Supplement No. 6(A/10006), p. 273 (1975).
6. On media reaction to UN events, see the otherwise excellent study by Alexander Szalai, *The UN and the News Media*, UNITAR, 1972.

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LIST OF SEMINAR PAPERS

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 'Information and Dependence', by Fred de Silva
 'Mass Communications, the New International Economic Order and Another Development', by Reginald Herbold Green
 'Western News Agencies: Problems and Opportunities in International News', by Al Hester
 'Par-dessus Nos Têtes' and 'L'Offensive des Multinationales du Côté des Nouvelles Technologies de Communication', by Armand Mattelart
 'A New World Communication and Information Structure', by Chakravarti Raghavan
 'The Historical Evolution of International News Agencies and Their Growth towards Domination', 'Synthesis of Proposals Extracted from Different International Documents and Articles,

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 'Opulence or Poverty of Information. The Historical Decontextualization of News', by Manuel Vásquez Montalbán
 'Partial and Provisional Report of the International Encounter on World Public Information and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States', Nice, 13 to 15 October 1975
 'Symposium of the Non-aligned Countries on Information. Final Report', Tunis, 26 to 30 May 1976

Can we meet
basic human needs
without transgressing resource
and environmental outer limits?

outer limits and human needs

This question, which provided a seminal moment in the genesis of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project, can only be answered by further questions: Who is to define the needs? Those that have them—or those that have the means to satisfy them? What is really meant by 'outer limits' and what constitutes 'transgression'? The seeming ease with which these and other related questions might be answered belies the need, in fact, for a very sophisticated understanding of societal and political processes as a precondition to the determination of outer limits.

This volume constitutes an introduction to these difficulties and also to the concept of 'ecodevelopment', a way forward to the satisfaction of basic human needs without transgressing local or global outer limits.

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df

The United States Sanctions Against Unesco and the Three Vetoes

Is a Democratic United Nations System Possible?

By Marc Nerfin

Obs. Koumou
Som. sid. 80 i. st. f. 79
Nerfin

Who runs the UN system? Is there a 'tyranny of the majority'? This paper, starting with a study of the Unesco crisis provoked by the United States decision to withhold payment of its assessed contribution to the budget of the organization, in violation of international law, not only shows that the USA overreacted to votes of secondary importance, but also establishes that in spite of the emergence of a new majority, the UN secretariat is still under the control of three principal centre countries—the USA, the United Kingdom and France. Commanding a disproportionate number of posts, especially in the financial and personnel services, they are in a position to exercise a hidden right of veto. The paper envisages that the new majority—from the Third World and a few forward-looking industrialized countries committed to the implementation of the new international order—may now extend its power to the management of the secretariat, even at the cost of 'politicizing' the fifth committee (on administrative and budgetary matters) of the General Assembly. Marc Nerfin served for ten years in the UN secretariat (1963–72) with, among others, Sir Robert Jackson, in the preparation of A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, and with Maurice F. Strong, during the organization of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. He has also acted as a consultant to several UN organizations.



Since December 1974, the United States of America has not paid its legal contribution to Unesco, which amounts to 25 per cent of a budget it has voted. It owes the remaining part of its dues for 1974 (US\$2.7 million) and the whole of them for the financial period 1975/76 (\$38.9 million).¹

In November 1975, the US Government gave the International Labour Organization notice of its withdrawal from the organization, with effect in November 1977. In May 1976,

the USA was in arrears of its dues to ILO for the second half of 1975 and for 1976 (\$25.9 million); again, the US assessed contribution to a budget it had voted amounts to 25 per cent of it.

In July 1975, in a testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, the president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL/CIO), George Meany, urged that 'the funding for the

UNDP be terminated'; he spoke of the 'blatant, outrageous and unconstitutional politicization' of ILO and Unesco. Mr Meany's feud with ILO is an old story, going as far back as the end of the Cold War, when, in early 1954, the USSR was admitted in the organization, but it was only last year that he attacked UNDP. However, the amendment which followed his intervention—the Zablocki amendment, which would have prevented any money contributed by the USA to UNDP from being spent through ILO and Unesco—was rejected. None the less, in 1975, the US Congress reduced the USA's contribution to UNDP from \$100 to \$77.9 million, but approved a full contribution for 1976.

The governing council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was informed by its executive director at its fourth session (Nairobi, April 1976) that 'through 1975, payments have lagged far behind pledges' and that information received from the US indicated 'the likelihood of a very serious shortfall in contributions'.² When in 1972, after the Stockholm Conference, the fund of UNEP was established, it was expected to reach a target of \$100 million over the first five years; the US Government then announced that it would contribute 40 per cent of it, but its contributions amounted to 37 per cent of the fund receipts in 1973, 32 per cent in 1974 and 23 per cent in 1975, a year in which it paid \$3.2 million, while \$10.2 million were expected. After many discussions, the pledge for 1976 seems to amount to \$7.5 million, or 30 per cent of the total. The fact that the USSR and the United Kingdom had not yet paid—by April 1976—the amounts they had pledged for

1975 does not exonerate the USA from its responsibility.

Each of these cases is different. The UNEP fund is a voluntary one and, whatever the disruption in activities resulting from the non-payment and the moral commitment implied by a pledge, it is not clear whether there is a legal obligation to honour it. Further, the decrease in contributions to UNEP was not ascribed to any political reason. In the case of ILO, the recent US action was largely due to the fact that the June 1975 International Labour Conference gave the Palestine Liberation Organization an observer status. The ILO was the last UN agency to take this step but the only one to be penalized. The notice of withdrawal was seen by the US Government as a 'threat [which], it was hoped, would stir the ILO to start making some of the changes necessary to keep the US in' as the *Washington Post* put it.³ With regard to UNDP, the Zablocki amendment, inspired or supported by Mr Meany, was rejected, as we have seen. The Unesco case, on the other hand, can be compared only to the USSR refusal to pay its share of the UNEF and UNOC operations.⁴ It is, however, more fundamental, since the US decision applies to the whole of a regular, assessed budget it had voted; furthermore, it affects development, not only strictly political operations. This case thus deserves a more detailed discussion.

I

At the end of 1974, the US Congress adopted an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which reads as follows:

(h) Congress directs that no funds should be obligated or expended, directly or indirectly, to support the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization until the President certifies to the Congress that such Organization (1) has adopted policies which are fully consistent with its educational, scientific and cultural objectives, and (2) has taken concrete steps to correct its recent actions of a primarily political character.

(Public Law 94-559)

As it appears from the Congressional record, the reason for this decision was an alleged 'politicization' of Unesco, a charge based on votes concerning Israel which occurred at the eighteenth general conference of the organization, in November 1974. The three Unesco resolutions voted upon were the following:

Resolution 3.427, which

condemns Israel for its attitude which is contradictory to the aims of the Organization . . . by its persistence in altering the historical features of the City of Jerusalem and by undertaking excavations which constitutes a danger to its monuments [and] invites the Director-General to withhold assistance from Israel . . . until such time as it scrupulously respects [Unesco resolutions and decisions];

Resolution 46.1, which, while including eighteen member states and associate members in the list of states 'empowered to participate [as full voting members] in regional activities, in which the representative character of states is an important factor', did not include Israel in the European region of Unesco; and

Resolution 13.1, which appeals to Israel

to refrain from any act that has the effect of

hindering the population of the occupied Arab territories in the exercise of their rights to national education and cultural life

and invites the Director-General

to exercise full supervision of the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, and to co-operate with the Arab States concerned and with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to providing the populations in the occupied Arab territories with every means of enjoying their rights to education and culture so as to preserve their national identity.

While it is not the purpose of the present paper to analyse in any detail the content of the three resolutions, which anyhow is not related to the illegal character of the US decision, a few elements need to be borne in mind in order to keep this affair within reasonable limits and thus measure how much the USA overreacted to it.

First, whatever judgement is passed concerning their content, timeliness, etc. the fact is that three resolutions were adopted by a majority of the general conference, as follows:

	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
Resolution 3.427	64	27	26
Resolution 46.1	85	2	9
Resolution 13.1	51	5	22

There were many accusations of 'automatic majority' and 'bloc voting', for instance in the US Secretary of State's Milwaukee address, which will be reverted to later. However, as Table 1 shows, there was no Third World 'bloc voting'. The only 'bloc voting' was, as could be expected, that of the Arab States of Western Asia and North Africa and, as usual,

the Eastern European countries. For the rest, the three Third World continents showed a rather dispersed pattern and even the Western European and other countries were not unanimous, with, for instance, Spain voting the condemnation of Israel (Res. 3.427) and Austria, Finland, Japan and Switzerland abstaining; and France, Greece, Portugal and Turkey as well as Australia and Japan abstaining on the resolution on the inclusion of Israel in the European region.

Second, there have been protracted discussions over the years on the question of the alteration of the historical features of, and excavations in, Jerusalem. The facts, ascertained by a number of Unesco missions,⁵ have

not been really contested, but rather the definition of Jerusalem as an occupied territory and the legal antecedents of the 1974 resolution. On the former question, the position of the United Nations is made very clear by General Assembly Resolution 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of July 1967 as well as by a number of Security Council resolutions (242, 1967; 258, 1968; 267, 1969; 298, 1971). It was obviously not for Unesco to depart from the views of the competent political organs of the UN system.

On the question of the legal antecedents, the discussion bears on the scope of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

Table 1 Votes in the General Conference of Unesco on Jerusalem and the inclusion of Israel in the European region (by group of countries)

Group of countries	Number of countries	Jerusalem (Resolution 3.427)			
		Resolution as a whole			
		Yes	No	Abstained	Absent
1 Western Asia and North Africa	19	19			
2 Africa (except North Africa)	32	15		12	5
3 Asia	19	11		3	5
4 Latin America	24	6	9	5	4
5 Subtotal (2-4)	75	32	9	20	14
6 Eastern Europe	11	10			1
7 Western Europe	23	3	13	5	2
8 Others ¹	6		5	1	
TOTAL	134	64	27	26	17

1. Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, USA.
Source: Unesco Secretariat.

of which Israel is a party, and to which is related Resolution 4.32 ('Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations') adopted by the ninth general conference of Unesco in 1956. The latter provides that occupying powers 'should refrain from carrying out archaeological excavations in occupied territory'. This was a recommendation and not a convention, but it is hardly surprising that the general conference, having passed such a resolution, and reiterated its principles on several occasions, for instance in a 1968 resolution adopted without opposition, should follow it up.

Further, the withholding of Unesco assistance to Israel is better appreciated when it is

known that the amount involved was \$24,000, compared with an Israeli contribution of \$197,000 to the Unesco budget (1975 figures).⁶

Third, the question whether Israel should belong to the European region of Unesco must be related to the fact that a similar discussion had already taken place in 1964 and 1966. Israel then considered that geography sustained its incorporation in the Asian region, but requested that a detailed study be undertaken. The conference thus did not reach any decision, and it was only in 1974 that Israel requested to be included in the European region. As Table 1 shows, 14 of the European states voted in favour of the Israeli amendment to this effect, with 11 opposing it, 4 abstaining and 5 being

Sanction (operative paragraph 3)				Europe (Israel amendment to Resolution 46.1)			
Yes	No	Abstained	Absent	Yes	No	Abstained	Absent
19					19		
13		14	5	1	8	16	7
11		3	5		9	4	6
3	11	6	4	15	2	3	4
27	11	23	14	16	19	23	17
10			1		10		1
3	16	2	2	14	1	4	4
	6			4		2	
<u>59</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>22</u>

absent; Resolution 46.1 as a whole, as already indicated, met only with two votes against it (USA and Israel itself). As far as the implications of this decision are concerned, it should be noted that it does not imply any 'exclusion' of Israel from any Unesco activities, including regional meetings, as pointed out in the Partan study.⁵ Furthermore, unlike the situation prevailing in, say, the World Health Organization or the United Nations itself, Unesco's regional activities are very limited. For instance, there was no regional meeting in Europe, in the last two years, at which Resolution 46.1 would have prevented Israel from participating with full voting rights.

Fourth is the question of the 'politicization' of Unesco. There is either shortsightedness or bad faith in the claim that Unesco, being devoted to education, science and culture, should be isolated from the major political developments of our time. Education, science and culture are part and parcel of an all-encompassing, comprehensive process, and cannot possibly be treated as if they were protected by an ivory tower. Actually, the preamble of the constitution of Unesco clearly refers to the political situation in which the organization was established, founding its purpose, as it does, in the need to construct the defences of peace in the minds of men.

In a more narrow sense, the 'politicization' of Unesco did not start in 1974; if it were to be dated, the date would rather be 1950 and 1951, when the executive board and the general conference supported, on the basis of a US proposal, the UN General Assembly resolution 'Uniting for Peace', i.e. the resolution on Korea bypassing the USSR veto in the

Security Council, whose link with education, science and culture is hardly perceptible. Further, and indeed institutional, 'politicization' occurred in 1954 when the Unesco constitution was amended, again on the basis of a 1952 US proposal, to provide for each member of its executive board to 'represent the Government of the State of which he is a national' whereas since 1945 board members, as 'persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas, and qualified by their experience', were to serve in their personal capacity, 'on behalf of the Conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective Governments'.

To these could be added other examples of 'politicization': whereas the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was admitted to Unesco in 1950 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951, the German Democratic Republic had to wait until 1972, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea until 1974. The rights of the People's Republic of China were recognized only in 1971,⁷ after the UN General Assembly resolution to this effect. None of these decisions can be related to education, science and culture. They show that 'politicization' has been in effect for a quarter of a century, but it is only when a new majority emerges that complaints are heard about it.

Fifth, the matter is not just that the USA is isolated from the world community; it is also in contradiction with itself, since the decision of the Administration to withhold payments to Unesco appears to rest on rather shaky legal ground. Following Senator Case, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Foreign Assis-

tance Act (FAA) of 1974 prohibiting obligation or expense of funds to Unesco 'under all laws'. But the US contribution to Unesco comes under the State Department Authorization Act, and the House rules do not allow for amendments on a subject different from that under consideration; as a matter of fact, the House, following Representative Bingham, wanted to prohibit payments only under FAA. The difference was reconciled in a decision of the Congress, that reproduced above, which uses a softer language and is not binding. The Administration thus had an option, and yet it decided not to obligate the funds. It was thus clearly a political choice.

Sixth, and finally, the US Administration action violates an international agreement. According to the constitution of Unesco—to which the US is a party—the general conference approves the budget of the organization and the apportionment of financial responsibility among the states members of the organization. The budget and the apportionment for the biennium 1975/76, which included a US contribution of \$38.9 million, was approved by the conference, and the US delegation did vote it. There is no legal escape from meeting such commitment (as was recognized by the White House in the case of ILO: 'all of this country's budget assessments would be fully met, as is required by international law'⁸)—but in the case of Unesco, the US Administration simply did not pay its assessed contribution. This is precisely, beyond all discussions on the content of the 1974 resolutions, why there are reasons to wonder whether a universal and democratic UN system is still possible.

II

The United Nations Organization was established, at the end of the 1939/45 war, in a world which was, in political terms, qualitatively different from ours. The membership included only 51 members, compared to 144 at the end of 1975. It was largely an Anglo-Saxon creation; most key posts were occupied by nationals of the western victors—the USA and the United Kingdom, plus France. The right of veto given to the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, USA) was only, during the Cold War, a kind of political protection for the USSR, but the organization was under western control with regard both to finance and management.

Things started to change—very slowly—with the 'great awakening', the end of the colonial era, the Bandung Conference in 1955, but political control was maintained, as illustrated by the fact that it was not until 1971—twenty-two years after the victory of the revolution—that the rights of the People's Republic of China were recognized. However, parallel with the easing of the Cold War and the *détente*, which soon appeared as the beginning of a condominium of the two super-powers, the Third World progressively asserted itself. The Algiers Non-aligned Summit in September 1973, the OPEC decision a month later, the liberation of Indo-China, all these events contributed to a new awareness among the 'wretched of the earth'. Third World governments, which had had a majority for many years, eventually started to use it in votes. In this respect, a turning point

was the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly (April–May 1974) which adopted the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (resolutions 3201 and 3202 (S-VI)). Those few countries which had for so many years controlled the organization were not prepared for such a change, and reacted with anger, as expressed, for instance, by the words of Ambassador Scali, former Permanent Representative of the USA to the UN, on the ‘tyranny of the majority’.

At a higher level, the US Secretary of State, in his Milwaukee address (14 July 1975, before the Seventh Special Session) mentioned ‘ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the Charter’ as ‘clouding’ the future of the United Nations. ‘The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions’, he said, ‘yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contribution they were a small proportion of the membership.’ He deplored ‘lopsided, loaded voting’ not reflecting ‘economic reality’, as well as ‘the trend in the specialized agencies to focus on political issues’ and the fact that Unesco and ILO ‘have been heavily politicized’. He threatened to ‘depart the scene’, leaving remaining countries with ‘an empty shell’.

Such a statement is truly astonishing for anyone having some knowledge of the UN: What was the 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution on Korea if not a (successful) ‘attempt to manipulate the Charter’? How would it have been possible to keep China out of the UN until 1971 without ‘bloc voting’? What are the majorities which are not ‘numerical majori-

ties’? Where are the population figures indicating that the Third World represents ‘a small proportion’ of the membership? Do three resolutions concerning Israel—when the resolutions adopted by the eighteenth general conference of Unesco fill a book of 190 pages—or according to the PLO an observer status mean that Unesco and ILO ‘focus on political issues’? In addition, the US Secretary of State is wrong when he refers to ‘economic reality’. The Charter does not make provision for any sort of weighted voting in terms of such a ‘reality’—but when the USA and other industrialized countries found it necessary, they did include in the relevant constitutions a clause to this effect, for instance in the case of UNDP or the constitutions of the World Bank group, where the USA has a *de facto* veto right.

More recently, in a testimony before the Senate (30 January 1976) the US Secretary of State put his position in the clearest political terms, that is, in terms of power:

The success of our efforts in North/South diplomacy depends also on more systematic efforts by us to ensure that each developing country understands that our bilateral relations with it include that country’s behaviour toward us in international meetings and, in particular, its votes there on issues of highest importance to us. I have asked each of our embassies overseas to make clear to its host Government that one of the factors by which we will measure the value which that Government attaches to its relations with us will be its statements and votes.

A group which could have been expected to be more liberal, since it includes Professor Richard N. Gardner of Columbia University, Norman Cousins and Charles W. Maynes

of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace appears to endorse, by and large, the approach of the Secretary of State. This 'Ad Hoc Group on a United States Policy Toward the United Nations' submitted in April 1976 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a report which, while including some useful suggestions and reflecting the fact that the UN can no longer be taken for granted by the USA, significantly supports the non-payment of the US dues to Unesco. It rests on the premises that

there is no more important challenge to US foreign policy than to determine which items of interdependence business can still be effectively performed by the UN and which cannot.

It criticizes the recent evolution in the UN (including what it calls the 'extremist rhetoric about economic issues', the 'failure to act' on Angola, the 'politicized behaviour' of inter-governmental bodies), and advocates 'selective participation'—including financial participation—of the USA in the UN system. This means, *inter alia*, that on economic matters

action responsibility should be vested, to the largest extent possible, in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and a reformed and strengthened GATT and other agencies where American interests can be adequately safeguarded.

It also means 'reassessing the utility of UN agencies ... to determine whether they ... still promote major American and world order interests'. This may lead to withdrawal from some of them and to taking

the lead in organizing new and more manageable groupings which reflect our interests and are better able to deal with emerging world problems.

Further, the report implies a policy of appealing to and accommodating 'the moderate' and 'the pragmatist', i.e. attempting to divide the Third World (a policy, which, it says, 'proved successful' at the Seventh Special Session) and creating an informal 'world order coalition' whose core would be the USA, its European allies, Japan and 'like-minded developing nations'.⁹

In contrast to such positions, which are indeed a negation of the very principles of the Charter of the United Nations, it was, ironically, the role of Professor Daniel P. Moynihan to express a more healthy reaction to the new situation when, before becoming the US Permanent Representative to the UN, he wrote the following:

We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is already much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains 'in' it. There is no escape from a definition of nationhood which derives primarily from the new international reality. Nor does this reality respond much to the kind of painfully impotent threats which are sometimes heard of America's 'pulling out'. [In such a situation] is it not reasonable to anticipate a quasi-parliamentary situation at the international level [in which context] *the United States goes into opposition* [Professor Moynihan's italics]. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. ... Going into opposition requires first of all that we recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic [a situation which requires] a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well.¹⁰

This is the situation at the political level. It is clear: there is now in all deliberative organs of the UN system except the Security Council a majority constituted essentially by those countries, belonging to the Third World or industrialized, which are committed to the implementation of the New International Order. No one would of course expect those in the minority, starting with the United States, to accept all the positions of the majority, which anyhow, at this level, are usually not binding. It is legitimate and healthy for the USA, and any other country, to differ and dissent—as happened recently in Nairobi, Vancouver and Geneva. However, this should logically apply to the whole system. In other terms, the political logic of such a situation would be for the Permanent Members of the Security Council to give up their right of veto—a decision which would go a long way towards establishing a democratic UN system.

The discussion has remained so far at the legislative level. What should not be forgotten, however, is that the control of the centre over the system never stopped at that level. The fact is that apart from the votes, the centre has maintained until the present day and for all practical purposes two other *de facto* rights of veto, through finance and management.

On the financial question, the bulk of the resources of the system are provided by the industrialized countries and, since these are the rich countries, this should continue, even if some adjustments are necessary (currently, 50 per cent of the Unesco budget, for instance, is apportioned to the USA, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United

Kingdom, 16 per cent to other western industrialized countries, 13 per cent to Eastern European countries and 21 per cent to the Third World). However, in a democratic system, financial contributions and decision-making power are separate matters. Everyone pays taxes, including the opposition, but decisions are made by a majority. Decisions on programme and budget, whatever the sources of funds, are made on a one country, one vote basis. The places to discuss these decisions are the many governing bodies of the system, which deliberate publicly. However, as any informed and honest international civil servant would testify, things do not work this way. Through private discussions, whether in Washington or at the headquarters of the secretariats, representatives of the US Government do exert an influence, not only on the use of US money, which would already be wrong, but on the manner in which the whole budget of an organization is utilized. In a democratic UN system, this would no longer be the prerogative of any government or group of governments, whether in the majority or in opposition. Direction and control would be exercised in the open—democratically.

The 'third veto' is more subtle. It is exercised through the continuing presence at key posts of the secretariats (not necessarily the most visible ones) of nationals of the centre or, sometimes, of nominal citizens of the Third World, who are in a position to influence, in an unaccountable manner, the actual implementation of the decisions of the legislative organs. A rigorous critical-path analysis of the actual functioning of the secretariats would reveal precisely how this works. There may not be

Table 2 Professional staff in the United Nations secretariat, 1974 (by group of countries)

Group of countries	Rank								Total
	USG, ASG ¹	D2	D1	P5	P4	P3	P2	P1	
1 USA	3	11	35	69	105	116	120	7	466
2 United Kingdom and France	2	11	33	52	52	54	43	12	259
3 Other western countries	9	14	46	96	136	130	109	18	558
4 Subtotal	14	36	114	217	293	300	272	37	1,283
5 USSR	1	12	10	20	66	49	20	3	181
6 Other Eastern European countries	2	1	8	18	43	17	8		97
7 Subtotal	3	13	18	38	109	66	28	3	278
8 Africa	7	4	12	31	61	63	63	9	250
9 Asia	4	8	29	53	58	64	46	16	278
10 Western Asia	2	1	6	9	15	10	6	2	51
11 Latin America	4	6	15	38	62	53	50	14	242
12 Subtotal	17	19	62	131	196	190	165	41	821
TOTAL	34	68	194	386	598	556	465	81	2,382

¹ Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General; these are usually political appointments.

Source: Based on United Nations, *Composition of the Secretariat*, doc. A/9724, Table 8.

too many clear cases of violation of Article 100 of the Charter, which provides that 'in the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization' since, in reality, the third veto operates almost on a routine basis. International civil servants are not pure spirits; they usually are culturally and/or politically determined. There are a number of them, well located, who just act—or prevent others from acting—according to their own national values and interests. And, to this day, even if the exceptions are growing in numbers, there are not so many

critical positions, in the secretariats, which are not subject to the influence of the State Department or the powerful Permanent Mission of the US.

Table 2 shows that more than one-half (54 per cent) of the professional staff in the UN secretariat come from the western industrialized countries, including 20 per cent from the USA itself, whereas the Third World occupies only one-third of the posts and the United Kingdom and France alone control as many positions as any of the major Third World regions. The proportion of the western countries is stronger, and that of the Third World weaker, at the level of directors (57 per cent

and 31 per cent). Table 3 indicates more precisely who runs the secretariat: two-thirds of the professionals in the financial and personnel services come from the western industrialized countries. Again, the picture is more skewed at the level of directors (76 per cent from the West, 16 per cent from the South). The USA alone has virtually as many posts (25 per cent) as the Third World (26 per cent). A similar analysis made for the specialized agencies would in all likelihood reveal the same pattern. Indeed, as a former Under-Secretary-General put it, ten years ago, 'the United Nations is not an international body but rather a dependency of the United

States'.¹¹ In a democratic UN system, this should obviously be changed. There is no justification for the privileged positions of the centre—in opposition or not—in the secretariats.

III

A democratic United Nations system would require that each member state (a) respects its statutory commitments, (b) accepts that it may be outvoted and (c) refrains from any unconstitutional control over either the programme or the budget of the organizations. Such a radical shift is not likely to occur overnight. A

Table 3 Professional staff in the financial and personnel services of the United Nations in New York, Geneva and Vienna, 1975 (by group of countries)

Group of countries	Rank ¹ /Secretariat unit									
	D2, D1					P5				
	A	B	C	D	Subtotal	A	B	C	D	Subtotal
1 USA	4	1	1		6	7	1		3	11
2 United Kingdom and France	6	1	1	2	10	5		3	1	9
3 Other western countries	3				3	3		4	2	9
4 Subtotal	13	2	2	2	19	15	1	7	6	29
5 USSR	2				2	2				2
6 Other Eastern European countries										
7 Subtotal	2				2	2				2
8 Third World	2		2		4	9	1	1		11
TOTAL	17	2	4	2	25	26	2	8	6	42

1. The ranks in the UN secretariat in the 'professional and above' category include directors (D2), assistant directors (D1), and five categories of professional officers (P5 to P1, the most junior rank).

Source: Derived from United Nations, *Composition of the Secretariat*, doc. A/C.5/L.1224.

more realistic attitude of the centre, i.e. one recognizing the new situation and abiding by the rules it had itself established, would certainly be an important step forward, but a policy that counted on it would be self-defeating. Change is possible, but the responsibility for it and action towards it rest with the new majority.

As we have already noted, the majority is very wide indeed. It includes both the Third World countries and those medium-scale or small industrialized countries which do need the United Nations and cannot accept that it should be dominated by the centre or by the emerging condominium of the super-powers. This majority has started to assert itself. It can

now go further on the basis of a direction, a programme, a strategy, and tactics.

The *direction*, in very broad sense, has been provided by the September 1973 Algiers Non-aligned Summit and by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Referring to the 'continued inadequacy of the internal structure of the United Nations' and calling upon 'the international community to restore the development objective to its rightful place in the functioning of the United Nations system', the Algiers Summit invited 'the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a special session of the General Assembly at a high political level devoted

P4, P3					P2, P1					Total
A	B	C	D	Subtotal	A	B	C	D	Subtotal	
22	5	2	3	32	9	2			11	60
9	1	7	2	19	3		2		5	43
9		11	4	24	13	1	3	3	20	56
40	6	20	9	75	25	3	5	3	36	159
6		2	2	10		1			1	15
1		1	1	3			1		1	4
7		3	3	13		1	1		2	19
19		6	7	32	13	1	1	2	17	64
66	6	29	19	120	38	5	7	5	55	242

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KEY A UN Department of Administration and Management: Financial Services, Personnel Services.
 B UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Administration, Office of Technical Cooperation, Administrative section.
 C UN Office in Geneva: Finance Division, Personnel Division, and UNCTAD Office of Administration.
 D UNIDO, Central Administrative Office, Financial Services, Personnel Services.

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exclusively to the problems of development including the revitalization of structures'.¹²

Following this initiative, the General Assembly, by its Resolution 3172 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, decided to hold a special session in order, among other things, 'to initiate the necessary and appropriate structural changes to make the UN system a more effective instrument of world economic cooperation'. Further, by its Resolution 3343 (XXIX) of December 1975, it requested the Secretary-General to appoint a small group of high-level experts to submit 'a study containing proposals on structural changes within the UN system so as to make it fully capable of dealing with problems of international economic co-operation in a comprehensive manner'.

The work of these experts, some of whom were associated with the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project, resulted in a report entitled *A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation*,¹³ which owes quite a few features to the 1969 Jackson Report on the capacity of the UN development system.¹⁴ However, it was hardly discussed at the special session, which met in New York in September 1975,¹⁵ but most delegations stressed the need for restructuring and commended the report. The special session then entrusted an Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the UN System to study the matter further and to report to the next session of the General Assembly. At the time of writing, the Ad Hoc Committee is considering a 'Consolidated Text of Informal Proposals (Written and Oral)' prepared by the chairman at the request of delegations as a basis for further discussion.¹⁶

Thus, if the direction is given, the *programme* is not yet available. Since suggestions have already been formulated on this matter in this journal¹⁷ there is no need to dwell at length on it here. The main point is really that the present financial crisis, because of its political dimension, is also an opportunity to streamline the system at both policy-making and secretariat levels.

This would involve, among other things:

Redefining the functions of the United Nations system as a world forum for the discussion of global problems, as a negotiating instrument (along the lines illustrated by UNCTAD IV) and as a coherent network of agencies for authentic international cooperation.

Concentrating in the policy-making organs on decisions which are likely to be implemented and to contribute to the realization of the New International Order.

Decolonizing the secretariats so as to make them fully capable of implementing the policy decisions democratically arrived at starting obviously with the New International Order, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the 'new dimensions' of development.

Cutting drastically unnecessary staff, meetings and publications, as recent FAO decisions suggest is possible.¹⁸

Studying in earnest the possibility and modalities of system-wide automatic financing.

Parallel to the definition of a programme, an area where it would appear that the Ad Hoc Committee has already made some progress, the definition of a *strategy* is of equal importance. It was probably not an accident that the

Seventh Special Session did not really discuss the restructuring, whereas it did have an opportunity to take very concrete decisions to be immediately implemented by the secretariat which is to serve the organization.

However, things may soon start to change. Indeed, it would not be surprising if the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with administrative and budgetary matters, were now to 'politicize' itself. This would mean that the majority, making a fuller use of the potential of the situation, would from now on also decide on the management of the secretariat. This is all the more possible in that in this area, unlike the political field, decisions are really binding.

To take only two examples—at the level of *tactics*—if the majority were of the opinion that UN activities should be more decentralized and the regional commissions given a larger autonomy, nothing would prevent the majority from so deciding in the Fifth Committee. Or in a situation where the US contribution to voluntary funds such as UNDP is no longer overwhelming, the majority, which includes such countries as the Scandinavian ones and the Netherlands, could contribute significantly to a reorientation of the programme, etc.

Because they throw light on situations, crises are also opportunities. For the first time in its history, the United Nations system might now be made a more democratic one—if the new majority wants it.

Notes and references

1. Following the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Congress has recently decided to pay the balance of the 1974 dues, in order to avoid the USA being deprived of voting rights at the 1976 general conference (Nairobi, 26 October to 30 November), as provided for by the constitution of Unesco.
2. Doc. UNEP/GC/L.36, 24 March 1976.
3. 15 May 1976. Indications are that, whether the withdrawal takes effect or not, outstanding dues will be paid.
4. UNEF was the United Nations Emergency Force set up after the 1956 Anglo-French aggression against Egypt, and UNOC the UN Operation in the Congo. The USSR 'reasons of principle' not to pay are ascribed to the fact that the relevant decisions were made by the General Assembly and not by the Security Council. The legal point was settled unequivocally by the International Court of Justice which stated that the Charter did give constitutional authority to the General Assembly to impose budgetary obligations on members, but 'political realities' led to a 1965 consensus, still in force, which excludes the application of Article 19 of the Charter (suspension of voting right of members in arrears of their payments) to matters related to UNEF and UNOC. The precedent, as bad as it is, is, of course, no excuse for any other country to further jeopardize the principle of collective responsibility of member states (for a discussion of 'collective responsibility and the financial veto', see Mahdi Elmandjra, *The United Nations System: An Analysis*, London, Faber & Faber, 1973, pp. 213–19).
5. As summarized in a lengthy section (pp. 11–76) of a *Documentary Study of the Politicization of Unesco*, by Daniel G. Partan, prepared for the United States Academy of Arts and Sciences, November 1975.
6. Partan, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
7. At its sixth (Paris, 1951), eighth (Montevideo,

- 1954), ninth (New Delhi, 1956), tenth (Paris, 1958) and all subsequent sessions until the sixteenth (Paris, 1970), the conference consistently followed the US position concerning China.
8. *New York Times*, 28 April 1976.
 9. The report indicates that 'while all the participants agreed on [its] conclusions they did not necessarily concur in every specific recommendation'. It should be noted in this connexion that Charles W. Maynes in a recent paper writes that 'It is a mistake to attempt ... to split the Third World' ('A UN Policy for the Next Administration', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1975).
 10. A posture which he elsewhere termed 'raising hell' with the Third World (*New York Times*, 27 February 1975) and which he adopted in his peculiar manner when he was the US Permanent Representative at the UN. The article quoted from was published in *Commentary*, March 1975.
 11. Hernane Tavares de Sa, *The Play Within the Play: The Inside Story of the UN*, quoted in Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The United Nations: Sacred Drama*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1968.
 12. UN doc. A/9330 (22 November 1973), reproducing the official documents of the fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, Algiers, September 1973.
 13. UN doc. E/AC.62/9, 20 May 1975.
 14. Sir Robert Jackson, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*, Geneva, 1969, 2 vols. (UN doc. DP/5).
 15. Cf. 'Assessing the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly', *DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE*, 1976:1, pp. 7-19.
 16. Unofficial UN doc. CRP/Ch./1, 12 June 1976.
 17. The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report on Development and International Cooperation, *What Now: Another Development*, Part Three, 'Towards a New United Nations Development and International Cooperation System' (*DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE*, No. 1/2, 1975, pp. 103-21).
 18. The council adopted in July 1976 a proposal by the new director-general to abolish 330 posts, cancel 155 meetings and discontinue 94 publications.

Documents

Ahmed Ben Salah

Independence, Development, Liberation

*A rather unusual defence of a doctoral thesis took place on 25 June 1976 at the Sorbonne, the University of Paris. The jury, presided over by Professor Alain Girard, and including such famous French professors as Georges Balandier, Jacques Berque, Gérard Destanne de Bernis and Pierre Marthelot met in an almost clandestine manner, in a small room packed with young Tunisians and a few friends of the defendant to discuss, for five hours, a thesis entitled *Hommes, Structures et Développement, Tunisie 1961–1969* which was presented by a man who was addressed as Monsieur le Ministre.*

This man, Ahmed Ben Salah, is a fugitive. He had been General Secretary of the Tunisian Trade Union Congress (1954–56), Minister of Public Health and Social Affairs (1957–61), Minister of Development (1961–69) and Minister of Education (1969), as well as deputy general secretary of the ruling party (1965–69). When the land reform he had initiated was well under way, in 1969, he was ousted from the government, arrested and sentenced to ten years of hard labour for 'high treason'. He escaped from gaol in 1973. He is openly threatened with assassination by the President of his country. He nevertheless spoke out publicly in 1974.¹ He is now leader of the underground Movement of Popular Unity. He was also one of the principal advisers of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project on Development and International Cooperation.

For ten years, Ahmed Ben Salah held great power, and his name is associated, both for those who saw him in action and for the younger generation, with one of the few authentic movements of total liberation of a society from all forms of dependence—political, economic, social and mental. There he was, nevertheless, having just turned fifty, submitting to an academic jury a document, written in prison, in which he analyses the policies, practices and contradictions of Tunisia's development of the 1960s. The discussion ended in his being made a Doctor of the University of Paris, maxima cum laude.

What Ahmed Ben Salah said in Paris, in his introductory statement, constitutes an important political, scientific and human document. Its modesty and its overtones of self-criticism, its analysis of the contradictions of political independence, its view of development as a process of liberation and its faith in the people's struggles for liberation make this text the testimony of an exemplary militant who never gives up. It will help those who fight, in power or in opposition, for another development.

Statement at the Sorbonne

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs,

It is with emotion that I pay homage to those who were my mentors within these illustrious surroundings in which, nearly thirty years ago to the day, I finished my first university year.

During that same year I, a student, had already taken on the responsibilities of general secretary of the Paris branch of the Néo-Destour.² A year later my activities as a militant were to lead me to stay for several days in the cellars of the Ministry of the Interior; this was in the order of things. But I confess that it never entered my head that it would also lead me to, among other places, Tunis prison, and this after my country had regained its independence and after I had carried direct national responsibilities for fifteen years in the great task of renovation and construction.

Indeed, having always advocated a real and profound transformation of the structures of the society of my country, a real and profound socialization of economic, social and political relations, I had the right to a quite modest sentence it seems, since it meant ten years of hard labour . . . A sentence which, before having been pronounced, was already being carried out in the form of confinement in total solitude within a cell of seven square metres, with a high ceiling and black walls of sadness, strange reliefs and contained revolts.

However, this solitude was sometimes broken by a few cautious reverberations of the progressive awakening to the truth of an opinion which had been firmly beaten down by the powerful means that we know of.

It was also broken on the day that I was informed of your gracious invitation, Monsieur le Président, to forward my name to the University of Paris for this doctorate.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs,

I did not hesitate: I immediately addressed myself to the subject whose discussion is today offered for your consideration. I felt under an obligation to treat it. And yet it was risky. Risky, first because my work had to be absolutely clandestine; written in secret, the completed pages needed to be concealed before being taken out. It had to be written on little bits of paper, for the exercise-book issued with a doubtful intention was made of numbered pages and carried the prison's stamp. . . . And then, above all, the more serious risk was that I had to make do with a lamentable lack of documentation. It was extremely hazardous to have access to the documents, to have them brought to me; it was important not to compromise my courageous

prison officer who had to appear neutral, even hostile, because we were already preparing the escape.

Thus, in sum, every finished page meant at the same time an exhausting resignation with the limitations imposed upon me, and a series of identical and repeated anxieties: waiting often in vain for a scrap of information, fear of a visitor being exposed, fear that a batch of material would not get out, permanent fear of failing to remember the real meaning of elements of action and analysis as I had understood them during the period concerned and not as seen from a cell cut off from the wonderful sounds of life by seven gates of iron.

I had to describe this situation to you, albeit briefly, not only to satisfy an apparently obstinate need for justification, but in order to try to place this text in the real setting in which it was born. Later, I was to risk all and to free myself from my cell and from the complex and intolerable abuse of power that had incarcerated me there. But in exile, in which I am obliged to remain in a state of utmost vigilance, once again I am obliged to resign myself to not being able to remedy the shortcomings of my work. I must, however, say that I do not regret having left, after three years, those sinister places and this thanks to the attachment, courage and nobility of mind of those to whom I owe so much in Tunisia and elsewhere and whom I may not yet name.

Allow me, Monsieur le Président, to express here with salutary joy my friendly gratitude to these friends, these brothers and to all those who in this country and in others have so disinterestedly and fraternally given me the benefit of their active solidarity.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs,

Again I think that I should explain myself and present my own analysis of the socio-economic policy carried out in Tunisia during the sixties. This policy has been observed and judged quite summarily; on occasions it has been assessed with reference to criteria regarded as scientific and well founded.

The thesis which is submitted to you expressed the aim of the author to present the choices that were the framework for this policy in relation to the specific facts of the time, the environment and the life of the people who have largely inspired it. Thus, I am particularly indebted to you, Monsieur le Président, for enabling this thesis to be considered here, and perhaps later by those who may agree to silence their prejudices for the benefit of a

careful hearing for one who, owing to the turn of events, became chiefly concerned in the affair.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs,

Over and above the moral, political and socio-economic data that are somewhat analysed in this thesis, there are factors whose weight hung heavily, at the very outset, on the dynamic process entered into at the beginning of the 1960s, which have been, it seems to me, treated summarily even if their effects are diffused and perceptible throughout the text.

In the first place there is the repression of 1956, directed against the will of the workers and of their leadership to continue the independence struggle into a vigorous movement of socialist construction of which they had been the *avant-garde*. An analysis of the documents and evidence would throw much more light on this phase of our history. It would bring out the real significance of the *de facto* compromise reached six months after the *coup* against the UGTT³ by the entry into the government of the former general secretary of the trade unions, who was the target, both real and symbolic, of the repression. Among other deeds and actions, it would spotlight, beyond the sometimes heavy public approbation of the political leadership for our strategy, the unfolding and evolution of the many and continuous confrontations between the socialist development current in the government and the political power. Thus it was throughout the sixties and even before and up to the 1969 *coup d'état* by the new class, a clever amalgam of the old guard of the constitutional liberal party (Néo-Destour), of old and new privileged and propertied and of strange young turn-coats hanging on to the arms of the 'father', who had easily managed in the secrecy of the palace corridors to take advantage of a pernicious confusion of tricks and ideas, pleasures and struggles, careerism and idealism. To develop this analysis, and I hope that this may be achieved, is to bring to light the permanent and real isolation in which the socialist current for development present in the government has retained a place at the very centre of power; it would also reveal its dynamism, its revolutionary perseverance, its expansion among the people, which still give the lie to the caricatures of technocrats with which they have very hastily rigged up the militants of this current. A better picture would then emerge of the intransigence of these militants, although often thwarted by the senseless acts of the political and police power, or even themselves failing in the compromises accepted in full cognizance of what they meant. But one can also understand and accept that ground was gained in the

combat and that the 1969 *coup* was not to redress a failure but to arrest the deeper successes that, in the liberation and rebirth of Tunisian society, were taking the country to the point of no-return; in its triumph over the infantile diseases of a fragile independence of which not the least obstructive was the '*périalisme*'⁴ of an authority that was running rapidly to anachronism and the absurd. We may understand why the militants of the movement are able today to continue their fight for a socialist society on the basis of arguments verified by a self-criticism that does not give way to disownment, even less to nihilism and despair. The fight continues through the growing allegiance of the masses of the people and the youth in a struggle against the post-colonial power that is trapped in its own sinister logic and is crumbling daily under the increasing pressure.

The facts are there. Research into the ties that make them the links of the same chain would provide a useful contribution in many ways. Some will assert sweepingly that this is an illustration of the class struggle and the permanent objective alliance of imperialism, colonialism and local reaction. . . . Why not? But it is probable that the more carefully considered analyses would not suffice to decide the questions which are addressed to the nature and the meaning of the attitude of nationalists struggling against colonialism, with regard to the people of their own country; nor the nature and the meaning of the compromise that we assumed in order to attempt the impossible transcendence of the events which in any case preceded it and the dark motives that brought them about; nor to settle the question addressed to the significance of this accident of history, this family quarrel, this theatrical rupture that national independence turns out to be in all of this. The study of these little-known aspects of Tunisia's history, better than all the analyses, it seems to me, would be a useful educational project for political and sociological research and perhaps also for the progressive and democratic fight in many Third World countries

In the second place it would have been quite useful to attempt to identify the Tunisia of the sixties and its policy in the international and regional context, more particularly perhaps in the Third World context. At the time, the Bandung conference still resounded with the release of many hopes. But neither Bandung nor the Belgrade conference six years later had succeeded in establishing the necessary structures for solidarity and communications at different levels among the nations of the Third World—this Third World which was barely stuttering its aspirations, still heavily deafened by the noises of multiple disparities, contradictions and conflicts that are better

surmounted, although with great difficulty, in our times. As for the Maghreb, the situation was above all marked by the war in Algeria, then by the beginning of its independence which was already observed with apprehension by neighbouring political powers. This did not prevent us from initiating, at the economic level, the process of coordination and integration of the Maghreb which is at present and has been for a number of years now in hibernation.

On the Arab side, only Egypt during the time of Nasser seemed engaged before us in a policy of progress and renaissance; but in spite of our personal efforts, from 1964 on at any rate, it could be said that nothing happened between our countries, by virtue of conflicts whose causes could hardly be admitted.

In fact, we were at the same point, i.e. faced with and in the middle of hostile, indifferent or ambiguous countries, rarely in active sympathy. Moreover, the decade of the sixties opened with the Bizerta war,⁵ that we had thought of as the price to be paid for our complete independence; in reality it was unquestionably the argument to a large extent chosen by the political power to break out of its isolation and to benefit, afterwards and last of all, from an invitation to the Belgrade conference.

In the third place and taking account of the data presented in the thesis as well as the brief comments that I have just made, it would have been possible to understand better the rhythm of the programme entered into during the 1960s and to evaluate it in its actual context; it is hardly necessary to evoke the quantifiable targets attained or planned during the decade; they are important, in some cases decisive and irreversible, and they remain to the credit of the socialist militants

But I would like, above all, to talk about what we still consider the essential point, i.e. the structural reforms, more particularly in the agricultural sector. Our conviction is as firmly rooted as ever that, without the structural reforms, the economic measures would hardly be different from the superimposed veneer of the colonial power, i.e. the fruits of production would just as mechanically be drawn off, to leave nothing but a few scraps to fall to anaesthetize the immense needs of the masses. Our programme was based on the major imperative of the satisfaction of these material needs and also on aspirations of another kind. In order to succeed fully and rapidly, it ought to have been revolutionary, both in time and in extent, whereas it gave the impression, according to the best accounts, of being a programme of long-term reform, stemming from honest and just motiva-

tions, a programme that failed to make a sufficient impact on the masses concerned, who would otherwise not only have protected it and fought for it but would also have imbued it with the revolutionary style capable of fundamentally transforming a situation that we then thought had to be tackled differently.

Was it our attitude that was the grave mistake, which could be explained by the situation itself, by choices which were inevitably unpopular at the start, perhaps by the lack of solid regional and international bonds of solidarity, by our confidence in a rapid and certain evolution of power structures under the pressure of new economic and social forces, or by the essentially favourable image that we retained, since our first acts as militant, of the chief holder of power? Or would this same attitude be considered as one of the natural components of a given phase of our evolution?

Well, maybe hereafter, and why not, our attitude, and this thesis helping somewhat as a document calling for research and as another moment in the combat, what has been achieved, the full exposure of the contradictions, the deeper and sharper awareness that resulted from it, and the acquired consistency of a just current, will perhaps be looked on one day as the sap rising, rising to feed not only the new phase of popular struggle in Tunisia, but also a broader plan for society, by the grouping of all those resolved finally to set out on the right road. A grouping that would have had the force, lucidity and courage to cast off the shackles in order to adopt the only valid strategy for today and tomorrow, that which is based on the deepest aspirations of the people, already irreversibly engaged on the difficult but bright road to revival.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs,

A need has been born from the approach adopted to present this period—lived in the heat of action and the intimate but collective ardour of reflection—the need for a method that will enable us to understand better and to act better:

To understand the real well-springs of the struggle for independence, the deficiencies that have been developed in it by those we have preferred to call the destructive élites, seeking to constrain the deep waves of aspiration of the people and of those we prefer to call their *avant-garde*;

To understand the real nature of independence that seems to be more and more like a pact, barely concealed, between ruling élites in both camps, colonizing and colonized, concluded tacitly in the name of some planetary

strategy and baptized in the name of cooperation, which in turn is presented as a way of access to the universal;

Better to grasp the mechanisms that the proclaimed independences have promoted to beget the myths, the heroes, the 'fathers of the nation'—so many means for corrupting the people, their struggle and their avant-garde—rather than the struggles to reconquer independence;

Better to apprehend, define and reveal the well-springs that must be those of the development of a given community, of its cultural revival in terms of its will to survive in its specificity and of its place in the evolving world—and not of its place in the pack of pawns and serfs;

Better to understand finally that the work of decolonization must be restarted, in order to pursue the work of emancipation, the work of revival to which must be channelled those energies that are at last freed from the infernal cycle of domination.

It may be permissible to add here, of all places, that the field of reflection and of research in these areas is as open as it is arduous, be it in the areas of economics, sociology or political science. Neither tranquil schemes, whatever their ideological foundations, nor rules and methods of brilliant novelty seem to us to merit being taken at their face value—this is the least that one may say—in order to draw conclusions that are valid for the understanding of the realities and manifestations of this world in conception and in emergence that we call the Third World. Perhaps more elaborated and more adequate sociological study of some representative cases will open up another phase of research, beyond the strategies of states, into the behaviour of the men and women and the social groups of this world and into the springs of their actions, in order to perceive better the perspectives of international relations at the regional as well as at the global level.

[*Translated from French*]

.Paris, 25 June 1976

Editorial notes

1. Marc Nerfin, *Entretiens avec Ahmed Ben Salah sur la Dynamique Socialiste dans la Tunisie des Années 1960*, Paris, Maspero, 1974.
2. Founded in 1934 the Néo-Destour was the political party which organized the Tunisian resistance to French domination. It has been the ruling party since independence (1956).

3. The Tunisian Trades Union Congress. Ahmed Ben Salah was its general secretary, in 1956, when he was dismissed by a decision of Habib Bourguiba, then Prime Minister, now life President of the Republic.
4. I.e. paternalism/imperialism, father being *père* in French.
5. The last part of Tunisian territory under French control was, in 1961, an important naval base adjacent to the city of Bizerta. The Tunisians wanted it to be liberated, the French Government, then led by General de Gaulle, refused even to negotiate. A short but violent war broke out on 19 July. At least 1,300 Tunisians (and 21 French) were killed; the use of napalm, atrocities against civilians and the destruction of economic targets, such as a major cement plant, by the French was observed by the international press. The UN Security Council was seized with the matter and requested, on 22 July, a cease-fire. The Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, visited Tunisia from 24 to 27 July; he went to Bizerta, then occupied by the French and his official car, in spite of its UN flag, was searched by the French paratroopers. Dag Hammarskjöld reported to the Security Council on 28 July, but the opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom, which used their veto right, prevented the council from adopting any resolution. A special session of the General Assembly—the third in its history—had to be convened at the end of August. It supported Tunisia's sovereign right to call for the evacuation of the forces present on its territory without its consent. The French troops withdrew from Bizerta in October and from the base two years later. The Bizerta case shows how the existence and moral support of the United Nations is important for a small country when facing a powerful one. (For an account of the Secretary-General's action over Bizerta, cf. Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, New York, Knopf, 1972, pp. 530–41.)

Comments on the RIO Project*

By *Hernán Santa Cruz*

The existing development model, based on the international division of labour and the organization of production in relation to 'effective demand' rather than to the requirements of the majority of the population, has proved to be inadequate. The first drafts of the Club of Rome project Reviewing the International Order (RIO) have endorsed the conclusion that, in the satisfaction of individual and collective spiritual needs, essential elements for a life of dignity, the models of the rich world have 'little to offer'. And yet, as Hernán Santa Cruz points out in this paper, these drafts have repeated the error of suggesting that, to reduce existing inequalities between the world's regions, 'massive public financial transfers will be needed' in order to attain the main aims of development. In the author's view, these transfers, while necessary, are only a secondary flow which cannot substitute for the primary, internal flow of resources in Third World countries, which are at present improperly used, wasted or siphoned off to other areas. The author, who is president of the Centre International pour le Développement (Paris), was formerly Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations (1947–52), president of ECOSOC (1950–51), rapporteur of the UN Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa (1953–55), Assistant Director General of FAO and FAO Regional Director for Latin America (1959–67) and from 1967 up to the Chilean coup d'état in 1973, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations (Geneva).



It is pertinent to discuss the question of new horizons for mankind in the context of a new international order from the standpoint of the historical significance of the United States of America, which is commemorating its bicen-

ennial in 1976. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence represented far more than the mere throwing off of an intolerable colonial domination—as has occurred in so many other cases—it actually constituted a major turning point in the history of man.

At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that any revolutionary process involves at least three elements: the rejection of the exist-

* This paper was prepared as a contribution to the Club of Rome discussions on 'New Horizons for Mankind' and given in a public address in Philadelphia, USA, in April 1976.

ing order; the elaboration of an alternative 'historical project'; and a set of instruments through which to promote the transition from one to the other.

From this point of view, there can be no doubt that the independence of the United States, as well as the country's later development process, represents a true revolution. In effect, not only was the pre-existing socio-political model overcome, with an important collateral influence on some social revolutions in Europe, but, in addition, in no other case more than in the United States have the instruments which were selected—individual liberty plus the desire to progress on the basis of profit—proven to be so efficient in the actual establishment of the alternative model: liberal society.

It is not our intention here to analyse the influence of that model nor of those instruments in the development of the United States. Only a major, interdisciplinary effort could accomplish such a task, particularly since, in two hundred years, as men as well as internal and international circumstances have varied, the form, ways and means of their application have deeply changed. The world has undergone immense transformations. The industrial revolution, the prodigious advance of science and technology, human migrations, the emergence of more than one hundred new states, the increased weight of some big powers and the reduction of that of others, and the growing interdependence of all the peoples of the world resulting from environmental, economic and sociological developments, as well as from progress in communications, have brought about a new world. The United

States became and still is a great empire, with a degree of world influence never seen before. If reference is therefore made to the model to which the United States revolution was oriented, it is because in the great debate of our times—about the society of the future (and we mean society in planetary terms)—this model is sometimes presented as a valid one for the Third World, that is, for two-thirds of humanity.

In a growing number of countries many people are beginning to question this model, from the standpoint of feasibility as well as on normative grounds. More and more sectors are discarding the model at the theoretical level; in some cases it has been abandoned in practice; and in others, only the use of economic and/or military force keeps it going.

As the report of the RIO Project indicates in one of its sections—one of the basic documents presented by the Club of Rome for discussion—'in terms of the satisfaction of individual and collective spiritual needs, essential elements of a life of dignity, the models of the rich world appear to have little to offer'.¹

Without in any manner sharing apocalyptic theories of short-term 'occidental decadence', one can well speak of the world crisis of these models in that they are not viable for countries that are structurally on the periphery of the international system. They have undoubtedly failed to change the quality of life of most of the populations of those areas—in other words, the great majority of humanity.

This crisis has numerous expressions and also has a number of causes, among which the following could be mentioned:

1. The model is based on an international division of labour that implies both the geographical and the human concentration of the capacity to accumulate, the basis of growth and development. The results of this phenomenon are startlingly perceptible: millions of persons at present have little to expect from life, while at the same time the product of their labour contributes to accumulation and consumption in a small number of countries.
2. Under this model production tends or is organized to take into account only effective demand, and not human needs, which in many cases amounts to ignoring the requirements of the majority of the population. The implications of this are particularly clear in Latin America where, on average, no more than 30 per cent of the population consume between 75 and 100 per cent of total goods and services. Thus it is that in this region 'the most dynamic nuclei of the productive apparatus are linked with and depend on the demand preference (sometimes the exclusive preference) of the groups located at the top of the distributive structure'.²

These characteristics and their tendency to perpetuate themselves mean that the struggle for development is essentially a struggle by and for the vast majority of the world's population, currently excluded from the minimum material and spiritual benefits necessary from the point of view of human dignity.

Furthermore, the same characteristics constitute the basis for the elaboration of an alternative socio-political model which, as indicated in the RIO report, envisages a higher

organization of society, the object of which would be man and the integral development of his potentiality, characterized by equity, social justice, environmental soundness and cultural diversity, on the basis of effective economic, social and political democracy.

Clearly, underdevelopment in countries in which the population is acquiring political and social consciousness, coupled with the extended crisis of the industrialized countries, is shaping a pre-revolutionary situation in the terms indicated above. It is not by mere coincidence then, that at a moment in which the centre-periphery paradigm is accentuated, the problem of the instruments to be utilized to channel imminent forthcoming change—ranging from the use of legal instruments to recourse to economic pressure and force, together with the variety of international cooperation initiatives—should constitute the nervous centre of current discussions on development and that, in turn, the developmental question should be the most crucial issue in discussions about the future.

In this paper, we can only make a number of remarks of a general and broad nature on this matter. Given that the present situation is not entirely new, it would seem pertinent to underline the deficiencies of traditional development instruments and to compare them with instruments currently being considered, in order to determine the extent to which the deficiencies are being effectively overcome.

Traditionally, development instruments have been characterized by the quantitative nature both of the implicit underlying conceptions of development, as well as of the goals to be attained. Explicitly or implicitly, they have

been founded on the conviction that backwardness represents also a quantitative problem, i.e. a mere insufficiency of resources. Hence, for example, the notion of 'poor countries', commonly used instead of focusing on the social and political system that inhibits real popular participation and in fact commonly generates 'poor peoples'.

If the concept of 'poor countries' is the basic premise, then, logically, the remedy is an effort to increase the amount of resources available to these countries. This has been the case with traditional development transfers or aid flows in all their forms. Experience shows that without radical internal structural changes, such policies simply serve to consolidate traditional power structures.

In this respect, however, the first concern is to find an adequate criterion to measure abundance or scarcity of resources, to achieve development. If the aim is to erect a consumer society in peripheral countries, certainly resources are inadequate. Moreover, they always will be, since it has been historically demonstrated that 'the present style of development requires that income and expenditure are concentrated in the wealthiest strata'.³

If, to the contrary, the basic premise is the need to feed the population, to satisfy their basic needs in the broad sense of the concept, then it is not accurate to speak of 'poor countries'. In effect, with very few exceptions, underdeveloped countries have human and material resource endowments which are more than sufficient for those essential purposes, provided that adequate policies are applied internally and internationally. This is not to imply that transfer of resources is not

necessary; it means, on the contrary, that they will be useful if directed towards the satisfaction of the needs of the majorities, and not the mimetic consumption styles of the privileged minorities.

Moreover, what is truly important is that, even if it were accurate to speak of poor countries, such a statement involves only a part of the problem, or to put it in another manner, it describes a result, without explaining its causes.

Ultimately, underdevelopment is a problem of improper use of resources, of institutionalized waste, the outcome of an integrated and highly complex set of mechanisms which bring about either their inadequate utilization or their transfer to other areas. However, this primary flow of resources is the product of inappropriate national policies and of the maintenance of an unjust world economic and commercial structure.

Seen in this light, development efforts—private foreign investment, financial assistance, technical assistance, which involve what we may call a secondary flow, as opposed to the primary flow of transfers referred to above—have until recently and in general ignored or devoted insufficient attention to the mechanisms through which uneven development originates in the first place, thereby leaving them more or less untouched.

When the RIO report indicates then that 'in order to attain the main aims of development and a substantial reduction in the inequalities existing between the world's regions *massive public financial transfers* will be needed',⁴ one cannot help feeling that, despite references to such issues as self-reliance—clearly based on

other conceptions—something of the traditional outlook continues to have a certain influence. This outlook may be regarded as somewhat inconsistent with the content of Section III of the RIO Project. The same is the case with the suggestions contained on page 9–6 concerning the possibility of establishing a system of taxation on certain types of consumption, the proceeds of which would be channelled to underdeveloped regions, for it amounts to saying that primary flows, as defined above, as well as the mechanisms which make them possible, will continue to exist, i.e. that the traditional periphery–centre type of transfer will continue. This may very well be the case, since even if the underdeveloped countries, through recourse to producers' associations, increased mutual cooperation, etc. manage to appropriate larger portions of the economic surplus created by their respective economies, this could possibly take place on a gradual basis, thereby still leaving what is usually called a gap between needs and available means.

In any event, the most important point here is that such solutions seem to disregard the fact that there is no empirical evidence—as post-war experience has demonstrated—to sustain the belief that this type of flow will lead to the desired results. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly shown that this type of 'aid' is not only a myth, but that in practice on many occasions it involves a direct and tangible economic—or at any rate political—gain for the donor countries.

In effect, secondary flows have historically been extremely irregular, displaying a tendency to reduction or even interruption at the

moments during which they are most needed, i.e. during periods of crisis.

In addition, these flows have been consistently inadequate in volume, i.e. inferior to primary flows.

Furthermore, their appropriation and use has only in a few cases actually reached or benefited the groups for which they were intended.

Finally, and most important of all, they have been a restraining factor for processes conducive to solutions based on structural change, self-determination and self-reliance, while at the same time being instruments of political influence and domination.

A striking example is to be found in the recent case of Chile which, for all practical purposes, was cut off from this type of flow during a period in which it was carrying out a programme of peaceful change, and then flooded with assistance once such an attempt was violently halted. In effect, Chile received in 1973 a total of US\$109.7 million in financial assistance from western countries, while in 1974 it received a total of US\$1,159, and a total of US\$2,141 million between September 1973 and June 1975. As far as the international financing institutions controlled by the western countries are concerned, the example of Chile is even more telling. In effect, the World Bank, during the three years of President Allende's administration, did not grant the country a single loan. Such a stance was allegedly based on the country's economic difficulties, yet during 1971 and 1972, the economy was clearly undergoing a process of rapid expansion. The Inter-American Development Bank has followed a similar policy. While in

1974 it granted Chile loans for a total of US\$97.3 million, in 1971 its total assistance to the country amounted to only US\$11.6 million. During 1972 and 1973, the country received no IDB financing at all.

This is also the case with the current world food crisis and can best be illustrated by a statement like the following one: 'The utilization of American food products to shift these peoples [those receiving United States food aid] to our sphere of influence, as we become their sole suppliers in the world in that field, would represent a really good investment.'⁵

It is not clear from the report, particularly when institutions such as the World Bank are explicitly referred to as executing agencies with respect to these massive transfers, how results like these will be avoided in the future. To the extent that fundamental changes are not introduced, this type of instrument will continue to be totally inadequate.

This leads us to an observation of a more general nature, which is applicable to the RIO Project as a whole as far as the suggestions pertaining to instruments are concerned. The proposals contained therein certainly cover the most important and crucial areas where change is required if a new international order is to be achieved. In effect, they cover the areas where the most important obstacles to peripheral growth and development are to be found.

The manner in which these changes are to be implemented is, however, not sufficiently underlined. Present power relations—to the extent that they are the factor which makes those obstacles possible—are being denounced, but, as has been pointed out in

this sphere, wishes and good intentions are inoperative.

For example, reference is made to the eventual establishment of a world treasury. How is this possible if since the 1971 monetary crisis all efforts to establish a new monetary arrangement have consistently failed? Population control and alteration of consumption habits in certain strata in underdeveloped countries are indicated as means for improving the world food problem. How is this possible though, since it has been irrefutably demonstrated that population growth in the Third World countries is the result of underdevelopment? How is it possible if, as is well known, the consumption patterns—as well as aspirations, value systems, etc.—of the upper strata in the underdeveloped countries are equal to or higher than the average in the industrialized countries? For this means that, though they are physically located in the periphery, in practice they are part of consumer society. In these circumstances, can one really expect these groups to have sufficient 'enlightened self-interest' to abandon their life styles in order to make the reshaping of production and consumption possible? Historically this has not been the case.

One final example deals with self-reliance—also endorsed by the RIO Project—which, at least at the theoretical level, few people disagree with. Yet, how is self-reliant growth to be implemented, bearing in mind that, in the past, attempts at more or less self-reliant growth have been forcefully brought to a halt? How, if a mere increase in oil prices—from their traditional exchange value to their actual use value—brought

about threats of armed intervention?

These problems require urgent study; they constitute the single most crucial issue if the qualitative changes conducive to development are to be carried out with the speed and depth which are imperative.

In any event this raises the need to underline an additional deficiency, also of a quite fundamental nature, which has characterized most development efforts in the past, i.e. the exclusion in both their selection and their application of those who theoretically should be the beneficiaries of the development process: the dispossessed masses of the earth.

This is not to conclude on a pessimistic note. Any structure, no matter how engrained it may be in practice, no matter how sacrosanct it may have become, is susceptible of being transcended.

The main problem then, on whose solution will depend either the success or the failure of present and future development strategies, lies in facilitating the assumption, by the oppressed masses of the planet, of the role to which they are entitled, that of being agents of a process of change which other groups have been unable to promote because of their structural links to the *status quo*.

The synonym for this is participation, understood simultaneously as an end in itself (actually, the condition for the crystallization of the right to self-determination) and as an instrument (in particular as the only efficient safeguard against the ever-present possibility of the agreed ends and means being distorted by those whose interests are different from the interests of the majority or the collectivity as a whole).

For this process of participation to be meaningful, i.e. to avoid a massive, but merely formal endorsement of decisions taken by others, a widespread and substantial increase in public awareness is required, a process which in turn raises the problem of making knowledge accessible to the masses.

This is perhaps the most difficult task ahead. To analyse the manner and the reasons which have led to the establishment of an effective monopoly of knowledge—an instrument without which participation can have no meaning whatsoever—by narrow intellectual and technocratic élites is not possible here.

The ultimate problem, which has received little or no attention within the context of discussions about development and future society, is to overcome current élitism, which discards, almost *a priori*, the possibility of universal access to science and knowledge (an élitism which operates through many mechanisms, beginning with the fabrication of artificially sophisticated terminologies). It is a question, in particular, of doing away with the fragmentation and atomization of knowledge, which prevents us from seeing the human phenomenon, in all its complexity, in the relations between its different aspects, as a whole. This goes beyond mere interdisciplinary cooperation and calls for the creation of one science of man.

The observations here are principally concerned with the RIO Project, the expression of the Club of Rome's most important recent endeavour. They have been made in the hope of clarifying certain questions which must necessarily be considered within the context of a

project of this importance, as well as in any effort related to the creation of a new international order.

If, as one of the most interesting and novel documents prepared in connexion with the new international order indicates, 'there is no fundamental contradiction, given the proper transition strategies, between the interests of people—if not of power structures—in both Third World and industrialized countries', it is no less true that 'just as another development in any country requires self-reliance, it also requires that the rest of the world recognize the right to pluralism and diversity, in practice as well as in words, and further requires a favourable world political and economic environment'.⁶ The creation of such an environment, as both that document and the RIO report go on to say, demands an international redistribution of resources.

The observations made above are certainly not a complete analysis of the issues. But no analysis can be complete if the matters to which they refer are not taken into consideration, for they will undoubtedly influence the outcome of any present or future redistribution efforts.

Furthermore, if such a redistribution is to be made possible, if a new international order based on individual and collective self-reliance, on diversity and pluralism, is to become a reality, all efforts to revive policies based on concepts such as 'balance of power', 'power politics', etc.—concepts which cannot easily be divorced from either of the two world wars—must be abandoned. If international cooperation is to have any meaning, it must be, in other words, consistent rather than cir-

cumstantial, universal rather than discriminatory. It must be channelled, finally, through a reformed, more integrated and substantially strengthened United Nations system, to be backed up not only by governments, but by peoples. Only within such a setting can one conceive a world of peace, a world in which today's still distant dream of revealing new horizons for mankind may become reality.

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The Garden Plot of Life and Justice

By Björn Berglund

'The resources which give people life are limited in each vegetable garden. And if we add up all these limitations we get a sum which is the total resource level of the earth. But it is a false testimony to life to regard our world's resources as insufficient without first deciding if the distribution system is as it could be.' In the parallel he draws between the distribution of plant resources in his garden and the equation of life and death and world resources, Björn Berglund underlines the need for a distribution that should be in accordance with actual human need. Björn Berglund is a writer on environmental affairs and a staff journalist on Dagens Nyheter, the Swedish daily newspaper.



I read books on gardening.
I buy seed and plant potatoes.
Get fertilizer, the most important of all. Dig.
Dig, fertilize, sow and water a vegetable garden. I try to understand what it means to take care of a garden.

From the radio I hear an echo of the outside world—about the crises of democracies and the battle over oil. Starvation is increasing.

'The price of mineral fertilizer has risen to shock levels. Purchasing-power among the most needy is low. One of the most significant causes for the increasing poverty in the world is the drastic exploitation of the soil. When people cannot refertilize their soil, harvests decrease from year to year. Agricultural lands are destroyed at a rapid rate. . . . In the rich countries more and more mineral fertilizers are used, but this alone will not avert a food crisis. . . . Demand and actual human need are two wholly different things. . . .'

One day I put spade to soil. There is no difference between life and life. Vegetables and people are equally nourished by the soil. The conditions of life are just as naked as the bare earth. Above the level of equality of life that we find in a vegetable patch, the division of resources among people takes place. But this division today is such that more often than not it extinguishes life itself!

To be able to understand how life and food are eternally anchored in the naked earth we must go back in time at least 425 million years. It was then that plant life began its journey up to the land. Plant life in the sea had existed for a long time. There, in the sea, nutrients, light and carbon dioxide abounded and flooded into the drifting algae which absorbed all this goodness in a practical, easy manner. And water was no problem at all for the plants in the sea.

On the land things became far more problematical. Nutrients and water had a tendency to

keep away from light and carbon dioxide. Nutrients and the water in which they were dissolved hid their stores down in the ground. But carbon dioxide and above all, sunlight, were found above ground. The plants had to learn to live a well-regulated double life. One part of the plant had to grow downwards to become the root, while another part grew upwards towards the sun.

From then on the life of plants—the food of mankind, the vegetables in my garden—has been a transport and distribution problem from the root in the soil to the flowers and leaves and back again. And so the fluids circulate in the plants' vessels and nothing can turn green if the flow of nutrients and water cannot continue from the ground up to the sunlight. A good result in my vegetable garden means that the plants have managed the difficult balancing act between life in the subterranean zone and life in the world of sunshine and air.

But this is not sufficient for us to understand what decides the conditions of life in my and all other vegetable gardens, in the vegetable garden of the earth. We must go even further back in time. The deepest explanation for the art of cultivation is hidden near the outermost limits of our imagination. My hand trembles in respect for eternity when I spread out small seeds in my vegetable garden.

I search within the plants that fill the earth. There I find the salts which once saturated the primeval sea, out of which all life came. It is salt water. The same salts which existed and exist in the waters of the sea are also

found in plants on land. We call them nutrient salts. It is such salts that we lay on when we fertilize a vegetable garden—a combination of nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium, etc.

We may say that because plants originated in the sea, they must have the sea salts, even on land, dissolved in water in the same proportions; at least they must have a number of the most important elements, as they found them in their original environment. It is a fact that the salt balance in the sea exists even in life on land. The waves of the primeval sea swell in cabbage and potato.

The salts which saturated the primeval sea came to it from the land in the same way that nutrient salts continually leak out of the soil, leached from the bedrock to be transported with water to the sea. When the organisms developed in the sea they were already endowed with a biochemical code of the necessary conditions for existence on land, where some of them were eventually to develop. The elementary qualifications for life on land existed already when the first organisms appeared in the sea, one might thus say.

Now I can't go back any further in time. For vegetative success a set mixture of nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium and sulphur and the rest of the earth's elements was determined long ago. When I fertilize my vegetable patch I do so to ensure that the earth will be just as saturated with these nutrient salts as the primeval sea once was on the morning of time. And when I water my vegetable patch I see to it that this same sea may continue to ebb and flow in my vegetables as in all eternity.

It now only remains to recall that animals and men, which live on what the plants produce, transfer this sea into their own bodies when they forage and eat. It follows that just as the ancient sea salts are found dissolved in plants in a balance which corresponds to that of sea water, so these same salts are to be found in human blood and other body fluids in a similar solution. I, a human being, cannot ignore this primeval fertility in the nakedness of the earth, this secret sign of creation under the grasses, life's potentials and limitations in the soil, the agreement with pea and spinach. We all know that the soil must be fertilized and we water when we need to, if we have water.

I cannot abolish life nor obliterate death, which embed determining nutrient particles of dissolved elements of fertility equally in all that we call living things, in plants as well as humans. It is a universal necessity that I take care of my garden.

And we are still going against the cosmic equality. The care and management of the earth, the care for life, environmental care—this is a question of maintaining balance in every human being so that they can live. The necessary conditions for that balance are found on earth, already passed on from the sea where life began. The resources were provided in a package in which life and death were indivisible from their necessary counterparts in earth and sunlight and water.

See how a turnip is reflected in the surface of the eternal sea in your own vegetable garden! Feel how you re-create that ancient sea in your tissues when you eat that turnip!

But, as seedlings wilt on depleted soils and overgrazed pastures and on parched plains for lack of water, so do the people there wilt, famish and die. Many who sit down at their groaning tables are stealing the sea of creation from their fellow human beings—for the sake of affluence. Now they dump poisons and garbage into that sea.

If the ancient sea's balance of elements no longer remains in a plot of earth, then the plants which should have grown there no longer exist either and—likewise for people—life simply dries up in that place.

These resources which are here on earth, forming seed germ and animals and humans, are limited everywhere. In each small clod of earth which lends itself to a spade the resources are limited. We continually hear, in the environmental debate, that resources will be exhausted in a hundred years' time. Totally and globally these resources are limited, of course, but perhaps not quite so limited that peoples' well-being need be threatened in a hundred years' time.

However, and this point is easily forgotten, in each little bit of earth, here in my vegetable patch in Sweden as well as in a farm field in India or on the entire North American prairie, in each spadeful of earth, the resources are already limited today and for ever as at earth's dawn.

The collapse, the devastating catastrophe—we do not need to wait for this. As the researcher into the future, who speculates in doomsday

prophecies, draws his curves, one bit of earth after another is dying around the world without the least hint of this acknowledgement. The doomsday prophet is much like a profiteer who is afraid to lose his stolen privileges.

The difference between the lack of resources which the crystal-gazers of the west, perhaps with good intentions, foresee for their neighbours and the lack of resources which already exists in some parts of the world is difficult to pinpoint in kind and quality. It is obviously a bad thing if my Swedish wastefulness with life's capital contributes to a fall in standards which puts me and my privileged friends in the same state as the most poverty-stricken in the poor world. Our necessary fall in standards need not go so far. But the resources which give people life are limited in each vegetable garden. And if we add up all these limitations we get a sum which is the total resource level of the earth. But it is a false testimony to life to regard our world's resources as insufficient without first deciding if the distribution system is as it could be.

A few seasons' forced farming of a few acres of land is enough to render it unsuitable for human life, to create a situation whereby all life from that piece of land is eliminated. There is good reason to question why this plundering goes on for our sake while we live in a country which is forced to stimulate its citizens' consumption with artificial means in order to keep the affluent society going!

Existence for all living things on earth since plants came up to the land some 425 million years ago has been chiefly a problem of distri-

bution. So, for example, plants on earth transport their nourishment in exact quantities from their roots in the soil up to the fruits and leaves in the air and sunshine and then go back again to the soil in the form of wilted greenery or, if man intervenes, as compost or fertilizer.

The plant can never be greater than its local resources but it can become just as beautiful as necessary to form its life in agreement with an underlying justice.

We humans who seek a future, we should consider the fact that, for us, existence is also just such a problem of transport and distribution both horizontally over the earth as well as vertically through life and death. It is not the lack of resources which is the limiting factor for a just distribution. The power of death and the capacity for life is not chiefly decided by resource availability in the world but by its distribution.

In the ability to distribute resources lies the shape of the future: in the amount of capital available for the building of wells and irrigation canals, in the availability of limited supplies of phosphorus, in the amount of earth which can bear harvests, in pastures for cattle and other grazing animals, in the power of justice which is determined by people's need to maintain the salt balance in their love-seeking bodies.

Environmental destruction is cosmic in its criminality. It drives the stars and sun and greenery out of people. How can we act in such a way towards each other? How can the evil take possession of the matter of life to

such an extent that human masses are driven to starvation on exhausted land?

I turn the earth with my spade, fertilize and sow. I am, for the time being, free and empowered to judge the distribution conditions which were established when life started. In the lilac bush the robin perches with his head tilted to one side looking at me with his bright eye. Even if the structures have become very complicated, the obvious fact remains that theft from life of its past and future in terms of chemistry and physics and human life is a very grave crime against creation. Such things should be impossible, especially if we value life, which pours down my neck in the form of sweat as I dig and which gleams in the eye of the robin—and then dies. This last thing—that one must die—is not denied by the powerful world economic superstitions of our time. Those who were enemies and exploiters of life's resources throughout more or less mindless lives will cancel out part of their debt anyway in the end.

Human life won't let itself be extinguished as long as we allow ourselves to die, but that doesn't comfort me. Terrible starvation catastrophes are unavoidable as long as technologies are adopted that run totally counter to the facts of life, as long as the rich exploit the poor and pile up their deaths in ever more violent constructions of inhumanity.

With which human lives do you over-fertilize your vegetable garden? How many deaths do you feel that your technological decline is worth? There are already too many deaths to

account for. The longer we wait before we begin to seek a distribution economy based on life's conditions (all else is pure deception), the more horrible will be the downfall, the more will die. Things have already gone on like this for too long.

People on earth are forced to take out more of their vegetable gardens than they are able to return; rich countries, through their economic systems and the power of wealthy, steal earthly possessions wherever they are to be found, merely to accumulate them as the products of affluence and waste. We dig a deeper and deeper hole in the common resources of the earth and heap them up in greater and greater piles. Eventually our beautifully overbuilt construction will come crashing down in the hole and bury our exploiter culture—in a tragic reunion with those already there who worked their fingers to the bone in the depths of our guilt.

So I think back to my origins when the wind comes with birds and rain and bumble-bees and weed seeds to my vegetable garden. Which say that whatever is taken out of the earth shall be replaced and no more shall be taken out than can be replaced. That is the principal law.

If man has any purpose it is to exist with the help of the given resources. It is very possible that available resources on the earth are sufficient for our support—at more than bare subsistence levels, even for the human masses which, because of need and unequal conditions, are suffering a population explosion—if

the exploitation of them were stopped, if the distribution were carried out in accordance with actual human need. Meanwhile today's affluence, as we know it, is not an adequate model, because it robs other people of their unquestionable right to existence.

So stands the law of all that lives. It is as indestructible as the stars. It is valid for people as well as for seedlings, fish or fowl, because it is grounded on the nutrient salts which, in blood and other fluids, balance all living things. Locally or globally, there is no difference.

This law cannot be broken. Not by people who try to balance the account with human

life. Not by world trade and power politics, which build up their wealth at the cost of existence, wherever it may be, or violate the human rights which were given in the form of life's nutritional elements in earth and sun according to this law.

So frighteningly difficult is it to sow a few vegetables in a patch by the edge of the house! No one can make me believe in the success of this deception. Mankind's contempt for life is not so great that those who with evil influence deny this law shall be able to lure us away from swaying grain-fields, patches of cabbage and onion, justice and equality, happiness in the dew and in the morning rain.

[Translated from Swedish]

News and Notes

Exploring Child Health: The Kirkos Study, Addis Ababa—What Now: Another Development—Fortcoming !Publications of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project—Improving Public Enterprise Management in Tanzania—The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—The International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA)—The Third World Forum—The Third World Centre for Economic and Social Studies

Exploring Child Health: The Kirkos Study, Addis Ababa

The first results are now available of a study jointly undertaken by the Ethiopian Nutrition Institute, by the Ethio-Swedish Paediatric Clinic (ESPC) of the Department of Paediatrics of the University of Addis Ababa, by the School of Social Work of the University of Addis Ababa, and by the Addis Ababa Public Health Department. The point of departure of the study was the direct experience of caring for the very many malnourished and severely ill children in an underdeveloped country with few economic and other resources. ESPC workers were daily confronted with great numbers of children suffering from severe malnutrition and serious infectious diseases. Those children treated often had to return to their original poor and unhealthy surroundings, to relapse again into malnutrition and infection. The inadequacy of available hospital resources raised the question of the role of health services in general.

The coexistence of malnutrition and a high rate of infections in low-income groups, coupled with the shortage of resources, have led to the conviction that where health budgets are extremely limited, emphasis must be put on the development of basic, simple and inex-

pensive health services and on a redistribution of health resources from the often relatively privileged urban areas to the rural ones. Equal access to health services may, however, require profound changes in the political and economic system. There has been little precision in the awareness that environmental elements such as sanitation, education and the provision of unpolluted water may be as important to community health as conventional medical services.

It is coming to be felt increasingly that the need is for an integrated multidisciplinary approach, with the emphasis on preventive programmes and non-medical solutions to medical problems. This view has not yet been adequately explored and tested by analysis of the data. The data, for one thing, are very often lacking, certainly in underdeveloped countries. The ability to construct or evaluate the impact of a multivariate approach is, as a result, weak.

This was the background to the Kirkos study, which started with the formation of a socio-medical/statistical research team and the setting up of a small mother/child health clinic, in the Kirkos village area, which would both

provide its services and also be observed to see what its performance and community utilization were.

The studies, which were prepared jointly by medical workers, nutritionists, social scientists and health administrators, were made over a year beginning in February 1972, with follow-up surveys in 1973 and 1975. They

included, apart from a baseline survey, a longitudinal study that ran for a year from April 1972, special medical studies during 1972, the initiation of the mother/child health clinic in February 1972 and health education lessons during the same year. The conceptual variables adopted for the Kirkos study were the following:

Socio-environment		Child-health services	
<i>Demographic conditions</i>	<i>Hygiene and sanitation</i>	<i>Organization</i>	
Age and sex of children	Water availability and consumption	Contents	
Age of mother	Latrine standard	Capacity	
Number of household members		Cost	
<i>Living standard</i>	<i>Cultural background</i>	<i>Utilization</i>	
Household income	Education	Community utilization:	
Housing quality and cost	Religion	initial and long-term	
Number of rooms	Ethnicity	behaviour	
Living area	Health beliefs and practices		
Child health			
	<i>Morbidity</i>	<i>Nutrition</i>	
	Acute illness	Weight development	
	Parasitoses		

The study revealed the readiness to cooperate in medical research of local authorities, of schools and of individual mothers. The lack of registers raised a methodological problem in depriving the study of a ready-made sampling frame. The mother/child health clinic demonstrated that basic child-health services could be delivered to large numbers of children at low cost, provided there was delegation of medical responsibility to nurses or dressers. The child-health chart proved to be a very useful tool for diagnosis and was well kept up

by mothers themselves. The need for rapid feedback of data was noted. Further lines of analysis within the Kirkos data framework include the investigation of socio-environmental determinants for child health and community utilization of mother/child health clinics, e.g. weight of children measured at the baseline survey set against such factors as income, mother's education, ethnicity, latrine and housing standard, and water consumption. The report, *Exploring Child Health and Its Ecology: The Kirkos Study in Addis Ababa*.

Stop dr.!

Research Frame, Project Description and Data Evaluation, is available free of charge from Professor Göran Sterky, St Göran's

Children's Hospital, S-112 81 Stockholm, Sweden.

What Now: Another Development

The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, published as a special double issue of DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE in separate English, French and Spanish editions (*What Now: Another Development, Que Faire: Un Autre Développement and Qué Hacer: Otro Desarrollo*), and subsequently in a German edition (*Was Tun*), by the Vienna Institute for Development, continues to attract interest. Altogether some 42,000 copies have now been printed and material has been reprinted from the report and its background papers in a number of outlets. Part One ('Towards Another Development') has been published in 1976 in the *Friedensanalysen* series of Suhrkamp Verlag in a volume entitled *Schwerpunkt: Unterentwicklung (Für Theorie und Praxis 3)*. The March-April 1976 issue of *Ceres*, the review on development of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), was published under the guest editorship of Professor Ignacy Sachs, a principal adviser for the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project, with the theme 'Another Development' and drew largely on the content of the report.

The French futurological journal *2000* devoted its issue No. 34 (1976) to the theme *Tiers Monde et Ressources*, reprinting from the report the country study, 'Self-Reliance and Ujamaa: Tanzania's Development Strategy' by J. H. V. Maeda and Ibrahim M. Kaduma, and related papers by Daniel Théry and Silvia Mücknik.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has now published the first volume in its series based on the background papers to the report. Entitled *Outer Limits and Human Needs: Resource and Environmental Issues of Development Strategies* (a note appears elsewhere in this issue of DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE), it has been edited by Professor William H. Matthews of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg (Austria). A forthcoming volume, *Another Development: Approaches and Strategies*, drawing on background material for the report and edited by Marc Nerfin, is described below.

Forthcoming publications of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation will shortly be publishing *Another Development: Approaches and Strategies*, a collection of papers edited by Marc Nerfin, the contents of which will include the following: 'Towards

Another Development' (by Fernando Henrique Cardoso), 'Basic Needs, Peasants and the Strategy for Rural Development' (by Rodolfo Stavenhagen), 'Another Development for Women' (by Krishna Ahoja Patel), 'Cultural

Aspects of the Crisis in the Industrialized Capitalist Countries' (by Jacques Berthelot), 'Alternative Life Styles in Rich Countries' (by Johan Galtung), 'Brazil: Growth Through Inequality' (by Paulo Singer and Bolivar Lamounier), 'Mexico: A Commentary on the Satisfaction of Basic Needs' (by Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara), 'India: An Alternative Framework for Rural Development' (by Rajni Kothari), 'Tunisia: Endogenous Development and Structural Transformations: A Societal Vision' (by Ahmed Ben Salah) and 'Chile: Elements of a Development Strategy' (by Sergio Bitar).

Most of these papers were first prepared in the context of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project and all the authors contributed to the conceptual elaboration of the 1975 Dag Ham-

mar skjöld Report (*What Now: Another Development*). The texts, which have been revised and sometimes expanded, are intended as a further substantive contribution to the international discussion on another development.

A further volume is being edited for publication (in French) by Hachette in 1976. It will comprise the more technical papers prepared by the research unit which had been working for the project from January to June 1975 at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris. This volume will include facts and figures related to the present disorderly state of international economic relations, as well as to nutrition, health and human settlements; its emphasis will be on alternative solutions to meeting basic human needs.

Improving Public Enterprise Management in Tanzania

A recent issue of the *African Review* (Vol. 5, No. 2, 1975) is devoted to a selection of papers delivered at the 1974 Seminar on Measures for Improving Performance in the Management of Public Enterprises in Tanzania, organized by the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam in cooperation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The seminar was held to discuss issues relevant to effective management of public enterprises in Tanzania, in the light of the country's development aspirations and the experiences of other countries, particularly in the Third World. The issue includes the following papers: 'The Predicament of Managers of Public Enterprises in Tanzania' (by A. H. Rweyemamu), 'Workers' Participation in Management in Tanzania' (by P. Msekwa), 'Public Policy-making and Public Enterprises in Tan-

zania' (by G. Hydén), 'Dilemma in Development Strategy: The Case of the Industrial Development Agency in Third Countries' (by M. J. Boodhoo), 'Control Versus Autonomy in Improving the Management of Public Commercial Corporations in Developing Nations' (by C. H. Muwanga-Barlow), 'Inefficiency, Irresponsiveness and Irresponsibility in the Public Services—Is Mwongonzo to Blame?' (by R. H. Baguma), 'The Effect of Changes in the Tanzanian Public Service System upon Administrative Productivity, 1961-72' (by G. Mutahaba), 'Relevance, Efficiency, Romanticism and Confusion in Tanzanian Planning and Management' (by R. H. Green).

The *African Review* is a journal of African politics, development and international affairs. The review, whose editors and associate editors are drawn from a large number of African

universities and institutions outside Africa, is published by the East African Literature

Bureau from P.O. Box 35042, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, with particular attention to disarmament and arms regulation. Established in 1966 and financed by the Swedish Parliament, its staff, governing board and scientific advisers are international. Apart from a steady flow of publications providing detailed information on modern warfare and disarmament issues, the institute publishes the *World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook* (now in its seventh year of publication), reviewing the events of the year and developments in armaments and disarmament and arms control. The 1976 issue of the *Yearbook* concentrates on new topics in the following areas: (a) 1975, the year reviewed (con-

flict, arms build-up in the Middle East, environmental and ecological warfare, and reconnaissance satellites); (b) developments in world armaments (world military expenditure, arms production, and arms trade in 1975); (c) developments in arms control and disarmament (disarmament negotiations in 1975, the implementation of agreements related to disarmament, and a chronology of major events related to disarmament issues in 1975). The *Yearbook* is published by SIPRI, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London) and Almqvist & Wiksell International (Stockholm). *SIPRI is located at Sveavägen 166, S-113 46 Stockholm, Sweden (tel. 08-15 09 40).*

The International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA)

IFDA (formerly the International Centre for Development Alternatives) has now been legally established as a Swiss non-profit foundation. Its first activities have included an informal meeting held at Bursins (Switzerland) in July 1976 to discuss the results of the UNCTAD IV, Habitat and Employment conferences, the major UN conferences which took place in May and June. IFDA is now organizing a seminar on Sweden in the World Society with the Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies; the first conclusions of

the Swedish research team on this subject will be submitted to an international group comprising a majority of Third World citizens.

IFDA's council now includes twenty prominent political figures, administrators and social scientists from all over the world, most of whom were associated with the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project. The programme of activities of the foundation will be made available after a meeting of IFDA's executive committee, scheduled to take place in Algiers in October 1976.

The Third World Forum

1976 has been a year of consolidation for the Third World Forum. In February, the executive committee decided to establish a permanent co-ordinating secretariat in Mexico City and Juan Somavía was appointed co-ordinator. In June, Ismail Sabri Abdalla was elected chairman replacing Enrique Iglesias, who headed the Forum through its organizational phase since its initial meeting in April 1973 in Santiago, Chile. In September this year, the executive committee of the Forum approved a three-year work programme covering such issues as conditions for national and collective self-reliance, policies to counter cultural dependence, operations of the international power structure and analysis of questions of current concern such as raw materials, monetary issues and exports of

manufactures. These activities will be implemented on a project basis through institutions in the Third World.

The present members of the executive committee are the following: Ismail Sabri Abdalla, Javier Alejo, Samir Amin, Mohamed Said al Attar, Gamani Corea, Driss el Jazairi, Mahbub ul Haq, Enrique Iglesias, Nurul Islam, Paul Lin, Archibald Mafeje, Ngo Manh Lan, Alistair McIntyre, Ikenna Nzimiro, Enrique Oteiza, Oscar Pino Santos, Justinian Rweyemamu, Yusif Sayegh, and Vinyu Vichit Vadakan.

Further information about the activities of the Forum may be obtained from *Juan Somavía, Coordinating Secretariat, Third World Forum, Apartado 85-015, Mexico 20, D.F.*

The Third World Centre for Economic and Social Studies

The Third World Centre—originally known as the Third World University—was inaugurated in Mexico City on 14 September, 1976, by the President of Mexico, Luis Echeverría, who is also president of the Centre, and by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim. The 800 participants in the ceremony included a number of Heads of State or Government, ministers and other representatives of some fifty Third World countries, many senior UN officials as well as representatives of the Third World Forum, the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. As indicated by its Director

General, Lic. Rafael Garcia de Quevedo, the Centre will tackle the following problems: the new international economic order; food and agriculture; technologies; the sociology of culture and education; information and population.

The general approach of the Centre was clearly expressed by the President of Mexico as will be seen from the following extracts of his inaugural address:

'The Centre is beginning its work with the principal objective of integrating universal experience and the contributions made by our peoples, in their struggle for survival, into a cohesive whole.

'That experience and those contributions consist of technologies and life styles that accord with our actual conditions, which have been ignored or unknown from one country to the next. Often disdained by ethnocentric and self-denigrating mentalities, they nevertheless constitute profoundly meaningful forms of culture that may be used as scientific weapons for a new development decided on and planned by ourselves.

'With this perspective, the centre intends to combat the pervasive inertia that led us to make inadequate use of methods and instruments originating in the cultural metropolises that use their impressive power of dissemination and penetration to impose guidelines of supposed universal validity.

'The most difficult problem lies in the fact that our people eventually are led to judging themselves and their realities from the standpoint and cultural patterns of foreign centres

of domination. Accordingly we must face these challenges within the context of our own capacities

'We must draft appropriate technology projects and reject a mimetic modernism that has led us, because of our own alienation, to the mechanical, indiscriminate and inappropriate selection of technologies or fields of research.

'We must not underestimate the value of the culture and history that are our roots; rather we must seek in them the fundamental answers to our problems. The sovereignty of our nations can be most effectively strengthened through the constant preservation and enrichment of our national identities and the generation of knowledge as a vital weapon for liberation—but this knowledge must be purposefully oriented toward overcoming the complex network of exploitation that has prevented the development of our societies.'

*Some publications of
the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation*

Mass Education. Studies in Adult Education and Teaching by Correspondence in Some Developing Countries. Edited by Lars-Olof Edström, Renée Erdos and Roy Prosser. Uppsala, 1970. 379 pp. Price: 68 Sw.kr.

Sovereignty, Aggression and Neutrality. Three lectures by Hans Blix. Uppsala, 1970. 64 pp. Price: 21.25 Sw.kr.

The Image of the Developing Countries: An Inquiry into Swedish Public Opinion. By Stig Lindholm. Uppsala, 1971. 100 pp. Price: 21.25 Sw.kr.

The World Development Plan: A Swedish Perspective. By Ernst Michanek. Uppsala, 1971. 71 pp. Price: 21.25 Sw.kr.

Nutrition: A Priority in African Development. Edited by Bo Vahlquist. Uppsala, 1972. 228 pp. Price: 51 Sw.kr.

Technical Assistance Administration in East Africa. Edited by Yashpal Tandon. Uppsala, 1973. 212 pp. Price: 29.75 Sw.kr.

The above publications may be ordered from Almqvist & Wiksell, P.O. Box 62, S-101 20 Stockholm. The publications below are available only from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation direct:

The Story of a Seminar in Applied Communication. Edited by Andreas Fuglesang. Uppsala, 1973. 142 pp. Price: air mail 35 Sw.kr., surface mail 25 Sw.kr.

Applied Communication in Developing Countries. By Andreas Fuglesang. Uppsala, 1973. 124 pp. Price: air mail 40 Sw.kr., surface mail 30 Sw.kr.

Action for Children: Towards an Optimum Child Care Package in Africa. Edited by Olle Nordberg, Peter Phillips and Göran Sterky. Uppsala, 1975. 238 pp. Price: air mail 40 Sw.kr., surface mail 30 Sw.kr.

The Treaty Maker's Handbook. Edited by Hans Blix and Jirina H. Emerson. Uppsala, 1973. 355 pp. Price: 90 Sw.kr.

Appointment with the Third World. Experts and Volunteers in the Field: Their Work, Life and Thoughts. By Stig Lindholm. Uppsala, 1974. 144 pp. Price: 25.50 Sw.kr.

Report from Swaneng Hill. Education and Employment in an African Country. By Patrick van Rensburg. Uppsala, 1974. 235 pp. Price: 20 Sw.kr. (UK and Commonwealth only: Wildwood House Ltd, 29 King Street, London WC2E 8JD. Price: £1.95)

Outer Limits and Human Needs: Resource and Environmental Issues of Development Strategies. Edited by William H. Matthews. Uppsala, 1975. 102 pp. Price: 45 Sw.kr.

Film-making in Developing Countries 1: The Uppsala Workshop. Edited by Andreas Fuglesang. Uppsala, 1975. 123 pp. Price: air mail 40 Sw.kr., surface mail 30 Sw.kr.

Film-making in Developing Countries 2: Highlights from a Film Workshop. Executive producer: Bo-Erik Gyberg. 16 mm b&w film, 16 minutes. Price: 500 Sw.kr.

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