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Dag Hammarskjöld and the United Nations: Vision and legacy — 50 years later



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Dag Hammarskjöld
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A sunny September day

I WAS ELEVEN, standing in our garden, moved to tears when my mother told me what had happened. In my childish world Dag Hammarskjöld had been a guarantor against "the worst", in spite of the Cold War round the corner. How could he suddenly go?

Fifty years later I have the privilege of introducing Henning Melber as guest editor of this special issue of New Routes. Thanks to his commitment, knowledge and network we present the vision and legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld in honourable memory.

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Editorial:

Dag Hammarskjöld re-visited

Henning Melber

This special issue of *New Routes* recognises the legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld as second Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN). 50 years after his death, his concepts of the UN, of mediation and peacebuilding, and his understanding of the role as the highest international civil servant remain as relevant today as they were then. The contributions address the standards and criteria set by Hammarskjöld during his eight years in office (1953-61). They also recognise the continued demand for the approaches and types of initiatives he embodied. This is not a backward-looking exercise, which portrays the romantic heroism of a by-gone era. Rather, it is forward-looking, intended to learn from the past for the sake of our future.

In an address to the University of California's convocation on 13 May 1954, Hammarskjöld, after a year in office as UN Secretary-General, concluded: 'It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.' According to him, 'that sums up as well as anything I have heard both the essential role of the United Nations and the attitude of mind that we should bring to its support.'¹ Indeed, and unfortunately, little in our times has changed for the better (if at all) to make such a pragmatic approach superfluous.

Despite the need for such realism, scepticism often reigns half a century after Hammarskjöld in judgments of



PHOTO: MATTIAS LASSON, DHF

– However ambiguous the achievements of the UN may seem, many of the efforts of the world body deserve our recognition, says Henning Melber, guest editor of this special issue of *New Routes* and Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

the performance of the institution established after the Second World War as a global body embracing all the recognised governments of sovereign states. The UN is barely appreciated for its achievements, but criticised rather for its failures. The wide range of covenants, conventions, resolutions and other codified programmes and declarations adopted over the more than 60 years of its existence often reveal an appalling discrepancy between defined

norms and sobering social and political realities. But would the world today be a better place in the absence of such frameworks, as selectively and arbitrarily as they have far too often been applied? Would we be better off without the UN?

There seems little reason to sing praise songs concerning the rather ambiguous achievements of the UN. But looking back, it would be unfair to dismiss the efforts of the 'family of nations' as merely useless or fruitless. Especially those voices in the so-called global South, at times now openly critical of international governance as a tool for hegemonic interests, should remember that in the absence of the limited power of a UN, their future might now be even more problematic.

After all, the UN played a pioneering role in declaring apartheid a 'crime against humanity' and imposing an arms embargo on the South African minority regime.² It also was decisive in bringing about the decolonisation of

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Namibia as a 'trust betrayed'³ and has played a similar role in mediating the end of conflicts elsewhere. Struggles for emancipation would in many instances have been even more prolonged – if successful at all – in the absence of the arena created by the world body, as limited as its powers may be. The same can be said of the many peacekeeping missions, which were established in their current form by none other than Hammarskjöld when dealing with the challenges of the so-called Suez Crisis in 1956. The organisational structure and chart for peacekeeping operations he designed during a mission to the Congo in 1960 (see p.42 in this issue) has stood the test of time.

UN resolutions for global responsibility

This year marks the half-century of Hammarskjöld's death during a mission to seek a peaceful solution for the Congo. The country has remained torn by violence bordering on chronic civil strife, at the cost of millions of lives and the ruin of the physical and mental health of so many more. As is so often the case, women and children have suffered most and have been the victims of a war that has not shied away from systematic rape and other forms of atrocities to the individual. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2000 paved the way for a new approach to dealing with gender issues, while Security Council Resolution 1960 of December 2010 finally consolidated new standards and norms in the effort to protect both women and men from systematic sexual violence as a means of war-making. The implementation of the latter will serve both as another beacon for humankind and a point of reference for measuring the effectiveness and legal and moral weight of the world body.

Murhega Mashanda highlights the role of a local civil society in the efforts to bring more peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Margot Wallström deal with the relevance of and obligations under the normative instruments created during the first decade of our century for the protection and promotion of women and the prosecution of sexual violence, and document how the UN has indeed responded to new challenges.

The situation in today's Democratic Republic of the Congo is unfortunately only the tip of the iceberg. People are exposed to similar and other forms of

destruction in many parts of the world, with Libya and the Ivory Coast being only the latest examples in a seemingly endless series of conflicts. With UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 adopted in February and March 2011 respectively, we seem to have entered a new norm-setting stage of global responsibility, even though the outcomes are still too early to judge. The highly unusual processes thereby set in motion carry with them the risk of yet more one-sided, opportunistic exploitation for hegemonic purposes. The jury is still out on the effectiveness of such interventions as a means of dealing with unacceptable violations by dictators of defined fundamental standards and norms, using the altar of national sovereignty as a protective shield, and of saving lives instead of sacrificing them.

Kiyo Akasaka illustrates how the UN today accepts the engagement with emerging challenges, while Phyllis Bennis critically assesses the risks of the new interventions in Libya and the possible ambiguities resulting from these for peacekeeping in a time of war.

Remaining global challenges

While the Westphalian order remains at the core of bi- and multilateral relations, the UN as an instrument for global governance in the face of global challenges is more important than ever. The greatest threats to human survival, the future of our planet and all forms of life know no borders. One can only speculate what the late Secretary-General's initiatives would have been for dealing with the challenges of climate change, international terrorism and many other then unknown phenomena. Being a person with a deep-rooted love and respect for nature, culture, religion and the arts, who sought dialogue instead of polarisation, he would have approached matters in his own way.

What is certain is that the challenges Hammarskjöld and his staff faced then have not been solved. Nor have we avoided the mistakes that marred not least the UN's involvement in the former Belgian Congo and culminated in the brutal murder of the Congo's first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, as well as the death of Dag Hammarskjöld.⁴ But the onus 'to save us from hell' still rests on the institution, which, despite all its setbacks and shortcomings, has also been a norm-setting authority. In an address on 'Asia, Africa,

and the West' delivered to the academic association of the University of Lund on 4 May 1959, Hammarskjöld confidently claimed that, 'the Organization I represent ... is based on a philosophy of solidarity'.⁵ Solidarity, empathy, integrity are the values for which he stood and by which he lived. He created a moral compass guiding the international civil service, thereby setting criteria against which the UN and their leaders continue to be measured.

The complementary reflections of Lena Lid Falkman, Hans Corell, Thomas G. Weiss, Peter Wallensteen, Brian Urquhart and Jan Eliasson testify with differing nuance to the significant role of Dag Hammarskjöld as an international civil servant and global leader and to his relevance today.

Human universalism

For Hammarskjöld, the work of the UN was to build on the commonality of humankind, its conduct and experience. During a visit to India in early February 1956, he addressed the Indian Council of World Affairs. Prompted by a moving encounter with a local cultural event performed in his honour earlier, his mainly extemporaneous speech explored the dimensions of human universalism. A commonality beyond Western – or, indeed, any culturally, religiously or geographically limited – ideology or conviction is what he spoke to:

It is no news to anybody, but we sense it in different degrees, that our world of today is more than ever before *one* world. The weakness of one is the weakness of all, and the strength of one – not the military strength, but the real strength, the economic and social strength, the happiness of people – is indirectly the strength of all. Through various developments which are familiar to all, world solidarity has, so to say, been forced upon us. This is no longer a choice of enlightened spirits; it is something which those whose temperament leads them in the direction of isolationism have also to accept. (...) With respect to the United Nations as a symbol of faith, it may (...) be said that to every man it stands as a kind of 'yes' to the ability of man to form his own destiny, and form his own destiny so as to create a world where the dignity of man can come fully into its own.⁶

Dag Hammarskjöld, as Swedish cosmopolitan, showed that firm roots in one's own society, with its particular



PHOTO: BERNT JONSSON

The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Crash Site outside of Ndola was added to the UNESCO World Heritage list in 1997. Nowadays there is also a museum with some remains of the plane. The picture was taken in 1971 by Bernt Jonsson, later to become Executive Director of LPI.

history and culture, were no obstacle to universal values but, instead, a valuable point of departure, provided that history and culture was not taken as the one and only absolute 'truth'. The awareness of one's own upbringing in a specific social context, anchoring one's identity in a framework guided by a set of values, allows for curiosity towards 'otherness' and explorations into the 'unknown' for one's own benefit and gain. There are no risks in entering a dialogue with 'strangers' if one knows where one comes from. On 8 September 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld addressed the staff at the secretariat of the UN for the last time. His words then are as relevant today:

What is at stake is a basic question of principle: Is the Secretariat to develop as an international secretariat, with the full independence contemplated in Article 100 of the Charter, or is it to be looked upon as an intergov-

ernmental – not international – secretariat providing merely the necessary administrative services for a conference machinery? This is a basic question, and the answer to it affects not only the working of the Secretariat but the whole of the future of international relations.⁷

Marco Toscano-Rivalta explores the perspectives resulting from such a notion. As a younger UN staff member today he testifies to the lasting mark Hammarskjöld made on a committed international civil service.

In honourable memory

Hammarskjöld died during the early morning hours of 18 September 1961, close to the wreckage of the plane that crashed before landing in Ndola, the Northern Rhodesia town bordering the former colony of the Belgian Congo. None of the 15 other members of his entourage and crew on board survived,

and the cause of the crash remains a matter of speculation. But the legacy of the UN second Secretary-General remains alive – not only, but not least through the further drafting, adoption and implementation of normative frameworks to promote and protect human rights for all. Common sense tells us, of course, that normative frameworks alone will not save us from hell. But hell is much more likely in the absence of such frameworks, which provide important markers and reference points for guiding the noble cause of ensuring human rights for as many of us as possible and for bringing those who abuse them to task.

In April 2011, the Swedish central bank announced the choice of personalities to be depicted on the new bank notes to be introduced in 2014/15. The new 1,000 kronor note will remind us of 'the boss', as he was respectfully and fondly (if not admiringly) called by the

UN staff he was heading. But Dag Hammarskjöld and his values, his principled views and his integrity should in another way be common currency in our daily lives. It is for us to keep his values alive as our own and to strengthen the UN, not, as Hammarskjöld reminded us, 'in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell'.

There is a website that allows one to visit the pictured graves of people and post a message. The Hammarskjöld family grave in Uppsala is one such tomb, and ever since the website was created a few years ago, people have posted messages to it, mainly around the date of Dag Hammarskjöld's birth or death. One of them, by a certain Kim from Texas, was posted on 17 September 2006. It reads: 'You set the bar high for everyone who came after you Mr. Secretary. Never a politician, always a diplomat. Rest in peace.'⁸ 🌿

- 1 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956*, (Selected and edited with Commentary), New York and London: Columbia University Press 1972, p. 301.
- 2 See for a summary on these specific UN interventions: *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information 1994; and *Twenty-Five Years of Commitment to the Elimination of 'Apartheid' in South Africa*. New York: United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid 1988.
- 3 *A Trust Betrayed, Namibia*. New York: United Nations, Office of Public Information 1974.
- 4 See the volume also reviewed in this issue: Robert A. Hill/Edmond J. Keller (eds), *Trustee for the Human Community. Ralph J. Bunche, the United Nations, and the Decolonization of Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 2010.
- 5 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of The United Nations. Volume IV: Dag Hammarskjöld 1958-1960*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1974, p. 384.
- 6 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier/Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1972, pp. 661 and 660.
- 7 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-general of the United Nations. Volume V: Dag Hammarskjöld 1960-1961*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1975, p. 563.
- 8 Accessed in March 2011 at www.findagrave.com.

PHOTO: DHF



Many prominent people have paid their respect to Dag Hammarskjöld at the family grave in Uppsala old churchyard, among them Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General 1997-2006.

The rising generation might not know too much about Dag Hammarskjöld's personality, visions and achievements, but none the less, our own age has a great deal to learn from his leadership. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has limited power but may have great influence. In order to exert this influence in a meta-organisation like the UN, you need trust, more than obedience, from the international community.

Hammarskjöld had visions and ideas about communication that were quite unusual in the 1950s. In order to enhance the presence of the UN in the world he initiated the system of Special Representatives appointed by the Secretary-Generals. He visualised and embodied the concept of an international civil servant.

General rather than Secretary

Lena Lid Falkman

It had been a colourful meeting on 3 October 1960 at the UN General Assembly Hall in the Manhattan headquarters, where Nikita Khrushchev accused the Secretary-General of not being neutral. Officially the Soviet Union did not believe in the system of one single leader of the UN and argued that the post of Secretary-General should be exchanged for leadership by a troika of countries. Rumour had it that the main reason for the attack was actually that Hammarskjöld was too strong and troublesome. During his assignment he turned out to be a General rather than the Secretary the member states thought they had elected. During the meeting Khrushchev explicitly and loudly told Hammarskjöld to resign. Dag Hammarskjöld, known to be an inexpressive public speaker, answered with strength and emphasis:

"It is not the Soviet Union or indeed any other Big Powers which need the United Nations for their protection. It is all the others ... I shall remain in my post during the term of office as a servant of the Organisation in the interest of all these other nations as long as they wish me to do so.

In this context the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of courage. It is very easy to resign. It is not so easy to stay on. It is very easy to bow to the wish of a Big Power. It is another matter to resist. As is well known to all members of this Assembly I have done so before on many occasions and in many directions. If it is the wish of those nations who see in the Organisation their best protection in the present world, I shall now do so again."¹

Hammarskjöld's statement was interrupted by loud applause and followed by a standing ovation. People around the world cheered as well, as the five boxes worth of admiring letters sent to Hammarskjöld testified to. The retort has come to be seen as an expression of some of the visions and values that Hammarskjöld stood for. It is also an example of power negotiation in the governance of a federation and meta-organisation. Furthermore, it shows the importance of trust in value-based leadership.

Hammarskjöld was one of the most effective and trusted Secretary-Generals, as the saying "Leave it to Dag", which was in common use in the organisation, seems to suggest. His conception of the international civil servant made him a role model for staff of international organisations. He is also an inspiration for many people around the world as a poet and religious mystic. The interest for Hammarskjöld seems to have gone through a revival in the beginning of the 21st century.² So what can we learn from Dag Hammarskjöld's leadership today?

Leadership as influence and communication

During the early 20th century, leaders and leadership (often categorised as management) became subjects of scientific study. The interest in leadership continues and leadership research seems to grow exponentially.³ The literature is diverse, perhaps due to different starting points: the leader as an individual, leadership as a process, or the behaviour of the leader.⁴ Other areas

that have been studied are strategy, efficiency, the importance of the organisational culture and the influence of particular situations. Leadership is not easily defined, and no single definition has become generally accepted. However, most scholars agree that leadership has to do with influence. Peter G Northouse has, by analysing a vast number of leadership studies, concluded that leadership "is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal".⁵ Influence is the base of leadership. Without influence, leadership does not exist.

How does this influence work? Through money, rules, laws or maybe even violence, but also "soft" influence through norms and culture. Since the 1980s, at least in the Anglo-Saxon research, leadership theory has been primarily concerned with investigating soft influence in the area of value-based leadership. Concepts such as "visionary", "charismatic" and "authentic leadership" have been explored to explain emotional, ethical, motivational and symbolic aspects of leadership.

Federation, meta-organisation and world community

"All the power a Secretary-General has, is the power of reason and persuasion", said Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General 1997-2006, in the Swedish/Norwegian TV show *Först och sist* in April 2007. Leading the UN has some particular conditions, due to the fact that UN in its form is a federation, meta-organisation and world community.

The word federation derives from the Latin word *fides*, meaning confidence

and trust. A federation is a voluntary association based on common agreements. The power in a federation is split between the owner-organisation (members) and the management-organisation (federation staff). Their interests and power overlap and in some events collide. The organisational scholar Erik Swartz argues that a chairman in a federation to a much larger extent needs to earn trust than leaders in organisations with stricter hierarchy.⁶ In some sense, the leader in a federation is the leaders' leader, in that it is the members who provide the leader with a mission and responsibility.

The UN can also be defined as a meta-organisation. It is an organisation that consists of other organisations as members, and is both an expression of, result of, and also a reason for globalisation. The meta-organisation is dependent on the members for its access to resources and its ability to exercise influence. Conflicts between members in a meta-organisation are hard to solve by means of exclusion or the authority of the leadership. The

The meta-organisation is dependent on the members for its access to resources and its ability to exercise influence.

possibility for the meta-organisation to exercise influence lies in persuasion, consensus, and negotiation. The UN is one of the larger meta-organisations that exist.⁷ It is unique in its multi-dimensionality and is universal as a world community.

These aspects make the UN and its front figure, the Secretary-General, interesting cases for value-based leadership. As Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers commented on the role of the Secretary-General in A world in need of leadership: "Although the office has little real power, it provides very wide possibilities for exercising influence."⁸ Value-based leadership is influence through communication, values, visions, and through the leader's own person.

Communication – personal and in new ways

Dag Hammarskjöld declared: "I go to Peking, because I believe in personal talks."⁹ This trip to China where Hammarskjöld negotiated, and socialised, with Chou En-lai became Hammarskjöld's first diplomatic break-through, in that he succeeded in releasing American prisoners. The view of communi-

***Dag Hammarskjöld declared:
"I go to Peking,
because I believe in
personal talks."***

cation as relational also influenced his view on media and public opinion. In his own words: "The Secretary-General – and I use him as a symbol for all of the Secretariat – is facing a public relations problem of a delicate and difficult nature ... But he has to try and reach the minds and hearts of people so as to get the United Nations' efforts firmly based in public reaction ... So the question of public relations to the Secretary-General develops into a question of human relations."¹⁰ Hammarskjöld also acknowledged one of the most established insights in rhetoric: the importance of emotions as a means to reach the audience.

Hammarskjöld pioneered new ways to communicate. He realised the importance of media, and the importance of using public opinion in diplomacy, through media. "His (the diplomat's) words will reach everybody by press and film and radio and television."¹¹ One way to reach out in media was to create a relationship with journalists. In 1953 Hammarskjöld introduced regular press conferences. In the first meeting he tells the somewhat puzzled journalists that he sees these meetings as a collaboration. Hammarskjöld had an idea and strategy in communicating through media, which seems to be unusual in the 1950s. However, he was aware of the fact that media does not always say what ought to be said: "In the modern world of mass media and publicity no diplomat trying to respond to the demands of the situation can only be a servant. He must to some extent and in some respects also be a leader by looking beyond the immediate future

and going underneath the superficial reactions, be they expressed by ever so important news organs ..." ¹²

Hammarskjöld used the Secretary-General's Special Representative as a tool to be present in more places than he himself could be.¹³ Thereby his idea of communication as a relationship did not remain just a personal ideal. He used it as an institutionalised organisational tool. Such translation of ideas into practical tools ought to be one of the most important lessons for value-based leadership. One key to the success of the initiatives resulting from Hammarskjöld's vision and values is his creative language. "Silent diplomacy" creates other associations than "negotiation behind closed doors". "Peace-keeping forces" means something else than "armed military". In talking of the UN Hammarskjöld often used metaphors based on the family, the informal and the close. The UN staff was the family and the UN headquarter was the house. He also acted in ways which showed that he was not a believer in hierarchy and status for its own sake, for example by eating in the café in the basement rather than in the delegates' dining room. As he did this on his first day as Secretary-General, it is said to have attracted a certain amount of attention. It is also something that appears to have become a symbolic ritual. Ban Ki-moon also did this on his first day at work.¹⁴

Visions as reaction to events

It is not only Hammarskjöld's creativity that is important in his communication, but also his patience and persistence. Over and over again he speaks and writes about the things that he sees as important. Take for example the

Hammarskjöld had an idea and strategy in communicating through media, which seems to be unusual in the 1950s.

role of the international civil servant. Hammarskjöld talks about what this role means, and what is important for people in this role, such as integrity and neutrality. He explores and defines the role and its values, over and over again.



In 1953 Dag Hammarskjöld initiated regular press conferences at the UN, then an unusual approach to communication through media.

If a norm is to be institutionalised in a culture, it is not enough to state this as a value statement. The message needs to be repeated, in many channels, in many ways.

The idea of the international civil servant can be seen as one of Hammarskjöld's visions. It is a goal. It unites the people in his organisation. It says how they ought to work and think and what the goal and ideal of their way of working is. Visionary leaders are often characterised as people who expound their visions with fiery performances, and whose visions were developed early, often in childhood.¹⁵ Hammarskjöld is sometimes described as a boring public speaker. But this is probably a result of judgments based on norms associated with other cultures of expression. Also, I believe that many of his visions and ideas derived from specific situations rather than being childhood visions. It seems as if it was the attack from Khrushchev and the need for a coherent culture in the early beginning of the UN, which triggered Hammarskjöld to

formulate the vision of the international civil servant. Subsequently, Hammarskjöld filled the idea with content, such as the importance of neutrality and integrity, and how it can work in reality, how it can be lived.

Leaders as carrier of values

One important part of value-based leadership is leading through one's own person. Authenticity and appearing to be genuine are being highlighted today as important aspects both in rhetorical theory and in the area of leadership. The leader is a symbol and a carrier of values.

The eight men who have had the role of Secretary-Generals are in many aspects homogenous. When analysing their exterior appearance, they are quite alike. Middle-aged (48-63 years of age) clean-cut men, all with a similar background (experience from both national and international politics). They also have similar education with studies in law or economics. Hammarskjöld sticks out. He is the only one without a

family, he does not have a background in party politics, and besides diplomas in both law and economics, he also has a humanistic education with studies in language and philosophy.

When doing a rhetorical analysis covering all eight installations of the Secretary-Generals, both the statement of the Secretary-General to be, as well as the statements of the delegates, I found over a hundred words that expressed character traits or virtues, which were said to be typical of these eight men. When analysed, these seem to be variations of classical virtues. The eight men are all attributed the same virtues, the most important one being integrity. A rhetorical analysis (both with classical genre analysis and with the contemporary model of dramatic pentad) shows that these virtues are reproduced and attributed to the leaders, not as descriptions of the leaders' personalities. They are rather an expression of the attempt to create unity in the group, the UN. It is the celebration of these virtues that is important in the organisation. The indi-

vidual person, the Secretary-General, is used as a rhetorical figure synecdoche, the part which represents the whole. A leader is made into a symbol of the organisation's values.¹⁶

The eight Secretary-Generals are homogenous in terms of their exterior attributes. They are also ascribed the same character traits in form of classical virtues. However, they seem to be very

**“Silent diplomacy”
creates other
associations than
“negotiation behind
closed doors”.**

different as persons, in that they have treated and handled the position very differently. In an ambitious study, Kent J Kille has mapped seven Secretary-Generals' actions and communication and argues that they have different leadership styles. Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjöld and Boutros Boutros Ghali were visionaries, U Thant, Kurt Waldheim and Javier Perez de Cuellar were bureaucrats, and Kofi Annan was a strategist. Dag Hammarskjöld was the most typical of the ideal visionary leader, even though his results were complex.

Despite getting the highest score on the aspect of visions, Hammarskjöld was at the same time focused on actions, which makes Kille call him “a visionary in a manager's clothing”.¹⁷ This is also expressed in many of the things Hammarskjöld has been called, such as a realistic idealist or a pragmatist with a vision. It is my belief that this says something about successful visionary leadership. In order to not stop at

empty vision statements, vision needs to be translated into practice, and visions also need to be lived and acted by their advocates.

Ageless values and lessons

To a large extent, Hammarskjöld stood for classical virtues. In many ways, his speeches and writings and poems have aged well. There are contemporary aspects in many of the things that Hammarskjöld wrote and said. In a time when diplomatic, secret correspondence is published on Wikileaks and the like, Hammarskjöld's words from 1953, when discussing the UN as operating in a glass house, are worth a thought: “Publicity is right and necessary in multilateral diplomacy. However, it also represents a danger. Open diplomacy may ... easily become frozen diplomacy. This comes about when open diplomacy is turned into diplomacy by public statements made merely to satisfy segments of domestic public opinion or to gain some propaganda advantage elsewhere.”¹⁸

2011 marks fifty years since Hammarskjöld passed away. But his values, visions, communication and leadership are modern and have much to teach us about the world of today. 🌿

1 Andrew Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*. Columbia University Press 1972.

2 See Lid Andersson, *Ledarskapande Retorik – Dag Hammarskjöld och FN:s generalsekretäre som scen för karisma, dygder och ledarideal*. Stockholm: EFI 2009, p. 247.

3 Keith Grint, *Leadership, limits and possibilities*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2005, p. 15.

4 Ibid., pp. 1-19

5 Peter G Northouse, *Leadership – Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks: Sage 2007, p. 3.

6 Erik Swartz, *Ledning och organisering av federationer*. Stockholm: Nerenius & Santerus 1994.

7 Göran Ahrne and Nils Brunsson, *Meta-organizations*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008.

8 Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers, *A world in need of leadership*. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 1990, p. 22.

9 Bo Beskow, *Dag Hammarskjöld – Strictly Personal*. New York: Double Day 1969, p. 35.

10 Address by Dag Hammarskjöld to American Political Science Association, Washington. 11 September 1953. Published in Kai Falkman, *To speak for the world*. Atlantis 2005.

11 Address by Dag Hammarskjöld to Foreign Policy Association 21 October 1953. Published in *ibid*.

12 Ibid.

13 Brian Urquhart. *Dag Hammarskjöld*. Tryckcentrum. 1972.; UN press release SG/849, August 27, 1959. In Cordier and Foote 1972. Vol 2: p 475.

14 Niklas Ekdahl and Inga-Britt Ahlenius, *Mr Chance*. Stockholm: Brombergs 2011.

15 Frances Westley & Henry Mintzberg, Visionary leadership and strategic management. In: *Strategic Management Journal* (10)1989, pp.17-32; Raed Awamleh and William L Gardner, Perceptions of leader charisma and effectiveness. In: *Leadership Quarterly* 10(3)1999, pp. 345-373.

16 Lena Lid Andersson, *op. cit*.

17 Kent J Kille, *From manager to visionary – The Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Palgrave Macmillan 2006, p. 68.

18 Address by Dag Hammarskjöld to Foreign Policy Association 21 October 1953, *op. cit*.



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Inspired by Dag Hammarskjöld

I do not remember where I first heard or read about the tragic death, but it was something that everyone talked about – and we still do. We, the students in Uppsala, were invited to honour Dag Hammarskjöld in different ways. Two nights after his death, students walked from the castle to the Main Hall of the University, where a commemorative speech was held. When his coffin was placed on *lit de parade* in the Cathedral, students made up the guard of honour and eight students carried the coffin out of the Cathedral after the state funeral.

I was one of the students lining up along the route of the several hundred meters long procession from the Cathedral to the cemetery. The atmosphere was overwhelming: the catafalque supporting the coffin covered with the Swedish flag and flowers symbolising the UN emblem, the horses, all the people representing different countries and different religions. In this historic moment I started to realise the greatness of Dag Hammarskjöld. It was a day with clear sky and some wind – and when the procession came closer to the cemetery the clouds covered the sun.

This occurred during my first term in Uppsala. The introduction to student life in Uppsala was thrilling enough, but

it was nothing compared to this magnificent scene. Never had I experienced anything like this before. And the daily life of the UN troops in Congo, which I had learned about in general terms in the letters I exchanged with one of the soldiers, took on another and more serious dimension for me.

My interest in international work grew over the years and during the last decades the memory from that very special day has influenced my life more and more. I have of course been to the UN Headquarters in New York and to Dag Hammarskjöld's summer house "to be", Backåkra in southern Sweden, now a museum. The lovely circle of stones with the word PAX inscribed on the big one in the middle, as well as the Memorial room, give me feelings similar to those I experience coming back to the mountains in Jämtland in northern Sweden where I grew up. Coming back there gives me time for reflection, to calm down, and get new inspiration.

With the fond memories I have from the mountains, from all seasons, and the stories told about the photographer Nils Thomasson and pictures taken by him, it is like having walked on a parallel track to Dag Hammarskjöld. Nils Thomasson was the one who introduced Dag Hammarskjöld to

photography, to nature and the mountains when he visited Jämtland in the early years.

Wherever you go in Uppsala, Hammarskjöld's home town during twenty years, and the city he wanted to return to, you encounter his memories: his article in the Swedish Tourist Association's year-book of 1962 about his beloved Castle Hill, the memories of the different Nobel Peace laureates like himself: Nathan Söderblom, Albert Schweitzer, Alva Myrdal and Martin Luther King, everything about Carl von Linné whom he admired and about whom he presented a Director's speech at the Swedish Academy in 1957. Dag Hammarskjöld's wordings are impressive. One can see his deep interest in literature, his contacts with authors. In the Cathedral, in the Peace Chapel, one of his Markings, "Not I, but God in me", was placed in 2005, 100 years after his birth.

Birgitta Nordenman



The outdoor meditation site with stones in a circle provides a peaceful experience for visitors to Dag Hammarskjöld's farm Backåkra in southern Sweden.

The position of civil servants within the United Nations (UN) in general and of its Secretary-General in particular is of a very sensitive nature. Neutrality and integrity are two crucial concepts in the discharge of these duties. Dag Hammarskjöld made evident the ethical dilemma when the Secretary-General is involved in situations that might lead to political conflict.

During the 50 years since Dag Hammarskjöld's death the world has undergone tremendous changes. The necessity of binding ethical and legal agreements within the UN system is, however, subsistent. They are a prerequisite for the efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law

The ethics of an international civil servant

Hans Corell

In September 2009, on the occasion of a commemorative event on the 48th anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's death, I had the privilege of reflecting on Dag Hammarskjöld's famous speech on the international civil service at Oxford University on 30 May 1961.¹ I noted that, in view of the challenges that humankind faces in our days of globalisation, the need for the rule of law in international affairs has never been greater. The way in which this has been emphasised by different United Nations (UN) organs leads to the obvious conclusion that we need effective international organisations. In particular we need an effective UN; the purposes of the organisation are just as relevant today as they were in 1945. A point of departure in Dag Hammarskjöld's 1961 lecture is the provisions in the UN Charter that deal with the role of the Secretary-General. In particular he identifies the dilemma that might present itself when the General Assembly or the Security Council entrusts the Secretary-General with tasks involving the execution of political decisions that might bring him and the Secretariat into the arena of possible political conflict. He also concludes that the Secretary-General of the UN is not a purely administrative official but one with an explicit political responsibility.

His main focus is on situations where the Secretary-General is entrusted with functions which by necessity require him to take positions in highly controversial political matters and where he may have to take action which unavoid-

 ***The Secretary-General must act on the basis of his exclusively international responsibility.***

ably may run counter to the views of at least some Member States. A particular dilemma is where an agreement reached in the general terms of a resolution may no longer exist when more specific issues are presented, in particular when subsequent developments that may not have been foreseen may call for action that could be regarded as highly controversial by the Member States or some of them.

He then comes to the ethical element in his reasoning. In his view the responsibilities of the Secretary-General under the Charter cannot be laid aside merely because the execution of decisions by him is likely to be politically controversial. Instead the Secretary-General must act on the basis of his exclusively international responsibility and not in the interest of any particular state or group of states.

Obligated to observe "neutrality"

According to the UN Charter, international civil servants shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organisation – in other words they are obliged to observe

"neutrality". Against this background, Dag Hammarskjöld develops his reasoning by analysing this word both in a legal and ethical perspective. In his view the international civil servant cannot be accused of lack of neutrality simply for taking a stand on a controversial issue when this is his duty and cannot be avoided. But at the same time there remains a serious intellectual and moral problem since in this situation the civil servant will find himself in an area within which personal judgement must come into play. Ultimately, the question becomes one of integrity or conscience.

In Dag Hammarskjöld's view the international civil servant must keep himself under the strictest observation. He is not requested to be a neuter in the sense that he has to have no sympathies or antipathies. In his personal capacity he can certainly have interests, or ideas or ideals. What he must be aware of are those human reactions and meticulously check himself so that they are not permitted to influence his actions.

To a lawyer it is interesting to note that Dag Hammarskjöld maintains that there is nothing unique in his reasoning. He ends by indicating that as a matter of fact every judge is under the same professional obligation.

The ethical core in Dag Hammarskjöld's reasoning must be conveyed in his own words:

"If the international civil servant knows himself to be free from such personal influences in his actions and guided solely by the common aims and rules laid down for, and by the Organisation



Integrity, independence and impartiality are words – and qualifications – of weighty importance to the Secretary General and all UN staff members.

he serves and by recognised legal principles, then he has done his duty, and then he can face the criticism which, even so, will be unavoidable. As I said, at the final last, this is a question of integrity, and if integrity in the sense of respect for law and respect for truth were to drive him into positions of conflict with this or that interest, then that conflict is a sign of his neutrality and not of his failure to observe neutrality – then it is in line, not in conflict, with his duties as an international civil servant.”²

Focus on democracy and the rule of law

The question is now what lessons we can draw from this reasoning in contemporary society. A given point of departure is the present geopolitical situation. Sadly, there are still conflicts

in many places around the globe. As a matter of fact, more people have lost their lives in conflicts that have occurred after the Second World War than in the two world wars combined. The root causes of conflicts that threaten international peace and security are the same: no democracy and no rule of law. Consequently, this is where our focus must be.

Ethical questions are omnipresent. However, when we have to deal with the unprecedented challenges that mankind is facing today they come to the forefront. The changing world economy, climate change, the growing world population, and migration will put extremely heavy demands on decision-makers around the world. A sad fact is that religious extremism, which one had hoped belonged to the past, has

“The civil servant will find himself in an area within which personal judgement must come into play.”

become a very serious complicating factor. These matters have to be addressed through political decisions based on international law. Ultimately such decisions may have to be translated into legislation or decisions of an administrative or judicial nature.


In the UN, the question of the rule of law has increasingly come to the forefront. The General Assembly has discussed it on several occasions. Of particular significance is the so-called Summit resolution, adopted in September 2005. In this resolution Member States recommitted themselves to actively protect and promote all human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Also the Security Council has engaged itself in this field for the simple reason that the rule of law has become a prominent element in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The presidential statement, adopted by the Security Council on 22 June 2006 deserves to be recalled:

“The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and international law, which are indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.”³

To someone who serves in an international organisation the question of how the standards agreed upon are observed by the members of the organisation is ever present. Are these proud declarations or decisions respected or do they constitute mere lip service? To international civil servants this sometimes becomes a question of ethics: should one speak up or ... ?

International agreements must be honoured

One of the fundamental principles of international law is expressed in the Latin concept *pacta sunt servanda* – agreements must be honoured. This principle is actually respected for the most. The simple reason for this is that it is



An international civil servant must be very strict not to let his own human reactions influence his actions. Dag Hammarskjöld visited Katanga in August 1960 for talks with Katanga authorities and Belgian representatives about possible solutions to the critical situation.

in the interest of states to abide by their commitments in order to be able to conduct their business in an orderly manner. However, when it comes to peace and security and state sovereignty, the picture changes.

The UN Charter is legally binding. As all international law it actually trumps national law, including national constitutions. If a state has concluded an international agreement, the state in question is bound by that agreement in relation to other parties to the treaty. Detailed rules about this are laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. With respect to the UN Charter there is also a provision (Article 103) that says that “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and the obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”.

However, in the debate we sometimes hear people in responsible po-

litical positions belittling international law, claiming that it constitutes an infringement on state sovereignty. That is a great misconception. When states enter into international agreements they actually exercise their sovereignty.

We also sometimes see flagrant violations of some of the core obligations in the Charter, in particular the rules that lay down the conditions under which use of force may be resorted to. Many events over the last few years have demonstrated that states are not fully committed to acting in accordance with their international obligations. Sadly, this applies also to members of the Security Council, including Western democracies.

Determination and efficiency

The development over the 50 years since Dag Hammarskjöld delivered his address has brought tremendous change. The Cold War is over, decolonisation is almost completed, the members of the United Nations now number 192, the number of resolutions adopted

by the Security Council is approaching 2,000, and international law is covering ever wider fields. In the latter respect, human rights law, humanitarian law and international criminal law could be mentioned in particular.

However, in some areas, there is still a wide gap between the norms that apply and the way in which they are respected. This is of course first and foremost a matter for the community of sovereign states. However, it also brings to the forefront the ethical element in the role of the international civil service. The UN is often criticised for not delivering. In many cases this criticism is valid. The truth is of course that the organisation can never be stronger than its members allow it to be. At the same time this raises the question whether the international civil servants might be able to influence the development in a more determined and effective manner in the future.

In this context the following provisions in the UN Charter are of particu-

lar relevance. According to Article 100, in the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the organisation. Article 101 stipulates that the staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly and the paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.

Staff's responsibilities are international

Staff Regulation 1.1 prescribes that staff members are international civil servants and that their responsibilities as staff members are not national but exclusively international.⁴ They shall make the following written declaration witnessed by the Secretary-General or his or her authorised representative:

"I solemnly declare and promise to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept in-

structions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other source external to the Organisation. I also solemnly declare and promise to respect the obligations incumbent upon me as set out in the Staff Regulations and Rules."

Staff Regulation 1.2 contains detailed rules on the basic rights and obligations of staff. Among the core values expressed in this provision, the following are of particular relevance in this context:

- Staff members shall uphold and respect the principles set out in the Charter, including faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.
- Staff members shall uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. The concept of integrity includes, but is not limited to, probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work and status.
- By accepting appointment, staff members pledge themselves to discharge their functions and regulate their conduct with the interests of the Organisation only in view. Loyalty to the aims, principles and purposes of the United Nations, as set forth in its Charter, is a fundamental obligation of all staff members by virtue of their status as international civil servants.
- Staff members shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner befitting their status as international civil servants and shall not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge of their duties with the United Nations.
- Staff members shall avoid any action and, in particular, any kind of public pronouncement that may adversely reflect on their status, or on the integrity, independence and impartiality that are required by that status.
- Staff members shall exercise the utmost discretion with regard to all matters of official business. They shall not communicate to any Government, entity, person or any other source any information known to them by reason of their official position that they know or ought to have known has not been made public, except as appropriate in the normal

course of their duties or by authorisation of the Secretary-General. These obligations do not cease upon separation from service.

Integrity and good judgement

The question is now how staff members should conduct themselves when they observe that Member States are not respecting the rules that they have agreed upon and when they observe that states are lacking in "loyalty to the aims, principles and purposes of the United Nations".

When states enter into international agreements they actually exercise their sovereignty.

It goes without saying that the rules just quoted mean that it would not be appropriate for staff members at different levels to express their personal views in various matters in a manner that may adversely reflect on their status, or on the integrity, independence and impartiality that are required by that status. Ultimately, this becomes a matter of judgement. And in this assessment, the reasoning of Dag Hammarskjöld is an obvious lodestar.

An evident conclusion from his reasoning is that the way in which the Secretary-General acts is of paramount importance. It is against this background that the Secretary-General – as any person serving in a high-level function – needs critical advisers around him. The most authoritative manner in which to deal with the dilemma that is described here is to bring the concerns of staff to the attention of the Secretary-General through the appropriate channels. It would then be for his or her senior staff to advise the Secretary-General what action to take. Ultimately, the Secretary-General must make a decision how to proceed in general terms and in the particular case at hand.

The interests of the UN are paramount

It is sometimes said that many Member States prefer that the chief administrative officer of the United Nations is more of a "secretary" than a "general". However, to the general public the Secretary-General actually personifies the UN. This is the reason why he is



Integrity is in Dag Hammarskjöld's ethical core, especially in the sense of respect for law and respect for truth.

sometimes criticised for the shortcomings of the organisation also relating to matters over which he has no authority. This requires that the Secretary-General proceeds with determination when it is obvious that the UN must act. It is in this situation that the Secretary-General must do his duty “guided solely by the common aims and rules laid down for, and by the Organisation he serves and by recognised legal principles”.⁵

To the general public the Secretary-General actually personifies the UN.

The tension that might arise in this situation is closely related to the question how states define their interests. Surely, one must be aware of the political realities here. However, it is striking to see how short-sightedly these interests are sometimes defined. There are several reasons for this. One obvious reason may be the current political situation at the national level, which could be an unfortunate reflection of arrogance in combination with ignorance not only among

people in general but also among those who represent them. Another reason could be that the government representing the state is not a true and legitimate representative of its people. The recent events in North Africa and the Middle East are cases in point.

It is in this case that the purposes and principles of the UN must be brought to the forefront. It is in this case that it is necessary that the international civil service with the Secretary-General in the lead acts on the basis of the commonly agreed norms which constitute the heritage from a generation that experienced two world wars.

A famous quote of Dag Hammarskjöld is from his statement in the General Assembly on 31 October 1956: “The principles of [the Charter of the United Nations] are, by far, greater than the Organisation in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are holier than the policies of any single nation or people.”⁶

Read in conjunction with the words of the oath quoted above, “with the interests of the United Nations only in view”, the obvious conclusion is that the interests of a particular state must yield to the interests of the organisation. Depending on the functions entrusted

to the international civil servant, he or she could make a difference. It is at this juncture that his or her integrity, independence and impartiality can be a determining factor. 

1 Published since then as Hans Corell, *The Need for the Rule of Law in International Affairs – Reflections on Dag Hammarskjöld's address at Oxford University on 30 May 1961, 'The International Civil Service in Law and in Fact'*, in Hans Corell/Inge Lønning/Henning Melber, *The Ethics of Dag Hammarskjöld*. Uppsala: The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2010.

2 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume V: Dag Hammarskjöld 1960-1961*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1975.

3 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 22 June 2006, S/PRST/2006/28.

4 ST/SGB/2009/6.

5 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, op. cit.

6 Statement by Dag Hammarskjöld in the General Assembly, 31 October 1956. Quoted from Kai Falkman, *To speak for the world: Speeches and Statements by Dag Hammarskjöld*. Stockholm: Atlantis 2005.

Rotary selects Uppsala University for new Peace Center

In keen international competition, Uppsala University has been named Rotary International's seventh center for international studies in peace and conflict resolution. This means that students from all over the world will be able to receive Rotary scholarships to pursue a master program in peace and conflict studies at Uppsala.

Out of an international pool of more than 100 universities, Uppsala University was selected for its established core curriculum in international relations, peace, and conflict resolution, superior faculty, excellent academic credentials and financial stability.

– It is, of course, a great honor to be recognized as offering world-class education, says Peter Wallensteen, holder of the Dag Hammarskjöld Professorship in Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. This is an effect of our long-term quality work in education and research. It has resulted in bright international students already finding their way here.

Founded in 1477, Uppsala University is one of oldest and top ranked universities in Northern Europe. Its department of Peace and Conflict Research was established in 1971.

– A key aspect of the department's research has been its numerous and wide-ranging collaborations with internationally leading scholars and institutions, says Carl-

Wilhelm Stenhammar, chair of the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International.

The Rotary Peace Center in Uppsala is scheduled to open in September, 2012.

– Rotary's decision is a source of tremendous pride for us, says Anders Hallberg, Vice Chancellor of Uppsala University. Peace, security, and democracy comprise one of our university's truly robust fields of research and education, and it means a great deal to us to have been selected out of more than 100 universities in the world.

The seven Rotary Peace Centers in the world are:

Uppsala University, Sweden
University of Bradford, United Kingdom
University of Queensland, Australia
International Christian University, Japan
Universidad del Salvador, Argentina
Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, (three-month certificate program).

*Adapted from: Rotary International and Uppsala University
Department for Peace and Conflict Research*

The number and character of the conflicts in the world of today have certainly changed since the 1950's, but it is a sad fact that several of them still remain unresolved. Thanks to, among other things, Dag Hammarskjöld's personal diplomacy, a number of agreements were reached to avert these crises. He had a special ability to see an agreement as the first step in a series of continued implementation of what we today would call peacebuilding. His perspective was conflict resolution, not only crisis management. This article also presents a number of concrete steps on the rough road of conflict resolution.

Leave it to Dag!

Peter Wallensteen

Among the many telegrams that reached Dag Hammarskjöld on his birthday, 29 July, 1955, one came from the Prime Minister of China, Chou En-Lai. It congratulated Hammarskjöld on his 50th anniversary and informed him that a Chinese Court had just freed a number of captured American pilots. This made headlines around the world and catapulted Hammarskjöld to fame as a United Nations (UN) leader that could achieve remarkable results. Media invented the phrase: Leave it to Dag! From then on Hammarskjöld became engaged in a series of political disputes and conflicts as a problem-solver and mediator. His achievements generated a momentum, which made it possible for him to convene the UN Security Council five years later and commit it to one of the UN's largest peacekeeping missions ever in the Congo. It also became the battle-field where he himself succumbed now 50 years ago, on 18 September, 1961. We can now legitimately ask, what legacy has Hammarskjöld left for conflict resolution?

Sadly, conflicts that Hammarskjöld dealt with are still on the agenda of the international community. His most recent successors, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon, have also had to deal with the conflicts in the Congo, as well as over Palestine. The focus may have shifted but the core concerns remain the same: keeping the Democratic Republic of Congo intact and giving legitimate rights to the Palestinians. In addition there are issues that were not on the agenda in the 1950's, notably sexual violence against civilians and suicide bombings, and some that are no longer relevant, notably the Cold War.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program shows that there were 39 armed conflicts going somewhere in the world during Hammarskjöld's period as Secretary General (1953-61). This can be compared to the 67 that were active during Kofi Annan's ten years (1997-2006) and 46 during Ban Ki-Moon's first three years for which there is data (2007-09). The sheer number of conflicts is now much higher. It also remains a fact that not all conflicts are on the UN agenda. Local uprisings in India and Burma, for instance, are defined by the governments as 'internal' and, thus, outside UN authority, in the same way that the Cold War rivalry barred issues from the UN agenda.

Turning crisis into opportunity

All Secretary-Generals are likely to face complicated situations involving major powers. Hammarskjöld had to deal with the military intervention by France, Britain and Israel against Egypt in the Suez Canal in 1956. As the two major powers also were permanent members of the UN Security Council, they could prevent action from this body, something that upset Hammarskjöld. He had seen Britain and France as champions of the UN and of international law. In this crisis they contradicted what they previously had supported. Instead, Hammarskjöld operated with the support of the UN General Assembly, Canada and the United States to bring about the first real peacekeeping mission, putting troops between the belligerents. The principles of action that he developed are still basic for peacekeeping operations.

Kofi Annan faced a similar impasse in 2003. Again, two leading member

of the UN, this time the United States and Britain, intervened militarily in Iraq without a proper mandate from the Security Council. In fact, they were breaking international law. In an important speech, Annan said that the international community had come of a fork in the road. There was a choice between unilateralism and multilateralism. Being constructive, Annan embarked on a reform process of the UN, resulting, for instance, in agreement

Sadly, conflicts that Hammarskjöld dealt with are still on the agenda of the international community.

on the international responsibility to protect civilian populations from mass violence and war crimes, committed by their own governments (known as R2P). This principle was the basis for UN action in Libya in February and March 2011.

Hammarskjöld and Annan turned a crisis into an opportunity to enhance the standing of the UN. Ban Ki-Moon may be facing his formative moment when dealing with the unarmed Arab insurrections in 2011. It remains to be seen if this becomes an opportunity for UN to demonstrate how R2P can be turned into action.

Hammarskjöld was strongly involved in seven major conflicts, which in fact

consisted of at least twenty decision points, and he had a reasonable record of achievements that we can learn from. First, there was his ability in forging agreements between parties in disputes. Second, he managed sometimes to get issues on the agenda, thus leading the international community. Third, he contributed to changing realities on the ground by negotiating arrangements for implementation of UN decisions. Let us take a quick look at situations he faced.

Making agreements

In the autumn of 1954 an American airplane flew into China's airspace. The plane and its crew were captured by the Chinese and the pilots were accused of spying. American media was alarmed. The US government demanded their immediate release. However, USA and China had no diplomatic relations. The Communist regime, led by Mao Tse-tung, had taken control over the mainland in 1949, and the Nationalist allies of the United States were only in control over Taiwan. They retained China's

seat on the Security Council, however, and the US continued to recognise the Nationalists as China's government. It also meant that the UN did not have direct contacts with the de facto rulers of China. However, the pilots were formally part of the UN operation in Korea. Thus, the US President Eisenhower could solve his dilemma of not being able to get the pilots out by pointing to the responsibility of the Secretary-General for 'his' staff. Hammarskjöld had to take on a mission that seemed impossible.

However, Hammarskjöld had one advantage. Sweden had recognised the government that controlled the mainland. Using Swedish channels he could send a message to the rulers in Beijing and ask for a meeting. He was invited and spent one week in China for discussions on a wide-ranging set of topics, including, of course, the pilots. When returning to the US from this visit, American media asked for the pilots, but he brought none of them. One solution had been that they could be released if their families visited China,

but the US Congress quickly passed a law forbidding such travel. The mission seemed to have been a failure. This is why the telegram from Chou En-Lai became such a surprise and why the outcome was important for Hammarskjöld's standing. In fact, the release of the pilots was coupled to the creation of a secret direct channel between the US and China, via their embassies in Warsaw, Poland.

Clearly the two major powers wanted a solution. Hammarskjöld could suggest different possible ways out without making any of the sides uneasy. However, he soon learned that major powers are not simple to handle. The Suez crisis was one such experience, dealing with the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary at the same time was another, as was the rebuff he encountered when approaching the parties in the short 1961 war between France and Tunisia. Finding an agreement primarily requires the consent of the parties. In the Suez crisis a solution based on the withdrawal of the intervening forces achieved this, particularly with the committed support of



PHOTO: UN PHOTO/X

UN peacekeeping missions were introduced during Dag Hammarskjöld's term as Secretary General. In December 1958 he visited Gaza to spend Christmas with the troops of the UN Emergency Force, here inspecting the Brazilian Battalion.

the United States. Hammarskjöld's role was instrumental as he had direct and personal conversations with the leading actors, notably Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion and Egypt's President Nasser. Hammarskjöld said that Nasser had never "gone back on anything he said to me personally" (Urquhart 1994: 269). By placing peacekeeping troops along the Suez Canal, the UN (and the USA) could pressure Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, ending the threats of an immediately renewed war.

In the following years, Hammarskjöld was involved in settling threatening conflicts, notably in Lebanon, between Cambodia and Thailand, and in the Congo. On what became his final mission he hoped to find a solution to the secessionist regime of Katanga, the mineral-rich southern part of the Congo. The plane crash may have killed the hope of a peaceful settlement. The following year, Katanga was forcefully reintegrated into the Congo. Hammarskjöld did not achieve a solution in the Congo, but he prevented it from becoming part of the Cold War by getting it to the UN agenda.

Setting the agenda

Before negotiating with the parties, the issue has to be on the agenda. Thus, it is important for a UN Secretary-General to get the international community involved. Article 99 of the UN Charter gives the holder such powers. This involves often invisible 'agenda diplomacy'. It was remarkable how Hammarskjöld could call the UN Security Council to meet in the middle of July 1960. Congo had just become independent and within days its army soldiers mutinied, and rich Katanga declared independence, no doubt with assistance of the former colonial power, Belgium.

The country was about to disintegrate, with disastrous effects for the newly independent continent of Africa. It threatened to turn Congo into an arena of Cold War proxy wars. Hammarskjöld was resolved to prevent this, and had the strong support from leaders of Africa, Asia and neutral states. His solution was to keep the country together with the help of an international peacekeeping mission. It came to involve Hammarskjöld in disputes with local actors, and, not least, the Soviet Union. In the beginning he had its support, but towards the end the Soviet leader refused to cooperate with the



PHOTO: UN PHOTO/BZ

Refugees crowding around a UN vehicle in 1962 to be repatriated from a camp near Elisabethville (present Lubumbashi) in Congo to the traditional tribal lands of their forefathers.

UN, even withdrawing its support to the UN budget. For the long term, UN action helped to save the country's integrity and independence, but the price was high.

Getting matters to the agenda and achieving support for internationally agreed action is not easy. In 1954, Hammarskjöld wanted to bring the CIA intervention in Guatemala to the UN Security Council, but was stopped by the United States. It argued that the issue belonged to the regional body, the Organisation of American States, which was under the US spell. In 1956, Hammarskjöld wanted to go to Hungary to inform himself on the Soviet invasion, but he was not allowed to enter. France did not allow him to act on the war between Tunisia and France in 1961. There are limits to what a Secretary-General can achieve.

Changing realities

Much of Hammarskjöld's work had to do with implementation: to pursue what has been agreed so that it becomes a practical reality. Hammarskjöld was a master in 'implementation diplomacy.' Getting a ceasefire in the Suez Canal was but a first step in a series of diplomatic moves that gave the peacekeepers authority in the area and convinced Israel of the advantages of withdrawal. The complex operation in the Congo included similar concerns, including persuading Belgian troops to leave, and making sure assistance money was not used to further outside powers interests but channelled through the UN.

Managing practical diplomacy is what the Charter expects the Secretary-General to do, presumably under the instructions of the Security Council. However, Hammarskjöld repeatedly encountered situations where the Council could not agree on instructions. Then it was for Hammarskjöld to interpret his mandate and chart his own route. Without a capacity to analyse and act the UN cannot function in critical situations. On the whole Hammarskjöld was remarkably successful. In several

“Hammarskjöld did not achieve a solution in the Congo, but he prevented it from becoming part of the Cold War.”

instances it was possible for him to overcome opposition from some of the permanent members by drawing on his position in the General Assembly. Hammarskjöld managed to build committed coalitions in particular issues.

Hammarskjöld's ability to interpret mandates and finding ingenious solutions, principles for action and practical courses of action may explain his activity. His intellectual capacity was geared to problem-solving. He understood very well that the survival of agreements depended on the ability to settle the first

crises that follow the signing of an accord. The implementation of the agreement on peacekeeping troops in 1956 made the mission stick until 1967. He displayed a preference for developing principles that would last. He did not want “fixes” for the day. The perspective was the one of conflict resolution, not simply crisis management. There are some lessons to be drawn for mediators also today.

Hammar-skjöld's contribution to conflict resolution

There are interesting features in Hammar-skjöld's way of operating. Here are some pointers:

Build unorthodox coalition! Hammar-skjöld's diplomacy built on working both with powerful USA and the newly-independent states. The North-South divide was not, and still is not, easy to handle. Hammar-skjöld repeatedly ran into conflict with the US administration but could still work with it in other areas. Hammar-skjöld's relationship with the Soviet Union was positive initially only to go sour in 1960, when the Soviets wanted him to resign in order to radically change the UN Secretariat. These complications contrasted Hammar-skjöld's cordial relations with Third World leaders, like India's Prime Minister Nehru. Hammar-skjöld's performance demonstrates the utility of principled pragmatism.

Meet the parties! The breakthrough for Hammar-skjöld's diplomacy came with his visit to China in 1954. Personal diplomacy was Hammar-skjöld's trademark. It is even more important today. Travel is more comfortable, communication is more rapid, Internet can be used for direct conversations. But much suggests that the direct personal meeting and establishing mutual trust is unsurpassed when moving towards conflict resolution.

Create leverage! Hammar-skjöld had no traditional power. His authority rested with the UN Charter and his standing in the UN. By threatening to bring a conflict to the agenda, he could gain leverage. By having an issue on the agenda, he could influence parties by outlining possible outcomes of votes. With the peacekeeping troops as an instrument even more leverage could be gained. This is partly what is today often described as ‘soft power’, and the resources may vary among institutions. There is often something to build on.



Private P. Fennessey at his camp in Albertville (present Kalemie). In 1960 some 15,700 soldiers from eleven countries were on duty with the UN Force in the Republic of the Congo, helping to restore order and calm in the country.

Act early, but with caution! The term “preventive diplomacy” was coined by Hammar-skjöld and again achieved prominence in the 1990's. Once bloodshed has begun and troops are in battle, the options narrow. There is mixed record in preventive diplomacy. Sometimes actions come too late, sometimes too early. The parties may have to be convinced of the use of outsiders, which requires skilful diplomacy.

Maintain your integrity! The UN Secretariat has a role position. A mediation mission rests on the integrity it can demonstrate vis-à-vis the parties. It is a platform of action and should not be allowed to be questioned by the parties.

Stamina and patience! Hammar-skjöld's key visit to Beijing took place in cold and dark January, after a tedious flight via London, Paris, Delhi, Canton, and Hankow. Hammar-skjöld could still walk around without a hat and “at a terrific pace”. He could also work through the night if necessary. For a conflict resolver it is important to have energy to stay focused on key issues.

We have also noted that Hammar-skjöld was willing to take risks. He took risks for peace, not for country or God. He was expected to be more of a ‘secretary’, and became an agenda setting ‘general’. He saw the duties his office required.

Most mediators come with unselfish perspectives. Well-considered risk-taking for peace should be applauded. 🌿

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With a starting point in voices from the United Nations Intellectual History Project, the author in this article makes a record of all the UN Secretaries-General up until now, with their different characteristics and styles of leadership. He points to the outstanding personality of Dag Hammarskjöld, who because of his untimely death left an unfulfilled legacy behind him. According to the author, the UN body suffers from problems like overlapping jurisdiction, lack of coordination and an overweight bureaucracy.

Global leadership of Secretaries and Generals

Thomas G. Weiss

In his oft-quoted May 1954 address at the University of California's commencement, Dag Hammarskjöld concluded: "It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell ... [which] sums up as well as anything I have heard both the essential role of the United Nations and the attitude of mind that we should bring to its support."¹ Ever the pragmatist, Hammarskjöld's down-to-earth prose understated his vision and aspirations. This essay explores two aspects of his tragically abbreviated tenure as Secretary-General. It begins with Hammarskjöld's leadership in comparison with other Secretaries-General, which build on oral histories from the United Nations Intellectual History Project.² It continues with two parts of his unfulfilled legacy, which are part of what ails the contemporary UN and could be fixed.³

Hammarskjöld's leadership

Leadership is critical to every human undertaking, and the UN's "CEO" holds a particular place in folklore and reality. The Charter, of course, labels him (not yet her) the "chief administrative officer", an understatement of the potential and actual role, certainly as demonstrated by the second Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld's tenure at the UN from 1953 to 1961 coincided with the initial period of decolonization, and it seems surprising that a Swedish economist did not spend more of his time on economic and social development. These issues invariably take second place to politi-

cal and security matters in the Secretary-General's office, regardless of the occupant.

Brian Urquhart, one of the first persons recruited to the Secretariat, explained: "The 38th floor, under [Trygve] Lie, and under everybody except Dag Hammarskjöld, didn't really devote anything like enough attention to the economic and social side – partly because they weren't economists and didn't totally understand it, and partly because there were so many political preoccupations ... It is very difficult, when you are Secretary-General, to focus on the economic and social side, because every day, and every night, something happens which preoccupies you on the political side." However, Hammarskjöld "believed that the UN was going to be the bridge over which the former colonial powers and the United States would be able, in a completely un-colonial way, to help in the development of the independent African countries".

Most of our interviewees echoed Urquhart: out of all of the Secretaries-General, the second occupant had the greatest impact on the organization. According to Robert Cox, a Canadian scholar and former ILO official, Hammarskjöld "was a key figure in that whole period, and became kind of an icon because he did stand so much for the integrity of the international civil service and its role. Then he became the martyr". Guatemalan UN ambassador and former Foreign Minister Gert Rosenthal agreed that the second Secretary-General was the only one who "broke the mold" of major power control but added that

"there is also a legend about Hammarskjöld ... this man who could do no wrong, and everything he did was perfect. Of course, he died in an airplane crash so it is easy to martyrize him".

Urquhart recalled that Hammarskjöld "looked about fifteen years old. He was the youngest looking forty-five-year-old I have ever seen. He was

The UN's various moving parts work at cross purposes instead of in an integrated, reinforcing, and collaborative fashion.

extremely diffident and very shy, and started off with all kinds of rather misguided gestures, like eating lunch in the cafeteria every day, and turning down the Secretary-General's hospitality and living allowance". Urquhart added that he eventually became "a master with the press ... he was like a Delphic oracle – ask Hammarskjöld a question, you would get an answer which you could read under water, at 10,000 feet, backwards, forwards, and sideways. He was a brilliant intellectual, but he didn't really tell you what he was doing".

Hammarskjöld, the economist

Oscar Schachter, director of UN's Legal Division and later a law professor at Columbia University, remembered



The 100th anniversary of Hammarskjöld's birth was celebrated in 2005 with a series of lectures in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the UN Headquarters. From left to right: Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary-General and a close colleague of Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and Shashi Tharoor, Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information.

that, “Hammarskjöld came in with the idea that as an economist he wanted to meet the economists ... He is the only Secretary-General who not only read but discussed the *World Economic Report*. He was critical of some IMF approaches. He had a kind of a stake in it, related to the fact that he wanted to be seen as an economist”. Schachter also pointed to the political resulting support from newly independent countries: “Psychologically, I think he identified himself with that movement ... He relied too much politically on the support that he thought he was getting from the majority of members ... But that’s when it looked to many as though the new majority of Third World states were taking over. It looked, on the face of it, as if he would have a big majority in the General Assembly – as he did. But how much did that matter? This was, I think, Hammarskjöld’s big miscalculation.” The Irish author, diplomat, and politician Conor Cruise O’Brien recounted why Hammarskjöld had selected him to work on the Congo: “He was much a ‘horses for courses’ person. He saw me as a horse who would be useful in certain circumstances, as being a west-

erner, but more well-disposed towards the emerging former colonial countries than most westerners were.”

“The stereotype of a bloated UN administration overlooks many talented and dedicated individuals.”

One of the results of Hammarskjöld’s leadership was Moscow’s ire, which became a proposal to replace the Secretary-General with a *troika*, or three-person square wheel to act as a check on the West. Vladimir Petrovsky, who was in the Foreign Ministry at the time and later directed the UN Office in Geneva, recalled Hammarskjöld’s giving “the impression of a man with philosophical cast of mind, who has his own vision of the world and of his role as the head of the international organization”.

James O. C. Jonah spent thirty years in the Secretariat before becoming a minister in Sierra Leone, and summarized a widespread view about the second Secretary-General: “I still believe that he is unsurpassed. I am convinced about that for three reasons. One, I think Hammarskjöld was a true intellectual of the highest and finest sorts. He was not a wishy-washy man. He had a good conceptual view of the UN. Secondly, he was a man of absolute integrity ... Thirdly, he had the quality of tremendous courage ... I am convinced that we will never have another Secretary-General like Hammarskjöld. There is a determination among the veto powers that that will never happen.”

In a similar vein to Jan Eliasson’s essay in this journal, Hammarskjöld had an impact on the long-time former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Sonny Ramphal’s internationalism: “He inspired me. He infused in me a bit of his vision ... of ‘one world to share’. And it is that kind of leadership that has to come from the Secretary-General to infuse successive generations of young people, particularly at a time when the UN is under siege, and there are so many

who would like to drag it down. I grew up with the basic conviction that the UN was the world's salvation. Not many people have that understanding today."

Predecessor and successors

Space only permits a brief comparison between Hammarskjöld and his predecessor and successors. Our interviewees had less to say about the first and third Secretaries-General whose autobiographies and speeches are little known:⁴ Norway's Trygve Lie (1896-1968), who served from 1945 to 1953, and Burma's U Thant (1909-1974), who served from 1961 to 1971. Not surprisingly, our voices were outspoken about the fourth Secretary-General from 1972 to 1981, Kurt Waldheim (1918-2007), who was subsequently elected as Austria's president in 1986. Few described him as either effective or sympathetic, and most believed that the major powers were familiar with his past – his allegiances to the Nazi Party and his involvement with war crimes while serving as a German officer in World War II. From 1982 to 1991 the careful Peruvian diplomat, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1920-), was at the helm for the move toward the right in the West and the reversal of the momentum toward dramatic change in international economic relations, as well as the thawing of the Cold War and the UN's renaissance. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1922-) served from 1992 to 1997 but was vetoed by the United States for a second term – an ordeal described in great depth in his autobiography.⁵ During the tumultuous first half of the 1990s, the organization was called upon to mount operations in an unprecedented number of civil wars at the same time that the UN system was collectively trying to revisit many economic and social issues through world conferences. He was characterized as a strong-willed, even arrogant, intellectual who did not suffer fools gladly.

The leadership from 1997 to 2006 by the seventh Secretary-General, the life-long international civil servant from Ghana Kofi Annan (1938-), came closest to approaching Hammarskjöld's. Our respondents' opinion was seconded by the committee whose members honored Annan with the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize in the midst of his term rather than posthumously.

The current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon (1944-), assumed office in 2007 after the completion of the oral his-

tory, but undoubtedly judgments about the eighth Secretary-General would compare unfavorably with Hammarskjöld and Annan. Having described himself proudly as "the invisible man",⁶ a starker contrast with at least some of his more dynamic predecessors is hard to imagine, and this lackluster leadership undoubtedly will continue during a second five-year term.

“Hammarskjöld believed that UN officials could and should pledge allegiance to a larger collective good.”

Reforming the UN system and its civil service

A significant UN malady is structural: the overlapping jurisdictions of various UN bodies, the lack of coordination among their activities, and the absence of centralized financing for the system as a whole. This decentralization is exacerbated by the nature of the staff and its leadership. These structural shortcomings highlight an unfinished Hammarskjöld legacy.

Hammarskjöld never pursued the reform of the UN's economic and social machinery to which he devoted time and energy during his first year in office. Disgruntled that he "had inherited a work program which had grown up piecemeal over the years and which consisted of a mass of unregulated and uncoordinated activities", Brian Urquhart recalls that "on economic and social projects alone Hammarskjöld held more than seventy-five meetings to find out what was going on".⁷

The UN's various moving parts work at cross purposes instead of in an integrated, reinforcing, and collaborative fashion. Organizations of various stripes relentlessly pursue cut-throat fundraising, stake out territory, and pursue mission creep. While the UN's organizational chart refers to a "system", this term implies coherence and cohesion whereas reality has more in common with feudalism than modern organizations. Frequent use is made of the term "family", a preferable metaphor because, like many such units, the UN is dysfunctional.

Robert Jackson, the Australian logistics genius who moved goods to Malta and the Middle East in World War II and subsequently oversaw a number of key UN humanitarian operations, began his 1969 evaluation of the UN development system by writing that "the machine as a whole has become unmanageable ... like some prehistoric monster".⁸ The lumbering dinosaur is more than 40 years older but not better adapted to the twenty-first century's climate.

Heavy bureaucracy

A related disorder stems from the overwhelming weight of the bureaucracy, its low productivity, and often underwhelming leadership. The stereotype of a bloated UN administration overlooks many talented and dedicated individuals. However, the world body's recruitment and promotion methods are certainly part of what ails it. Success usually reflects personalities and serendipity rather than recruitment of the best persons for the right reasons and institutional structures designed to foster collaboration. Staff costs account for the lion's share of the UN's budget, and the international civil service is a potential resource whose composition, productivity, and culture could change quickly.

In fact, Rube Goldberg would have trouble finding a better design for futile complexity than the current array of organizations, each focusing on a substantive area, often located in a different city from relevant UN partners and with separate budgets, governing

“Confronting such threats as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction requires multidisciplinary perspectives.”

boards, organizational cultures, and independent executive heads. Confronting such threats as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction requires multidisciplinary perspectives, efforts across

sectors, firm central direction, and inspired leadership. The UN rarely supplies any of this.

Treatment would be possible if governments chose to pursue, rather than ignore, making the UN operate with more cohesion, as advocated by “Delivering as One”,⁹ one of the last proposals published before Annan’s departure. No previous reform has reduced turf struggles and unproductive competition for funds within the so-called UN system. But one could if donors stopped talking out of two sides of their mouths and insisted upon the centralization and consolidation that they often preach before UN forums and parliamentary bodies but never implement.

A related therapy consists of taking steps to reinvigorate the personnel of the United Nations. There is an urgent need to revive the notion of an autonomous international civil service, a passion of Hammarskjöld’s. Competence and integrity should outweigh nationality and gender as well as cronyism, which have become the principal criteria for recruitment, retention, and promotion. In fact, Hammarskjöld

pressure on the intentional Secretariat”.¹¹ His clarion call did not ignore the reality that the international civil service exists to carry out decisions by Member States. But Hammarskjöld believed that UN officials could and should pledge allegiance to a larger collective good symbolized by the organization’s light-blue-covered laissez-passer rather than the narrowly perceived national interests of the countries that issue national passports in different colors.

Setting aside senior UN positions for officials approved by their home countries belies that integrity. Governments seek to ensure that their interests are defended inside secretariats, and many have even relied on officials for intelligence. From the outset, for example, the Security Council’s five permanent members have reserved the right to “nominate” (select) nationals to fill the key posts in the Secretary-General’s cabinet. The influx in the 1950s and 1960s of former colonies as new Member States led them to clamor for “their” fair share of the patronage opportunities, following the bad example set by major powers and other Member States. The result was downplaying competence and exaggerating national origins as the main criterion for recruitment and promotion. Over the years, efforts to improve gender balance have resulted in other types of claims, as has the age profile of secretariats. All positions above the director level, and often at every level, are the object of government lobbying.

The UN should rediscover the idealistic roots of the international civil service, make room for creative ideamongers, and mark out career development paths for a 21st-century secretariat with greater turn-over and younger and more mobile staff. Moving back to the future would involve recruiting people with integrity and talent. There are numerous ways to attract more mobile and younger staff members with greater turnover and fewer permanent contracts while providing better career development. Regional or linguistic quotas could diminish the governmental influence resulting from national ones.

Conclusion

Dag Hammarskjöld described Markings as “my negotiations with myself and with God”,¹² but this poetic text contains no reference to his service as Secretary-General or to momentous events in which he was a key actor. Hopefully, this short essay brings to bear insights

from his unusual leadership as well as interest in confronting structural problems that are his unfulfilled legacy. They are not the UN’s most virulent illness – the myopia of Westphalian Member States wins that award – but fixing these structural problems is crucial for enhanced global governance¹³ in the 21st century. 🌿

1 Andrew W. Cordier, and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 301.

2 See Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly, *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 347-58. See also the CD-ROM *The Complete Oral History Transcripts from “UN Voices”* (New York: Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, 2007). For additional information, see www.unhistory.org and the capstone volume by Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, *UN Ideas That Changed the World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

3 See Thomas G. Weiss, *What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

4 Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), and U Thant, *Portfolio for Peace: Excerpts from the Writings and Speeches of U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on Major World Issues 1961-1968* (New York: United Nations, 1968).

5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga* (New York: Random House, 1999).

6 Joe Lauria and Steve Stecklow, “the U.N.’s ‘Invisible Man,’” *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 July 2009.

7 Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: Norton, 1994), 76.

8 UN Development Programme, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System* (Geneva: UN, 1969), vol. I, iii.

9 UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence, *Delivering as One*, 9 November 2006.

10 Dag Hammarskjöld, “The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact,” lecture delivered to Congregation at Oxford University, 30 May 1961, reprinted by Clarendon Press, Oxford, quotes at 329 and 349.

11 Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 58.

12 Quoted on the jacket of Dag Hammarskjöld, *Markings* (New York: Knopf, 1965).

13 See Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

Moving back to the future would involve recruiting people with integrity and talent.

championed an ideal that harks back to what the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during World War II called the “great experiment” of the League of Nations.

Allegiance to a collective good

Hammarskjöld’s speech at Oxford in May 1961 spelled out the importance of a first-rate, independent staff. He asserted that any erosion or abandonment of “the international civil service ... might, if accepted by the Member nations, well prove to be the Munich of international cooperation.”¹⁰ While this speech was delivered shortly before his death, Urquhart points out that Hammarskjöld started his tenure in the midst of the McCarthy witch-hunts and was persuaded that “the future effectiveness of the UN ... would depend in large measure on resisting all efforts by governments to interfere with and put

A famous Swede

In September 1961 I was eleven years old. Born in Nkana, on the then Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, I had moved with my parents to Mufulira in the early 1950s when my father had taken a position on what was to become the biggest underground copper mine in the world. Operated by Rhodesian (later Roan) Selection Trust but one-third owned by Anglo American, the larger of the Copperbelt's two mining corporations, Mufulira, is only about eight miles south of the Katangese/Congo border, and about 40 miles from Ndola, the commercial capital of the region and home to the Copperbelt's main airport.

The previous year had seen the wider world impinge ever more pressingly on the Copperbelt. Independence in June 1960 for what up until then had been the Belgian Congo was followed swiftly by Katanga's secession in July 1960. Other provinces also attempted to break away. The ensuing 'Congo Crisis' seemingly brought the Cold War to the doorstep of the Central African Federation, of which Northern Rhodesia was part. When the Congolese armed forces mutinied, rounding on their Belgian officers and attacking white settlers generally, streams of refugees flowed across the border. I remember – or at least I think I do – seeing Federal troops and armoured cars on the road between Mufulira and Mokambo, the nearby border post, as well as along the stretch of road to Ndola.

Like other white mining families, my parents hosted Congo refugees for several nights, before helping them on their way further south, many of them to a large camp located in Salisbury's (now Harare) agricultural Show Grounds. What I vividly recall is putting my finger into a bullet hole in the exotic, very dusty Simca car parked in our driveway. But all this was really a subject for grown-ups, and children in those days were expected to keep quiet, even if occasionally allowed to hover on the fringes of adult conversation. What I can recall is the odd name 'Welensky' (the Federal Prime Minister) or the phrase: 'It could never happen here', but what precisely the 'it' might be, I had no idea.

Life soon returned to normal. As far as I was concerned, all that Katanga's 'independence' meant was the appearance of new stamps and, occasionally,

*Two 'famous Swedes':
Dag Hammarskjöld
and 'Ingo' Ingemar
Johansson at the
UN Headquarters in
New York, where the
Secretary-General
showed 'Ingo' around.*



PHOTO: BONNIERARKIVET/SCANPIX

coins. These were much sought after and swapped during 'break' at school. But at the age of ten, about to be eleven, my horizons were filled by school and holidays. Many hours were spent laboriously gluing together plastic model aeroplanes, and any remaining spare time was devoted to a new, all-consuming passion. This was following the tribulations of heavyweight boxing. In March 1961, America's Floyd Patterson had defended his title against Sweden's Ingemar Johansson.

An 8 mm (I think!) black and white film of the bout eventually found its way to the Copperbelt, and one evening I was taken by my father to watch a screening at the Mufulira Mine Club. Absolutely enthralled, I couldn't put out of my mind the thrilling first round in which 'Ingo's hammer of Thor' – his straight right punch travelling faster than the eye could see, according to sports writers – twice bludgeoned Patterson to the canvas. Despite the fact that Johansson was eventually kayoed by Patterson, those unbelievably exciting first minutes turned me into a fervent 'Ingo' supporter.

From that day on I followed his career as closely as the local newspaper, The Northern News, permitted. Hence my consternation one night in September 1961, when I overheard my parents talking in the lounge. From what I could make out, as I lay in bed in the room I shared with my younger brother, a plane crash just outside Ndola had killed a number of people, including a 'famous Swede'. Thinking that this could only be Johansson, I was hugely upset. I was astonished because I hadn't known that Johansson was coming to the Federation, and devastated by the news of the crash in which he'd died.

It was only the next morning at breakfast that my gloom lifted when I realised that it was not Johansson who had died, but another famous Swede. Too embarrassed to admit to my mistake, I began quietly reading whatever I could find about the United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld. I still have in my possession the copy of Time magazine, devoted to his last days.

Ian Phimister

In the early 1950's, in a world shattered after the Second World War and split by the widening gap of the Cold War, the young United Nations were marred by internal conflicts. When Dag Hammarskjöld entered the stage as the second Secretary-General, hopes were high that he would instill new life into the world organisation. A man of great charisma and integrity, he left a legacy of extraordinary wealth, as one of his close members of staff recalls.

Dag Hammarskjöld's legacy: **A beacon of hope**

Brian Urquhart

Far more important was the status and standing of Hammarskjöld's UN. It is hard to remember what a beacon of hope it was in the 1950's: indeed, it was every young man's dream to serve.¹

It is now fifty years since Dag Hammarskjöld died in an air-crash near Ndola in what was then Northern Rhodesia, on his way to put a stop to a battle between UN peacekeeping troops and the mercenary-led forces of Moïse Tshombe, the secessionist leader of the Congolese province of Katanga.

In 1953 the United Nations (UN) had long outlived the enthusiasm and apparent common purpose of its early, post-war days. The nations, and especially the great powers, were anything but united. The Cold War had frozen many of the hopes and possibilities of the UN. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General, had had a particularly difficult time. His support of the UN's forceful intervention against North Korea's invasion of South Korea, which the Security Council had authorised in the absence of the Soviet representative (in protest at the exclusion from UN membership of the recently victorious People's Republic of China) had caused the Soviet Union to sever all relations with him. At the same time the US congressional, anti-communist witch-hunt, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, had found a happy hunting ground among the American members of the Secretariat. Lie had struggled with this intricate problem and in the process lost the respect of the Secretariat, where morale had plummeted. Lie put his resignation before the General Assembly in November 1952. On 9 April, 1953, at New

Hammarskjöld devoted his first eighteen months at the UN to discreetly winning the confidence of member governments.

York's Idlewild airport, he welcomed his successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, to "the most impossible job on this earth".

Hammarskjöld had been chosen as Lie's successor on 31 March, 1953, after a long stalemate in the Security Council. He was not well known except to a few European negotiators and, of course, in his own country. There was a general feeling that he would be a good but relatively colourless civil servant who would not rock the international political boat. He inherited a dismal situation at the UN, and to many observers it seemed unlikely that this youthful-looking and ostensibly diffident Swede would be able to deal with it. However, as was his habit, Hammarskjöld had arrived with firm principles already formulated, as well as imaginative ideas on the nature and execution of his new responsibilities. Recent developments were also in his favour. The advent of a new US administration, the death of Stalin in March 1953, and the prospect of an armistice in Korea all gave hope of improvement in East-West relations and of a more constructive role for the Secretary-General.

Hammarskjöld devoted his first eighteen months at the UN to discreetly winning the confidence of member governments and to reorganising the Secretariat and reinforcing its discipline and morale. He showed himself a master administrator who could combine principle and practical common sense in the resolution of controversial problems. He also dealt firmly but quietly with the anti-communist US witch-hunt, emphasising the Secretary-General's overall responsibility for the Secretariat. He strongly defended the independent position of the fledgling international civil service and reinforced both its discipline and its efficiency.

The first political intervention

Hammarskjöld had said that the Secretary-General should not "jump up on the stage" on political matters unless there was a critical situation which he was best suited to deal with. Such a situation arose at the end of 1954. Seventeen American air force members had come down in China during the Korean War and were convicted as spies by Chinese courts. They were still being held, and the United States, having refused to recognise the People's Republic of China, was in no position to get them freed. Enormous internal pressure on the Eisenhower administration had built up in Washington. Nuclear strikes on the Chinese mainland had even been suggested, and the administration was desperate.

The UN Security Council and the General Assembly, in neither of which the Peking government was represented, had been able to do no more than censure the Chinese government and



Dag Hammarskjöld's entering the stage as the Secretary-General in 1953 has been compared to a beacon of hope for the UN marred by disunity among its Member States.

ask the Secretary-General to seek the release of the air force crew members and all other captured UN personnel. Immediately after the Assembly had adopted its resolution Hammarskjöld announced his intention to go to Peking. He knew however that a government, which was excluded from the UN and had just been severely criticised by the UN General Assembly, was unlikely to cooperate with him as the Assembly's representative. He therefore had to find a rationale for his mission which Chou En-lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister, might be able to accept.

This rationale, which is a good example of Hammarskjöld's genius for improvisation and which added a new dimension to the work of the Secretary-General, became known as the 'Peking Formula'. Its essence was that under the terms of the UN Charter the Secretary-General has an obligation to reduce international tensions anywhere in the world. He was coming to Peking as a result of this legal obligation, not on the basis of the General Assembly resolution, which had censured China. Chou En-lai accepted this formula. The negotiations proceeded on the high intellectual level that both participants

preferred, and the release of the last of the US air force crew members, on 1 August, 1955, was announced in a message from Chou En-lai, who also congratulated Hammarskjöld on his fiftieth birthday. The date of the airmen's release was not a coincidence.

Under the terms of the UN Charter the Secretary-General has an obligation to reduce international tensions anywhere in the world.

The successful solution of a highly explosive international problem showed governments that in the person of the new UN Secretary-General they had a major resource for resolving dangerous problems at a time when the Cold War had severely limited the effectiveness of the Security Council. Hammarskjöld's

achievement was based on the elements which also made possible his future successes: determined independence and objectivity, absolute honesty with all concerned, rigorous intellectual and practical preparation, ingenuity in creating innovative alternatives in order to break deadlocks, intuition and understanding of the positions and difficulties of those he was dealing with, and the integrity and moral courage which gave him a unique and respected position in the world.

Major international crises

During the Cold War regional crises had an extra and terrifying dimension. This was the possibility that what had started as a regional conflict could develop into the cause of nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. This threat strengthened Hammarskjöld's effort to develop conflict resolution mechanisms involving the Secretary-General and his representatives. Among these mechanisms was the new concept of peacekeeping forces.

Hammarskjöld continued to develop the UN's capacity for conflict resolution in a series of major crises. During the Suez Crisis of 1956 he displayed not

only his ability as a mediator, but also his flair for emergency political/administrative action, improvising the first UN peacekeeping force and deploying it within ten days of the decision to establish it. In 1958 he played a central role in defusing the Lebanese crisis, during which the United States landed troops in Lebanon and the British in Jordan. Hammarskjöld conducted a score or more of “quiet diplomacy missions” in different parts of the world during his eight years as Secretary-General. “Leave it to Dag” became a familiar slogan in the world press.

At mid-summer 1960 the mounting chaos in the newly independent Congo demanded a UN operation that included a large civilian administrative element as well as a large peacekeeping force. The Congo situation faced the UN with highly complex demands in a vast and often violent tribal country in which both superpowers had a strong interest. It later involved Hammarskjöld in disagreements with Nikita Khrushchev and to a lesser extent with Charles de Gaulle, the latter embittered by Ham-

By his leadership, skill and creativity he not only gave the Secretary-General and the international secretariat a new position in world affairs. He also renewed and strengthened the standing and performance of the world organisation itself. His achievement has remained an inspiration to his successors.

In May 2010, at a symposium in Delphi, Greece, a group of former foreign ministers, UN permanent representatives, and members of the Secretariat discussed the role and the process of selection of the UN Secretary-General.² Of the desirable qualities for a UN Secretary-General, their report included:

- integrity, independence, moral courage, and impartiality;
- moral and intellectual as well as political leadership;
- diplomatic skills essential for a mediator and crisis manager;
- capacity to manage the Organisation effectively and to provide leadership to the wider UN system;
- problem-solving capacity and sure political instincts; and
- charisma and contemporary media skills.

Not altogether coincidentally, Dag Hammarskjöld displayed most, if not all, of these qualities. In doing so he set an admittedly high standard for his successors. That is perhaps the most basic part of his legacy. Hammarskjöld championed and personified the principles of the Charter, and especially those that applied to the Secretary-General. He was a dedicated intellectual actively participating at the highest and most demanding level of international politics – an international civil servant of unique integrity and passion.

In a world of power politics haunted by the Cold War, Hammarskjöld generated a strong and welcome feeling of hope. He had proved his ability to act effectively in dangerous situations where the UN Security Council was frustrated by the conflicting interests of the great powers. He became widely trusted to solve life-endangering problems that no one else could tackle. He seemed undaunted by powerful governments. In times of crisis he showed that one man, if sufficiently spirited and courageous, could stand up for principle against even the greatest powers and have an influence on important events. Thus Hammarskjöld greatly expanded the

scope of the political functions of the Secretary-General, as well as the respect of both governments and the public for the office. He left to his successors a position and a range of responsibilities far greater than the limited role outlined in the Charter.

Charisma is an important quality for any public figure, and of all human qualities it is the most elusive and unaccountable. Hammarskjöld was not a sociable or gregarious man. He was naturally shy and had little interest in social life. He was not a particularly good public speaker. He was a very private person who valued and protected his privacy. He spurned supposedly crowd-pleasing gestures. Nonetheless, ordinary people all over the world knew who he was, why what he did was important, and why the Secretary-General was relevant to their lives. This kind of charisma is a quality which cannot be handed on, but it is particularly important in an office which has none of the normal attributes of power.

Enhancing UN presence

Hammarskjöld not only expanded the role of the Secretary-General; he also created new methods of conflict control and bridged at least part of the very large gap that the Cold War had made in the UN's principal function of maintaining international peace and security. Peacekeeping forces, quiet diplomacy, UN “presences”, and Representatives of the Secretary-General were just four of such creations.

Hammarskjöld realised that the permanent representatives of the member nations at UN headquarters could be immensely valuable to the work of the Secretary-General. He established close cooperation with them to such effect that some of them said that they sometimes found it hard to remember whether they were national representatives or members of the Secretariat. This new alliance was passed on to his successors, most of whom greatly benefitted from it.

The basic element of Hammarskjöld's famous confrontation with Khrushchev in the 1960 General Assembly was the degree of independence and authority of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The operation in the Congo became so controversial that neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly could agree on the necessary directives. Hammarskjöld was therefore forced either to make

In a world of power politics haunted by the Cold War, Hammarskjöld generated a strong and welcome feeling of hope.

marskjöld's efforts to protect Tunisia from an armed French incursion in the summer of 1961. His relations with the United States, the United Kingdom and several African countries were also severely strained by disagreements over the Congo. Hammarskjöld died during an effort to resolve the Katanga problem, which, for the previous two years, had poisoned the UN's work in the Congo as well as the mood of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The legacy

Hammarskjöld had become Secretary-General of a world organisation that was divided and paralysed by the mutual ideological and political hostility of the nuclear superpowers and was thoroughly demoralised by both governmental and public disillusionment.

the important decisions himself, or to close the operation down. He rightly chose the first and more difficult alternative. Thus the Congo operation came to represent everything that Khrushchev found intolerable about the independent action of the Secretary-General. Khrushchev therefore proposed replacing the Secretary-General with a troika of three senior officials – from the capitalist West, the socialist countries, and the third world. Hammarskjöld knew that such an arrangement would in effect extend the veto power that had paralysed the Security Council into the Secretariat, and he fought it with all his strength. The UN, he argued, would be reduced by the troika to a mere conference machinery with no capacity to resolve critical problems or to take action in controversial emergencies, a development that in the current circumstances could well prove to be the “Munich of international cooperation”.

Khrushchev's troika was soundly defeated in the General Assembly, but Hammarskjöld still felt that the essential and vital nature of a truly international civil service owing no allegiance to any national government was not sufficiently understood. In his last major speech, at Oxford University on 30 May, 1961, he addressed the subject with a text, *The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact*, which remains the classic pronouncement on the nature and reality of the international civil service, a central principle of the UN Charter.³ It is a text that should be studied and discussed again at the present time when both the concept and the practice of international civil service are subject to neglect and serious erosion.

Long-term development of the UN

Finally there is Hammarskjöld's vision of, and contribution to, the long-term development of the UN. He was acutely aware that the world organisation was still in a very early stage of development and needed a constant effort to establish new precedents and ideas in order to keep up with contemporary problems and grow with the times. He took great care to lay a strong foundation for new ideas and techniques. He personally engaged, for example, in the laborious negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement with Egypt to define the relationship of the first UN peacekeeping force with its host country. When criticised for spending so much time and energy on this he replied that if the agreement



PHOTO: UN PHOTO/X

Dag Hammarskjöld visiting a kindergarten class in the school of Givath-Jearim, a village for immigrants in the Jerusalem hills in 1956. Most immigrants in this community came from Yemen.

was sound enough, it would benefit future peacekeeping operations by establishing an accepted legal basis for them. He has proved to be right.

Hammarskjöld believed that a reliable and just world order could eventually be built only by a process of precedents and case law. He hoped that by this process the world organisation would be gradually transformed from an institutional mechanism into a constitutional instrument creating obligations that were recognised and respected by all nations. “Working at the edge of the development of human society”, he stated on 1 May, 1960, in a speech at the University of Chicago Law School, “is to work on the brink of the unknown. Much of what is done will one day prove to be of little avail. That is no excuse for the failure to act in accordance with our best understanding, in recognition of its limits, but with faith in the ultimate result of the creative evolution in which it is our privilege to cooperate”.⁴ The view of the United Nations as a work in progress, a “creative evolution” which, especially at the most critical times, must be believed in, supported, and sustained by innovative

practical work and ideas, is a vision of profound importance for those who believe that a just and peaceful world is the greatest of humanity's objectives. Hammarskjöld's ideas and his unsurpassed record of international service have left a generous legacy for the fulfillment of this vision. 🌿

- 1 Sir Raymond Appleyard, recalling his time at the UN in the 1950's setting up the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (1953-1961), ‘The birth of UNSCEAR – the midwife's tale’, in: *Journal of Radiological Protection*, 30(2010), p. 622.
- 2 *The UN in the 21st century: The role and selection of the secretary general of the United Nations*. The Delphi Symposium in honour of Javier Perez de Cuellar, Athens and Delphi, 27-30 May 2010. Athens: Athens Development and Governance Institute (ADGI-INNERPOST) 2010
- 3 In Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume 5: Dag Hammarskjöld 1960-1961*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1975, pp. 471-489.
- 4 Quoted from Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume 4: Dag Hammarskjöld 1958-1960*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1974, p. 592.

Leading by example

For most Swedish diplomats Dag Hammarskjöld is the ultimate role model. He combined sharp intellect with depth and cultural sensitivity. He was a man of action and a man of reflection. He personified courage and integrity.

His violent death in September 1961 was a painful shock to millions of people around the world. I heard the news on the radio during a navy exercise in the north of the Baltic Sea. It happened to be the day after my 21st birthday, giving this day of entering maturity a special meaning. Since then, I have been a diligent student of Hammarskjöld's personal and professional life.

His posthumously published "Markings" ("Waymarks" would have been a better translation of "Vägmärken", the Swedish original) made a deep, albeit confounding impression on me as a young man. I was struck by Hammarskjöld's intense search for meaning and direction in his life from the perspective of Christian mysticism. In those early days I could not fully identify myself with many of his reflections. Later in life, they took on more meaning and clarity, perhaps reflecting personal development and experiences on my part.

Respect for words and humans

I have always been fascinated by the centrality of language, the power of the word, in life and society. Hammarskjöld had a deep respect for the word and he used it with utmost care. He showed little tolerance toward the abuse of the word – our main tool to influence and communicate. If some of his "Markings" were difficult to grasp, the text on *The Word* is crystal clear:

Respect for the word is the first requirement in the discipline through which a human being can be nurtured to maturity – intellectually, emotionally and morally.

Respect for the word – using it with strictest care and in uncompromising inner love of truth – is also for the society and the human race a condition for growth.

To misuse the word is to show contempt for man. It undermines the bridges and poisons the springs. In this way it leads us backward on the long road of human evolution.

These words of Hammarskjöld have followed me through my diplomatic life, in many negotiations and mediation efforts. I have frequently quoted his words in lectures to students and young diplomats in order to instill in them Hammarskjöld's strong plea for the respect of the word as well as his stern warnings for misusing them.

The importance of prevention

Another aspect of Hammarskjöld's contribution to diplomacy and the conduct of international affairs is his emphasis on prevention – early warning and early action to achieve "pacific settlement of disputes" in the language of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. I have myself tried to make prevention a priority both for Swedish and UN diplomacy.

In his work as Secretary-General of the UN Hammarskjöld showed deep insight in preventive diplomacy. He also proved the value of dialogue and cultural sensitivity. His meetings and interaction with i.a. the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai on the release of American pilots captured after the Korea war is a case in point.

Lastly, Hammarskjöld's courage and integrity has been a constant source of admiration and inspiration for me. A Secretary-General of the UN is ultimately dependent on the Member States and among those, in particular the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Hammarskjöld never waived in his convictions and beliefs which to a large degree were anchored in the UN Charter.

A role model

During his tenure in office he had complicated relationships to the Permanent Members on various occasions. Examples are differences of view with France and the United Kingdom on the Suez crisis, with the US on Guatemala and with the Soviet Union on Hungary and the Congo.

His General Assembly confrontation with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev is legendary. Hammarskjöld knew, of course, that a Secretary-General serves at the mercy of the Permanent Members, especially if he wants to get re-elected (a strong reason, in my view, to give the Secretary-General one extended term of 7 years instead of the possibility of two 5-year terms – as proposed by the UN veteran and icon, Sir Brian Urquhart).

But Hammarskjöld also knew that a Secretary-General must defend the interests of the large majority of states, big and small. His principled approach vis-à-vis the Permanent Members won him wide support and a very high degree of legitimacy as Secretary-General.


I know that Hammarskjöld is a role model to many and not only to Swedish diplomats. "Leave it to Dag" was the line often quoted in the 1950s by many national politicians. Kofi Annan, who perhaps more than any other Secretary-General has been guided by Hammarskjöld's conduct in office, often said in crisis situations: "What would Dag Hammarskjöld do?"

This, to me is a solid confirmation of the role Hammarskjöld plays and will play in a changing, tumultuous world.

Jan Eliasson

"It is more important to be aware of the grounds for your own behaviour than to understand the motives of another."

(From Markings, November 1955)



Much of Dag Hammarskjöld's inner life and thoughts are unknown, but in his book Markings, he recounts some of his beliefs and doubts. He was a man of steadfast principles and a very high degree of integrity, which sometimes made him unpopular but always respected.

During his years as Secretary-General, the United Nations (UN) strengthened its role as an instrument of collaboration among states and peoples. Since then, the world has undergone enormous changes that pose new challenges to the UN. However, today as well as fifty years ago, the UN is as strong as the support from its Member States.

Dag Hammarskjöld: His values and legacy

Kiyo Akasaka

Fifty years ago, when tragedy struck Dag Hammarskjöld, I was thirteen years old. I was in middle school, in a small village in Osaka, Japan. We were deep in the Cold War. The Berlin wall was built. The Soviet Union had sent the first man into space. Carole King's hit song, "Will You Still Love Me Tomorrow", played in our ears. "West Side Story", starring Natalie Wood, was all the rage. The United Nations (UN) was still a new organisation. It was developing its identity, based on a set of almost impossible ideals. How far away those days seem, and yet, how close they are to those of us who remember these moments from that special year, 1961! Why does it feel that people then, in those times, seemed to have all been young, energetic, innocent, decent, idealistic – and deeply motivated?

Hammarskjöld, a profoundly mystical man, strongly believed that there was a direct correlation between motives and consequences. His book *Markings*, published after his death, reflected his constant questioning of his own motives. He described this notebook as the "only true profile" of himself – it was an exploration of his inner life, which was the source of all his strength. For Hammarskjöld, his inner life had to be the guide for his outer life, which had to be in harmony with his beliefs.

Hammarskjöld understood that in diplomacy, as in life, the outcomes of one's efforts would be lasting and good only if the motives of all those involved were pure and disinterested. Otherwise, the results would prove to be transient and bad. In advice to him-

self – and to all those who sought to serve the UN – Hammarskjöld wrote in *Markings* what have subsequently come to be known as his "commandments" on how a diplomat of the world body should behave. They were a modest eight in number – appropriately fewer than the ten that Moses brought down from the mountain top.

Here is a selection of those general rules of conduct that guided him in his job:

- It is more important to be aware of the grounds for your own behaviour than to understand the motives of another.

- The other's 'face' is more important than your own.

- All first-hand experience is valuable [...]. A closed mind is a weakness.

- If, while pleading another's cause, you are at the same time seeking something for yourself, you cannot hope to succeed.

Hammarskjöld also provided his views on the qualities required for his office: "perseverance and patience, a firm grip on realities, careful but imaginative planning, a clear awareness of the dangers but also of the fact that fate is what we make of it".

A conscience of its own

Fifty years after his death, and several Secretaries-General later, these reflections continue to provide a profound and practical guide to all those involved in seeking solutions to seemingly intractable problems. The UN has never had a shortage of problems, either in

Hammarskjöld's time or now. Hammarskjöld's reflections also provide insight into the kind of person he was: a man of great intelligence, honesty and conviction.

When one thinks about Hammarskjöld, another word that most often comes to mind is integrity. In his bio-

"The UN has never had a shortage of problems, either in Hammarskjöld's time or now."

graphy of Hammarskjöld, Brian Urquhart, a former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, writes that Hammarskjöld's "integrity, disinterestedness, and purity of intention were clear even to those – and there were many – with whom he frequently and strongly disagreed. He was not always liked, but he was almost invariably respected".

Today, we see a tendency by Member States and institutions alike to talk a great deal about "accountability". But the life of integrity of which Hammarskjöld spoke and which he lived, was, by its very nature, "accountable". It needed no external auditors to certify it as being so. Indeed, Hammarskjöld's concept of "integrity", by which he meant that UN officials should have only one loyalty – to the United Nations in the performance of their duties – would ensure an organisation accountable to

The UN General Assembly boasts 192 members, almost double the 104 members in 1961.

its Member States and to the peoples it serves. This personal belief, together with other qualities that Hammarskjöld possessed, like a fierce desire for independence and for objectivity, helped to define the very nature of the UN.

Hammarskjöld, through his own behaviour and values, helped to articulate and give shape to a new understanding of the UN – one that shifted it from a static organisation to a dynamic instrument for constructive international cooperation. Brian Urquhart credits him for making “a new art of multi-lateral diplomacy” through his skill, stamina, and resourcefulness. It was as if Hammarskjöld, over the course of his Secretary-Generalship, gave the organisation a conscience of its own, a conscience that sought to transcend the narrow interests of individual states. A conscience that called on states to rec-

ognise the true meaning of the Charter, namely, that states needed to accept the limits put on their national ambitions by the very existence of the UN and by their membership in the organisation. In an organisation of competing sovereign states and opinions, this was, and remains, a lofty vision – one that was to be tested over and over again.

Unchallengeable values

The world is a vastly different place today than when Hammarskjöld lived. Power is no longer locked in the old East-West rivalry. The UN General Assembly boasts 192 members, almost double the 104 members in 1961 – with more needs to be met, and more views to be reconciled. China is now the second largest economy in the world. Wealth is concentrated in the so-called “Group of 20” countries, which collectively represent 85 per cent of the global GNP. Wars and conflicts mostly take place within nations, not between them. UN peacekeeping has evolved from maintaining a ceasefire to a fighting role for the enforcement of peace. Roughly 120,000 UN personnel serve in 14 peace operations on four continents today.

People’s access to information – and to each other – is greater and faster than ever before. More than two billion people use the Internet. People spend over 700 billion minutes per month on Facebook. Environmental degradation continues unabated, with the threat of catastrophic climate change the greatest problem facing the human family. Yet despite these enormous changes, the values that Hammarskjöld embodied and provided to the UN 50 years ago remain unchallengeable.

Moreover, the conscience that he inspired in the UN – of active service in the common interest – is now manifested in many of its greatest undertakings: in the embrace of human rights, the fight against impunity, the spread of democratic principles, the preservation of our global commons, and in the Millennium Development Goals, which aim to lift the most vulnerable of the human family out of the circumstances that have denied them lives worthy of dignity and opportunity.

This conscience is living and breathing. We see it most dramatically in the revolutionary changes taking place in North Africa and the Middle East. Starting in Tunisia, we were witnessing an upheaval across the region. Led

PHOTO: UN PHOTO/ESKINDER DEBEBE



On 28 June 2006, the Republic of Montenegro became the 192nd, and so far newest, Member State of the UN. A flag-raising ceremony was held at UN Headquarters in New York.

largely by young women and men, the desire for freedom, for participation, and for a voice, is expanding. People are increasingly aware of their political, civil, social, and economic rights – and they are fighting for them. They are fighting for an end to despotic rulers, and for the right to choose their own leaders. Their vision is one that is contained in the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Their demands for their inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms are shattering the idea that state stability and improvements in wealth, alone, are enough to satisfy people's aspirations for a better life.

In 2009, the independent Arab Human Development Report, sponsored by the UN Development Programme, warned that “spreading poverty, unemployment, civil wars, sectarian and ethnic conflicts and authoritarian repression have exposed the limits of many states in guaranteeing their citizens' rights and freedoms”. The peoples' movements have been powered by information and by new communications tools and by an insistence on freedom of the press, freedom of information and freedom of expression.

A world of crises and transformation

With regard to Libya, on 17 March, the UN Security Council took a historic decision. Resolution 1973 affirms the international community's determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence brought upon them by their own government. The concept of responsibility to protect has been gaining acceptance in the international community. Responsibility to protect means that dictators will no longer be allowed to kill their citizens with impunity.

The sweep of change across the Arab region reminds us of the transformation of Eastern Europe after 1989. Then, too, people were demanding democratic and economic development and values more closely in line with those promoted by the UN. More than 20 years later, Europe is still working out the impact of the transformation that took place at the end of the Cold War and with the subsequent reintegration of Europe.

In Asia, in the region where I am from, we have also witnessed a shift in ideas and political philosophy, from so-called “Asian values”, promoted in the



PHOTO: DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD

“Weep if you can, weep, but do not complain. The way chose you – and you must be thankful.” (From Markings, July 1961)

1980s, to more universal ones today. The “Asian values” of which I speak were advocated mostly in the countries of East Asia, like Japan, Malaysia and Singapore, which placed a premium on group orientation and on placing the interests of the community before those of the individual. “Asian values” were associated with self-effacement, self-discipline and personal sacrifice to the greater good. They were identified as the reason for the region's enormous economic successes and advances in development.

But they were also associated with strong or authoritative government, the curtailment of some political and civil rights in the interest of society,

and restrictions on the free exchange of ideas and of the press. The stated need to maintain social order and peace among different ethnicities and cultures was used as an excuse to restrict human rights and political opposition. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 put an end to the “Asian miracle”. And the same “Asian values” that were once said to have been the source of the region's success were now attributed to be a source of its collapse.

Over the past ten years and more, many countries in East Asia and the region are differentiating the good and bad aspects of Asian values. They are moving away from some of the more restrictive habits, and are slowly

The values that unite us must continue to be the ones that motivate the UN.

embracing universal values – values such as freedom, tolerance, human rights and democracy. The universality of such values is still the subject of debate in some countries, but I am confident that the “Asian century”, if it emerges at all in the near future, will embrace the universal values embodied by the UN.

Meanwhile, here in Europe, the question of values is also alive. A number of European leaders have recently spoken about the failure of “multiculturalism” – about whether policies that support the right of all groups to live by their traditional values have failed to promote a sense of common identity centred on values such as human rights, democracy, social integration and equality before the law. These views have triggered an enormous amount of debate – about immigration and integration, about cultural and religious intolerance, and about whether states have been too “neutral” in defending certain values

that are dear to their national identity. It is a debate that requires the ability – and the will – to listen to all sides. It is also one that must avoid hatred, fear, and jingoism, and that instead looks to find ways to build inclusive societies. Since 2005, the UN, through the Alliance of Civilizations, has been working towards this goal – to unite different cultures in common cause.

Strengthening the UN

Brian Urquhart described Hammar-skjöld as “a man of great vision and compassion who desperately wanted to strengthen the United Nations as a protection and insurance against the great storms of the future”. The list of storms, problems, and challenges facing the UN today is daunting. You hear or read about them in the news every day. “But, although the dangers may be great and although our role may be modest, we can feel that the work of the Organisation is the means through which we all, jointly, can work so as to reduce the dangers.” These were among Hammar-skjöld’s last words to the staff of the UN, just ten days before his death.

The UN is constantly adapting and recreating itself to better meet the changing times and demands placed on it by the world. We have seen this in its contributions to peace, development, and the spread of human rights. The UN is also

undertaking measures to improve our efficiency and effectiveness – from implementing new administrative systems backed by modern technology, to initiatives aimed at more rapid resourcing and service delivery of field missions, to ensuring that our staff have the integrity embodied by Hammar-skjöld and can perform at the highest level.

But, ultimately, for the organisation to be strong and to continue to make a difference in the world, it needs the support of its Member States. And it will continue to require that governments give priority to the general global good rather than to specific national interests. This is not an abstract statement. Member States and governments are composed of individuals whose vision and compassion create the institutions and spirit that animates the UN

The UN is us. And the values that unite us must continue to be the ones that motivate the UN. Dag Hammar-skjöld, the second Secretary-General of the UN, was ahead of his time. His ideas and his values remain valid – and useful – today. His was an enduring legacy. Hammar-skjöld continues to inspire all of us with his conviction that our “fate is what we make of it”. The UN is proud to have had such a remarkable leader, one who, in the simple words of the poet W.H. Auden, was “a great, good, and lovable man”. 🌿

Slower global rise of military spending

World military expenditure in 2010 is estimated to have been \$1630 billion, an increase of 1.3 per cent. The region with the largest increase was South America, with a 5.8 per cent increase, reaching a total of \$63.3 billion, according to new data published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI’s Yearbook 2011 is launched in June and presents comprehensive information and analysis of military spending.

Part of the explanation for this rise is to be found in the strong economic growth that the region has experienced in recent years, while in other regions the effects of the global economic recession caused military spending to fall or at least rise more slowly in 2010.

Although the rate of increase in US military spending slowed in 2010, to 2.8 per cent compared to an annual average increase of 7.4 per cent between 2001 and 2009, the global increase in 2010 is almost entirely down to the United States, which accounted for \$19.6 billion of the \$20.6 billion global increase.

The global increase in military spending of 1.3 per cent is the slowest annual rate of increase since the surge in global

military expenditure began after 2001. Between 2001 and 2009, the annual increase averaged 5.1 per cent. In many cases, the falls or slower increases represent a delayed reaction to the global financial and economic crisis that broke in 2008.

In Europe, where military spending fell by 2.8 per cent, governments began to address soaring budget deficits, having previously enacted stimulus packages in 2009.

In Asia, even though most economies did not experience a recession, economic growth slowed down in 2009, while military spending continued to rise rapidly. Thus, the slower increase of 1.4 per cent in military spending in 2010 partly readjusts growth in military spending to economic growth rates.

The Middle East spent \$111 billion on military expenditure in 2010, an increase of 2.5 per cent over 2009. The largest absolute rise in the region was by Saudi Arabia.

Estimated spending in Africa increased by 5.2 per cent, led by major oil-producers such as Algeria, Angola and Nigeria.

Source: SIPRI press release 11 April 2011

An unforgettable moment

At the end of August 1961 I travelled to New York together with my father. It was a must for us to visit the United Nations. Walking around in this building of such importance to the world, we felt deeply impressed.

We looked down from the balcony of the General Assembly Hall on all the empty seats. In the front we saw the yellow wall with the round UN emblem behind the large podium. Along the side-walls were long rows of windows for the interpreters. The walls were decorated with yellow lines – like sunbeams.

Suddenly the door to the left of the podium opened and a solitary man entered. He had some papers in his hands and stood for a moment pondering over them, arranged the papers and finally placed them on the small platform. I felt my heart jump – it was Dag Hammarskjöld!

It felt like a blessing to see this great man on stage in the General Assembly Hall of the United Nations, where he so brilliantly mastered conflicts in our world.

He looked up, spotted my father and me and, despite the distance, seemed to

smile at us. My heart grew and became warm. I smiled back.

At that moment it was impossible to think that Dag Hammarskjöld only had three more weeks to live. On 18 September 1961 his plane crashed near Ndola in Africa.

Maria Barck-Holst



PHOTO: UN PHOTO/SOPHIA PARIS

The empty UN General Assembly Hall, the site of an unforgettable memory of the author.

The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and in particular 1973 marked a new chapter in the history of internationally decided and endorsed military interventions. But while some celebrate this as a break through, the reality is far more dangerous. The dangers of another western intervention in a Muslim Arab country in the Middle East-North Africa region, despite the UN endorsement, are at the core of the following reflections. They show the dilemma if not impossibility of peace keeping in times of war.

Libya and the limits to the R2P

Phyllis Bennis

The United Nations Charter begins with the commitment to ending the “scourge of war”. And just as the Charter serves as the core repository of international law, the United Nations (UN) itself should serve as the broadest and most representative institution of the international community as a whole. That should mean the UN playing the central role in ending wars and imposing ceasefires, in establishing the primacy of diplomacy and negotiating peace.

The UN is an organization of governments – based on the principle of sovereign independence.

The problem is, domination of the UN, and especially of the Security Council by its most powerful member states, means that too often UN actions are neither representative of the global community as a whole, nor legitimate reflections of international law. Since its founding, the UN has faced – or, more often, ignored – the contradiction between absolute national sovereignty and human rights. That is, the UN is an organization of governments – based on the principle of sovereign independence. But the UN also stands, especially through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for the defense of people, including the human rights

often denied by those same UN member governments.

On issues of war and peace, that sovereignty vs human rights challenge is no easier. And the capacity of the UN – including its legitimacy – to act against war and in defense of peace is especially compromised when the UN itself, most often through Security Council actions, becomes a belligerent actor on one side of an internal conflict or a civil war. In the case of Libya in 2011, the possibility of a UN peacemaking role, encouraging, negotiating or even imposing a ceasefire, was thwarted by its involvement as a participant in the military effort to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi.

Military escalation instead of political dialogue

The UN Security Council resolution that aimed at protecting civilians in Libya started with the call for “the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and ...the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people”. It then took note of the goal of “facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution”.

Those were important goals. But for the first two weeks the only action taken by the powerful countries that orchestrated the UN response was to escalate military engagement: a no-fly zone, air strikes, “all necessary means”, ostensibly for the narrow goal of protecting civilians. The US, UK, France and other western countries continued calling openly for regime change. Some African Union (AU) heads of state tried to go to Libya to begin negotiations, but

were initially denied entry to the country, apparently in response to South Africa’s vote supporting the UN resolution. A ceasefire didn’t seem to be at the top of anyone’s agenda, and certainly the UN’s most powerful members did not put negotiations anywhere close to the top of their agenda.

The western countries’ process of gaining international – read: UN Security Council – approval for the use of military force against Qaddafi was somewhat different than the approach used in earlier efforts to legitimize armed interventions in countries of the global south. To his credit, President Obama essentially recognized that while Security Council approval may provide legal authority, it does not, by itself, assure international legitimacy. It is too widely understood as an undemocratic bastion of power, where the veto of the five permanent members looms as a constant reminder of all the other countries’ disenfranchisement. This

The opposition’s sudden call for a ceasefire began to significantly change the terrain.

time was to be unlike George Bush I’s success in gaining endorsement for war against Iraq in 1990-91, or Bill Clinton’s instrumentalizing of the Council to win support for interventions in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia (even while the US and France prevented the UN from



Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon meeting with Muammar Qaddafi, President of Libya, in spring 2011 in focus of the world community's (misguided?) efforts to protect civilians.

acting against genocide in Rwanda). This time President Obama, with other western allies, acknowledged that support from the Arab League and the AU would be necessary to legitimize a UN-backed military assault on Libya.

The response from the two regional bodies was telling. The Arab League, made up of 22 governments of which most are dependent on US political, military and/or economic support, soon offered a cautious and rather tepid endorsement of a “no-fly zone” in Libya. Despite its dubious nature, the Arab League vote provided much-needed political cover for US, UK, French and broader NATO involvement. The AU, on the other hand, rejected the idea of a UN-endorsed “no-fly zone”, let alone an even broader military campaign against the Libyan regime.

This was not surprising, since the organization’s 2001 founding, Muammar Qaddafi had been its biggest cheerleader and certainly its biggest funder. Qaddafi had also provided huge contributions to African countries, much of it for schools, clinics and other infrastructure projects, but much of it inevitably going straight to the pockets of corrupt government officials. And as soon as the AU made clear it did not intend to embrace the US-NATO plan for a mili-

tary role in Libya, we were hearing only of the need for the Arab League’s backing. The AU was out of the picture.

From civilian uprising to civil war

The Libyan opposition, reflecting the independent spirit of the Arab Spring uprisings in other Arab countries, initially rejected any foreign intervention. But fairly quickly, after the Qaddafi regime’s initial military attack on the democratic protesters followed by the spontaneous action of the opposition to take up arms itself had largely transformed the Libyan conflict from a civilian uprising into a civil war that changed. First there was the call for “just a no-fly zone, but no foreign intervention”. Then that escalated to the call for UN or NATO or US or British or French or somebody’s military to attack Qaddafi’s armor and ground forces.

Ironically, because it quickly became the leit-motif of the overall call for humanitarian intervention, the no-fly zone itself was never likely to provide the main civilian protection, since most of Qaddafi’s attack came from tanks and other ground-based forces. The US had initially rejected the British-French initiative in the UN calling for a no-fly zone, because influential forces within the Obama administration, the Penta-

gon, Congress, and other US elites believed a no-fly zone would not protect civilians, and would pull the US into a quagmire with no clear exit strategy or basis to declare “victory”. But after a few days of internal debate, the pro-intervention forces, largely based in Hillary Clinton’s State Department, won the day. They told the British and the French that they could not support the no-fly zone plan, but that instead of simply vetoing the proposed resolution, they would redraft it to fit US requirements.

The result was a vastly expanded resolution that not only endorsed a no-fly zone, but authorized “all necessary measures” to be used in the name of protecting civilians. While the regional and global discussions focused on the no-fly zone, the resolution actually went much further. The language “all necessary measures” legalized unlimited military force, and because “to protect civilians” was not defined, it was left to the US-NATO coalition forces themselves to decide how far they wanted to go. The public urgency that limned the UN debate focused on threats Qaddafi had made, as his forces continued their assault on cities, primarily in eastern Libya, still under opposition control. The language was dire, threatening

“no mercy or compassion’ for those who fight”¹ against his regime. But the threatening language was distorted further, beyond its actual meaning by the constant repetition of threats to search “alley by alley” and the words “no mer-

Certainly the UN’s most powerful members did not put negotiations anywhere close to the top of their agenda.

cy”. The result, deliberate or not, was to convince a broad swathe of Americans and others in western countries that Qaddafi was threatening to slaughter the entire population of Benghazi – threatening a genocide.

The notion that the threat was directed against civilians, or that a genocidal assault on the city was either imminent or inevitable, simply is not borne out by the facts. There was a threat, but its severity could not be known. Weighed against that was the known consequences of “humanitarian” military interventions by the most powerful countries in the world, even beyond the likely inadequacy of military protection for civilians. Consequences include directly-caused civilian casualties, escalation of the existing humanitarian or human rights crisis, and legitimization of unilateral military interventions, and the sidelining of diplomacy. And then of course there is the problem of increasing the economic and strategic power of imperial countries while escalating the power disparities, dispossession and disenfranchisement of civilian populations left in occupied and/or destroyed states, as well overall military/political/humanitarian failure and years of lethal and costly US-NATO occupations.

Selective military intervention

Foreign military intervention by powerful northern governments, especially that of the US, against far weaker countries of the global South, is a dangerous, risky proposition, whether couched in the language of humanitarianism or not. And that very real danger emerges even before the broad political challenge of hypocrisy and double standards is

confronted. Military intervention is always selective. This isn’t about weighing all the various humanitarian crises, deciding where and how to respond on the basis of which ones impact the most people, which ones are the bloodiest, which ones are closest, which ones have the most brutal dictator ... This is about moving directly to military intervention in a few select cases, while other humanitarian crises are not responded to at all, even by non-military means – because the primary motivation for the governments involved, unlike the motivation for people, is not humanitarian at all. It would be easier to accept that military intervention in Libya really was based on humanitarian motives if non-military but active intervention was already underway in other similar (if so far smaller) crises.

For example, if the US had immediately cut all military and economic aid to Bahrain at the first sign of its king bringing in foreign troops to suppress the uprising. If the US had immediately ended all arms sales and stopped the current weapons pipeline to Saudi Arabia when its soldiers crossed the causeway. If the US had announced a complete halt in all military aid to Yemen when Saleh’s forces first attacked the demonstrators. Not to mention the possibility of a decision to cut military aid to Israel and end the decades of US-granted impunity for war crimes. All of those actions were possible, appropriate, non-military, and would have had huge humanitarian impacts. When none of them is done, it’s difficult to accept the claim that military intervention in Libya is really grounded in humanitarian motives.

So far, even the combination of massive air strikes, CIA agents on the ground coordinating with the opposition, Obama’s authorization to arm the rebels, and the defection of Moussa Koussa and other key Qaddafi regime officials, has not been sufficient to defeat the regime. Claiming they simply “hoped” Qaddafi’s regime would crumble from within, international actors’ military involvement resulted in a position that essentially ruled out negotiations while the long-time Libyan leader remained in power.

The opposition’s sudden call for a ceasefire began to significantly change the terrain. Clearly this was a moment for a rapid international move towards new negotiations aimed at establishing the immediate ceasefire. The op-

position’s shift may have reflected their growing realization that even the massive US-NATO attacks against the regime and the possibility of CIA arms and training could not ensure – let alone consolidate – a real victory over the far better-armed and better-trained forces of Qaddafi’s military.

This new position may have also reflected a growing uncertainty as to whether the vastly disparate components of the opposition – young democratically-oriented professionals, unemployed workers, a range of Islamists possibly including some identifying with al Qaeda, defecting regime soldiers, newly returned Libyan CIA assets and more – can unify enough to continue fighting. They also may have been watching the rapidly disintegrating public international support for the western coalition fighting on their side of the civil war, and judging that they dare not rely too much on their current

The no-fly zone itself was never likely to provide the main civilian protection.

allies. Finally, the opposition may have recognized the increasing danger to civilians across Libya posed by the escalating fighting. Even NATO was warning its partners, the Libyan opposition, against attacking civilians.

Rejected proposals

But Qaddafi rejected the opposition’s proposal, despite its unexpected narrow focus that would have allowed the long-time Libyan dictator to remain in power. The next move came from the AU, whose representatives proposed a “roadmap” for a ceasefire and political reforms “to eliminate the causes of the current crisis”. The opposition rejected that proposal, although its text bore similarities to the Benghazi leadership’s own earlier offer.

Clearly urgent negotiations are needed. There have been choruses of enraged cries – “Negotiate?! With Qaddafi?!” – mostly coming from US and European officials. That disingenuous outrage needs to be answered with the quick reminder that until about six or seven weeks ago, that same Muam-

mar Qaddafi was their guy. They need to be reminded that starting in 2002, US and European diplomats managed to negotiate quite nicely with their Libyan counterparts, and, in just about a year reached an agreement in which Qaddafi surrendered his nascent nuclear weapons program and paid huge compensation claims to victims of Libyan terrorist attacks. The US in return removed Libya from its “anti-terrorism” blacklist and ended sanctions, while European governments rushed to embrace the Libyan dictator and European oil companies flooded Libya with new oil contracts. And those western officials need to be reminded that Qaddafi’s repression is nothing new, it was well known back then too. So yes, negotiations are possible – and urgent.

A ceasefire alone does not answer all the critical questions. A real ceasefire should mean an end to US claims that somehow the UN resolutions’ unequivocal demand for a complete arms embargo does not apply to weapons the US might provide to strengthen the opposition, but the US may continue that

claim and it will have to be challenged. A ceasefire does not provide for the kind of real accountability so desperately needed to hold not only Qaddafi but other dictators across the region, those already overthrown and those still holding on to power, to account for their human rights violations and other crimes. The situation in Libya has been referred to the International Criminal Court, where prosecutors are already investigating possible violations. A ceasefire should not end those investigations, but the timing of accountability efforts always has to take into consideration the requirements of ending bloodshed.

The limits of UN peacemaking and UN diplomacy have been open and visible throughout the Libyan crisis. The legality created by a Security Council resolution authorizing force was not matched by real legitimacy. The very real challenge that led to the UN’s adoption of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine – the fact that many people face dire human rights violations, war crimes, even crimes against humanity at the hands of their own government

or the government controlling them in illegal occupations – remains to be answered. But it must be answered in a way that does not create more humanitarian, human rights, political, economic and other problems than it solves. Libya is not a model for the “R2P” doctrine – it is a model of why we need a different one. 

- 1 David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, “Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears”. *New York Times*, 17 March 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18libya.html?pagewanted=1&r=1&src=mv>.

UN PHOTO/OCHA/DAVID OHANA



The humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the riots in Libya spring 2011 made hundreds of refugees line up for food at a transit camp near the Tunisia-Libya border.

Il y a cinquante ans, Dag Hammarskjöld mourrait dans un accident d'avion en Rhodésie du Nord (aujourd'hui Zambie). Il se déplaçait pour une réunion avec Moïse Tshombe, chef des sécessionnistes Katangais. Malgré sa mort tragique, Hammarskjöld a joué un rôle déterminant dans les premières années turbulentes d'après l'indépendance de la RD Congo et dans les missions Onusiennes de maintien de la paix. Aussi, son habileté diplomatique, sa façon courageuse et intègre d'intervenir, ses qualités d'homme compétent au capital relationnel étendu et d'une culture politique et générale élevée constituent une source d'inspiration pour la société civile congolaise vouée à la cause de la population.

République Démocratique du Congo

50 ans après Dag Hammarskjöld

Acquis à valoriser et leçons tirées

Murhega Mashanda

Après l'indépendance du Congo, Dag Hammarskjöld, Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), a astucieusement évité au Congo, aussi bien la guerre civile que l'émiettement en de petits États autonomes. Aussi, le Congo était déjà en instance d'être un champ de bataille de grandes puissances lors du conflit Est-Ouest. Au fait, il avait mis en exergue tous ses talents et ses multiples qualités d'homme compétent, au capital relationnel étendu, d'une culture politique et générale élevée et d'une diplomatie habile.

La perte inopinée de cet artisan de la paix et de la sécurité internationales en plein exercice d'une mission de "salut public" pour le Congo a brutalement préjudicié l'évolution harmonieuse de ce pays. En effet, si l'Eternel lui prêtait vie et que l'ONU accompagnait le Congo dans la voie qu'il avait tracée, des hypothèses optimistes se vérifieraient. Le paradoxe de pays "scandaleusement riche avec une population scandaleusement pauvre" serait déjà contredit. En outre, dira Frantz Fanon, dans son ouvrage, *Les damnés de la terre*, "l'Afrique a la forme d'un fusil dont la gâchette est placée au Congo". Ce géant au centre de l'Afrique avec neuf pays voisins pourrait jouer un rôle déterminant "de gâchette" dans le développement du continent. Se souvenir de Hammarskjöld au travail avec ses qualités permet d'imaginer, d'une part, ce que son œuvre pourrait engendrer pour le Congo en particulier et

l'Afrique en général s'il la poursuivait et, d'autre part ce qu'elle peut inspirer à la société civile vouée à la cause de la population.

Rôle de Hammarskjöld dans la crise congolaise

L'indépendance du Congo (30 juin 1960) est suivie des tensions entre Lumumba, premier ministre, et Kasavubu, le premier président. Les soldats congolais de la Force Publique refusent d'obéir aux officiers belges. Des émeutes éclatent, quelques européens sont violés ou assassinés. L'armée belge intervient sans l'autorisation du gouvernement central (pour protéger les européens).

Le 11 juillet 1960, Tshombe proclame la sécession katangaise, Katanga étant la province la plus riche du Congo où se trouvaient beaucoup d'intérêts industriels et commerciaux belges. L'armée belge le soutient. Devant cette agression Kasavubu et Lumumba demandent la protection de l'ONU. En même temps, les années 1960 sont caractérisées par une tension Est-Ouest et des mouvements des libérations africains. Hammarskjöld se rapproche des positions africaines face à cette crise, mais il évite la confrontation avec les grandes puissances.

Le 14 juillet 1960, Hammarskjöld met sur pied l'ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo) qui débarque à Léopoldville le 15 juillet 1960. Hammarskjöld engage aussi des soldats

suédois et irlandais pour rassurer les belges contre la colère de la population congolaise révoltée à l'égard de l'administration belge, et des soldats congolais qui n'obéissaient plus aux ordres des officiers belges. Aussi, lors des émeutes quelques Européens avaient péri.

Il exige la rapidité de l'action du Conseil de Sécurité, l'empressement des États à envoyer des troupes et à disponibiliser les moyens pour éviter au Congo :

- une guerre civile ;
- une guerre contre l'URSS ;
- l'émiettement total en territoires peu étendus mais autonomes ; et
- l'éclatement et qu'il ne devienne un champ de bataille Est-Ouest. Sans l'ONUC, le Congo aurait sombré dans la déliquescence qu'il a connue plus tard, après la guerre froide (1997-2002).

Hammarskjöld a milité pour obtenir une résolution des ONU exigeant le départ des troupes belges en vue de placer le Katanga sous le contrôle des Nations Unies. Cette rapidité dans la mise en place de l'ONUC permet de mesurer l'aptitude de Hammarskjöld à attirer et à mobiliser l'attention des grandes puissances.

En septembre 1960, Kasavubu démet Lumumba, Lumumba désavoue également Kasavubu. Pour éviter la guerre civile l'ONU traite les deux camps au même pied d'égalité.

La tragédie

Novembre 1960, l'Assemblée Générale vote une résolution attribuant au gouvernement Kasavubu le siège du Congo à l'ONU. Pendant que Kasavubu fête sa victoire, Lumumba fuit de sa maison protégée de l'ONUC pour Stanleyville. L'armée congolaise le capture. L'URSS accuse l'ONU de complicité.

A mi-janvier 1961, Kasavubu et Mobutu remettent à Tshombe trois prisonniers dont Lumumba. A mi-février, après l'assassinat de Lumumba, Valerian Zairine, nouvel ambassadeur soviétique à l'ONU, exige des sanctions contre la Belgique, l'arrestation de Mobutu et de Tshombe, la cessation de l'opération de l'ONUC et la démission de Hammarskjöld.

Nikita Khrouchtchev, Secrétaire Général du parti communiste soviétique condamne l'action de l'ONUC et propose un « troïka » comprenant un représentant de l'Occident, un de l'État socialiste et celui des pays neutres pour remplacer le Secrétaire Général (aucune autre puissance n'opte pour la position de l'URSS).

Hammarskjöld refuse la trainée par l'Union soviétique : il rejette l'idée de la troïka, il refuse de démissionner. Son discours est suivi d'acclamations des participants à la session ordinaire d'automne 1960. Le 30 mai 1961, à Oxford, sur base de l'expérience acquise au Congo, il définit les tâches qui incombent au Secrétaire Général et son rôle comme fonctionnaire international. Il insiste sur les notions du devoir et de responsabilité.

Le 21 février 1961 une résolution de l'ONU autorise la force pour éviter une guerre civile au Congo et exige le départ des conseillers belges. En mars 1961, l'URSS et la France refusent de payer leurs contributions à l'ONU à cause de cette résolution. En application de la résolution du 21 février 1961, le nouveau Représentant des ONU à Lubumbashi, Conor Cruise O'Brien, nommé par Hammarskjöld, fit arrêter et expulser les conseillers belges de Tshombe.

La sécession katangaise nécessite un armistice. Hammarskjöld doit amener Cyrille Adoula représentant le gouvernement central et Tshombe, le leader de la sécession, à négocier. La rencontre est fixée au 18 septembre 1961 à Ndola, en Rhodésie du Nord (Zambie actuelle).

L'avion de Hammarskjöld quitte Léopoldville. Le 17 septembre 1961 à 23h35, heure locale, le pilote annonce à la tour de contrôle de Ndola son atterris-

sage pour peu après minuit. A 00h10, le pilote signale qu'il voit les lumières de la piste d'atterrissage de Ndola, puis le contact est rompu. Il faut 16h de recherche pour retrouver l'épave à 19 km de l'aéroport. Les montres de l'avion s'étaient arrêtées à 00h20 heure locale, le 18 septembre 1961 soit 22h20 GMT le 17 septembre.

Les corps retrouvés dans l'épave étaient en partie carbonisés, mais celui de Hammarskjöld était éjecté de l'avion, il avait de nombreuses blessures, sa colonne vertébrale brisée en plusieurs endroits. Hammarskjöld est mort et plusieurs hypothèses sont émises, mais aucune ne semble convaincante. Il est inhumé au caveau familial au cimetière d'Upsala.

Les négociations de paix que Hammarskjöld avait commencées se poursuivent après sa mort pendant trois ans et la sécession du Katanga prend fin en 1963.

Heritage de Hammarskjöld en RD Congo



Hammarskjöld s'est immortalisé. En effet, depuis 1948, les soldats de paix des ONU ont mené 63 missions de terrain qui ont permis aux populations de plusieurs dizaines de pays de participer aux élections libres et honnêtes et ont

aidé au cours des années 90 à désarmer plus de 400.000 anciens combattants. La force de maintien de la paix est un élément central de réponse internationale aux conflits armés. Ses soldats sont envoyés dans des régions en proie à des conflits dans lesquelles personne d'autre n'est disposé ou capable d'aller pour empêcher la reprise ou la recrudescence des combats.

De 1960 à 1964, la RD Congo a été prise en charge par l'ONUC. Depuis la guerre de 1996, le Conseil de sécurité suit la situation de la RD Congo. La Résolution 1234 du 9 avril 1999, qui nomme un envoyé spécial du Secrétaire Général, exige l'arrêt des hostilités, le cessez-le-feu et la médiation. La résolution 1258 du 6 août 1999, qui déploie 90 membres du personnel militaires de liaison de l'ONU, personnel civil, humanitaire et administratif, illustre un nouveau début des actions de l'ONU pour la paix en RD Congo. La Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo (MONUC) est née. Le 28 mai 2010, le Conseil de Sécurité adopte la Résolution 1925 qui donne une nouvelle orientation au mandat de la MONUC. Elle devient la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Congo (MONUSCO)



Members of the Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri, DRC, in front of the military personnel of MONUC during a disarmament, demobilisation, and rehabilitation exercise.



In the early hours of the morning in Léopoldville in July 1960, Dag Hammarskjöld sketched out his ideas of the organisation of the UN operations in the Congo.

à partir du 1 juillet 2010. Son mandat porte sur deux priorités majeures, à savoir la protection des civils ainsi que la stabilisation et la consolidation de la paix.

Les résolutions successives traduisent les difficultés rencontrées, les avancées opérées par l'ONU et son engagement à accompagner la RD Congo à recouvrer la paix. Il convient de reconnaître les progrès réalisés et le défis relevés ces 15 dernières années avec la MONUC (arrêt de la guerre, mise en place d'un gouvernement élu en 2006 mettant fin à la crise de légitimité, le retour des armées étrangères, la réunification du pays) et les défis qui restent à surmonter sous l'accompagnement de la MONUSCO (la présence des FDLR, de la LRA, Mbororo, la présence des groupes armés nationaux, la stabilisation et la consolidation de la paix). C'est dans les ornières de l'ONUC, initiative de Hammarskjöld, que l'histoire s'est répétée.

Cependant, il faut souligner que l'efficacité et la durabilité de l'intervention des ONU dans la construction de la paix en RD Congo dépend des facteurs internes notamment de l'implication de la population congolaise organisée au

sein de la société civile. Celle-ci renforce les actions de maintien de paix par des interventions de consolidation de la paix. Pour ce faire, la société civile doit être forte.

Rôle de la société civile

Depuis l'indépendance, la RD Congo traverse une série des guerres dont les sécessions katangaise et kasaïenne, la rébellion muleliste ... La société civile a joué un grand rôle pour la restauration de la paix.

Dans ses débuts, un peu avant l'indépendance, la société civile congolaise a commencé par la création des ADAPES (clubs d'évolués, cercles d'études, association d'anciens élèves), APIC (Association du Personnel Congolais), des mouvements religieux tels que le Kimbanguisme et le Kitawala, la conscience africaine de l'Abbé Joseph Malula et des mouvements politiques comme l'Association des Bakongo (ABOKO) de Joseph Kasavubu, le Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) de Lumumba.

Depuis 1957, la Belgique a été obligée d'organiser la première élection populaire, puis la table ronde de Bruxelles. Le 4 janvier 1959 a lieu la révolte populaire (avec 300 personnes tuées par la force

publique) suivie d'une campagne de désobéissance civile refusant de payer les impôts et boycottant les institutions coloniales.

C'est ce courant de la population civile qui, malgré la dictature de Mobutu, a fini par s'organiser en Société Civile structurée en 1980, et dont la mission sera l'encadrement de la population jusqu'à la proclamation de la démocratisation du pays le 4 octobre 1990. La société civile se cristallise lors de la conférence nationale souveraine en 1991 en jetant des bases théoriques de la démocratie bien qu'elles soient restées lettre morte. Ses actions se multiplièrent après.

Ainsi, pendant les deux dernières guerres, celles de 1996 et 1998, les populations civiles ont créé des mouvements de résistance populaire (Maï Maï). La société civile a mené la Campagne Nationale pour la Paix Durable, tributaire de l'Agenda de la Paix élaboré (le 5 et 7 Novembre 1998) en vue de contribuer à mettre fin aux conflits et à la relance du processus de la démocratisation. Elle a mené ou participé au plaidoyer/lobbying pour la tenue des différentes rencontres (Gaberonne, Addis Abeba, Lusaka, Prétoria, Sun City ...)

et la signature des accords auxquels elle a participé (accord de cessez-le-feu, accord global et inclusif). Elle a fait partie des institutions de transition dont l'objectif principal était l'organisation des élections pour mettre fin à la crise de légitimité. Elle a encadré la population dans les élections de 2006.

Par diverses actions, elle accompagne la population dans le plaidoyer auprès des pouvoirs publics, pour la mise en place d'un état de droit. Elle a amené la population à maintenir l'unité nationale et le sentiment d'appartenance à une même nation ainsi que la Communauté Internationale à reconnaître l'agression du pays et à mettre en place des mécanismes d'accompagnement vers la stabilité de l'État.

Aujourd'hui, en dépit des avancées significatives, il se révèle d'autres défis à relever : la protection des civils, la stabilisation et consolidation de la paix. La situation du Congo interpelle et de graves problèmes persistent à cause des enjeux économiques des acteurs nationaux et internationaux : la présence de groupes armés étrangers (FDLR, LRA, FNL, Mbororo), l'impunité, la corruption, le non paiement des salaires des fonctionnaires de l'État et des militaires, les assassinats, les viols, les violations des droits humains, le chômage, la mauvaise condition de vie, les conflits intercommunautaires, le détournement des deniers de l'État. Il y a encore beaucoup à faire. Au fait, cinquante ans après l'indépendance, le bilan est encore insatisfaisant.

Au regard de cette situation d'un État malade confronté à toute sorte de crises et devant l'absence de repères, en dépit de tous les efforts de la communauté internationale, le pouvoir public, la société civile et le secteur privé devraient : veiller au respect de la constitution et des lois de la République ;

- promouvoir les valeurs démocratiques telles que : justice, vérité, liberté, respect du bien commun, transparence, représentativité, alternance, participation citoyenne, tolérance ... ;
- lutter contre les antivaleurs dont la corruption, l'impunité ;
- se mobiliser pour que les élections prochaines soient libres, démocratiques et transparentes ;
- promouvoir une expertise technique, une bonne capacité d'analyser le contexte, de récolter les données, de planifier et formuler des priorités ;

- développer les capacités d'identification des piliers pour la paix et le développement durables ;
- favoriser l'accès à l'information ; et
- mettre en place des mécanismes de suivi-évaluation des réalisations du gouvernement.

Au fait, si la société civile peut jouer le rôle de catalyseur dans cette synergie, elle peut, à la manière de Hammarskjöld, apporter des bases à la consolidation de la paix, à la démocratie et au développement du pays et s'allier aux efforts de la communauté internationale.

Conclusion

Il convient de reconnaître que l'ONU s'est préoccupée de la RD Congo depuis l'indépendance. A l'époque, l'intervention de l'ONU au Congo était l'œuvre de Hammarskjöld, un Secrétaire Général plein de plusieurs qualités et auprès de qui la communauté internationale d'aujourd'hui ainsi que le pouvoir public et la société civile congolaise peuvent beaucoup apprendre tant sur le plan individuel qu'institutionnel.

D'une part, l'exercice de hautes fonctions nécessite un ensemble d'atouts et de qualités, notamment l'expérience dans le domaine professionnel avec un niveau de culture générale élevé, la capacité d'analyser rapidement les situations et de proposer des pistes de solutions appropriées aux problèmes, la bonne santé mentale et l'endurance physique, le capital relationnel étendu et diversifié, le sentiment de devoir et de redevabilité, le sentiment de sacrifice de soi, la fidélité à soi-même, etc.

A ces qualités individuelles des acteurs, s'ajoute le soubassement de l'efficacité, il convient, d'autre part, que la société civile, comme contrepoids au pouvoir public et intermédiaire entre la base et le politique, veille à la protection de l'intégrité des institutions du pays, à leur impartialité, leur compétence, leur indépendance et leur légitimité.

Ainsi, pour jouer efficacement son rôle et avoir de l'influence sur la situation du pays ainsi que son évolution sociopolitique et économique, la société civile, à travers ses composantes, devra éviter des amalgames, des confusions, des complicités avec le pouvoir ... ; tout ce qui est dommageable à son impartialité, son objectivité, sa neutralité, son indépendance, sa non violence Elle ne se laissera pas traîner par le pouvoir à tous les niveaux mais elle devra prôner

les valeurs, accompagner la population pour ne pas se résigner et identifier leurs besoins fondamentaux, plaider pour une bonne gouvernance, veiller aux interventions de la communauté internationale et renforcer toutes les initiatives porteuses de sens pour faire la transition entre le travail de maintien de la paix et celui lié à la consolidation de la paix et au développement. 

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The DRC 50 years after Dag Hammarskjöld's death

A tribute and a current assessment

Summary in English of Murhega Mashanda's article

50 years ago, Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash in Northern Rhodesia (today Zambia). He was on his way to a meeting with Moise Tshombe, leader of the Katangese secessionists. Despite his untimely and unfortunate death, Hammarskjöld has played a significant role in Congo's turbulent first years after independence, as well as in a number of UN-led peace keeping missions. Moreover, his courageous and honest way of intervening was and remains a source of inspiration for the Congolese civil society. In his article *République Démocratique du Congo 50 ans après Dag Hammarskjöld*, here summarised in English, Professor Murhega Mashanda, partner of the Life & Peace institute in DRC, gives his view on these topics.

The early loss of this remarkable peacebuilder has had unfortunate consequences for the development of Congo after its independence. Instead of being a centre of renewal for itself and for its nine neighbouring countries (a "trigger" in Central Africa, as Frantz Fanon would have it in his book *The Wretched of the Earth*, this "scandalously rich country with a scandalously poor population" has not witnessed the awakening, the stability and the prosperity it would have known if Dag Hammarskjöld had still been alive. Yet the memory of his career, his exceptional qualities and his remarkable action remains a source of inspiration for civil society in its work in defence of, and for the sake of, the Congolese people.

After independence on 30 June 1960, a rivalry arises between Prime Minister Lumumba, and Kasavubu, the first elected President. The Congolese soldiers rebel, riots break out, and a number of Europeans are raped and killed. The Belgian army intervenes to protect the Europeans. In July 1960, Tshombe proclaims Katanga's secession, and both Kasavubu and Lumumba ask for the intervention of the United Nations (UN). At the same time, the Cold War between East and West goes on, while liberation movements operate throughout Africa in their anti-colonial struggles.

Hammarskjöld creates the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) as a means of action to avoid a civil war, to prevent a conflict with the USSR, to avoid Congo splitting up into a number of small independent states, and to prevent the country from becoming a battle-field between the super powers.

Hammarskjöld's involvement draws the attention of the international community to the alarming situation in Congo.

In late 1960, Lumumba is arrested, then tortured and finally murdered, and the Soviet Union claims that Mobutu and Tshombe should be arrested, the ONUC suppressed and Hammarskjöld dismissed. Nikita Khrushchev suggests the creation of a "troika" that would replace Dag Hammarskjöld. The idea is rejected by the majority of member states in the UN.

The peace negotiations Hammarskjöld had started continued after his death and the Katanga secession ended in 1963.

In the following years and in spite of many difficulties, a great number of initiatives were taken by Congolese civil society to end the civil war, organise general elections, protect people against internal or external threats, and ensure that Hammarskjöld's engagement would provide a starting point for the further development of the country. Moreover, a new peacekeeping organisation, MONUSCO, was created.

But the public authorities and civil society in Congo still have many challenges to face: the presence in the country of foreign armed forces, the non-payment of salaries to civil servants and servicemen, murders, rapes, civil rights violations, unemployment, poor living conditions, internal conflicts between communities, corruption, etc. Fifty years after independence was proclaimed, the results are still inadequate and there is much left to do.

Given this situation of a sick state confronted with all sorts of crises, without any benchmarks, and despite all the efforts of the international community,

the public authorities, civil society and the private sector in Congo should:

- ensure respect for the constitution and laws of the Republic;
- promote democratic values such as justice, truth, freedom, respect for the common good, transparency, representativeness, alternation of office-holders, citizen participation, tolerance, etc;
- fight against harmful tendencies, including corruption and impunity;
- mobilise the population so that the upcoming elections are free, democratic and transparent;
- promote technical expertise and analytical capacity, collect data, plan and formulate priorities;
- develop the capacity to identify the pillars of peace and sustainable development;
- promote access to information, and
- create mechanisms for the monitoring/evaluation of governmental activities.

In fact, provided that Congolese civil society is able to play a catalytic role in this synergy, it can also, in the same way as Dag Hammarskjöld did in his time, provide a basis for the consolidation of peace, democracy and development in the country, and ultimately take part in the efforts of the international community.

Bertrand Ligny

Before UN resolution 1325 was adopted in 2000, the Security Council had only focused on traditional security threats. In addressing the special hardships of women in violent conflict, the UN recognised the needs for participation, gender mainstreaming and protection of women.

Looking back to the days of Dag Hammarskjöld, the issue of individual actors played a minor role compared to the considerations of states. However, his belief that peaceful coexistence among states would lead to liberty for every individual is worth taking into consideration when reflecting on the background of UNSC resolution 1325 and the challenges it poses today.

My sister's keeper

Angela Ndinga-Muvumba

Remembering Dag Hammarskjöld in the context of women's peace and security is a mystical affair. The record left behind by the United Nations' renowned second Secretary-General does not overtly deal with the question of gender equality, but it does cover a range of metaphysical, political, social and legal issues regarding peace and justice. This article explores the UN Security Council 1325 agenda, defined to include the body of resolutions, policies and practices designed to address women, gender, peace and security challenges.

Participation, gender mainstreaming and protection

Resolution 1325 situated a social problem – the inequality of women and the disproportionate hardships they face in contemporary conflict – in the Security Council, a body that had never before addressed issues beyond 'traditional' security threats. The resolution came about following a long line of processes and international agreements including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), and the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (2000).

Decades of difficult work coalesced in a standard-setting framework in 1325 which would at last draw political, economic and security resources to address the way women's inequality intersected with exceptional suffering in war. In this regard, 1325 was normative, because it established expectations

and prescriptions for the international system's response to the problem. In three areas, participation, gender mainstreaming and protection, the UN faces challenges about how to move forward.

Although 1325 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council's members, the resolution was passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Council resolutions under Chapter VI are meant to induce good behaviour from member states following violations of international peace and security.¹ As such, 1325 has "no mechanisms for ratification, compliance or verification".² But according to PeaceWomen's Resolution Watch, as of November 2009,

39.6 per cent of country-specific UN Security Council resolutions contained specific language on women or gender (Peacewomen.org, 2010). According to my own preliminary review of PeaceWomen's online record of Security Council resolutions, the percentage had risen to 45 per cent by September 2010. Signalling that gender has become a legitimate security concern at the highest plane, the Council now deals with these issues as part of its functions and powers.

Illustratively, 1325 is now a major component of most conflict resolution policy rhetoric and in some instances, policy activities and planning. The Af-



PHOTO: KATE HOLT/IRIN

Helen does her homework together with her brother Jacob in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Respect, collaboration and protection are cornerstones in building a peaceful life for women, men, girls and boys.



Education is an important prerequisite for enhanced women's participation in decision-making. Female students get their training at the Islamic University in Gaza City.

rican Union (AU) has a new gender policy (2009). A central commitment is to increase the level of gender equality within peacekeeping operations. The AU Commission will also produce a training manual for AU peacekeepers. A number of countries have put in place National Action Plans (NAPs) for the systematic implementation and monitoring of the 1325 agenda. Yet, out of 19 NAPs in existence, 12 are in Europe, 5 in Africa and one each in Latin America and Asia. Because armed violence has been particularly persistent in Africa, the delay in developing and implementing national policies is cause for concern.

Participation

The job of increasing women's participation has been particularly difficult at the international level. A UN Development Fund for Women study of 24 major peace processes since 1992 found that "only 2.5 per cent of signatories, 3.2 per cent of mediators, 5.5 per cent of witnesses and 7.6 per cent of negotiators are women".³ Of the foreign ministers sitting in the Executive Council of the African Union in 2006, only six were women, while there were no more than three women members of the Permanent Representatives Council.⁴ Although women leaders have represented their governments across the globe, they remain outnumbered at every level by men. This has allowed peacemaking to continue to be dominated by men. At

the same time, concentrated lobbying for greater participation through high-level designations limits the scope for change and ignores the need for gender equality and women's empowerment at the local level.

Gender mainstreaming

Early on, the UN adopted a code of conduct for its peacekeeping forces and appointed gender advisers to its operations in the field of war. But these focal points (sometimes offices rather than single individuals) have wide mandates that may include mainstreaming gender into personnel matters, integrating gender into reports, liaising within the mission and with local women's groups, and training troops, police and civilian observers in gender mainstreaming.⁵ Without adequate funding, the capacities of gender focal points are constrained.⁶

Protection

In June 2008, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1820, which, among other key normative claims, recognised sexual violence as a security problem. Two additional UN Security Council Resolutions, 1888 and 1889, went further to deal with the mechanisms for implementation of 1325. These resolutions have led to important steps including the appointment of the UN Secretary-General's first Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström (see her article in

this issue). Resolution 1820 recognised sexual violence as a security problem that required a more robust approach during all phases of conflict resolution. In subsequent resolutions 1888 and 1960 (2010), the Council further underscored that armed actors (state and non-state) must not be allowed to participate in peace processes.

But are peace processes conducive to dealing with the problem of sexual violence? While amnesty and impunity is a common concern for international justice, the UN and its member states must also navigate the challenges of political transition after civil war or armed conflict. Armed actors that carry out systematic human rights crimes, in-

Without adequate funding, the capacities of gender focal points are constrained.

cluding sexual violence, legally, should be excluded from amnesty regimes. Yet, amnesty regimes may in turn provide incentives to actors to buy into peace processes.⁷ Out of 300 peace agreements in 45 conflicts from 1989 to 2008 only 18 – in total dealing with ten conflicts – dealt at all with sexual violence.⁸ Mediators have failed to get

the parties to include sexual violence because they are faced with, among other things, the need to use amnesties in order to “hasten conflict resolution”.⁹

Remembering Hammarskjöld

During Hammarskjöld's time international law and the resolution of conflicts were drawn around the parameters of the state as a unit of analysis – less so (if at all) on the role of non-state actors, civil society, and least of all, individual security. Hammarskjöld's speech at the University of Chicago in 1960, “The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation”, maps out his views that human social development, having produced units of nation states was not the end

“For Hammarskjöld, the coexistence of states would mean liberty for every woman, man and child.”

of humanity's evolution, but a new beginning. He argued that these nations – through the UN and the challenges facing the world at that time – were being forged into a system of states increasingly interdependent and capable of enjoying peaceful coexistence and, eventually, cooperation.

In this respect, it would be revisionist to try to establish a link between Hammarskjöld and climate change as a cause of armed conflict, for example. Nevertheless, what we can say about Hammarskjöld, and the UN that he left behind, is that the system of justice within the international community was strengthened through his advocacy. In particular, one important aspect of his conduct of conflict resolution was that he adhered to, and urged submission to the UN Charter, even under enormous political pressure from major world powers.

He is, however, also portrayed as having been very capable of a kind of practical flexibility when dealing with complex problems.¹⁰ In the workings of the UN, he was not partial to allowing bureaucratic rules to ruin well-intentioned actions. He was, just as were subsequent Secretary-Generals, forced to navigate the art of the possible, in

order to achieve his objectives. Sir Brian Urquhart stated that Hammarskjöld espoused the idea of balancing the binding nature of the Charter and international law, along with momentary dynamics and circumstances.¹¹ In the quest to stop sexual violence in armed conflict for example, the legacy of Hammarskjöld points to a careful balance between what is practical and what is fundamental, with an emphasis on protecting the rights and liberties of people. I contend that in the conundrum between amnesties and peace negotiations, for example, Hammarskjöld would have urged that women and men must first be protected from violence. Therefore the capacity, mandate and strength of blue helmets should be radically improved in order to protect civilians.

Coming before the Commission on the Status of Women in 1954 Hammarskjöld seemed enthusiastic about the urgency of ratification of the Convention of the Political Rights of Women. He did, however, in 1955 express that it would be difficult to ‘give priority to women’ in the staffing of positions at the secretariat, because this would be tantamount to reverse discrimination.¹² At the same time, Hammarskjöld advised Sture Linnér, who served as head of the UN's civil activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960 to pay attention to the status of women.¹³

For Hammarskjöld, with the UN serving as peacemaker, the coexistence of states would mean liberty for every woman, man and child. It is that aspect of his personality which has imbued the legend of Hammarskjöld with qualities suggesting he would have been his sister's keeper. That perhaps is the main lesson from remembering Hammarskjöld in the context of today's debates about 1325. 

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3 Pablo Castillo Diaz with significant contributions from Samina Anwar, Hanny Cueva Beteta, Colleen Russo and Stephanie Ziebell, *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*, UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), August 2010, p.3.

The magic of Africa and a white guy in a suit

On my daily way from home to the primary school in the Southern German city near Stuttgart I passed the editorial offices of the local daily newspaper *Esslinger Zeitung*. At times I paused in front of the news related photos and captions at display outside of the building. Having just acquired reading skills good enough to catch an interest not only in the pictures of athletes, singers and actors I started to pick up the illustrated headlines from the big world.

"Africa" became the magic word, and Tshombe (for us in the local dialect "Schoombe", which seemed by coincidence close to the correct pronunciation), as well as Lumumba moved close to the status previously held by the Indians. "Lumumba" echoed the sound of drums in the wilderness, the roaring of lions and the heat of the African sun.

There was also a white guy, a Swede whose name we did not even try to memorise, since being too long and complicated. But wasn't he the one who made the Russian leader hammer with his shoe and his fists on the desk at the United Nations? We were deeply impressed by the scenes of angry outburst we could witness in the weekly news documentaries, which were shown before the Wild West movies in cinema finally started. For us such rude behavior would have ended in severe punishment. But we were no leaders and already realised that you can do a lot more things if you had power.

Then came the news of white refugees and massacres in a place named Congo, from soldiers and mercenaries. The imagined scenery of the African jungle added to our Wild West fanta-

sies. We realised there was war, which involved blacks and whites. Images of dark nights lit by fire, wild animals and adventures of all sorts occupied our fantasies.

One day we heard about the wreckage of a plane, combined with the news that the white guy had died in a crash deep in Africa. Pictures showed solemn mourning and reports presented a world disturbed. We did not comprehend the full meaning. But we realised that the guy, who looked like Gary Cooper in a suit, was no more.

Henning Melber



Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation provides a forum for free and frank debate, and plays a catalysing role through seminars, publications and public events on topics such as development, security, human rights and democracy.

Our activities focus on United Nations-related issues. We promote the values of Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, within the current global development discourse.



Development Dialogue is the Foundation's main publication.



The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation was established in 1962 in memory of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. According to the charter the broad purpose of the Foundation is to promote, in the spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld, social, political, economic, environmental and cultural development in the South and globally.

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The Dag Hammarskjöld Centre is located in a historic mansion in the heart of the academic town of Uppsala, where Dag Hammarskjöld spent most of his young life. It houses the secretariat and also provides the premises for most seminars organised in Sweden.

In the fifty years since Dag Hammarskjöld died, the world has changed a lot. In the UN context, the nature of conflict has perhaps changed the most: Whereas war traditionally could be described as being a fight over territory between two countries by armies facing each other on the battlefield, modern warfare is predominantly intrastate or domestic with more than 75 per cent of those killed or wounded in wars being non-combatants. Had Hammarskjöld lived today, I am convinced that protecting civilians also from conflict-related sexual violence would have been one of his top priorities.

Ending sexual violence:

From recognition to action

Margot Wallström

Sexual violence in conflict has traditionally been absent from the global policy-making level – despite its horrible and very real existence on the ground. UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 from the year 2000 was the first to recognise the impact of war on women and to emphasise the importance of women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It would, however, take almost another decade until the specific issue of sexual violence in conflict became the subject of its own SCR.

Earlier this year I visited the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), whose eastern parts have been referred to as the 'rape capital' of the world. A 70-year old woman who shared her story told me how she had tried – in vain – to convince the rapists to leave her alone, pointing out to the perpetrators that they could be her own grand-children.

Why is it that sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations keeps taking place, and what can be done to prevent similar atrocities in the future?

Historical phenomenon

Sexual violence in conflict is, I am often told, unavoidable. That it should be considered collateral damage. That the phenomenon is nothing new. The latter is certainly true: Already Homer in the Iliad has described how Trojan women were treated as war prizes, the most famous of whom is Briseis, the princess of Lyrnessus, who was given to Achilles for having led the assault on that city during the Trojan War. Also the Bible, Numbers 31:15-18, contains

a reference to virgins as prizes of war: 'Moses said to them: "Have you let all the women live? [...] Now, therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman who has known man by lying with him. But all the young girls who have not known man by lying with him keep alive for yourselves."' In more recent history, we have numerous examples of rape and sexual violence from the Thirty Years War, the US Civil War, colonial wars in Africa, the Cen-

therefore within the Council's mandate. The Resolution also requires us to expose these claims that fuel continued sexual violence. No other human rights violation is routinely dismissed as inevitable.

The changing nature of armed conflict

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent times. Whereas war traditionally could be described as being a fight over territory between two countries through the instruments of well-trained, disciplined armies facing each other on the battlefield, modern warfare is predominantly intrastate or domestic, waged by non-state actors and triggered by issues of identity, ethnicity, religion and competition for land or resources, particularly oil and mineral wealth. This has also led to a transformation in terms of who is most affected by the hostilities: During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, for example, civilian casualties were almost non-existent, while today more than 75 per cent of those killed or wounded in wars are non-combatants.¹ In contemporary low-intensity wars, rebel groups – and government forces – often kill civilians and defy international law.² It has been said that most civilians tend to die from war rather than in battle.³ And women have ended up on the front-line – not as soldiers but as victims.

Since war in the DRC started over a decade ago, more than 200,000 rapes have been reported.⁴ For each rape reported, up to 50 are likely to go unre-

“Sexual violence in conflict is neither cultural nor sexual. It is criminal.”

tral European Counterrevolution in the 1920s, and the Second World War (both in Asia, Russia and Europe) including the post-conflict situation in the countries affected. And from our days, we know of horrible accounts of rape on an unprecedented scale in the Western Balkans, Rwanda, Timor Leste, and the DRC.

All of this can certainly make rape and sexual violence seem unavoidable, as if it were something we would have to accept as part or consequence of any conflict. But we cannot and should not accept these false premises. Sexual violence in conflict is neither cultural nor sexual. It is criminal. Security Council Resolution 1820 acknowledges that sexual violence in conflict is a matter of international peace and security and

ported. Sexual violence in conflict has become the weapon of choice. The reason is as simple as it is wicked: because it is cheap, silent and effective. One does not need bullets or bombs, only individuals with cruel intent. Acts of sexual violence do not only maim its victims mentally and physically, they also sow the seeds of destruction of an entire community: female survivors in some instances become pregnant, often get infected with sexually-transmitted diseases including HIV/Aids, and are regularly rejected by their own families. Traditionally, the risks for the architects behind the atrocities have been negligible. While the women walk in shame, the perpetrators walk free.

Sexual violence as obstacle to sustainable peace

The challenges to overcome, on an individual level, the physical and psychological trauma of rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict should not be underestimated. In addition to the long-term psychological injuries that may include fear, depression, anxiety

disorders, flashbacks, and difficulties in re-establishing intimate relationships, sexual violence is also an obstacle to sustainable peace for several reasons:

- Long-term sexual violence undermines social safety through the destruction of families and societies;
- The fear of assaults is an impediment to women's participation in economic activities and girls' school attendance; and
- If impunity reigns, the faith in a country's judicial system and its ability to protect its citizens is seriously undermined.

Women must be active participants during the peace process and its aftermath and must take an equal role in shaping decision-making. Lack of a reconciliation process which includes women might jeopardise the long-term stability of a society after a conflict is over. No peace agreement engineered solely by men will ever be legitimate as long as wars affect the lives and livelihoods of women. No society emerging from

the ashes of conflict can realise its full potential unless women and girls are free to realise theirs. For many in positions of power women are seen only as victims and not as agents of change. Despite women's active engagement in informal efforts to build peace, they are often excluded from any formal peace-building efforts.

What has been done?

We as the United Nations are often criticised for our shortcomings and mistakes. The systematic acts of mass rape committed in the end of July and beginning of August 2010 in the territory of Walikale in the eastern parts of the DRC were no different. This has also been acknowledged. Rather than trying to present excuses, we need to look at explanations and at what we can improve. I also think it is important that we start looking at what we already do well, and how these actions can be further strengthened. In response to the changing dynamics of conflict outlined above and in light of lessons learned, I believe it is vital to start operationalis-



Women sit together outside the Heal Africa Transit Center in Goma, DRC, for victims of sexual violence. While they have received humanitarian and medical assistance for their immediate needs, they are unlikely to receive consistent humanitarian programming for prevention or reintegration.

ing promising practices used by peacekeepers to protect civilians from sexual violence – as captured earlier this year in ‘Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence – An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice’, developed by the UN Action network. What the Inventory suggests, among other things, is:

- the value of having community liaison officers who can build a relationship of trust with the community, including with women; ideally we need women as well as men to serve in these positions;
- deploying foot patrols that actively engage with the population and are accessible/approachable;
- ensuring that peacekeepers on those patrols know how to recognise and react to reports of sexual violence;
- establishing early warning/distress call systems;
- signalling a night presence in areas at risk of attack;
- using joint patrols which include peacekeepers, while acknowledging that the primary responsibility rests with the national and regional authorities.

States bear primary responsibility for protecting their citizens from violence. I see my role as helping to build the capacity of governments to meet their obligations. The UN and no matter how many peace keepers can ever substitute a state. Capacity-building means improving data collection, statistics, monitoring, evaluation, and better reporting mechanisms. The data, once available, must also be widely publicised in order to educate communities. Having the right monitoring and reporting in turn makes it safer and easier for women to report these crimes. In some countries, building capacity can have a more comprehensive reach and include overhauling their entire judicial system. This is no small challenge.

One of the most important elements of building or recreating a viable judicial system is the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which often takes as its starting point a dysfunctional security sector which is unable to provide security to the state and its citizens effectively and under democratic principles. And as we try to address one of many challenges of SSR, we typically realise that other components are missing:

During my visits to the DRC, for example, the need for a disciplined and well-trained national army presence in the eastern parts of the country was made obvious. But as more soldiers from the national army (FARDC) are deployed on the ground, there is a shortage of food (rations) and housing (barracks). In addition to this, soldiers do not receive their salaries regularly. The consequences? Soldiers take refuge in villagers’ houses and huts, and pillaging and rapes follow. A similar pattern is true for the police.

I believe that donor governments must impose tougher terms when providing assistance to the DRC and other countries with a similar situation. Donors and different parts of the UN system must also be better coordinated. In the DRC, we have military and police officers who have received excellent training from a number of both donor and neighbouring countries, but the training is not necessarily harmonised. The result risks being an army and police force with a different understanding of how their job should be carried out.

Although the issue of women’s participation in efforts to prevent and address sexual violence as a threat to their security and impediment to peace still has a very long way to go, some achievements have been made in the last two decades: The Beijing Platform for Action, to which 189 countries are signatories, in 1995 agreed to strengthen the participation of women in national reconciliation and reconstruction and to investigate and punish those who perpetuate violence against women in armed conflict.

“States bear primary responsibility for protecting their citizens from violence.”

The Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, established SCR 1325 ten years ago. For the first time, the UN Security Council did not only recognise the gender-biased impact of internal or country conflict, but also mandated that the UN itself and its Member States to monitor enforceable protection from such vio-



Although military and police officers in DRC have received excellent training, the need for coordination and harmonisation must not be overlooked.

lence. More recently, the Security Council adopted resolutions 1820 and 1888. SCR 1820 demands nothing less than the ‘immediate and complete cessation

“Women must be active participants during the peace process and its aftermath.”

by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians’, and was a historic response to a horrific reality. Resolution 1888 then followed in 2009, which established the position I am the first to hold, to act as an advocate, coordinator and leader within the UN system to address the issue. It also requested that the United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict – a network of 13 UN entities – assist the SRSG in this task. Finally, in December 2010, resolution 1960 was adopted by a unanimous Council. This most recent resolution contains concrete proposals on how the international community can create a comprehensive monitoring and accountability system to fight conflict-related sexual violence. Instead of being considered a cheap, silent and effective weapon, sexual violence must be seen as the crime it is. Those responsible will be exposed and the corridors of power and all career options will be

closed for the individuals who commit, command or condone such acts.

The outlined system is structured around four pillars: The first means ensuring better and more consistent information through a monitoring and analysis mechanism. The second calls for the listing (naming and shaming) of perpetrators. The third pillar means gaining concrete commitments from perpetrators to cease and prevent sexual violence. The fourth and last implies that, when no commitments have been made, targeted measures can be imposed against persistent perpetrators, including sanctions by the UN Security Council.

The road ahead

Although several UN Security Council resolutions during the last decade have stated that international peace and security also must bring peace and security for women, impunity for crimes related to sexual violence in war and conflict has reigned for too long. For this reason, I have made ending impunity my top priority. We have seen that this is now starting to yield results: During my second visit to the DRC in October 2010, UN peacekeepers played an active role in apprehending 'Lieutenant Colonel' Mayele, one of the rebel leaders suspect-

sexual violence in conflict that we are aware of the atrocities they commit, and that justice will ultimately prevail. And this goes back to the goals I have set for my mandate.

In response to the changing dynamics of conflict outlined above and in light of lessons learned, I have framed a five point agenda which I have also outlined to the Security Council:

“Women have no rights, if those who violate their rights go unpunished.”

My first point is ending impunity, i.e. ensuring that perpetrators do not remain at the helm of security institutions and that amnesty is not an option. If women continue to suffer sexual violence, it is not because the law is inadequate to protect them, but because it is inadequately enforced.

Secondly, women must be empowered to become agents of change: A ceasefire is not synonymous with peace for women if the shooting stops but rapes continue unchecked. Women activists should never have to risk their lives to do their work.

The third point is to mobilise political leadership: Resolutions 1325, 1820 and 1960 are tools in the hands of political leaders, and should be used as such. Both traditional and non-traditional stakeholders need to feel accountable for the success of this agenda.

Fourth is increasing recognition of rape as a tactic and consequence of conflict: Those who tolerate sexual terror should be notified that they do so in defiance of the Security Council, which holds the power to enact enforcement measures. The Council, for its part, should not underestimate the tools it has at its disposal and be ready to use them.

Finally, I will drive and empower efforts to ensure a coordinated response from the entire UN system: The inter-agency network mentioned above, UN Action, has proven a successful means to not only 'act as one', but also to 'deliver as one' – and a network that I intend to draw on as SRSRG. Making use of the entire UN system means having more resources, and utilising the strengths of the individual entities for one common goal – stop rape now. My vision includes ensuring the UN system is attuned to

early-warning indicators. Crimes on this scale are no accident; often they are strategic, planned and therefore predictable – which we were painfully reminded of from the Walikale atrocities.

Far from being a niche issue, sexual violence is part of a larger pattern. Rule by sexual violence is used by political and military leaders to achieve political, military and economic ends. These crimes present a security crisis that demands a security response. To me, the 'Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice' and Security Council Resolution 1960 represent the start – not the end – of a process to identify what works in preventing sexual violence and improving women's security. Much more must yet be done to promote actions that have real impact, as we move from recognition to action and from best intentions to best practice.

Women have no rights, if those who violate their rights go unpunished. I am still haunted by what I heard in the DRC and in Bosnia and Herzegovina – that women are still not safe, under their own roofs, in their own beds, when night falls. Our aim must be to uphold international law, so that women – even in war-torn corners of our world – can sleep safe and sound. 

“Instead of being considered a cheap, silent and effective weapon, sexual violence must be seen as the crime it is.”

ed of being involved in the mass rapes in Walikale. Only a week later, French authorities acting on an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC) arrested Callixte Mbarushimana, an FDLR leader suspected of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the DRC. And last November I attended the opening of the principally important ICC case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, former Vice President of the DRC, suspected of not having prevented sexual violence in the Central African Republic.

Why is this important? It is crucial, because it sends a strong message to these and other perpetrators of acts of

- 1 Walter C. Clemens Jr., and J. David Singer, *The Human Cost of War*. *Scientific American*, vol. 286, no. 6, June 2000, pp. 56-57.
- 2 Human Security Report Group, *The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. Part II of the Human Security Report 2009/2010*. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, p. 2 (available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2009/2009HumanSecurityReport_Overview.pdf)
- 3 Hugo Slim, *Killing Civilians. Method, Madness, and Morality in War*. New York: Columbia University Press 2008.
- 4 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *Secretary-General Calls Attention to Scourge of Sexual Violence in DRC*, UNFPA News, 1 March 2009 (available at <http://www.unfpa.org/public/News/pid/2181>).

During its 65 years of existence, the United Nations has undergone profound changes in terms of its structure and mission. Dag Hammarskjöld urged the Member States to consider how they could best make use of the organisation in their approaches to challenges in the world. An often overlooked passage in the UN Charter says of the UN that its role is “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations ...” This short passage is powerful enough to be central in the discussions about the reform and effectiveness of the UN, as well as the role and potential of the UN civil service.

Renewing the choice:

Developing the United Nations further

Marco Toscano-Rivaltà¹

Dag Hammarskjöld took office as the second United Nations (UN) Secretary-General in 1953. Starting with his first Report on the Work of the Organization to the General Assembly in August 1953, Hammarskjöld focused on the role of the UN and its potential. Through his nine Introductions to the Reports on the Work of the Organization, he tried to stimulate UN Member States' considerations on how to make the best use of the organisation in order to tackle existing and emerging world challenges with full respect for the rule of law.

During Hammarskjöld's leadership from 1953 to 1961, the UN membership increased from 60 to 110 states with some significant challenges to the decision-making process. It also underwent some important developments, including the creation of peacekeeping operations and of the system of Member States' permanent representations at the UN as well as the further development of the theory and practice of international civil service. These changes were made possible by the close cooperation that Hammarskjöld inspired and harnessed among some of his visionary colleagues within the UN, and outside in governments, academia, scientific institutions and civil society organisations as well as the arts.

The choice in 1961

In the Introduction to his last Report to the General Assembly, dated 17 August 1961, just a month before the incident in Ndola, Hammarskjöld clearly delineated a critical choice that states,

as members of the UN, were facing: Should the UN be used only as a conference facilitator or also as an instrument for executive action? In his closing remarks, he exhorted Member States to clarify their views on the direction in which they wanted to see the future work of the UN develop.

Fifty years later, it is evident that the Member States have chosen and practiced the latter option. The number of operations and programmes executed by the UN is a confirmation. World civil society and public opinion at large have supported this approach.

Changes in reality – changes in expectations?

During the same period the world has gone through enormous changes in social, economic, cultural, political and scientific terms – a natural consequence of evolution. Among these changes is the increase of public, private, profit and non-profit organisations, competent, committed to, and active in all the fields of international cooperation, and rightfully expecting to play their role in the betterment of humanity and living conditions in the world. As a consequence, Member States are in the increasingly challenging position of no longer being the “owners” of the United Nations, but rather the “trustees” on behalf of the “peoples of the United Nations” in the attainment of the Purposes and the practice of the Principles enshrined in the UN Charter. As such, they have to ensure that the decisions and actions taken by the UN are as informed as possible and in full accord-

ance with the law, and that all those who can contribute to decisions and actions have an opportunity to actually do so.

A critical question then is: who does take decisions and action at the UN? Broadly speaking, decision-making in the UN is the result of interaction among four different constituencies: Member States, non-governmental organisations, independent experts, and UN civil servants. UN actions are carried out by Member States directly or through other governmental organisations, by international civil servants throughout the numerous UN departments, funds, programmes, and specialised agencies, as well as independent experts and envoys. Others, including civil society organisations and business, may also join the executive entities of the UN in appropriate forms. In broader terms, an increasing number of civil society actors, while acting independently from the UN executive entities, find inspiration from and motivate their actions on the basis of the UN Charter and Resolutions.

As one can see, the expression of the will of the UN, as manifested through its decision-making and actions, is a rather challenging process, full of risks as well as opportunities. It is certainly something new in the history of humanity, and thus it deserves further attention for the development of its full potential.

A new choice

Against this background, it is legitimate to ask ourselves, as Hammarskjöld did in 1961, whether there are

new choices that Member States and the world community at large are confronted with. These choices concern the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN and, most of all, its relevance in addressing global challenges which require collective thinking, decision-making and action.

Whereas reforming the UN has been a topic for discussion since its creation, a question for consideration is whether we really need to keep the focus only on the “form” aspects and how to implement the necessary changes or whether we should also try to identify and understand other potentialities enshrined in the idea behind the creation of the UN, and thus work for its further development.

The UN Charter in all its parts has been the focus of important commentaries. One element, however, has received comparatively little attention. It is the last part of article 1, namely paragraph 4, which enshrines what could be considered as the “essence” of the UN: “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”. Understandably, the compelling challenges faced by humanity and the use of the UN as an instrument for executive action have kept the focus on the first three paragraphs of the same article:

1.1 To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

1.2 To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

1.3 To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;

1.4 To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

However, the often mixed results in attaining the ends enshrined in the initial three paragraphs demand that due attention be given to causes beyond those normally considered in the context of *realpolitik*. The UN Charter contains an important indication to this end. In a mighty understatement, article 1, paragraph 4 seems to indicate that the UN needs to become a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in order to effectively attain the common ends enshrined in the earlier paragraphs. In other words, until and unless the UN becomes such a centre, it cannot effectively decide and act to attain the ends enshrined in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the same article.

A legitimate question is whether the often-cited mixed results of the UN are an indication that it is unfit to meet global challenges, or whether it is just a reflection of the still partial development of the UN due to the scarce attention given to the specific purpose enshrined in article 1, paragraph 4, and its practical consequences and requirements.

Harmonised decision-making capacity and action

The harmonising function calls into question the very quality and capacity of the UN’s decision-making. How are its acts of will generated? Who contributes to them and how are they executed? How much do Member States invest in ensuring high quality and well-informed decision-making? How do the Secretary-General and the UN civil servants support the decision-making and actions?

The purpose enshrined in article 1, paragraph 4 thus strikes at the heart of the discussions on UN reform and its effectiveness in achieving the other three purposes. Considering what is at stake, it seems critical to give it careful and practical consideration.

A number of very concrete questions emerge. What does “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations” mean, require, and entail? If the UN needs to be such a harmonising centre, what are the consequences for, and legitimate expectations of, UN civil servants, and what is the role they are expected to play? To what extent are Member States really willing to fully cooperate, through their governmental agencies and other

entities, and within the agreed common frameworks? Therefore, what are the required changes in the working methods of the UN and in the international cooperation framework at large? Ultimately, what are the margins for further improvement and thus the opportunities to be seized?

The answers to these questions may also have important financial consequences: a more effective international system, with new and competent actors, may permit a reduction of the UN executive machinery, its complexity, volume and costs.

Certainly there are already interesting examples of this “harmonising function”, such as: international conferences with critical contributions from civil society in the 1990s on key issues such as children’s rights, environment, population and development, women’s equality and rights, least developed countries, human settlements, and human rights. Other examples include the work of the International Law Commission and similar bodies for the development of international law, the role of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Humanitarian Coordinators and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (a body composed by UN agencies and non-governmental organisations) in the field of humanitarian relief operations, the Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams in the development field, and the latest very interesting example, the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, in the field of building resilience to natural hazards.

At the same time, there is room for further. Most Permanent Missions in New York have – with a few exceptions – a relatively small number of delegates, a fact that undermines the countries’ capacity to fully engage in every process and decision. This is in itself an interesting indicator of the overall equality, capacity and quality of the decision-making in the UN.

Another indicator is the frequent use of “agreed language” in the preparation of new Resolutions, i.e. language used in past Resolutions and therefore not problematic or requiring negotiations. Whereas this can be useful to reiterate certain positions, it also highlights the limited capacity and, occasionally, the limited will of Member States to fully engage in negotiations which fully and holistically address new and existing challenges, with clear consequences

for the quality of the decision-making and the relevance of the Resolutions adopted.

Delegates have a complex job, often misunderstood and unrecognised. One could also question whether it is fair to expect, from the small number of delegates in most Permanent Missions, the knowledge and ability to negotiate on all the issues that are on the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council's agendas.

The above-mentioned challenges are certainly not only delegates' responsibility. International civil servants have a large responsibility too, as do Ministries for Foreign Affairs that are to support delegates and the way a country's position is formulated. The apparent vastness of the decision-making question cannot be a reason for not tackling it. Attempts were made with the "Agenda for Reform" under Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and it is critical that these be continued.

Strengthening the tenants of cooperation

One may argue that, at the time of the adoption of the UN Charter, collective decision-making and cooperation were an aspiration, an option. Today, however, given the challenges that humanity faces, they are a must, regardless of the existence of legal obligations. As a consequence, there is a need for a continued renewal of international politics and its spirit and foundations.

An open-minded and close consideration of the quality and effectiveness of collective decision-making and action for the attainment of the common good articulated in the UN Charter, various UN General Assembly Declarations and Resolutions and international law needs to be guided by certain principles. These include "cooperation based on universality" – a firmly established principle, as Hammarskjöld put it in his Introduction to the Report on the Work of the Organisation in 1959. Other critical principles include "domestic jurisdiction", "national interest" and "self-determination".

Cooperation can be driven by selfish and partisan interests or the effort to achieve a set common goal that transcends partisan interests. Throughout the millennia human beings, groups, tribes, peoples, and nations have developed forms of cooperation characterised by a variety of purposes. We need to ask ourselves whether the no-



PHOTO: UN PHOTO/MAHER ATTAR

A United Nations peacekeeper during exchanges between the French UNIFIL contingent and the Shiite militia of Hizbollah in Marrakeh, Lebanon.

tion of the "common good" of humanity requires developing new forms of cooperation.

Cooperation for the common good of humanity requires an uncompromising commitment and the best that every country can express and offer. In this context, principles like "national interest", "domestic jurisdiction" and "self-determination" need new connotations and interpretations. These principles can no longer be misused to justify and perpetuate selfish behaviour and departures from agreed frameworks. Yet, they are fundamental in allowing

the growth of the potential of each nation. This will, in turn, strengthen their ability to contribute to the collective efforts toward achieving the common ends expressed in the UN Charter. With this new meaning and intent only, they should be invoked and respected, as they are instrumental to an ever greater global cooperation.

Through the UN humanity is conducting an unprecedented experiment. Although it was established 65 years ago, this timeframe is certainly nothing vis-à-vis humanity's lifespan. It is the first time in history that humanity is



Dag Hammarskjöld at one of the observation posts along the Armistice Demarcation Line in Gaza, December 1958 manned by the 2nd Battalion of the Grenadiers Regiment of the Indian UNEF contingent.

trying to collectively organise itself and plan and execute actions for the common good on a global scale. Such an experiment needs to be fully comprehended in its grandiosity, and requires the uncompromising and full commitment of all those who feel ready and want to contribute and engage. The UN needs to be geared up to make sure that all those who are able to contribute to well-informed decisions and actions can do so. Changes may also involve the UN leaving operational tasks to more effective organisations of governmental and non-governmental, public and private nature, in order to focus on and utilise its political capital to leverage international cooperation.

The role and potential of the UN civil service

The UN civil servants have a special duty and role to play in these collective efforts in decision-making and action in the attainment of the common good, as articulated by the UN Charter and Resolutions and international law, and in making the UN “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”. UN

civil servants are instrumental and thus share accountability for the outcomes. UN civil servants need to be “trusted” in order to be “entrusted” with this responsibility. A well-informed assumption of responsibility is of paramount importance and requires a lot of professional and personal preparation. UN civil servants serve, and are therefore accountable not only to Member States, but also other constituencies, and ultimately to the “Peoples of the United Nations”.

On the day of his arrival to New York to take up his functions as the Secretary-General of the UN, on 9 April 1953, Dag Hammarskjöld affirmed: “The public servant is there in order to assist, so to say from the inside, those who take the decisions which frame history. He should – as I see it – listen, analyze and learn to understand fully the forces at work and the interests at stake so that he will be able to give the right advice when the situation calls for it. Do not think that he – in following this line of personal policy – takes but a passive part in the development. It is a most active one. But he is active as an instrument, a catalyst, perhaps an inspirer – he serves.”²

On 4 December 1953, the UN Staff Day, Dag Hammarskjöld challenged the UN staff: “...Why are the standards and the independence of the Secretariat so important? The more I see of the work in the United Nations, the more convinced I feel of this importance. Countries are arming in order to negotiate from a position of strength. The Secretariat too has to negotiate, not only in its own interest, but for the cause of peace and a peaceful development of our world. The weight we carry is not determined by physical force or the number of people who form the constituency. It is based solely on trust in our impartiality, our experience and knowledge, our maturity of judgment. Those qualities are our weapons, in no way secret weapons but as difficult to forge as guns and bombs. The Secretariat has an essential part to play in the world affairs today. We will play it if we accept the price for building up our position of strength. We must reject a role of insignificance subject to constant criticism and shirking the risks of a full part in our world. We must choose a role of responsibility and independence, sacrificing part of the illusory safety you may derive from a locked door.”³

UN civil service is a relatively new concept in the history of international relations and exchanges among peoples. A deeper understanding of the UN civil service, of its role and potential, by UN civil servants, governments and civil society at large is necessary. Hence the need for an open and public debate, study, research, training, and academic teaching, within and outside the UN, on the further development of international civil service. Dag Hammarskjöld placed a lot of importance on and dedicated considerable work to this, as indicated in his speeches, including the famous lecture in Oxford in May 1961. It is critical to bring this legacy forward. 🌸

1 The author is a UN staff member. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily the views of the United Nations. Feedback is welcome – please, write to: marco_toscanorivolta@yahoo.co.uk

2 *The International Public Servant*, in *Dag Hammarskjöld – Servant of Peace*, edited by W. Foote, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1962, pa 27.

3 *The Weapons of the Secretariat*, in *Dag Hammarskjöld – Servant of Peace*, edited by W. Foote, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1962, pp 32-33.

Reviews

At the side of Hammarskjöld

Robert A. Hill/Edmond J. Keller (eds.), *Trustee for the Human Community. Ralph J. Bunche, the United Nations, and the Decolonization of Africa*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 2010

Ralph Bunche (1904-1971) was a scholar of African studies who, in 1934, became the first Afro-American to receive a doctorate in political science. As a key diplomat in the US American Foreign Service he was involved in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, where he had main responsibility for drafting the chapters of the Charter, dealing with trusteeship and non-self governing territories. He served as chief aid to the UN-appointed Swedish mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in the efforts to establish a peaceful solution to the conflict over Palestine. After Bernadotte's assassination in 1948 he achieved an armistice between Israel and the Arab states and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 as the first recipient coming from outside of Europe. A few years later he became one of the closest UN officials at the side of the second Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, and played a major role in establishing the UN peacekeeping mission during the Suez crisis.

Bunche's pioneering role both as a remarkable scholar in African studies as well as an international civil servant contributing to the UN's role in the decolonisation processes on the African continent is at the centre of this volume, published with the intention "to situate Bunche within African American intellectual history and within the focused world of the UN's critical role in the end of European empires in sub-Saharan Africa", as the editors state in their Introduction (p. x).

As a student exposed to, among others, Melville J. Herskovits, Bronislaw Malinowski and Isaac Shapera, Ralph Bunche displayed the ambiguities of a radically minded, anti-imperialist inspired Afro-American, who at the same time tended towards pragmatism. This tension, if not discrepancy, is sensibly observed and sketched in some of the five chapters in the first part, focusing on "Bunche the Africanist Intellectual". Equally enlightening are the four chapters in the second part on "Bunche the Statesman for Africa", which concentrate on Bunche's role in the Congo.

Bunche's interaction with Lumumba highlights a mismatch due mainly to clashes in the personal chemistry, suspicion on both sides and miscommunication. Taken together, this escalated into a toxic personal relationship characterised by animosity and mutual contempt. This resulted in deadly consequences for Lumumba and one of the biggest failures of a mission in the history of the UN.

This is a timely tribute in recognition of an outstanding Afro-American with an exceptional career, who notably contributed as much to the state of the art in US-American African Studies as to the transition to independence on the African continent, even though at times not with much fortune, as the sad story of the Congo illustrates.

Henning Melber

Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
and Research Associate with the University of Pretoria

The relevance of normative global frameworks

Indivisible Human Rights. A History, by Daniel J. Whelan. Philadelphia and Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010

Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, by Roland Burke. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010

Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, edited by Mark Gibney/Sigrun Skogly. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010

These three titles published during 2010 in the "Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights" series deserve recognition. They should all be relevant reference books on the shelves of libraries and offices dealing with human rights and global governance-related subject matters. Their focus on normative frameworks as designed, adopted and at times even implemented by the United Nations (UN) and within domestic politics as well as bi- and multinational relations presents incisive overviews of the emergence of an international legal order and its relevance (and at times irrelevance) for human well being.

The historical discourses and stages of contestation over the definition and applicability of the Universal Charter of Human Rights is a fascinating case in point, which shows that 'the South' (and in particular representatives from the colonised world, not least from Africa) was indeed able to claim ownership of these fundamental principles during the 1950s and 1960s – principles which were also created for the sake of their own emancipation – if only to later forget about them at times or dismiss them as instruments of Eurocentric cultural imperialism when the same conventions were applied to the new governments. Double standards are, so to say, among the universally shared techniques for those in power. This makes the thorough stock taking exercise by all three of these volumes a valuable undertaking, since it helps to remind us how much has already been established, at least in principle, if not in practice.

Daniel J. Whelan presents a concise and in-depth analysis of the various generations of human rights as codified within the UN since their beginning. It is a meticulously documented source book with regard to the different stages and thematic foci in the development of the contemporary international standards.

Roland J. Burke pays special attention to the role of the human rights discourse in the decolonisation processes. The book's merits lie especially in its documentation of the views from the so-called Third World countries during the various stages of their struggles for emancipation and the shifts of emphasis – if not fundamental change in views – as a result of securing a new position. It is a fascinating narrative of how power corrupts and how perceptions change with the change of power relations.

The volume edited by Mark Gibney and Sigrun Skogly shifts the focus to the international arena and issues which know no borders. The contributors are highly authoritative and competent when dealing with issues such as torture, arms trade, international refugee law, environmental rights, health, food, labour standards, housing and water.

All three volumes underline that rights of people are always also obligations by states and their governments, that the ratification of treaties, conventions and other normative frameworks imply entitlements by human beings and duties by institutions if they are relevant in their implementation.

But even if ratified without direct consequences in terms of their applicability, they create a normative reality, which is useful as a reference point for those seeking to benefit and continue their struggles for a better life.

Henning Melber

*Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
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The mechanisms of transitional justice

Judging War, Judging History – Behind Truth and Reconciliation by Pierre Hazan. Stanford University Press, 2010 (originally published in French in 2007 under the title *Juger la guerre, juger l'histoire: Du bon usage des commissions vérité et de la justice internationale*. Presses Universitaires de France)

The post-Cold War era has witnessed a rise of truth commissions and international courts on several continents, endeavouring to pave the way for reconciliation and reconstruction by bringing justice to victims and re-establishing the state of law in war torn societies.

"Judging War, Judging History – Behind Truth and Reconciliation" examines the challenges of reconstructing shattered societies in the era of globalisation by taking a critical look at the processes and mechanisms behind transitional justice and reconciliation. The author questions the ideological foundation of transitional justice which he claims to be anchored in "the politics of punishment and pardon", aiming to condemn the perpetrators of violent crimes and to reconcile and heal torn societies.

This is further illustrated in three case studies that explore experiences of truth and reconciliation commissions in the beginning of the 21st century, with the focus on the world's third conference against racism in Durban, South Africa, organised by UNESCO, Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission, which was established on the initiative of King Mohammad VI of Morocco to examine human rights violations committed by the government, and the International Criminal Court, which investigated war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the leaders of the Lord's Resistance army in Uganda.

Example by example, the author carefully lays the groundwork for his criticism, pointing out the difficulties in reinforcing social cohesion among the victims of violence and injustice and the ambiguity of the legal basis for contemporary transitional justice. He discusses the challenge with growing claims of victimhood and continuous demands for recognition of suffering by those who identify themselves as victims, and argues that instruments and institutions applied in contemporary transitional justice, i.e. international tribunals, courts and resolutions, have an undermining effect on a sovereign state's legal, political and symbolic influence.

The book raises questions that have no clear-cut answers and it reveals built-in weaknesses in the machinery of transitional justice that need to be addressed so that it can contribute to nationwide reconciliation while implementing new value systems and institutional structures in torn societies.

Tiina Saksman Harb

Desk Officer, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

Celebrating a legendary peacemaker

Experiments with Peace: Celebrating Peace on Johan Galtung's 80th Birthday. Edited by Jørgen Johansen and John Y. Jones. Pambazuka Press, Networkers SouthNorth and the Dag Hammarskjöld Program at Voksensiden, 2010

On celebrating Johan Galtung's 80th birthday, what could be more appropriate than having 36 well known scholars and thinkers in the field of peace research illustrate different experiments with peace inspired by the work of Professor Galtung, 'the father of peace and conflict studies' and the founder of the International Peace Research Institute? The articles present a broad picture of the thoughts, theories and actions taken by 'El Professore' to the field of peace research.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu praises Galtung as a peacemaker and activist who has dedicated his life to the ongoing processes of understanding, spreading and making peace. Narayan Desai, chancellor of Gujarat Vidyapith University established by Mahatma Gandhi, thinks of Galtung as one of those personalities born to this earth to meet a need of the hour. Gandhi and his unarmed struggle for India was the need of the hour for an India struggling for freedom and lacking weapons to fight for it. Inspired by Ghandi, Galtung saw peace and 'peace learning' as the road, a way of living, not a milestone at the end of the road. His personality as an improviser and a creative person determined to carry out what he had set his mind on is well captured in eco-philosopher Sigmund Setreng's article about Galtung on the road to India. Born between the two world wars, he took upon himself at a young age to understand, analyse and find solutions to conflicts and to do it in a scientific and systematic way.

Many associate Galtung with the 'conflict triangle' as a means to understand the dynamics of a conflict: attitudes (A), behaviour (B), and the conflict issue (C). Students of peace and conflict all over the world are familiar with the ABC of a conflict. Galtung also presented an approach to conflict resolution divided into the stages of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Several of the authors illustrate how he taught and dealt with these three phases.

Peace journalism is another concept developed by Galtung, which is commonly recognised. As opposed to war journalism, used by many journalists, peace journalism is truth oriented, profound and should present a more accurate picture of what is going on.

Returning to Galtung as a peacemaker and looking at UN Peacemaking 50 years after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, Henning Melber, Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, compares the two great peacemakers and stresses that both of them felt responsibility for the welfare of the people.

Both Galtung and Hammarskjöld also felt strongly for nature. Hammarskjöld loved spending time in nature and Galtung engaged in climate change conferences. Professor Peter Wallensteen gives examples of how peace researchers can be useful for peacemaking. Galtung has dedicated his life to peace and he is still going strong. His plan for the coming 20 years is to write fiction!

Helena Grusell

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Power and conflict in Sri Lanka

Power and politics in the shadow of Sri Lanka's armed conflict. Edited by Camilla Orjuela, Sida Studies No.25, 2010. The study can be downloaded in PDF format from www.sida.se.

On 19 May 2009, after 26 years of civil war, Sri Lanka's President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared that his armed forces had defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The defeat of one of the belligerents meant that the war had ended. However – as this volume shows – many of the underlying causes of the war remained unresolved. Edited by Camilla Orjuela, Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, this analysis aims to contribute to an understanding of the complexities of power in Sri Lanka and the dynamic nature of post-war reconstruction. The introduction by the editor lays the analytical basis for the in-depth examination of different spheres of power in war-time and post-war Sri Lanka. Orjuela defines power with reference to i.a. Foucault's power concept – emphasising that power is as much a capacity of an actor to influence as it is produced by those who obey – and outlines major causes of war and key determinants of power dynamics in post-war Sri Lanka.

One of the authors in this volume, Jayadeva Uyangoda, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colombo,

investigates the politics of political reform and comes to the conclusion that the end of the war was not accompanied by an end to the reform-resistance of the Sri Lankan state. Power analysis also has to take gender aspects into account, and this perspective is provided by Sepali Kottagoda, a civil society representative with wide academic and practical experience. She discusses the poor representation of women in politics and portrays civil society efforts to change this. Finally, political economist Sunil Bastian focuses on the nexus between market economy and political power.

This publication shows how different determinants shape the struggle for power in a post-war reconstruction process. It highlights that much of the uneven power relations, as well as attempts to challenge them, remain and will continue to shape Sri Lanka's political future. International actors inevitably become part of the struggle for power – as they have in the past – and therefore need to be highly aware of the dynamics in place. In-depth understanding is thus crucial for devising strategies for contributing to a positive transformation of structures of power.

Charlotte Booth

Programme Advisor, the Life & Peace Institute

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



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