no. 60 | august 2012

development dialogue

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

50 Years Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

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Printers
X-O Graf Tryckeri
Uppsala, Sweden,
June 2012

ISSN 0345-2328
ISBN 978-91-85214-68-6

Development Dialogue is a forum provided by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation since 1972 for critical discussions of international development priorities and challenges. Its main focus is on North-South relations and alternative perspectives to dominant paradigms. *Development Dialogue* is published in consecutive numbers on average twice a year.

Subscribers are kindly requested to inform the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation of any changes of address or subscription cancellations.

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50 Years Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Edited by Henning Melber

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A 50th Anniversary Roundtable Debate

Congratulatory Messages

On 18 September 2011 I had the special privilege to present the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in Uppsala, exactly 50 years after the untimely death of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. Another rewarding experience was for me to participate in a public round table debate on Security and Development organized by the Foundation on 2 March 2012, on the very day 50 years after it was established in the name of Dag Hammarskjöld. The same day I was appointed as the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General. My close affiliation to global diplomacy and policy making within the United Nations as well as to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation were thereby in an almost symbolical coincidence documented within a few hours.

The Foundation was established only a few months after Dag Hammarskjöld's death in a plane crash near Ndola in Northern Rhodesia. A hitherto singular act of popular support ensured through a campaign among the Swedish people an initial endowment fund. Ordinary citizens from all walks of life donated the funds for the first programme activities. Since then the funds were provided mainly through state authorities and hence remain part of the Swedish taxpayers' contributions to civil society.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has since then paid tribute to one of the internationally best-known and most respected Swedish civil servants, who combined his local roots with truly cosmopolitan orientations. For many of my generation, Dag Hammarskjöld has been a role model and a source of inspiration - representing a Swedish culture and tradition we can proudly associate with.

During the last half century the Foundation has in many ways promoted a noble legacy with great relevance today. Its efforts in keeping the values and ethics of Dag Hammarskjöld alive have resulted in a variety of engagements and global networks. The themes pursued are mainly seeking to strengthen and improve North-South relations, the global governance system of the United Nations and the normative frameworks in promotion and protection of human security, social justice, peace and development.

Through often un-conventional initiatives and reflections, the modestly equipped idea-based institution manages to add value, enrich debate and provide alternative discourses. We need such constructive second opinions to find the best solutions for the numerous global problems and challenges we are facing.

As a Swedish and international civil servant I am proudly associated with this Foundation, which I wish the very best for the next 50 years ahead.

Jan Eliasson, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

In 1972 at a meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America in Santiago, I met Sven Hamrell and Marc Nerfin. It was complicity at first sight. We shared values and visions and the will to act for a fairer world. I was in charge of regional economic integration in the Government of Salvador Allende. Little did I know then that with the military coup d'état in Chile 1973, my early career representing the Government of Chile would come to an abrupt end. Another, unforeseen, chapter of my life started: exile, not least affected and subsequently shaped through my encounter with Sven Hamrell, then Executive Director of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

The shelter provided through an involvement in the Foundation's activities, and also as a member of the Executive Committee of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA) in Nyon, Switzerland, headed by Marc Nerfin and on the Advisory Committee of Development Dialogue, opened new avenues, engagements and possibilities. Ever since then, my further professional life was in some way inspired by these encounters and their consequences. You never forget those who helped in your difficult moments.

It was also a moment to be inspired by Dag Hammarskjöld's life and the Swedish tradition of solidarity and its capacity to stimulate alternative thinking. The Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales (ILET) and the Comisión Sudamericana de Paz were born out of those values. I have fond memories of the office of the Foundation's secretariat in Geijersgården, where I did not only find a temporary place to work. The couch in the corner office on the first floor allowed me numerous nights to rest. Much to my pleasure it had survived until the time I re-joined the Foundation as a member of its Board in 2006. By then I had gone back to Chile in 1983, was part of the democratic opposition to the dictatorship in charge of international affairs, become in 1990 the representative of the democratic Chile to the United Nations and in 1999 was elected Director-General of the ILO.

A new era had begun at the Foundation, though the spirit of the earlier years and the character of an idea-based organization challenging dominant paradigms had not vanished. The couch is gone, but the values it stood for have remained.

Over half a century the Foundation lived up to the ethics of the cosmopolitan Swedish international civil servant Dag Hammarskjöld, who set standards in the engagement for more global justice. The principles he personified have remained valid as a moral compass for those seeking to promote equality, respect for otherness and fair social conditions based on a truly human commitment to ensure a decent living for all. The Foundation, established in his name a few months after his untimely death, remained in its work loyal to these fundamental convictions and turned into a truly global network and anchoring place for those sharing similar values and principles.

I am glad to have the opportunity to congratulate the institution in its 50th anniversary as a member of its Board of Trustees and wish it many more years of productive and critical engagement in the struggle for a better world.

Juan Somavia, Director-General of the International Labour Organization (ILO)

When I was a student in Geneva I came across the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's flagship journal "Development Dialogue" as part of the recommended must read list for development studies. It was the beginning of what became a long established personal link with the personality of the distinguished Swede. My familiarity with the country started with my first job at the Swedish Cooperation Office, opened soon after Guinea Bissau's independence. As the first national recruited staff, I was part of those who helped foster a relationship that dated from the liberation struggle and the special complicity between Olof Palme and Amílcar Cabral. It was a source of pride.

My connections with Sweden continued to be present in different strands of my life: guest researcher at the Nordic-Africa Institute in Uppsala, books and articles published in Sweden, member of a project of the Royal Academy of Sciences, leader of a pilot project for UN field cooperation sponsored by Sweden and a variety of events and connections that brought me on a regular basis to beautiful Stockholm.

At the helm of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and as Director of the United Nations System Staff College it was natural to formalize a special rapport between that UN institution and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The symbolism for me to be the one signing an agreement with the Foundation's Executive Director - and close friend - Henning Melber, was quite special. It brought together a cycle of atoms of my personal journey, so closely linked to the UN, and so deeply touched by the man that died doing what he could for the world to be a better place, and for Africa to have justice.

Hammarskjöld's memory keeps being reinterpreted and reinvented. That is befitting. It is a memory that most would recognize as unique. A figure that typifies still today what an international civil servant should and ought to be. Hammarskjöld wrote in his only published book "Markings" that, "We are not permitted to choose the frame of our destiny. But what we put into it is ours. He who wills adventure will experience it — according to the measure of his courage. He who wills sacrifice will be sacrificed — according to the measure of his purity of heart." This haiku deep thinking attitude is missing in current international affairs. We are all becoming trapped by speed and "effectiveness" as if it had to come at the expense of contextual knowledge and comprehensiveness. Hammarskjöld would have a lot to say about such lightness.

I join the many admirers of the contribution of Hammarskjöld at the auspicious occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Foundation named after him.



Carlos Lopes, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)

'There will always be enough people to fight for a decent future'

An Introduction

Henning Melber

Not everything that counts
can be measured
and not everything
that can be measured
counts.
(Albert Einstein)[1]

> The whole package, coming in at just over 300 pages, has the feel more of a scholarly book than it does a single journal issue, and it practically demands employment as such – for this volume has both the philosophical heft and general accessibility to serve as a primer to the field of genocide studies. While its modern historical case studies are limited to a meager handful of sub-Saharan nations (with two of them focusing upon Zimbabwe), they are all excellent works that provide a useful template for further inquiry. Moreover, the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre generously makes this issue along with others in the *Development Dialogue* series, available for free download at its website. If this volume is indicative of the broader work of the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre, then people of goodwill across the world have a valuable ally in their struggle against inhumanity and violence.[2]

This is the encouraging conclusion by a reviewer unknown to the Foundation. It was published in a scholarly periodical almost two years

1 As quoted by Kumi Naidoo, former head of CIVICUS and executive director of Greenpeace International when staying in Uppsala as a visiting scholar at the Centre for Sustainable Development of Uppsala University to prepare the manuscript published as 'Boiling Point – Can Citizen Action Save the World', Development Dialogue No. 54, July 2010

2 Guy Lancaster, Encyclopedia of Arkansas History & Culture, at the end of his review of Development Dialogue No. 50 (December 2008) in African Studies Quarterly, vol. 12, issue 1, Fall 2010, p. 90.

Henning Melber

after the release in December 2008 of the volume commemorating the 60th anniversary of the UN genocide convention. Entitled 'Revisiting the heart of darkness – Explorations into genocide and other forms of mass violence', it had a print run of 10,000 copies, all of which have since been distributed.

The Foundation became aware of the review only coincidentally. This illustrates in a small way the challenges an ideas-based institution faces when it comes to accounting for its visibility, the relevance of its activities and the results of its work. As is so often the case, the advocacy of ethical values, ideas and norms as a form of wider political education and of scholarly or policy debate and as a contribution to a more enlightened public awareness and possible engagement produces visible and measurable effects (if they are visible and measurable at all) only after a certain time lag. It is thus not easy to provide quantitative evidence of results and relevance.

Of course, a small ideas-based organisation like ours needs proper conception and planning of its activities, the defining and setting of an agenda and designing as well as applying indicators to measure the effects of its work. But such measurement can only ever capture part of the story about the relevance of its mission and effects. The experience of a small South African NGO facing similar dilemmas is instructive:

> We don't *really* know whether we're on the right track, not least because every move we make changes the terrain within which we're travelling. This is the thing about social complexity. Every … community and situation is in a state of change all the time. And we, who seek to intervene, are not separate from whatever it is we intervene into; on the contrary, we're an integral member of the complex whole into which we intervene, and we change as it changes. All this stands to reason, if we take complexity seriously … The world is fluid, and we are fluid, and everything is shifting in ways that we can gradually learn to anticipate, but not predict, and never control.[3]

The writers continue:

> Measurement, especially quantitative measurement … is easy … compared with the challenging task of reading for what is *really* going on, in all its complexity and with all its nuances and contradictions, and making sense of this. The rigour and disciplined observation and imagination used in an effective open reflection process makes the

3 Allan Kaplan and Sue Davidoff (2011), The Singer, not the Song. The vexed questions of impact monitoring and social change. The Proteus Initiative, May, p. 12.

> measurement procedures of impact monitoring seem like exercises done at primary school. In the final analysis, both the quantitative and the qualitative forms of reflection may be necessary, but with respect to different 'outcomes', and if this is so then much hinges on what exactly we mean by 'impact'.[4]

Nevertheless, much of our work can be traced and put on record, and does provide a sense of the visibility and impact of the Foundation over the half-century since its official establishment as an autonomous institution by royal decree on 2 March 1962. Despite the temptations this rich history offers, this volume is not just a nostalgic excursion to recall 'good vibrations'. Some of the contributions clearly go beyond self-appraisal and testify to the fact that a small group of people (never more than half a dozen) with a modest annual budget (never exceeding one million Euro in today's terms) can in cooperation with many more like-minded individuals and initiatives achieve a great deal. There are also critical self-reflections. And there are those narratives beyond and behind the visible. Some of these come to the fore in the personal stories shared in this collection, which offer a variety of approaches and perspectives. They bear testimony to the fact that a history of ideas is at the same time a history of the people promoting these ideas.

★★★

In the case of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, everything started with 'the Boss', as the second Secretary-General of the United Nations was fondly and respectfully called by his staff at the UN. His legacy lives on, and continues to inspire many. Like few others in similar positions, Dag Hammarskjöld personified the spirit of justice, personal integrity and faith in humanity. He relentlessly promoted the principles of the UN Charter and his faith in the future.

As the transcript of his extemporaneous remarks at the UN Correspondents' Association luncheon in his honour on 9 April 1958 reveals, Dag Hammarskjöld maintained the

> … belief and the faith that the future will be all right because there will always be enough people to fight for a decent future … I do believe firmly that … there are enough people who are solidly engaged in this fight and who are strong enough and dedicated enough to guarantee its success.[5]

4 Ibid., p. 17.

5 Quoted in Kaj Falkman (ed.) (2005), *To Speak for the World. Speeches and Statements by Dag Hammarskjöld*, Stockholm: Atlantis, pp. 51f.

According to Hammarskjöld, all of us are confronted with fundamental choices. His Cambridge University address only a few weeks later highlighted the need for people to position themselves. In this vein, he continued:

> The conflict [over] different approaches to the liberty of man and mind or between different views of human dignity and the right of the individual is continuous. The dividing line goes within ourselves, within our own peoples, and also within other nations. It does not coincide with any political or geographical boundaries. The ultimate fight is one between the human and the subhuman. We are on dangerous ground if we believe that any individual, any nation, or any ideology has a monopoly on rightness, liberty, and human dignity.[6]

Ever since its establishment, the Foundation – albeit in often unconventional ways – sought to promote and support the 'pursuit of happiness' not only as an American dream but also in the spirit of Hammarskjöld's humanism. This has never been understood as a backward-looking, iconographic approach. Instead, such commitment seeks to reactivate and translate the relevance of Hammarskjöld's thinking and work as an international civil servant into global policy matters regarding current issues and challenges. It is a conservative role only in the sense that there are ideas and concepts that deserve to remain alive or be revived for the sake of a better future.

In the case of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, everything started with 'the Boss', as the second Secretary-General of the United Nations was fondly and respectfully called by his staff at the UN.

UN Photo/JO

6 Dag Hammarskjöld, 'The Walls of Distrust', address at Cambridge University, 5 June 1958, in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds) (1974), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume IV, Dag Hammarskjöld 1958-1960*, New York: Columbia University, pp. 91f.

The struggle for a decent life for all in the name of humanity and humanist ideals always remains a struggle about the future. Many stories about the history of this struggle as it played out within the small arena of this Foundation could be told. Some of them are shared here. They allow insights into the role of this small secretariat, situated in the historical Geijersgården near the main hall of Uppsala University. Its location is somehow symbolic: it is almost equidistant from the Castle where Dag Hammarskjöld grew up and the cemetery where he is buried with other members of his family.

A year before his appointment as the second UN Secretary-General, Hammarskjöld penned the following words in his private notebook: 'It is easy to be nice, even to an enemy – from lack of character.'[7] One could have also added, from lack of empathy and solidarity with those who are victimised by those who abuse the power they seized or – worse – were entrusted with to serve the people. Hammarskjöld had a sense of justice. He was on the side of the oppressed. So should be we.

Based on Hammarskjöld's cosmopolitan orientation, his devoted service to humanity and equality and his relentless efforts to bring violence of all kinds to an end (including the non-military violence exerted by structures), the Foundation soon joined other like-minded forces, individuals and alliances. Half a century after its establishment, the Foundation can stand proud of its record as a faithful advocate of alternative paradigms, and its promotion of the fundamental values enshrined not least in the Charter of the United Nations and all the global normative frameworks formulated since then.

Some of the following contributions take us down memory lane by offering glimpses of and experiences from the last 50 years. Others present evidence from our current networks, and finally we have also added some investigative, analytical views from the outside. In the end, though, all the evidence presented allows for only limited insights into the variety of undertakings, explorations, successes and failures.

If there is one lesson we embody above all else, maybe it is that the pen can indeed be mightier than the sword. At times against all odds, the belief in a better future does not succumb to force. One can kill

7 Dag Hammarskjöld (1993), *Markings*, New York: Ballantine (16th ed.), p. 70. The new translation by Bernhard Erling suggests the following English wording: 'It is easy to be friendly even to the enemy – from lack of character.' Bernhard Erling (1982/87), *A Reader's Guide to Dag Hammarskjöld's* Waymarks, p. 88. Fifty years after Dag Hammarskjöld's death, the Foundation was able to make this unique work accessible electronically on our web site. See: http://www.dhf.uu.se/publications/other-publications/a-reader's-guide-to-dag-hammarskjold's-waymarks/.

institutions. One can destroy structures. One is able to marginalise and ridicule social movements and other forms of mobilisation and organisation. One can fight ideas by every means, even eliminate groups of people and individuals. But one can never ever get entirely rid of our visions, hopes and values about justice, equality, human rights and dignity. As a contemporary artist performing at the Foundation put it:

What kind of activist are you?

The dangerous kind.

I mean what's your issue?

Justice.

Can you be more specific?

Justice without borders.

Unfragmented. Decompartmentalized. Seamless, indivisible justice.[8]

There is a crack in everything. That's how the light gets in.

Dag Hammarskjöld would most likely have chosen other words and expressed them in a different style. But equally likely, he would have sought to put across a very similar message, sharing the same motivation and intent. We also like to assume that he would have approved of how the Foundation has, as a tribute to his vision and values, tried to translate this understanding into related ideas and practical action.

★★★

Ring the bells that still can ring
Forget your perfect offering
There is a crack in everything
That's how the light gets in.

Leonard Cohen, 'Anthem'

8 The Kenyan poet, playwright, spoken word artist and political activist Shailja Patel began her stay as guest writer with Mai Palmberg's 'Cultural Images in and of Africa' programme at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala with the opening performance of 'Slice A Heart On A Curve: The Poetics of Insecurity' at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation on 3 April 2009. See http://www.dhf.uu.se/events/public-events/slice-a-heart-on-a-curve-the-poetics-of-insecurity/.

Crown Princess Viktoria, Birgitta Dahl, Kofi Annan and Nan Annan on the occasion of the 2001 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture

We Must Not Fail!

Birgitta Dahl

In July 1961, two weeks before the Berlin War was constructed as the most abominable expression of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, Dag Hammarskjöld, working indefatigably to restore peace and the rule of law in the Congo, wrote these words, which were later published in his 'Markings':

Tired
And lonely,
So tired
The heart aches
Meltwater trickles
Down the rocks,
The fingers are numb,
The knees tremble.
It is now,
Now, that you must not give in.

On the path of the others
are resting places,
Places in the sun
Where they can meet.
But this
Is your path,
And it is now,
Now, that you must not fail.

Weep
If you can,
Weep,
But do not complain.
The way chose you –
And you must be thankful.

With these words he expresses his burden, but also his steadfastness, his courage, his conviction that a solution to the problems creating war and human suffering had to be found by him and the United Nations. He worked for this until the moment he died only two months later.

Dag Hammarskjöld's funeral procession as seen from the roof of Geijersgården.

On 29 September 1961, he was carried back to Uppsala, the city where he grew up, and his funeral. I stood just outside Castle Hill together with my new-born first daughter Anna as part of the quiet honour guard made up of thousands of students and citizens. I remember my respect and sorrow, my fear for the future. What kind of life would my daughter have and what world would she live in when evil forces could act like this? Since then, I have felt an obligation, as have so many people in Sweden and throughout the world, to honour his life and deeds by working tirelessly for peace and international cooperation through the UN. It was thus a great honour for me and an obligation to work for the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in its first years (1965-68) and later for the UN in various roles.

Dag Hammarskjöld grew up in Uppsala during the breakthrough towards democracy and international cooperation in our country. A little more than a century ago, there was at the University of Uppsala a group of students who were close friends and passionately interested in politics. Most of them went on to become great men and women in a society on its way to democratisation. Two of them, the liberal Carl Staaff and the social democrat Hjalmar Branting, became not only strong and respected leaders of their parties, but also prime ministers. Branting was also one of the founding fathers of the League of Nations.

The challenge they had to face in the then politically, economically and socially backward Sweden bears a great resemblance to what we are facing in the world of today.

Living conditions were very poor – similar to the conditions in a poor African country today. Sweden had the highest infant mortality in Europe. Twenty-five per cent of the people – more than one million persons – emigrated because of poverty, hunger and lack of rights. People did not have the right to vote, the right of association or freedom of religion.

But at the same time, the beginnings of something new were visible, a breakthrough in infrastructure and communications. Electricity was introduced and railways shrunk the world. Industrialisation, commerce and urbanisation changed the lifestyles of ordinary people. Many had to move far from their families and places and provinces of birth to

find jobs. New popular movements – the free churches, the labour movement and the temperance movement – mobilised and organised people to take action in common to improve living conditions. Adult education through lectures, study circles, libraries and folk high-schools was introduced and was much in demand.

An absolute majority of our people believed in possibly slower but steadier and more secure reforms, based on respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The art of negotiating and finding majority solutions for problems and for reforms was developed during the struggle to fight unemployment and economic crisis and build the welfare state. Sweden has always had a multiparty system – almost never a government based on a majority for one party. The art of government in Sweden has therefore been and still is the art of negotiating majorities at all levels, local, regional and national.

Dag Hammarskjöld was a respected and important actor in this work as scientist and investigator, as government official, as international negotiator and as cabinet minister during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. He brought all the knowledge and experience he had gained from his work in Sweden with him to the UN.

For all those in our NGOs and political parties of that time who had fought for the right to vote, there was a natural link between democracy, peace and international cooperation. Prior to 1810 and for 1,000 years since the Viking era, Sweden had seen war, cruel and bloody civil war and wars with our neighbours. At the end of the 19th century, the memories of the atrocities and sufferings of war were still strong. People wanted peace. They believed that democracy was a guarantee of peace. A democratic country ruled by the people would not use violence against its citizens or its neighbours. Hjalmar Branting took this conviction one step further and became a driving force in the international peace and disarmament movement and the League of Nations. From this originates the Swedish tradition of working for peace and international cooperation and for support for the UN.

But when Dag Hammarskjöld was born in July 1905, Sweden was very close to war. Norway wanted independence from Sweden. Negotiations had been going on for decades. On June 7 1905, Norway declared its independence and on 13 August an absolute majority of Norwegian people voted in support of independence in a referendum. The Swedish conservative government, the king and the royal family wanted to use military force to control Norway. When Dag Hammarskjöld was born, there were military forces along Sweden's borders with Norway, ready

to act. The Swedish people, however, did not want war. The popular movements, whose members did not yet have the right to vote, organised protests against a military solution throughout Sweden. And they succeeded in persuading the Swedish parliament to seek a peaceful solution and to draw up an agreement between Sweden and Norway. Dag Hammarskjöld's father Hjalmar, then a cabinet minister, was part of the Swedish negotiating team. As a result, Dag Hammarskjöld's baptism had to be postponed for several months.

However, the tradition of basing political solutions on constructive co-operation across the political, national and other borders of the time has obvious parallels in today´s responses to the challenges of unrestrained globalisation and senseless violence, of poverty and environmental destruction. The creation of the UN after the Second World War as an expression of these aims and ideals has proven to be even more farsighted than its founders may have realised. True, there has been a constant need for flexibility and reform in keeping with developments in international society, at a pace and of a scope that could not have been foreseen. And in the UN, as in all international organisations, a democratic deficit has to be addressed. It has been the task of Secretaries-General to strengthen the organisation and to adapt it and its working methods to a rapidly changing world. It is our common responsibility to secure the work and role of the UN by supporting and strengthening it for the future.

Against this background, I was extremely pleased to see the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation established in 1962, based on a national collection of funds in Sweden. This initiative was to honour the memory and deeds of Dag Hammarskjöld by establishing as a 'living memorial' an institution that could strengthen the work of the UN and of the states that had just achieved their independence. It was indeed a privilege and an honour to serve as administrative secretary during its first years in the early1960s and to be one of its first employees. Since those days I have carried with me an invaluable global network of friends and colleagues, whom I have met as partners in new roles in a period of constantly growing international interdependence.

The board of trustees of the foundation held its first constituent meeting on 21 May 1962 in Stockholm under the leadership of Ambassador Alva Myrdal, president *a.i.* of the foundation. During the foundation's first years, the board of trustees consisted of 15-19 members, representing the international community, the UN and Sweden. Among them were Secretary-General U Thant and former Secretary-General Tryggve Lie; Deputy Secretaries-General Ralphe Bunche and Andrew

Cordier; Mongi Slim, president of the General Assembly; Governor Bo Hammarskjöld (brother of Dag Hammarskjöld); Mme Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, India; Prime Minister Lester Pearson, Canada; and Sture Petrén, a judge on the International Court of Justice. The executive committee comprised Ambassador Myrdal and later Undersecretary Ernst Michanek, Andrew Cordier and Mongi Slim. In the new statutes of 1968 the number of board members was limited to 'not more than seven'. Its composition should 'reflect the international character of the activities of the Foundation'. The board is assisted by an international honorary committee.

A report from 1963 to the board by its first executive director, Bengt Rösiö, states:

> The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has, however, very special characteristics: it is non-official and yet international. It is non-official because it is a private foundation, and it can therefore work with flexibility, efficiency and a minimum of bureaucracy, and its activities will not be hindered by any consideration of political parties or member-governments. It is international because it has Trustees from four continents, national committees in several countries, and the unanimous support of the members of the United Nations voiced in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly.

Dag Hammarskjöld passed Geijersgården every day on his way to school and to the university.

The Foundation is to serve as an arena for the origination and exchange of views on sustainable development, international cooperation and development of the UN system. This purpose is achieved through seminars, conferences, workshops and consultations on the social, political, economic and cultural issues facing the Third World and by publishing and disseminating the results. The first seminar – on international law – was held in The Hague in 1963, and was organised in cooperation with the Hague Academy of International Law.

The initial years were characterised by systematic and searching efforts to develop plans and strategies as well as very practical organisational solutions. In 1963, the foundation was able to find premises in Dag Hammarskjöld's hometown Uppsala for its administrative services as well as its seminars and conferences. The Dag Hammarskjöld Centre in Uppsala was set up and furnished for this new purpose in 1965. It is accommodated in a historic mansion belonging to the University of Uppsala and closely associated with its history. Professor Erik Gustaf Geijer had lived there with his family during his tenure as vice-chancellor of the university and as professor of history nearly 200 years ago. He was also a famous author and musician, and had been a member

of parliament who introduced liberal ideas into Sweden. During his life, Geijersgården was a cultural meeting place where ideas were exchanged. Geijersgården is situated in the centre of Uppsala and is surrounded by the university, the cathedral, the university library and the castle. Dag Hammarskjöld grew up in the latter when his father was governor of Uppsala. He passed Geijersgården every day on his way to school and to the university. He has described this milieu and his love for it in his essay 'Castle Hill', the last text he composed, just before his death.

The defined aim of the foundation, already in its first years, included 'supplementary short-term training for senior staff within national administrations, who are dealing with problems of an international character, or other qualified persons otherwise interested in such problems'. (Board of Trustees, 23 June 1964).

In article 1 of the 1968 statutes, the foundation is defined as:

> a nonofficial, autonomous institution, having as its major objective the promotion of social, political, economic and cultural progress within the nations whose development Dag Hammarskjöld had so closely at heart, by providing training for nationals of the development countries to hold responsible positions.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Centre serves as the executive office of the foundation. Since 1966, it has also been the venue for seminars. During 1966-68, seminars were held on 'The Law of Treaties' (1966, 1967), 'Development Economics' (1966), 'The Use of Correspondence Instruction in Adult Education' (1967, 1968) and 'The Structure, Role and Functions of the UN System' (1967, 1968). The idea to introduce correspondence instruction was mine. I was very glad that the board of the foundation accepted it. As part of the preparations for these seminars, I visited Sudan and a number of countries in East Africa and participated in a conference on continuing education organised by the Adult Education Association of East and Central Africa in Kampala.

These first pioneering years showed that the seminar concept was well chosen. Since then, seminars have been held in Uppsala, in Africa, Asia and Latin America as well as in the context of various UN meetings in New York and Geneva. The materials arising from these events have been made available in over 100 publications as well as in the foundation's biannual journal *Development Dialogue*.

The foundation's work on the development of international cooperation and reform of the UN has been significant in a period when many

actors, with Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Sir Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers as precursors, have tried hard to reform and strengthen the system. The ideas of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights have not lost their significance. They must be protected and strengthened more than ever in today's world of harsh reality. They represent the good alternative that does exist: in the words of a Holocaust survivor, 'The best way to fight the evil is to hold up the good!' It is irrefutable that the world today would have become, would be, much more horrible without the UN. But no doubt the UN needs to be strengthened and reformed.

The world has changed since the UN was founded by the victorious powers of the Second World War. Today the UN has four times as many members (around 200 as compared to 50) as it had at the outset. The majority of the new members are countries that nearly 70 years ago were not free, independent and democratic. At the time of its founding, a majority of the human beings did not have the right to vote and could not read or write. A majority of the UN member countries now are developing countries or countries in transition, still much poorer than the rich Northern and Western minority.

UN Photo

The UN can never be stronger than its members want it or allow it to be. This reality is illustrated by the obstacles to reform of the Security Council and to strengthening the whole UN system. It is highlighted by the shortcomings with regard to the tragedy in Syria. Clearly support for and the role of the UN need to be reinforced.

Today we see strong new actors on the international arena that parallel national states: regional organisations, economic forces – multinational companies and financial empires – popular and social movements, academia, the scientific society. The environmental threats and climate issue call for common action. New technologies enable instant coordination of action at a global level.

We have a very good common agenda for peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development. The problem is that the agenda is, to far too great an extent, not realised in practical deed.

We do have a great number of international agreements and commitments – final documents from global conferences. They are included in the Millennium Development Goals and in the millennium declaration of the General Assembly of 2000, reinforced by the General Assembly 2005. Thus we have a very good common agenda for peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development. The problem is that the agenda is, to far too great an extent, not realised in practical deed. For this to happen we require strong support from citizens, popular movements and democratically elected representatives in member states. The very weak

parliamentary control of international cooperation that prevails in most countries today, rightly gives rise to a sense of democratic deficit.

Civil society, popular movements and NGOs have from the beginning had an explicit role in the work of the UN, as is clearly reflected in the wording of the Charter of the UN. Their role has increased considerably over the last 25 years, particularly in connection with major global summits and international negotiations. So we have seen really strong developments in this regard.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan strove to reform the UN. He wanted to strengthen the role of civil society and popular support for the UN.

On the other hand, these have also caused tensions and problems, and not only in relation to financing and hosting. For instance, at some summits there were around 30,000 NGO persons present. We also have to consider the democratic legitimacy of each NGO. Who do they represent? What is their mandate? It is also true that some governments do not like this development and the growing influence of civil society. From the South there are many who feel that the North, the rich North, is making use of civil society in a provocative way.

These problems have to be addressed systematically so as to allow for greater participation by civil society and national parliaments.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan strove to reform the UN. He wanted to strengthen the role of civil society and popular support for the UN. His Millennium Report, launched as a response to the problems posed by globalisation and the need for appropriate governance, was an important step towards meeting the challenges of today´s and tomorrow´s world.

Pictured here with Sven Hamrell during his visit to the Foundation.

> We must put people at the centre of everything we do. No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better. Only when this begins to happen will we know that globalisation is indeed becoming inclusive, allowing everyone to share its opportunities.

His ambitions were set out in his report to the General Assembly in September 2002, entitled 'Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change' (A/57/387 and corr.1) and in his address to the General Assembly in September 2003. The General Assembly, in its Resolution 57/300 of 20 December 2002, concurred with his vision and agreed to consider the recommendations through the relevant intergovernmental process.

Accordingly, in February 2003, the Secretary-General appointed the eminent persons panel on UN-civil society relations and invited Fernando Enrique Cardoso, former president of Brazil, to chair it. The panel comprised 12 members, of whom I was one. In June 2004, the panel presented its report 'We the peoples: Civil society, the UN and Global Governance'. Later in 2003, the Secretary-General created a high-level panel on threats, challenges and change to generate new ideas about the policies and institutions required if the UN was to be effective in the 21st century. This panel presented its report 'A more secure world: Our shared responsibility' in December 2004.

The task of our panel on UN-civil society relations was expressed in the terms of reference as, to 'undertake an assessment of relations between the UN and Civil Society with the objective of formulating recommendations to the Secretary General for enhancing interaction between the organization and civil society, including parliaments and the private sector'. At our first meeting, we were told by the Secretary-General to be both bold and pragmatic. We understood this to mean as bold as possible without creating resistance that could block the process.

Our recommendations were based on the principle that civil society, popular movements and elected representatives must have a significant role in the work of the UN and a real and substantive influence on international cooperation. We identified three paradigm shifts we would like to see.

The first is that the UN should reinforce its role in convening, leading, facilitating multi-stakeholder partnerships, global policy networks, coalitions of likeminded governments and other actors. The UN should act not only on the premise that all governments, and only governments, should be present at all deliberations. We proposed that the UN should actively initiate and lead global policy networks, with different participants for different issues, but including governments, national parliaments, civil society, NGOs, academia and the private sector. The idea is that likeminded partners will come together and join forces to try to change the world.

This approach has already been used in a number of cases. The first instance was in 1979 when the World Health Organisation and UNICEF brought together stakeholders to address the problem of the marketing of breast-milk substitutes. It has been used for issues such as debt, land mines and tackling major diseases like malaria, HIV/AIDS and others. As minister of environment, I adopted this method extensively in the preparations for Rio 92 and for the ban on CFCs. It was by forming

informal networks among countries, ministers, parliaments, civil society organisations and the academic world that we were able to achieve much more than would otherwise have been possible. It was also in the course of this work that the issue of climate change was identified and the work of IPCC under the leadership of Professor Bert Bolin initiated.

The second shift we proposed was a stronger focus at the country level on implementing global agreements and commitments, on supporting sustainable development, on analysing how this could best be done. In many countries, the UN family plays a crucial role in the eradication of poverty and disease, in education and in sustainable and economic development. Likeminded responsible groups, organisations and institutions should form alliances at the national level as well as local level to find effective solutions to problems and secure the best use of resources. By this means, one could say we should act both according to the classic 'Think globally, act locally' approach and, at the same time, according to the reverse principle 'Think locally, act globally'. This means that ideas can come from both directions and converge. The way we are able to implement our commitments should be improved. This requires resource allocation and the strengthening of civil society in countries where it is weak and needs better organisation.

The third shift we suggested is that the UN and its members address the democratic deficit in international cooperation. Traditionally, in terms of constitutions and international law, it is the government that represents the country in all international deliberations. This is part of the government's executive power. Today, parliamentary control over international cooperation is very weak in most countries. This tradition stems from the time when kings and emperors represented the country and ruled through a very undemocratic system. There are, however, no constitutional restrictions or rules in international law against strong parliamentary control in this area. Such parliamentary control could give democratic legitimacy to international cooperation and promote popular support for it. We need parliaments to implement international commitments. International commitments should be followed by action – decisions, legislation and budgetary commitments in national parliaments. We need parliaments as the national arena in which international cooperation and solidarity are made part of our daily work and personal responsibility. No international agreement – be it on the rights of children and women or the climate – can be fulfilled without action at home. Most international affairs can be dealt with openly, without secrecy.

Thus, national parliaments should take on the role of active executive controller of the government, even in international affairs and on UN

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been a promoter of the good alternative from its beginnings. It has been the arena and meeting place for new and productive and sometimes initially controversial ideas. The world needs the foundation to continue in that role into the future.

issues. National parliaments should receive all important UN documents at the same time as governments, so as to be able to influence further developments. All standing committees in national parliaments should carefully follow what is happening in their respective areas, including on the global scene. Open public debates should be held in parliament on major issues.

The representation of parliaments and NGOs in national delegations to the General Assembly and global summits should be strengthened. The Secretary-General should organise public debates and hearings on major issues to which parliamentarians, local constituencies, civil society, academics and others are invited. National standing committees should send representatives to global public policy committees in the UN dealing with issues needing to be addressed carefully, jointly and globally.

The Security Council needs to be reformed to better represent all kinds of member states. The Security Council should, by using the so-called Arria Formula, invite civil society to a dialogue. Every Security Council delegation that visits an area with conflicts and problems should meet with representatives of civil society. The Security Council should arrange seminars and public hearings on questions of importance from time to time.

The Secretary-General should use his role as chair of the UN system's co-ordination mechanism to encourage all agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to enhance their engagement with civil society and other actors and to cooperate with each other across the system.

The basic idea is that the UN should exercise global leadership in a world where the multilateral system and international cooperation is changing. Both are no longer exclusively governmental – only governments meeting with each other, agreeing on the lowest common denominator. We need a multilateral society characterised by coalitions of the willing seeking cooperation on the highest common principle, coalitions of the promoters of the good alternative that want to join forces to create a better world.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been such a promoter of the good alternative from its beginnings. It has been the arena and meeting place for new and productive and sometimes initially controversial ideas. The world needs the foundation to continue in that role into the future.

We must not fail!

‘In those days, it was fun to be a Swede’

The first decades of The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Sven Hamrell in conversation with Thomas G. Weiss

Prof. Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science at The City University of New York Graduate Center and director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies interviewed Sven Hamrell, the foundation’s longest serving executive director, on 5 and 6 June 2001 in Uppsala for the United Nations Intellectual History Project at The Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York. Ron Nerio transcribed the exchange. Excerpts are reproduced in slightly edited form below. We are grateful to Sven Hamrell, Tom Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis for enabling us to publish parts of this conversation for the first time. The editing has been limited to shortening and style, but the present tense has been retained.

TGW: How do you explain your own interest in Africa, and Sweden’s interest?

SH: In my case, it was partly the American experience, because I lived on 118th Street in New York, and it was not so far to go down to Harlem. I could go to Harlem and dance at the Savoy. I had already read Richard Wright in school in Sweden, and so on. Then I think the missionary factor is very important. There are missionaries in many villages who came home. That meant a lot.

Then, of course, it was also Hammarskjöld, and Hammarskjöld’s death. There are many books about Hammarskjöld, but there is one by the Russian Victor Lesiovsky. He was one of the highest officials in the secretariat in New York. Brian Urquhart knows him. He is an old-

Sven Hamrell was the Foundation's Executive Director from 1967 to 1994.

fashioned Russian. There were many good people in Russia before the propaganda state developed. He devoted himself to studying the death of Hammarskjöld and he has written a book called *The Enigma of the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld*. He believes that there was more to this than an accident. We are not trying to solve the enigma in any way, but he has an interesting chapter on why Hammarskjöld became so involved in the Congo. Hammarskjöld was the son of the prime minister; he lived in the castle over there. That's his boyhood home. Lesiovsky says that one of the reasons Hammarskjöld involved himself so much in the Congo was that he felt that now he was, so to speak, living up to the heritage of his ancestors. He became, for a while, a provincial governor, not of Uppsala, but a provincial governor of the Congo. What a beautiful way to write it in this book. It shows how Hammarskjöld was very interested. He went on a tour of Africa. Hammarskjöld had quite a lot to do with the active interest we took in African affairs.

TGW: Other than dancing at the Savoy, what was your first experience in the Third World – your first living and active experience? What kind of memories do you have of that?

Joseph Ki-Zerbo during a visit to the Foundation in 2001.

SH: Thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), I was enabled to go to Dakar to attend the first conference on 'Ways to African Socialism'. Yes, this is how the CIA worked in those days. It was an interesting conference in Senegal, on Gorée Island. That's where I met some other CIA-funded people. Of course, I met Senghor, the president. But I also met a fellow who played an important role in those days, namely the British Labour Party politician John Strachey. He was very influential when it came to trying to work for nuclear disarmament.

TGW: This was in which year, this conference?

SH: It was 1962, I think. There I met a very close friend of mine, who comes here every summer and sits here and writes. His name is Joseph Ki-Zerbo. He is the last in line of the UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) *General History of Africa*. He was also on the board of the international advisory committee of the UN University (UNU) in Japan. He has also been on the board of UNESCO for a long time.

TGW: What do you recall from the African nationalist movements in the 1950s and 1960s? How were these treated either in the press or in university texts in that period? Our own sense is that very little was known about Africa and African economies, certainly in the US and in

other universities. I am just curious as to what kinds of things you were reading, how you got your information about Africa.

SH: We got quite a lot, for instance, from the British newspaper *The Observer*. Colin Legum was the head of the Africa section. That was the most important newspaper. Actually there was a strong interest in Africa on the part of the Swedish newspaper *Expressen*. That is an evening newspaper, a tabloid you might say, but of high quality in those days.

Sweden had been isolated since the Second World War, and now the world was opening up. We had people like Olof Palme, and so on, in the forefront. Then we entered into the Vietnam debate. Maybe we felt a little bit lonely up here, so we wanted some friends to embrace. I remember when I was a kid, for instance – I was 10 years old or something – there was a Negro who came to our town up north and we all got on our bicycles and went down to watch him. Then, of course – maybe I shouldn't go into this – my wife's oldest known ancestor was a Sephardic Jew, who was colonial governor of the Gold Coast and lived in Christiansborg Castle in 1660. So we have had relations here in the family. He was a slave trader.

I was so upset by this CIA business. I was lecturing in political science. I gave the first course on the politics of the African countries at the University of Uppsala in the 1960s. There was a fellow who came here to Uppsala; he was going to write something about Hammarskjöld. So I met him, and I said, 'You are going to write about Hammarskjöld. I don't know if that's worthwhile. Why don't you come and lecture in my course?' And he came and it was a marvellous lecture. It was on American foreign policy, and it was about how reactionary America was, and how dangerous America was.

I said afterwards, 'Why don't you write a book, expanding your lecture into a book?' He said, 'Well, I might do that.' Then I said to him, 'I can organise for you a place where you can live.' We found a house actually, a bit on the outskirts of Uppsala. He sat down there and started to write. He wrote for a year and a half. In the end it was a huge volume. He went to the London School of Economics (LSE) and finished the book. Then the book was published – it's dedicated to me – as *The Free World Colossus*. This fellow was David Horowitz. I managed to have a Swedish translation of it also.

TGW: You mentioned your contacts with other prominent Swedes who went into the government. What led you to take a different route to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies and eventually the Dag

Hammarskjöld Foundation? Did you ever think about working in the government or in the private sector? What attracted you about this alternate route?

SH: This organisation, when I joined it, was almost in a shambles. We almost collapsed. Everybody thought that it would come to nothing. In those days, actually, the Hammarskjöld Foundation had just a single room as an office in a bank in Stockholm. So when the Hammarskjöld Foundation came to Uppsala, we had the very same vice chancellor of Uppsala University. But his father was the leading anti-Nazi editor in Sweden. He was a fantastic person, and an enormously talented writer. He wrote about Hitler and Nazism in such a way that I think one could edit and translate his articles from the 1930s and 1940s.

He gave the speech here when Hammarskjöld died. He said that he wanted the name of Hammarskjöld to be preserved. So he called the board – originally the Hammarskjöld Foundation had a huge board of 18 members or something, Ralph Bunche and many people like that. So he called those who could come and he said, 'If you move to Uppsala, I will put this house at your disposal.' It's still one of the most famous houses in Sweden.

Originally, Alva Myrdal was the chairman of the board – Gunnar's wife. But then she felt that she couldn't cope. So they made Ernst Michanek chairman. Michanek was also anti-Nazi. I think he asked me because he knew that I was also from this group of people. There were many Nazis in Sweden: you must not forget that.

TGW: In looking back at the 1950s and 1960s and the first wave of African independence, how did you think it would proceed? What kinds of thoughts were going through your head and other people's heads when Ghana became independent, sort of at the front edge of this big wave? How did you see Africa developing, and how quickly?

SH: I thought it would develop in a better way. I saw some of the failures of Nkrumah, of course. But still, I didn't think it would develop the way it did, especially since Ghana has many people of talent.

TGW: Speaking of history, what about the First Development Decade? As you look back on that first snapshot of where Africa and Asia and Latin America should go, and the role of outsiders, Western powers, donors, as well as UN agencies, what do you recall of that moment when that decade was launched?

SH: We were, so to speak, bilateral in a way. We felt that actually the UN is behind, and it is better that we start with our aid programmes and guide the way for the UN. It might have been a good thing, actually, but we put much greater emphasis on bilateral relations and we thought that could start something off.

Patrick van Rensburg at the Foundation in 2003.

TGW: Once you took over at the foundation, what was the role of Swedish orientations, or bilateral relations, versus multilateral relations in your work programme, in your own conference schedule? How did you conceptualise these two spheres?

SH: It was more, so to speak, bilateral. Recently, it has changed a bit in the foundation. We knew that education, for instance, mattered. You know that we had plenty of seminars with Patrick van Rensburg. He has been extremely important for the Hammarskjöld Foundation. He was a Boer. He was once a diplomat. He shared an office with Pik Botha. Then he decided no more apartheid. He went to England. When he went to Europe, people were marching and demonstrating against South Africa.

We had plenty of seminars with Patrick van Rensburg. He has been extremely important for the Hammarskjöld Foundation.

Here he said, 'I can't go around as a demonstrator in London.' So he more or less hitchhiked to the closest he could get to South Africa, Botswana. Then he established a friendship with Seretse Khama. He said, 'We have to organise a new education system for Africa.' He started up a secondary school in Serowe. He started up some more secondary schools also. But he said, 'We can't have just diploma courses. We have to have a new kind of school, education combined with production.' He started this at Swaneng Hill in Botswana. Then he also started a workers' brigade.

The money came from the Swedish Committee on Humanitarian Aid. He has written many books. He started not only a builders' brigade, he started also a printers' brigade. And the printers' brigade established one of the leading newspapers in Southern Africa, *Mwegi*. Working with this kind of thing was more important than working with UN plans of a global nature.

TGW: You mentioned him as an example of somebody who wandered through the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. What was your conception of what this institution should be, and how did you carry it out? In one interview you said, 'We have a good cash-flow of ideas.' This project is about ideas and intellectual history. How did you stimulate ideas and why did you think that the stimulation of more practical or more theoretical ideas was useful and had value? Why did you want to push ideas, and where did these ideas come from in the Hammarskjöld Foundation?

SH: Ideas matter, as you say. What we have done in the Hammarskjöld Foundation was that we have been very careful in trying to find people who can make ideas matter. That is, I think, in a sense, the secret of the success of the foundation. When it comes to that, this foundation has only had five paid employees throughout its history – no more than five at any time. We have almost no resources. We have commissioned from the government very little money.

So we have had to rely on people who had good ideas. But if you were established and had good ideas, you don't work for a foundation like this. But if you are in trouble … We tried to get people who are in difficult situations. For instance, this Van Rensburg, he had no money. He started from scratch. He had to hitchhike to Botswana. Then he managed to build up this big foundation. The Foundation for Education and Production is active in Zambia, Mozambique and so on. It's a working enterprise. We looked for people who were in difficulties. Sometimes we take a government man, like Gerry Helleiner, but they were established.

There was, for instance, a refugee who didn't have very much money, who couldn't stay in his country. We heard about him and we said, 'Come and help us a little bit.' It was Juan Somavia. The programme for the Latin American Institute of Transnational Studies he wrote here, in this room, over there. Then we had a seminar in Mozambique that was partly financed by us. But when we needed help, we found another person, a minister of education who worked with him, Graça Machel. And when it came to Latin America, we found another refugee who couldn't be in Chile, Manfred Max Neef. We said, 'Come here.' And he wrote a book here, called *From the Outside, Looking In*. Then he helped us to organise this seminar on development in Latin America, which became quite well-known. And Ki-Zerbo considered that it would help him also through the years.

Come to think of it, a friend that we benefited a lot from is the former finance minister of Tunisia, Ahmed Ben Salah. He was a trade unionist, a very important political leader in Tunisia. But then President Bourgiba became afraid that he would be unseated. So Ben Salah was imprisoned, but he escaped from prison and went to his friend in Austria, the chancellor, Bruno Kreisky. And Kreisky called on his parliament because, he said, 'Ben Salah is not safe here. You will have to help.' Parliament called Michanek and said, 'Ben Salah is out of prison, and he needs help. He has to be somewhere in Sweden, or somewhere. Can you help?' And Michanek called me. I said, 'OK. He can be on our farm in southern Sweden.'

So he came, and it was a big hullabaloo – 50 policemen all around the airport. They took him in a car. The police were watching and nobody could follow. They switched cars up at the castle there and then took him to my farm. There I was responsible for him. In order to see to it that he could survive, he had to re-establish his political existence. To re-establish his political existence, he needed to make a political statement, and somebody had to be found to take down that statement. Marc Nerfin was asked to do that. So he also stayed on our farm. He interviewed Ben Salah for a whole week, and then a book was published and translated into seven languages – not English, though. This was how I established contact with Marc Nerfin – by offering to help an exile with a publication and rescuing his life. Marc Nerfin had been a high school teacher in Tunisia for a while and admired Ben Salah.

When Marc Nerfin decided, together with Maurice Strong, the follow-up to the Founex Initiative and the Stockholm Conference, Ben Salah became an important person. It shows what Marc did. First he organised money, because he had established his reputation as a master organiser in Stockholm. So he talked to Olof Palme. Olof Palme said, 'I'll talk to Michanek.' We had a meeting in the foreign office. Then he intended to get money from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Canadian SIDA, but that didn't work. Then it was indicated to the Dutch that we needed money. And one morning I came here, and in the mail was a cheque for $100,000 from Jan Pronk. Then Marc managed get something from the UN also.

This is how these things were organised. When they decided to organise the *What Now?* project, there was nothing new in the *What Now?*. But what was good was the way it was put together. There was no original research, although there were basic purposes and so on. But it was not a research project in the sense that the foundations wanted one to be. But it was a very excellent political summary of good thinking. And who became the principal advisors of *What Now?* It was Ahmed Ben Salah, Ignacy Sachs and Juan Somavia. We had a hell of a lot of good people here. Among them was also András Bíró. Then another fellow came, Fernando Enrique Cardoso, because he also couldn't be in Brazil. Then we had Reginald Green. But even Ibrahim Kaduna – he was the vice chancellor of the University of Dar es Salaam. That was quite a crew. Many of these were here because they couldn't operate in their own countries.

TGW: Betting on good people is always an important aspect of an institution. You said, 'Have a good cash flow of ideas.' But how do ideas matter? Specifically, how do you think they are used, or of what utility

are they? Out of all of the ideas you have produced here in Uppsala, why are they important?

SH: Well, this is such a big question. I would say that there are ideas that we have produced. There are three, actually. We have dealt a lot with education, primarily education with production. We have another thing that we have been dealing with a lot. We have had two areas where we have had an impact – maybe more – and that is health. Health is an important thing in *What Now?* Health for all was an idea that we felt. We had a very good Swede who helped us, Göran Sterky. He has been very important. He was originally a medical doctor at a hospital in Ethiopia, a paediatrician. I met him there. He had been dealing with refugees. He said, 'Sven, you know, we have to make noise about children.'

That was how the whole thing started – 'We have to make some noise about children.' So what I did then was to say, 'Couldn't we organise a meeting in cooperation with the ECA (Economic Commission on Africa) on childcare in Africa?' We contacted paediatricians from many parts of Africa, called them together in Ethiopia. They felt a great deal of self-confidence afterwards. And we published a book called *Action for Children: Towards an Optimum Childcare Package in Africa*. We had another of a similar title.

Then Sterky gained a reputation and he suddenly became head of the WHO (World Health Organisation) unit on maternal and child health. Then he came to us again and said, 'There will be a conference on health. You are in favour of alternatives. Can't you organise something?' So we organised a seminar on other developments in health.

TGW: So once an idea crystallises in a publication, it is acted upon by governments and NGOs. Are there other ways that you think that ideas make a difference? What causes an idea to be acted upon by an intergovernmental organisation, by a government, by an NGO? Is it the quality of the idea? Is it the political circumstances surrounding it? Is it the salesman who came up with the idea? What are the factors that influence the acceptance of an idea, however good?

SH: We could look at *What Now?* as an example. We had a number of good ideas, but then we were very careful in selecting people to, so to speak, promote these ideas and also internalise them, because it is not just ideas. They have to be internalised. They have to become moving forces. This I think the UN has difficulties doing, in a way, because they are country representatives, and so on. But here you can select the people, if you can just pick the right people.

You know the three systems that Marc Nerfin formalised, in his so-to-speak political philosophy? He said, 'We have to deal with the three systems. They are the princes – that is the government; the merchants – that is trade and industry; and the citizens – the civil society organisations.' If one is to really work on building ideas, one has to have people from all three systems in a reasonable mix.

Marc Nerfin and Sven Hamrell in 2002.

TGW: Then when does the UN pick up the idea?

SH: Well, it didn't pick up *What Now?* But they may.

TGW: They may?

SH: This is what is so interesting, that even if they are not picked up, they are sort of dormant. But they can come to life. That is what makes this kind of work so interesting.

TGW: Amongst all the people whom you've mentioned, and who have been associated here, as academics and practitioners, what is the balance, the most effective people with ideas in the international arena?

SH: You know the three systems that Marc Nerfin formalised, in his so-to-speak political philosophy? He said, 'We have to deal with the three systems. They are the princes – that is the government; the merchants – that is trade and industry; and the citizens – the civil society organisations.' If one is to really work then on building ideas, one has to have people from all three systems in a reasonable mix. You are thinking a little bit along these lines, aren't you?

TGW: We're hoping to. Would you say that there are thinkers or conceptualisers within all three of these groups?

SH: It is very difficult with the business people. You feel that when you read *Ahead of the Curve?*.

TGW: What is the role for academics in this enterprise?

SH: I was struck when I read *Ahead of the Curve?* that you mention very often 'the Nobel laureate,' constantly emphasising the role of the academics, in a way. I sort of like it. Do you know that there are also these economist Nobel laureates that are not so good, apart from Amartya Sen. But there is something called the Right Livelihood Foundation. It is the alternative Nobel Prize. I have been on the jury for that for many years. Actually, there are quite a number of alternative Nobel Prize winners, for instance, Patrick van Rensburg, Johan Galtung, András Bíró and Joseph Ki-Zerbo. This is quite a good collection. They are better than the economists – except Amartya Sen. But what I mean is that academics will be increasingly important. They will have an enormous importance in the future.

It was a fantastic lecture by a young fellow, Pat Mooney, whose eyesight was failing him. But he was a beautiful speaker. He spoke about the gene banks and gene depositories. I felt that this was a major issue, which was not given enough attention. So I told this fellow, 'Come to Uppsala.'

Pat Mooney in Uppsala in 2006.

I will tell you just a little story that ends in a bigger story. When I had organised a conference on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – I handed out copies all over the UN – I went to Washington to a small meeting of NGOs. There was a meeting on the power struggle for plant genetic resources. It was a fantastic lecture by a young fellow, Pat Mooney, whose eyesight was failing him. But he was a beautiful speaker. He spoke about the gene banks and gene depositories. I felt that this was a major issue, which was not given enough attention. So I told this fellow, 'Come to Uppsala.' It was the first time I saw him, but I was fascinated by his view of these things. And he came. Then I said, 'Why don't you write a book about these things?' He said, 'Yes, I will.' That was the first book on plant genetic resources that the Hammarskjöld Foundation published, *The Role of the Seed*. It was excellent. I wrote a sort of editorial introduction. Then I said, 'I have to know the academic qualifications of the author.' So I called him up and said, 'Pat, I am writing this introductory note. I must end by giving your academic qualifications.' You know what he said? 'I flunked out of high school.'

How the hell are you going to be able to manage anything in the future with all the threats coming – the ocean, and technical training, et cetera – without the academics? You need them more than ever. And the UN is behind the curve, because they haven't instilled that properly.

TGW: I thought we might return to your evaluation of the role of *Development Dialogue* in the dissemination of ideas. What is the importance of this journal, and how does it get into people's hands?

SH: I was inspired during my stay in New York when I read the *Partisan Review* and *Commentary*. I wanted somehow to establish something similar, a small magazine that had an impact on a selected number of readers whom we could provide copies free of charge. Then, of course, it was a problem of identifying those readers. We tried to find our way. Hammarskjöld was quite well-known when he died, and afterwards. So we received letters from people, and if the letters seemed interesting, we sent the journal to them. Then we also wanted to make the journal – the foundation was small and had limited resources, but we wanted to give it a sort of soul. So the journal became the sort of soul of the foundation. Without the journal, the foundation would have been just another foundation.

We could do this because there was aid money. Aid money paid for the printing. Then we could send it on His Majesty's postal service. So we could distribute it all over the world at the expense of the government. That was, of course, a great thing for us. The Hammarskjöld Founda-

tion is supposed to deal primarily with problems that confronted Hammarskjöld in the Third World. So that is why we really aimed at sending it to lead people in the Third World – policy-makers, ministers, but also civil society leaders. There weren't so many in those days as there are now. But it became a very important instrument in our activities.

We invited, for instance, Mahbub ul Haq to give a lecture here. We printed that in one of the first issues. Then Marc Nerfin came, with Ben Salah. Then we did the *What Now?* project. That was, so to speak, a contribution to a special session in the United Nations General Assembly in September of 1975. It was non-partisan – well, partisan in a way. But it was not a government contribution. It was the result of a collective reflection, primarily but not only by people from the Third World.

Then, of course, when it came to making a mailing list for *Development Dialogue*, it hit people of importance. But when we did that, we found that dissemination, generally speaking, of the ideas in *What Now?* has a very strong civil society component – dissemination was extremely important. And, of course, *Development Dialogue* couldn't do the trick. We had to also promote dissemination in wider circles. That is how we came into contact with an Italian service that was concentrated on the Third World – the Interpress Service (IPS). It became an organisation with which we cooperated.

Then what we did in addition – and here the UN comes in – the IPS found a very good Indian journalist, Chakravarti Ragavan. He was the Indian correspondent at the UN in Geneva. He started up something called 'The Special United Nations Service (SUNS),' which sent out news about what was happening in the Third World particularly all over the IPS network, and supported later by the daughter organisation to the Hammarskjöld Foundation, the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA).

So the world dissemination effort grew in a natural way out of our work. Very significantly, and not to be forgotten, is that when we presented *What Now?* to the members of this special session on Development and International Cooperation in New York, we did not have press conferences. We decided to invite a number of Third World journalists to the UN. So they came to the UN, and we paid for their hotels and we assisted them in transmitting the news to their respective countries. Ragavan was one of those who reported to India, for instance. But there were many other journalists.

This was the beginning of an effort at international dissemination of development news to the Third World in order to create, so to speak, an exchange of views between North and South. This was also reflected, of course, in the title of *Development Dialogue*. We also tried to follow this up on a governmental level. That is interesting, because we had, among the leaders of the planning group, Juan Somavia, who was active in the Andean Pact, and so on. He had a friend, whose name was Echeverria, and he was president of Mexico.

So when the proposal for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) came up, we decided that we should make a contribution to the New International Economic Order by elucidating the dissemination problematic. What happened then was that Echeverria was also interested in this, because he was also interested in the special session. We did a seminar in 1976. It was held in Mexico and had many good contributors. One of them was Juan Somavia, who spoke about the transnational power structure and international information. Then there was a fellow by the name of Fernando Reyes Marta, who spoke about the 'information bedazzlement' in Latin America. Then Chakravarti Ragavan was there and spoke about the new world communication information structure. There was also a fellow from Sri Lanka, whom I admire very greatly. His name was Fred de Silva. He was editor of the *Ceylon Daily News*, which was a leading newspaper in Sri Lanka. But he was also a little bit reluctant to embrace English: the Third World languages also had to be given prominence. So he gave a very good speech in Mexico, entitled, 'The Language of the Oracle: English as a Way of Our Dependence.'

We tried also to organise some kind of cooperation for the advancement of the development issues and the dialogue on these issues. We tried to organise some kind of foundation for that, at a meeting actually in Malta, where Gabriel Valdez came. But there was also a fellow

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

Olle Nordberg, Juan Somavia and Sven Hamrell in 2005.

who was becoming close to us, and who later has become rather well known. He is a Maltese – Michael Zammit-Cutajar. He was involved at the early stages with these problems too.

We used the *Development Dialogue* for other causes. They had not played the role that they should play, and have to play. So we developed a relationship with Marie-Angélique Savane, who was the lead feminist, in quotation marks, in Senegal. We organised a seminar in Senegal in the early 1980s on development for women. There were many very good women there. We also published a French translation, which was distributed, I think, at the second women's conference in Nairobi.

TGW: As you look at these issues of *Development Dialogue* that are stacked here, you have mentioned *What Now?* as being an important one. What are the other two or three that stick out in your mind as having made the most original contribution to ideas?

SH: I would say, in a sense, part of the idea of *Development Dialogue* was also to cut living standards a bit in industrialised countries, not to allow this constantly expanding growth. The first person who drew attention to this was Johan Galtung, the philosopher and peace researcher. Actually, we said, 'Why should Sweden become such an enormously rich, influential country? Couldn't we come down a little bit? Couldn't Sweden be shrunk?'

We thought about that, and it was quite a debate. In *What Now?* we had a chapter, 'How Much Is Enough?' Then, I think, if you ask me what stands out in my mind as important in *Development Dialogue*, it is our attack on the IMF. Because in 1980, we published material from two meetings that we organised on the International Monetary Fund, and what happened, it's effects. We tried also to call for reforms. This was done, actually, in cooperation with the government of Jamaica and Michael Manley. So we had a planning meeting in Jamaica with him and his close collaborators. The first and most important one was Norman Girvan, who was a planner. Then, of course, we decided to organise a conference on this subject, this IMF seminar.

Then other representatives came into the picture. So this caused an uproar, and I was personally afraid. I thought, 'Well, I will do it and I will be sacked, maybe. But I will take the risk.' But the quality of the seminar and the papers and recommendations was such that they had to recognise that this was an important contribution. In the end, Mahbub ul Haq wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* on global economic policies, and he quoted *Development Dialogue*. Then I knew they couldn't sack me.

TGW: That raises an interesting question. Did you ever come under pressure from the government? You mentioned that you do have an infusion of aid funds, and I presume other kinds of contributions. Was pressure ever exerted on you by the government to tow whatever line was being towed, or to behave other than you behaved?

SH: I will be perfectly frank with you. No foreign government has ever tried to influence the activities of the foundation. But when we decided to do this seminar, I was afraid. I was a little bit afraid of my own chairman. I admire my old chairman, Michanek. I think he is probably an absolutely outstanding international activist and administrator. But he is very democratic. So I suspected that he might say that if we organise this, the IMF should be heard. And we didn't want the IMF to be present, for the very simple reason that the IMF is present everywhere and you can't avoid them. We felt that for once they shouldn't be present. So then the trickiest thing I have ever done in my career – I went to the chairman, and I said, 'You know, we also want to be heard. We propose this seminar on the IMF. But we also would like to see the finances of the UN improved. Couldn't you possibly take on the task, yourself chairing a seminar on what was then popular – the automatic mobilisation of resources for development?'

So that was decided at the same time by the board – the IMF meeting and the meeting on the automatic mobilisation. And the chairman was asked to head that. Then he knew that we had so much work that he couldn't possibly get involved in the IMF thing. I told himself so, afterwards. But it is the only time that I was a little bit afraid that a government might feel that we were poking into things.

This issue of *Development Dialogue* was read in many places. It was also read carefully by Susan George, the vice chairman of Attac. And she said that 'the Hammarskjöld Foundation told me that from *Development Dialogue* when I wrote my book *A Fate Worse Than Death'*. So it had an influence, and you can see that.

Then we did a seminar on other developments in health with Debabar Banerji. That was very influential in setting the agenda for a conference on health, resulting in the Program for a Healthful World. That was a very beautiful issue of the journal. We continued this work on health in two issues on pharmaceuticals. The more philosophical one is on the developments in pharmaceuticals, which deals with the role of pharmaceuticals, both in a strictly medical sense but also in a social sense, and so on. It had as its aim the creation of a healthy pharmaceutical industry replacing the criminal organisations. We had been, of course, a little bit

afraid when we went on with the seminar on national job policies as a development priority.

TGW: You mentioned the quality of people and the quality of the work itself. Under what circumstances do you think – assuming you have good, quality people and decent quality work – that publications such as *Development Dialogue*, or the ideas that are in *Development Dialogue*, under what circumstances do they have the most impact? do people pick them up? are governments, NGOs, and others, particularly prone to what you have to say and do something with them?

SH: I am not so sure about governments, but I know, for instance, that foundations sometimes read *Development Dialogue*. We asked for money from one of the big American foundations for a seminar on the People's Health Assembly. A representative of the foundation replied, 'No book has meant more to me than your book on an optimum childcare package for Africa. You can be sure that we will support you.' But I don't have any examples of the governments, except when it comes to Nyerere. But of course, he felt that we were underpinning his stand.

TGW: My guess is that Ujamaa, in Sweden, is probably not a very good idea to try to sell. But you mentioned the importance of information sharing and journalism and communications in the Third World, and the foundation has spent a lot of time on that. I think one of the ideas that some people would say was one of the worst ideas of all time grew out of some of this, that is the New International Information Order (NIIO). How do you look back on that period?

SH: We were not instrumental in promoting the New International Information Order. We wanted to develop the more development-oriented ideas. But, of course, we did agree that there was a need for a new information order, not a New International Information Order. That, of course, we never wanted – we wanted free exchange of views. Others feared it was used to oppress a free press.

TGW: That's right, it was the control of information, making sure you have the right kind of information, not access to information.

SH: But that has been against the Hammarskjöld Foundation from time immemorial, ever since we started. Sweden has an almost unique constitution where freedom of access to public documents is guaranteed. Sweden was never in favour of any kind of controlled information.

TGW: What about the New International Economic Order? How do you look back on that? You mention this as being one of the key documents. Do you think we will come back to the New International Economic Order, or is this something that was a cute historical artefact, and we won't see it again?

SH: We would like to see a great economic equality. We said that we would like to reduce consumption in Sweden: it was also partly because we wanted these goods to go to the Third World in our aid programmes, preferably multilateral aid programmes. But we saw sometimes that they did not work, so we felt that maybe we should show how they should work.

TGW: I wonder if we could take a different tack for a moment and look at one of the important transmission belts for us for ideas: global ad hoc conferences. I wonder whether we could just go back a moment to Stockholm in 1972. I think we are not the only ones who see this as launching a kind of a new emphasis on the environment, or the environment and development, but also launching a whole period of conferences in which different problems came up. So I wondered whether you could tell us what your own judgment is on global ad hoc conferences, and perhaps using the Stockholm meeting as one illustration of when these things work and when they fall flat.

SH: Recently, as you know, since 1995, I haven't been so intimately involved in the foundation activities. But I would say that one such ad hoc conference that must have been important was the WHO conference in Alma Ata. That I think was an important conference. It was important partly because it was so carefully prepared, and it was a truly global conference. This is the one that comes to mind for me, but this is of course because I have been involved in other particular things and I have not been able to follow properly.

I think the world is confronting an enormously critical situation, particularly with genetic problems and the rapid technical transformation going on and the corporate concentration. A world conference on this subject is really needed. But if it is to be successful, you must have a UN organisation that really works. As Brian Urquhart says, 'All the UN agencies should be in the same place, and they should be cooperative.' Unless you have a structure of that sort, a special session will not meet the needs of the times. But still I would like to see a special session on this subject.

TGW: I wondered if we could just go back, because you mentioned Marc Nerfin a lot, and also the importance of meetings before Stockholm, and how the notion, which is quite commonplace today, of a link between

levels of development, and sustainability, and protection of the environment. When this idea first got off the ground, it was really much more oriented towards conservation of resources, stopping pollution. How do you recall that set of ideas being developed before Stockholm? I think most people point to Founex.

SH: Founex was key. It was Marc's idea. I think Maurice Strong did not think quite along the lines of Marc on this issue. I think he was right in emphasising the centralised nature of development. Of course, the environment – that came in just as a little thing. Development should be economically sound.

Do you know that the number of citizen organisations has increased at a tremendous rate? I think it is one of the truly significant developments in the world – one of the few things that make you hopeful.

TGW: Part of that process is the role of civil society, and within Stockholm or other meetings, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). How, precisely, do you believe that civil society and NGOs have contributed to the world of ideas? What has been their role, side by side with the UN system, in pushing ideas and concepts?

SH: In Sweden civil societies have played an extremely important role during the past 100 years. So we have popular associations, civil society organisations of different kinds – agriculture, professional – that played a very important role. That's why I liked Marc. He was such a free-wheeling person that he was excommunicated from the Communist Party. That's why he went to Tunis and became a high school teacher. At the same time, he knew – he had worked at the post office in Geneva – he knows what ordinary work is like. And his wife was also an activist. She's famous, because she's a character in a book by an American writer, Erdman: *The Crash of 1989*, or something. It's a famous sort of thing. There is a woman there who throws, I don't know, a bottle or something at the Shah of Iran when he comes to the Geneva airport. So Marc had that kind of background. But at the same time, he was a true Swiss democrat. He's thoroughly democratic.

TGW: Do you see a growing role for civil society?

SH: Yes. At an early time the state and the governments were the important things. But at the Stockholm Conference, there were NGOs. They were in the meeting, and they also had a forum outside. Now we have to see that all social actors can participate. That's when Marc developed this idea of the prince, the merchant and the citizen. And they all have to cooperate, they have to come together in meetings of all sorts. Do you know that the number of citizen organisations has increased at a tremendous rate? I think it is one of the truly significant developments in the world – one of the few things that make you hopeful.

TGW: One of the other techniques that we are interested in exploring your views about concerns the role of eminent commissions, or the role of visible groups of people coming together around an idea. We could take the Stockholm Conference and the Club of Rome report, or subsequently the Brundtland Report on the same sort of topic. Or you mentioned at dinner yesterday Pearson and Brandt and a whole series of reports. Do these matter? If they matter, what makes them important? When do they have an impact?

SH: I think they matter. In a sense, one thing about *Ahead of the Curve?* is that it is the first time I have seen an attempt to gather the ideas developed in these reports and turn them into a part, maybe, of the university curriculum. Only by doing that, if you achieve that objective, will you have a great impact on developments in the future. But when I think about things, also, somehow these groups are still rather small. There are many, but the number of participants in a group is not so big. I don't know how to handle this. The Hammarskjöld Foundation is strong, in a way, in influencing thinking because of the network. But I would like to see more organisations like us.

TGW: These reports of eminent commissions are a little different. You get people with household recognition. If we look at the Brandt Report, Willy Brandt, a former German chancellor, and people on it like Sonny Ramphal and Ted Heath, looking at a topic like development. But the question is whether visible groups of people, focusing on an issue, have a greater impact than large numbers of people looking at the same issue.

SH: I am afraid that visible groups are without very much influence.

TGW: I was curious that when the Hammarskjöld Foundation wanted to look at a particular issue – UN reform – you didn't choose a large group of people. You chose Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers.

SH: And Stéphane Hessel.

TGW: In some ways, perhaps the impact of a couple of ideas in those reports has gone farther toward implementation than ideas by large groups of people. Why did you choose this vehicle of Brian and Erskine getting together?

SH: Because we knew them. I hate to say this, but I believe a little bit in the role of families.

TGW: In Brian Urquhart's interview on this topic, he actually said it was important to have fewer people. One, it was cost-effective. Two, they could also write things in a sharper fashion. But three, the factor that he pointed to that was most consequential was trying to get the report into the hands of a few people who mattered, and therefore sponsoring a set of discussions in capitals in New York was probably the most important element in his dissemination and discussion strategy.

In looking at the United Nations system over your own lifetime, which people stick out as having been particularly important to the world of ideas about economic and social development? And which particular Secretaries-General, in your view, pushed development, and why?

SH: I would say that Hammarskjöld was unique. He was an economist and a mystic and a very good historian. He was very well aware of the family traditions. Also, he was not in agreement in every respect with Palme. Then, I think, Ralph Bunche must be considered an extraordinarily important person, because of his wide knowledge and his unpretentious behaviour. He came here also. He was a remarkable person. Then, a person I liked a lot was Prince Saddrudin Aga Khan. He wrote for *Development Dialogue* also, his critical views on nuclear power. He was in charge of a group on that in Switzerland. These are people I worked with. I also admire Kofi Annan.

TGW: That's sort of at the pinnacle of the international system. At a more working level, do you have any impressions about the quality of the international civil service? How do you compare them with your own colleagues at the foundation and the academic world here in Sweden?

SH: I haven't seen too many. I have told you about my friend Peter O'Malley from Ghana. He was an absolutely outstanding civil servant, absolutely. Also those I worked with in the ECA. Then, of course, I guess Richard Jolly. He's quite an important figure. I never met Brad Morse, for instance. He was for a long time in the ILO (International Labour Organisation). And Gilbert Jaeger in UNHCR, he was also very good. Conor Cruise O'Brien – but he's a bit on the mad side. He was an early person, but I don't go for these theories about Hammarskjöld that he holds, you know.

Hans Blix at the occasion of his Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2005.



Alva Myrdal – she was very able in the UN. And Gunnar Myrdal. They were very able. Hans Blix, who was a schoolmate of mine. He's a nice fellow. Mary Robinson, I think. But you know, she came here actually when she was in the government, as president of Ireland. She said, 'I want to go to the Hammarskjöld Foundation.' She is an able person.

She could be Secretary-General, maybe. There is a need for a woman to be Secretary-General, but she has to be very strong.

One person whom I know also is Martti Ahtisaari. I have known him for 40 years. He is very able. But he is also at a high level.

TGW: I wondered if you might say a few things about Sweden's role in the North-South dialogue, or the so-called North-South dialogue, in bridging capacity. What was the significance of not just Sweden, but the like-minded countries who tried to play this role in bridging the most extreme parts of the North, the West, and the more extreme parts of the South?

SH: We played a role, as you know. There was a lot of talk about the Like-Minded Countries in the *What Now?* context, of course. The chairman of the board of the foundation for many years, Michanek, played a very important role because he listened to people and he had a good mind. So he played a role. And, of course, Olof Palme played an important role. Everybody knew about Olof Palme. And Sweden played a role in Chile because we had a very good ambassador. Harald Edelstam saved many, many Chileans from execution. And, of course, Alva Myrdal played an important role, also, when it came to the Third World issues and bridge-building. Alva Myrdal was important in that respect. But, of course, Palme's successor, also. He had great support in Swedish public opinion, because we felt that we had developed so well that we owed the world a debt. We should do something. So in those days, it was fun to be a Swede.

TGW: To use Nerfin's image, what about the merchant in all of this? It seems to me that certainly the disappearance of the Cold War has made the market a far more important variable in development discourse and in government policy. How do you look back on the 1980s and the 1990s, and the infatuation with market forces? Isn't this one big element that has come out of the Cold War?

SH: I don't have much contact with the merchants. I come from a peasant family, and we have not been involved in industrial activities up north very much, except for up north in mining. I would like to reach the merchants more. Actually, we should do that. But it is not easy for me. There are some good merchants. There was a banker, the head of the biggest bank here. He was a great admirer of Hammarskjöld. He reads *Development Dialogue* religiously and he writes every time he gets a new issue. So there are a few merchants who are people you can really respect and want to be with. But I have very few contacts with them.

TGW: Actually, how has your own thinking about development changed over the last half century? How did you look upon development at the outset of your career and how do you look at it now? What has changed most in your thinking?

SH: We have not spoken about that, but I think, so to speak, intellectual assistance will increase in importance. For instance, at the Hammarskjöld Foundation we have a programme in support of indigenous publishing in Africa. I don't think we can build roads and so on. They have to do that for themselves in Africa. But we have developed a loan guarantee programme for indigenous African publishers in Kenya. We were also promoting the freedom of the press in Southern Africa. One organisation, MISA (Media Institute for Southern Africa) is devoted to safeguarding the freedom of the press. Then, of course, we have to see to it that the genetic resources of Africa are protected and properly utilised. Personally, I would like to see a closer relationship with the development of foundations in Africa, like the Nyerere Foundation and other foundations.

TGW: So your own views about the role of basic needs, or the social factors in development, were primary at the outset. That was a minority view at one point, but it became a majority view. And now it seems to have slipped out of favour again.

SH: Yes. I am in favour of assistance for habitat and health and food, and so on. But our contribution must be, so to speak, intellectually stimulating about resource-providing. I am not so sure that it is much use sending volunteers into the bush.

TGW: What about your own views toward the role of the state as a factor in development in the Third World? Has that evolved at all over the last half-century – the role of the state, the appropriate role of the state, the appropriate balance between the state and the private sector?

SH: I have not been up against these problems in this practical way. I am a little bit reluctant to enter into these things. I would like to see people building the social development section of the ECA. They will go into business and build something like this. But should we?

TGW: I totally agree. You know that Bernard Chidzero's children are mainly in the private sector, after Bernard spent his life by running ministries of finance.

SH: But you are suggesting actually an interesting project for the Hammarskjöld Foundation – the princes and the merchants.

TGW: You might get Nerfin out of retirement to come back and do this!

SH: We tried, of course, a little bit on urban development in Lesotho, and so on. But there are these new things, also now, with genetics and the power struggle between the big industries. They are really looking for medicine plants everywhere in Africa. Personally, I would like to see the OAU get a very good director succeeding Salim Salim. I think regional efforts are very important, because New York cannot run things. The regional organisations will be increasingly important.

TGW: Yes. But I mainly look at the security around them, and the economic and social as well.

SH: It is obvious that the UN has to have stronger leadership. The UN has to be reorganised, and how do you go about that? You make people think, and think, and think. In the end, they might try to find out their own way. But on the other hand, I think that our little booklet, *A World in Need of Leadership,* puts the issues rather well. I am a little bit proud of that. It was so difficult – all the things the secretary handles, the very curious way in which he is elected, and then the heads of the departments moving in all directions uncontrolled. This is a very curious situation. I was wondering – would you like to see regional organisations considerably strengthened, with the agencies more or less concentrated in cabinet fashion?

TGW: That's what I would want if I were redesigning it myself. And that volume of yours that looks back at the origins of the system. It is in *A World In Need of Leadership*, and looks at the importance of a somewhat more structured, centralised system. It seems so obvious, but at the same time it seems so politically unrealistic at this juncture. One of the things that I think does come out in *Ahead of the Curve?* is the fact that strengthening civil society and citizens, and strengthening the merchants are important tasks. But the role, not so much of the princes but of the 'inter-princes', the intergovernmental system, is indeed crucial, and it's the part of the debate that is always set aside. So I think presently folks are quite enchanted with the notion of the market solving lots of problems, and proliferating NGOs solving social problems. Too little thought is given to this other leg of the stool, which is seemingly getting shorter and shorter, while the other ones are getting longer. The balance is not right.

The Vindication of Triviality

My Relationship with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Manfred Max-Neef

The Story

Tiradentes is a small town in the interior of the state of Minas Gerais in Brazil. There I stayed for three of my 12 years of exile from the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. Although my family could visit me occasionally, I was mostly alone, as is normally the case with exiles, because lack of stability and resources preclude travelling with family.[1]

The state of Minas Gerais was of great importance during colonial times, mainly due to its enormous mineral wealth. It gave rise to cities of opulence and culture, as well as a concentration of highly talented plastic artists, architects and musicians. Many of these cities have deteriorated quite considerably over the years, but several still contain invaluable treasures and traditions from the 17th century. Tiradentes is one of them. Being small, and despite its original splendour, it slowly vanished into oblivion. During the last century it decayed, yet survived, in almost total isolation. It was in the late 1960s that Tiradentes was rediscovered, because of a new highway built in the vicinity. Paradoxically, it was the town's impoverishment and isolation that allowed most of its architecture and artistic treasures, as well as traditional institutions, to be preserved, their evident decay notwithstanding. It thus represented a magnificent case and opportunity for revitalisation.

There I was. There I was supposed to live, not knowing for how long, and not quite understanding why destiny had brought me there. As a consequence, I felt lonely. Loneliness, as I realised during the first few months in my new and unplanned locality, can be very devastating. Despite the beauty of the surroundings, the charm of the colonial

1 My Tiradentes story, which is quite fascinating, is half of my book *From the Outside Looking In: Experiences in Barefoot Economics* published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in 1982, and later by ZED Books in Britain.

architecture and the kindness of the people, I could not avoid a certain degree of depression. The fact that you feel that you just have to be in a place where you do not belong; in a place which never was part of your image of a future, is indeed tough, no matter how attractive that place might be if you were a tourist. I was reminded of those whom, in my many years of field experience, I had seen crack up, sometimes with dramatic consequences, because they could not take it. So I decided that I had to build up my self-defences. What I did was simply to persuade myself that, instead of suffering an enforced loneliness, I was undergoing voluntary solitude. As I have told in my book,[2]

> I achieved this by repeating the idea over and over again to myself, especially before going to sleep. I even went as far as to give loneliness a concrete form, turning her into a *dramatis persona* and staging an act between her and myself. I talked in a loud voice, as if to a living interlocutor, and proposed a truce: I would draw the most positive elements out of her presence, thus dignifying her existence; she, in turn, would let me go as unharmed as possible. This small yet important psychological game worked wonders, and I soon felt very much at ease with, and drew inspiration from, my newly acquired solitude.



WolfgangSchmidt

Manfred Max-Neef in 2010.

I began working with increasing enthusiasm on the project I had designed, together with two young couples, for the revitalisation of Tiradentes.[3] The days were full of action, and the evenings, when solitude became more omnipresent, were full of mathematics. In fact, I could immerse myself for hours, and sometimes for the whole night, in that magnificent and limitless world of mathematical speculation.

It was then, actually almost one year after my arrival, that I received an invitation from the Bariloche Foundation in Argentinian Patagonia, to attend an international seminar on 'The Concept of Time'. I was quite amazed by an evident synchronicity. In fact, at that time, I had been working on a mathematical model to explain the phenomenon of *déjà vu*.[4] Hence, I accepted the invitation because I felt I had something to contribute. Never could I have imagined that my decision to travel to Patagonia would dramatically change and determine the direction of the rest of my life. I was on the way to a new and totally unexpected destiny.

The organisers of the seminar had booked for the participants a very nice hotel in the beautiful city of Bariloche. However, since the sessions

2 Ibid.

3 The whole story of the Project is part of the book mentioned in previous footnotes.

4 *Déja vu* occurs when. given a certain event. we have the sensation we have through exactly that same event before.

were to be held in Llao-Llao, 25 kilometres away, we were transported by bus. The first morning I was one of the first to climb aboard the bus. Others followed, sitting in different places, until a gentleman sat next to me. He stretched out his hand to introduce himself: 'I am Sven Hamrell from Sweden.' I replied: 'I am Manfred Max-Neef from Chile, but living in Brazil.' He asked why I was living in Brazil, and I told him that I was in exile from Chile's dictatorship. This gave rise to a long conversation. He asked more and more questions. I was surprised that instead of feeling that my privacy had been invaded by a stranger, I liked what I felt was a truly and genuine interest on his part. At the end of the day, on our way back, we sat together again, and the conversation full of questions continued. I felt that I had never said or confessed so many things about myself, and I began to like it. He was clever enough to pose questions that plumbed the depth of my experiences, motivations, inclinations and beliefs. In fact, he got so much information out of me, I sometimes had the feeling I was undergoing some sort of introspective analysis in the hands of an unusually able psychotherapist. We ended up in the hotel where we continued our dialogue for another couple of hours while drinking good wine. This situation was repeated over the whole three days of the seminar. At the end, I became aware that, at that stage, there was hardly anyone in the world who knew so much and, especially, so many things about me as this Sven Hamrell, who turned out to be the director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Uppsala, Sweden, an institution for which I had enormous admiration because of its philosophy, its programmes in the Southern world and its publications

The last night we were sitting in his room drinking whatever there was in the minibar. At about one o'clock with his clear and loud voice he exclaimed: 'Well, you will go to Sweden!!' 'What?' I asked. 'Yes,' he repeated, 'you will go to Sweden, and we will take care of everything.' I just could not believe what I was hearing, and asked once again, 'What do you mean?' He answered: 'Well, we have a Programme entitled *From the Village to a Global Order,* and you will fit into that.' I asked, 'And what am I supposed to do?' 'Well', he said again, 'you will sit down and write. Yes, write everything you have told me. That is all you will do, write.'

There I was, an exile without any clear future, experiencing the most unexpected and unimaginable event. It was like being a lost and hopeless person in the middle of a desert, realising that suddenly an archangel was descending in order to carry one away to safety. I was a full person again, in control of my life and with a concrete and challenging project ahead.

Gerd Ericsson

Lotta Elfström



Being aware of its enormous and well-deserved prestige throughout most of the Southern World, I could hardly believe that it was all the product of just five and a half people working together.

A few months later, in May 1981, I arrived in Uppsala, and was introduced by Sven Hamrell to the other members of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation: Olle Nordberg, Lotta Elfström, Gerd Ericson, Kerstin Kvist and Daniel von Sydow. Having been an admirer of the Foundation´s development philosophy and work, and being aware of its enormous and well-deserved prestige throughout most of the Southern World, I could hardly believe that it was all the product of just five and a half people working together (von Sydow worked half-time). It was for me a confirmation of the efficiency that can be achieved through organized smallness. The absence of bureaucracy, combined with frantic work, frightening deadlines and a frequent atmosphere of highly creative chaos, amounted to the most stimulating human environment I could have expected.[5]

The fact that I was granted the privilege of using Dag Hammarskjölds personal desk to write my book provided the final touch of quality.

I began my work with tremendous enthusiasm, especially after my wife arrived to stay with me. Her presence was that of a wonderful comrade to whose nightly critical scrutiny all my daily writings were subjected. The result after five months was my book, *From the Outside Looking In: Experiences in Barefoot Economics*. For the book, I chose two stories. The first is about the miseries of Indian and black peasants in the Sierra and coastal jungle of Ecuador. The second deals with the miseries of craftsmen and artisans in a small region of Brazil. The former is, in a way, the story of a success that failed. The latter is, in a way, the story of a failure that succeeded. Both refer to a people's quest for self-reliance. Both are lessons in economics as practised at the human scale. And both were part of the experiences that Sven Hamrell extracted from me in those three days and nights of our Patagonian dialogue.

The book was published by the foundation in 1982, and was very well received by members of the international development community. Its success was such, that two years later it was republished by ZED Books in Britain as a classic. My participation in the stories related in the book was decisive for the jury of the Right Livelihood Foundation to grant me its award ('the Alternative Nobel Prize') in 1983, while I was, after leaving Uppsala, working in poverty-stricken areas of southern Mexico. This was just the beginning of an enormous list of events that followed in my new life.

5 From the Prelude of *From the Outside Looking In*.

After receiving the award, and despite the fact that the dictatorship persisted, I decided to return to Chile, on the assumption that the international notoriety of the prize would be a protection. Although most doors were closed to me, I was not directly disturbed. Hence, with the money I had received from the award, I founded the Development Alternatives Centre (CEPAUR), which received recognition and support from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation that allowed me to hire two fine professionals, Antonio Elizalde, sociologist and Martín Hopenhayn, philosopher, who were jobless for political reasons. We proposed a project to establish the principles of what we called Human Scale Development, and received the financial support of our Swedish friends. We managed to attract interesting intellectuals from Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and Sweden, and organised three seminars in order to elaborate the ideas. The first was in Chilean Patagonia, the second in the north of Brazil and the last in Uppsala. The final report gave rise to the publication, in Spanish first and later in English, of *Desarrollo a Escala Humana* (*Human Scale Development*). The Spanish version was widely distributed to all the Latin American contacts of the Hammarskjöld Foundation. The positive impact it had was beyond our wildest expectations. As a matter of fact, as we found out after the first year, it was almost certainly the most photocopied document in Latin America. We had the experience during our fieldwork of arriving in remote peasant or Indian communities and being approached by some community member with an almost unreadable photocopy of a photocopy of a photocopy of *Human Scale Development* in order to discuss with us whether they were properly adapting the principles in their development efforts. Such experiences were moving and fascinating. The interest in *Human Scale Development* has been constantly increasing ever since. Over 500,000 pages can be found on Google both in Spanish and in English. Furthermore, in 2009 it was declared by Cambridge University to be one of the 50 most important books in the world about sustainability.[6] There are innumerable local development projects of all over the world applying the principles and methodologies of Human Scale Development. It is here to stay, and, not only that, it is seriously being considered in many parts as a strong alternative to neoliberal monetarism. A research project is presently being carried out by two academics at the Universidad Austral de Chile in order to establish the diversity of Human Scale Development initiatives in different parts of the world, as well as all the publications that it has given rise to.

It was thanks to the foundation that my work – not only that described and produced under its auspices but also my earlier output – became

6 See Wayne Visser, (2009), 'The Top 50 Sustainability Books', Cambridge and Sheffield: University of Cambridge and Greenleaf Publishing.

widely known, with extremely interesting and stimulating consequences for me and for those working in my team. International invitations, recognitions, honours and memberships in important institutions have not ceased – quite the contrary – over the last 25 years.

Of particular interest is the fact that my ideas and the vision of development that the CEPAUR team generated had an impact in post-dictatorship Chilean society, especially among the young and among groups feeling left out by conventional politics. This situation led a number of such groups (youth, women, indigenous cultures, copper labour unions and environmentalists) to invite me to become a presidential candidate in the elections of 1994. It was one of the craziest and most wonderful decisions I have taken in my life. I was nothing less than a presidential candidate, but without a political party and without a penny. We went ahead, and the whole experience was really moving. There were voluntary collaborators all over the country, and people collecting money in every town and city I visited during my tours as a candidate in order to pay for my lodging and transportation. For me to become an official candidate, we had to collect 53,000 signatures from voters, as long as they were not members of a political party. According to the existing law, if more than five per cent of the signatures belonged to members of a party, all the signatures were invalidated. We thought that this was just a matter of requesting the information for each collected signature from the electoral tribunal. It was then that we discovered that such information was secret. The only alternative was for each person who gave his/her signature to simultaneously sign a paper under oath to the effect that no membership existed, and if it did they resigned as a member of the political party by that act. Each one of these declarations had to be legalised by a notary public. It is not difficult to imagine the colossal work that this entailed, and the immense amount of money that 53,000 legalisations required. As incredible as it may sound, this task was achieved thanks to hundreds of volunteers, and thanks also to the fact that there were a few notaries who wanted me as a candidate and didn't charge for their services. In the process I was caricatured and ridiculed and told I would never make it. The national surprise was incredible when the day came when our signatures were officially recognised by the tribunal as legitimate. Now I was an official candidate. The election came, and the next national surprise was that I got half a million votes, and that many of our electoral themes, such as the environment and indigenous rights, have become permanent components of the Chilean political agenda

What has to be pointed out about this political experience, apart from the fact that it was magnificent and absolutely unusual, is that it was

only possible because of the ideas and philosophy that sustained the candidacy. And those ideas and philosophy were the product of my existential adventure with the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.

Many more things began to happen in my post-Uppsala life. As to memberships: member of the Club of Rome (now honorary member); member of the New York Academy of Sciences; member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts; fellow of the Schumacher Society in England; member of the Leopold Kohr Academy of Sciences, Salzburg, Austria; member of the editorial council of the *International Journal of Ecological Economics*; member of the editorial board of the journal *Environmental Values*; member councillor of the World Future Council, Germany; rector (vice-chancellor) of the Universidad Austral de Chile between 1994 and 2002; and presently director of the Economics Institute of the same university.

In terms of honours and distinctions: Right Livelihood Award ('Alternative Nobel Prize') in 1983; with my colleagues Antonio Elizalde and Martín Hopenhayn, the National Prize for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights in 1987, granted by a group of Chilean institutions fighting against the dictatorship; gold medal for academic merit from the University of Manizales, Colombia; gold medal for academic merit from the University of Santiago de Cali, Colombia; Award of Highest Honour, from Soka University, Japan; Grand Officer of the Order of the Sun of Carabobo, Venezuela; doctor *honoris causa*, University of Jordan; degree *honoris causa*, University of Antioquia, Colombia; doctor *honoris causa*, Universidad del Litoral, Argentina; doctor *honoris causa*, Saint Francis University, United States; Kenneth Boulding Award, highest award granted by the International Society of Ecological Economics; gold medal for scientific merit granted by the government of the region of Los Rios, Chile.

In addition and as mentioned earlier, my book *Human Scale Development* was declared by Cambridge University to be one of the world's top 50 books on sustainability. Routledge in England published a book edited by David Simon, *Fifty Key Thinkers on Development,*[7] which includes me as one of them in a list that includes, among others, Malthus, Marx and Myrdal. Furthermore, I am included in the book *Visionaries: The 20th Century's 100 most Important Inspirational Leaders*.[8]

7 D. Simon (ed.) (2006), *Fifty Key Thinkers on Development*, London: Routledge.

8 S. Kumar and F. Whitefield, (2006), *Visionaries: The 20th Century's 100 most Important Inspirational Leaders*, London, Chelsea Green Publishing.

Final Reflection

Ever since I left Uppsala in the summer of 1981, I have returned almost every year to visit those I call my Uppsala family, that is, the old members of the foundation. Last year I was sitting with Sven Hamrell, whom I regard as my brother, as usual drinking some good Chilean wine. I told him what I had already told him several times:

> What would my life have been if that day, in Patagonia, you would have sat on another seat of the bus? I would certainly not be here dinking and chatting with you. I would not have been a presidential candidate in my country. I would not have written the books I wrote. I wouldn't have done any of the things I did after coming to Uppsala.

'Obviously', I went on, 'I would have done other things and my life would have been a different life. A better one? I absolutely doubt it. The life you made possible for me is the best I could ever think of. You are more than a brother to me!!' With that, we embraced and had another drink, but this time in honour of triviality.

This is the most important message I can draw from my life. The colossal importance triviality can have. The fascinating thing about it is that one can never know, except *post facto*, whether an absolutely trivial event or moment will turn out to have been transcendental. Some call it 'the right place at the right moment'. Fine, but one only knows after sufficient time has passed whether that really was the right place at the right moment. Hence, what we should learn is that every minute, every moment is important in our lives. That is precisely the magic of life. And I shall remain permanently grateful to Sven Hamrell and the magnificent institution he headed for having made me aware of that magic of life.


TH
SIDE
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IN
XPERIENCES IN 'BAREFOOT ECONOMI
ANFRED A MAX-NEE

The Foundation in the Wooden House

Louis Emmerij

The location of an Organization is important. Most are located in impersonal buildings of steel and glass. In some, very few indeed, you feel the vestige of a presence of the past. The House in which the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been located since 1965 - a few years after its inception 50 years ago - is one of those very rare places where one gets the distinct impression that creative people have lived and worked here.

Ever since I entered the modest House, almost 40 years ago, I felt this presence. It is as if one enters in a different atmosphere where a lighter and more creative ambiance exists compared to other places. This atmosphere is stimulated by the castle on the hill where Dag Hammarskjöld's father was Governor and Dag was raised. It is also enhanced by the lovely garden in the back of the House. In short, the House is made for creative work and for scholars who want to concentrate on writing and reflecting. It was only later that I learned that this old wooden building served for over 200 years as the private residence of several of Sweden's most important scholars among whom we find Erik Gustaf Geijer whose liberal ideas and international outlook have had a great impact on the development of modern Swedish society. Their ghosts still have a positive influence.

The House is in Uppsala, a lovely, small city with a well-known University and good research centers. Dag Hammarskjöld studied at the University of Uppsala and each day as he descended from the Castle to go to his studies he passed the House.

The first time I was in touch with the Foundation was in the middle of the 1970s when it published *What Now* in its journal *Development Dialogue*[1]. I was then working as Director of the ILO World Employment Programme, which was responsible for the preparation of the 1976 World Employment Conference. We had chosen the concept of basic needs as the focus of the Conference and had prepared a first draft

1 The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Report, *What Now, Another Development*, prepared at the occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Uppsala, 1975.

of the main document towards the middle of 1975, which gave us a year to discuss the concept worldwide and to improve the document.

It was at that time that we received *What Now* and immediately, right from the introductory chapter, we recognized that we had brothers in arms in Sweden because the concept of basic needs, although differently worked out as compared to our approach, was clearly recognizable. That Report was prepared under the direction of the unforgettable Marc Nerfin of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA) in Nyon, Switzerland, and went through many reprints and languages. It would have been the bestseller of the 1970's if the document had been for sale but it was distributed free of charge like all the admirable issues of *Development Dialogue* till this very day.

For people of my generation working on economic and social development issues this was the moment when we discovered the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF), the House, the low key but oh so astute long serving director Sven Hamrell, and the small team of delightful and capable people around him.

The Foundation organized seminars and invited excellent but not-so-conventional scholars to discuss and write about development topics that it thought would become burning issues of the future. These were often treated outside of the mainstream of scholarship. In the case of *What Now* this was very good, but in later times it got the Foundation in trouble when mainstream development strategies hardened in the 1980s and beyond, strategies, it must be said, that got the entire world in trouble during the 2007-2012-and counting crisis.

I have always defended the importance of examining alternatives to conventional wisdom and so the Foundation's work has attracted my attention ever since those days of the 1970s. I came frequently to the House whenever I was invited to inspire myself with fresh air and ideas. And each time as a bonus I enjoyed the atmosphere in the House, the castle, and the city.

But the moment I got again heavily involved with the Foundation was when I was Co-Director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) – together with Richard Jolly and Thomas Weiss. UNIHP lasted 11 years (1999-2010) and was an independent effort, based at the Graduate Center of City University of New York, to identify and evaluate the policy ideas launched by the UN system of Organizations. It was a history of ideas in the true sense of the word. We undertook it because to our surprise such a history did neither

exist for the individual UN Organizations nor for the UN system as a whole. What did exist was an institutional history here and there, but not a history of ideas, not an intellectual history. UNIHP produced a series of books on specific topics (development strategies, international assistance, transnational corporations, human rights, global governance, etc.) on the one hand and oral history interviews with people who have played a role in stimulating ideas or hindering them.

This was therefore an ambitious and complicated Project and we were very happy when the Foundation invited us to discuss the Project in Uppsala early on. Between 2001 and 2003 three review sessions were held at the DHF at Uppsala and they were all of great use to the authors and the Co-Directors of the Project. The first session took place in June 2001 and gathered the International Advisory Council of UNIHP. This meeting was important in that it reviewed the topics for which volumes were to be written as well as the persons to be selected for oral history interviews. Member of the International Advisory Council present were Margaret Joan Anstee, Lourdes Arizpe, Enrique Iglesias, Andres Inotai, Thandika Mkandawire, Gert Rosenthal, Makoto Taniguchi and Ramesh Thakur.

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

The second session was held in June 2002 at which four volumes were examined. Final review sessions were held for *UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice* by Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai and Frederic Lapeyre and *The UN and Global Political Economy – Trade, Finance, and Development* by John Toye and Richard Toye. At that meeting we also reviewed preliminary outlines for *The UN and Transnational Corporations – from Code of Conduct to Global Compact* by Tagi Sagafi-nejad and John Dunning and *Development without Destruction – the UN and Global Resource Management* by Nico Schrijver. Joining the authors and UNIHP staff in the reviews were the director of DHF Olle Nordberg, the former director Sven Hamrell, DHF staff member Niclas Hällstrom, J. Ann Tickner, Graciana del Castillo, Rhames Thakur, Olav Stokke and Arthur Westing. Margaret Joan Anstee provided detailed comments on the Jolly et al volume.

In 2003 the UNIHP International Advisory Council gathered again in Uppsala to review the progress of the Project as a whole. Moreover two volumes were examined more specifically, namely *The UN and Transnational Corporations* and *The UN and Development – from Aid to Cooperation* by Olav Stokke.

I have gone into some detail here because these three meetings constituted an important investment for the Foundation and have been a great help to UNIHP. This has been an 11-year Project that produced 17 volumes and 79 oral history interviews.[2] The Foundation has been of invaluable help to get the Project on the right track and to keep it there. It also represents a good case study of how the Foundation works by not only stimulating unorthodox ventures but also new work that had not been tried before.

And that is not all: when we produced the final synthesis volume of the Project – *UN Ideas that Changed the World* by Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss – Henning Melber, the third executive director of the Foundation, organized a series of dissemination conferences in Uppsala and Stockholm where we met politicians, civil servants, academics, and NGO representatives to discuss critically this final report and its findings. And so the Foundation has been involved in this pioneering project from beginning to end.[3] It may be in order to show some results of UNIP to let the reader decide whether or not the Foundation was right to support the Project. I have therefore attached two annexes with general and specific conclusions respectively.

2 For details, see the website of the Project www.unhistory.org

3 In annexes 1 and 2 some of the conclusions of UNHP are presented



For me the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been a friend through the atmosphere of and in the House.

For me the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been a friend through the atmosphere of and in the House and through the three directors I have known, Sven Hamrell, Olle Nordberg, and Henning Melber. They are people with different personalities but have one characteristic in common: they believe in dialogue and in examining alternatives, as witnessed in the DHF journal *Development Dialogue*. I have been reading this journal for the last 40 years and have admired its independent and truly interdisciplinary voice. It reminds me of the UNCTAD's "Trade and Development Report" which also has come up with its own opinions that frequently went against the orthodoxy of the day. Both have been criticized but both frequently have been proven right afterwards. In the case of UNCTAD this has been true for their critique of the economic and financial orthodoxy of the 1980s and 1990s that exploded in the crisis of 2007-to-the-present. In the case of DHF it has been true for their emphasis on basic needs that continues its trajectory through the human development approach (initiated in the UN), their early warnings about the ecological problem, and many other issues such as crimes against humanity.

I was there in the wooden House when evaluations of the Foundation came in that were very critical of its work and activities. I have not known the details of the reason and of the content of the negative appraisals but I only hope that they were not focused on the unorthodox approach that the Foundation has always maintained. Every country must have an institute where current orthodoxies are critically examined lest routine and neglect set in. Obviously, even the search for alternatives and the identification of new ways of dealing with old problems can become routine and every institution must therefore be shaken up from time to time. In the case of the Foundation this is happening by regularly changing the Executive Director since the very long serving director Sven Hamrell stepped down after almost three decades in the mid-1990s. After him we have had his long-time assistant Olle Nordberg taking over for more than a decade and now a 6-year term comes to an end with Henning Melber.

Indeed, very recently I have learned through the DHF website that the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the main funder of DHF) will increase its contribution so that the Foundation can expand. At the same time the DHF board is looking for a new Director as of the middle of 2012 although the present director, Henning Melber, will stay on board. We have seen that before, when Sven Hamrell stayed on as senior adviser after Olle Nordberg took over as director.

When this article appears in the Foundation's 50th anniversary issue of *Development Dialogue* the new Director will have been appointed. May s/he continue in the footsteps of her/his three predecessors and maintain the integrity, independence of thought, wisdom, and straightforwardness, which were main traits of the man after which the Foundation has been named.

Annex I

In order to illustrate some of the more general conclusions of UNIHP a few broad points are presented here about the nature of the UN's impact in the realm of ideas. For more information, see our website www.unhistory.org/briefing

The strongest areas of international consensus – at least in rhetoric – are those in the areas of human rights, social development, women's rights, and empowerment. Here the United Nations has clearly played a major role in generating ideas and influencing the international climate of opinion, although its influence has often been considerably less in implementation and practice, which in any event must take place at the country level. These also are areas in which considerable interest and support exist from professionals and civil society, and for which growing resources have been allocated. However, the lack of financial support in relationship to the size of the tasks usually means that clout has been limited, even with strong rhetorical support from both governments and other donors.

The balance sheet is also increasingly positive in the area of the environment and climate change. Since the 1970s thinking about the environment has evolved considerably, from the UN's early influence in putting environment *and* development on the international agenda and in giving the topic sustained and growing attention. The Earth Summit in 1992 passed Agenda 21, which included the Framework Convention on Climate Change and led to the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and a Statement of Principles for the Sustainable Management of Forests. It also agreed that a Commission on Sustainable Development would monitor follow-up and planned two further governmental meetings to do this, the 1997 General Assembly's special session and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, in Johannesburg. As the effects of climate change become more visible, this is increasingly seen as the main and sometimes the only item on the global agenda.

In fact, climate change is only the most evident of a range of highly important issues, most of which are gathering increasing support from governments and gradually – too gradually, it is true – making an impact.

The UN's impact in the area of humanitarian affairs and human security has also been pioneering and effective. There are signs of increasing support for the United Nations to have a leading and active role, notwithstanding the tendency for major powers to go ahead in certain areas with or without Security Council approval. But it is also true – in major conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq and even more so in less visible conflicts – that UN action and support is sought as necessary for international legitimacy. Early in 2009, there are some twenty peacekeeping missions supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – over sixty since 1948. With approved budgets of over $8 billion, some 120,000 UN personnel are now engaged in these operations, including over 90,000 military troops, police, and military observers, some 19,000 civilian personnel, as well as some 2,000 volunteers. The interrelations between economic development, human security, and human rights are now recognized by most actors.

The UN's impact in the area of humanitarian affairs and human security has been pioneering and effective.

The UN has had less influence in the matters of international economic solidarity and, after 1980, in relation to national development strategies. Here, the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions have dominated and moved to center stage, promoting neoliberal economic policies and leaving the world organization increasingly on the sidelines. The considerable costs of this distribution of labor were visible even before the current global crisis: lagging economic growth in the poorest and least developed countries; rising global inequalities between these countries and wealthier ones; and levels of education, health, and social protection and human development that have fallen short of international goals, especially in the poorest countries and among the poorest people.

At the time of writing, the world is in severe recession and likely to be prolonged. The ghosts of the 1930s are frequently evoked. It represents in

and of itself a fundamental critique of the extreme neoliberal policies pursued since the 1980s. UN institutions have long championed alternative approaches which, if implemented, might have avoided many of the problems that we have faced in the past and are now facing with a vengeance.

Annex II

Here are some more specific conclusions of UNIHP.

1940-1950s: The Foundations

Economic development was a new field when the UN was created. The Charter indicated determination "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," but there was little experience and little professional academic research or writing to turn this commitment into action. True, the classical economists of the nineteenth century had written much that was relevant. At the time, however, most of this work was treated as outdated analysis. Thus, at its beginning, the world organization faced an open field. With the help of some pioneering economists – for instance, David Owen, Sidney Dell, Jan Tinbergen, Hans Singer, W. Arthur Lewis, Nicholas Kaldor, Walt Rostow, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, and Michal Kalecki – the UN contributed a great deal. During this early period, the UN focused on industrialization, diversification of trade, and technology. There was considerable emphasis on development challenges and a good deal of pessimism about prospects. This gave way to optimism about achieving progress captured in such commonly used metaphors as the need for a "big push," a "snow-ball effect," and "take-off."

International trade presented particular problems, which were identified and studied within the UN by such intellectual giants as Raúl Prebisch and Hans Singer. Their research culminated in what has become known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis. Singer, as part of his early UN analytical work, had studied the long-term trends in commodity prices and discovered a tendency for commodity prices to fall relative to the prices of industrial goods over the long term. As commodities were the main exports of developing countries and industrial goods and machinery the imports they needed for economic development, Singer's research revealed that developing countries were in a bind. Such evidence led Raúl Prebisch – the executive director of the Economic Commission for Latin America – and much of the UN to argue strongly against policies of unrestricted free trade and for strategies of import substitution. Although at the time, the Prebisch-Singer thesis of deteriorating trends in the terms of trade of developing countries was much criticised, recent research, some five decades later, has actually confirmed the tendency.

A major contribution of this period was the commissioning of experts to prepare three major economic reports for the UN. One on *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries* (1951) still stands tall as a pioneering document. It had a major impact on development thinking at the time. Its authors included two distinguished economists who were later awarded Nobel prizes in economics – W. Arthur Lewis and T. W. Schultz. The report's analysis was wide-ranging and outspoken. It tackled rural and urban issues, agriculture and industry, and dealt, for instance, with the importance of such issues as land reform, the exploitation of cultivators, and the frequent dominance of peasants by a landlord class. The need for tackling inequality was a major theme. The report also emphasized the need for a major inflow of capital into what were then called "underdeveloped countries" if economic development was to be accelerated. This was necessary, the report argued, because inflows of private investment were limited and governments of underdeveloped countries were unable to borrow much in private capital markets. The report recommended a major increase of lending by the World Bank to developing countries and the creation of "some mechanism" for transferring grants-in-aid to developing countries. Such ideas were much discussed in the UN over the 1950s, often with bitter controversy. This led to several proposals – first for a UN Economic Development Agency and later for a UN Fund for Economic Development. Not surprisingly, developing countries supported the creation of the fund. Perhaps more surprisingly, the principal industrial powers made their participation conditional on worldwide internationally supervised disarmament. Another group of industrial countries also indicated support but did not make it contingent on disarmament. The World Bank, however, was adamantly against the creation of such a fund. Eventually, after nine years of contentious debate, a compromise was reached. A Special Fund would be created within the UN to deal with pre-investment activities, technical assistance, and the development activities of the world body's specialized agencies. Some three years later, the governors of the World Bank decided to set up the International Development Association to provide loans at concessional rates to developing countries on a much larger scale.

The 1960s: The First Development Decade

By the 1960s, many developing countries were on the path to independence, and India, Pakistan, Ghana, and some others had already achieved it. Development moved to center stage at the UN. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy came to the United Nations and proposed a Development Decade. Within a few months, the UN Secretariat had turned Kennedy's proposal into an action plan for "growth plus change." Developing countries as a whole were to accelerate their rate of growth

of national income to a minimum of 5 percent per annum by 1970. In order to support the attainment of this goal, developed countries were to pursue policies that would enable underdeveloped countries to export more at stable and remunerative prices and, in further support, to increase their resource flows, both public and private, to the underdeveloped countries. The General Assembly expressed the hope that international assistance and private capital flows from developed to developing countries would be increased substantially so they could reach, as soon as possible, a level of 1 percent of the combined national incomes of the economically advanced countries. Although the targets for economic growth are often quoted in reference to the development decade, the action plan encompassed a much broader agenda of "growth and change." Change covered six major tasks for each country: systematic surveys of physical and human resources to make possible the maximum mobilization of domestic resources; the formulation of development plans for social as well as economic development; the improvement of administrative machinery and incentives for effective implementation; a redirection of science and technology to focus on national problems; an increase of export earnings through the increase of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods; and an increase and more assured flow of capital to developing countries.

The UN was also beginning to set global goals to provide targets for this broader process. In addition to the goals for economic growth and aid flows, UNESCO set goals for the expansion of education from 1960–1980 while the WHO did so for the eradication of smallpox. The UN itself followed up this call for growth plus change in many areas and by several institutional changes. The World Food Programme was created in 1961, the UN Research Institute for Social Development in 1963, the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, and UNIDO in 1966. The UN also played a major role in supporting economic and development planning in many countries.

The 1970s: Basic Needs and Redistribution with Growth

The UN's goal for faster economic growth in the 1960s, although dismissed by some as naïve and overly optimistic, was in fact more than achieved. Well over sixty individual countries exceeded the 5 percent growth target by 1970, and the growth rate for developing countries as a group averaged 5.6 percent over the decade. Nevertheless, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the result. As the ILO director-general put it in his 1970 report titled *Poverty and Minimum Living Standards: The Role of the ILO*: "The reason for my concern is basically that the immense – and in global economic terms, not altogether unsuccessful – efforts for development during the past two decades have not so far

resulted in many perceptible improvements in the living standards of the majority of the world's population".

UN Photo/Milton Grant

Meeting basic needs was defined as ensuring for each family of a country's population sufficient income for the purchase of food, shelter, clothing, and other essential requirements together with the provision of essential services to ensure basic education, health, safe drinking water, and sanitation.

Over the 1970s, the ILO led the way with alternative thinking on development strategies. The innovations emerged from detailed country level analyses by international employment missions, each of which consisted of a team of analysts drawn from the various UN agencies, but also included other professionals, that was led by a distinguished economist from outside the UN system. Policy analyses were undertaken of Colombia, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Iran, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Sudan and a number of other countries. By 1976, the ILO – also through its research Program – had distilled the lessons of these studies into a set of proposals that were put before the World Employment Conference and published as *Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem*. This report proposed national strategies prepared at the country level that focused, as an explicit goal, on meeting the basic needs of a country's entire population. Meeting basic needs was defined as ensuring for each family of a country's population sufficient income for the purchase of food, shelter, clothing, and other essential requirements together with the provision of essential services to ensure basic education, health, safe drinking water, and sanitation. The basic needs strategy also implied the participation of people in decisions that affected them.

The macroeconomic strategy to meet basic needs included two essential elements: an employment strategy to enable all families to generate sufficient income to meet the family's basic needs – in cash or kind, through rural or urban home production, or through employment in the informal or formal sector. The second element of this macro-strategy was redistribution with growth. An acceleration of economic growth was required, but it was recognized that growth alone would not be sufficient to meet basic needs within a generation. Thus an element of redistribution was required, not by any simple "taking from the rich and giving to the poor" but by concentrating increases in production and income and growth on those parts of an economy with disproportionate numbers of poor people. Such a strategy would enable the incomes of the poor to grow faster than the incomes of the rich.

After some initial controversy, the basic needs strategy received widespread support – from the president of the World Bank, from many parts of the UN, and from many donors and developing countries. It was close to becoming the development consensus of the late 1970s. But wider changes were afoot. With soaring oil prices in 1973–4 and again in 1978–9, the foreign debt of many developing countries rose sharply. In parallel, there was a pronounced shift to the right in developed

country policies, led by the elections of President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Actions to tackle national deficits and debt took center stage and the near-consensus for basic needs collapsed.

The 1980s: Reversals and Structural Adjustment

The 1980s became "a lost decade for development," at least in most of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to cope with deficits and debt, many countries had to turn to the IMF and World Bank for assistance. With this support came stringent conditions, for the stabilization process in the short term and thereafter for structural adjustment. Structural adjustment policies had three declared objectives: to reduce soaring inflation, to correct disparities in foreign balances and national budgets, and to restore economic growth. To achieve these objectives, government budgets were often severely and indiscriminately slashed, which resulted in the shrinking of public sector employment, including in the areas of education and health, in the name of restoring balance and reducing the size of governments.

Although inflation rates mostly decreased quite quickly, balance in foreign exchange or government budgets was often not achieved and seldom was growth restored. Policies of structural adjustment continued into the 1990s, with disastrous effects on economic growth as well as on human resources. Over the two decades from 1980 to 2000, per capita income actually fell on average in Sub-Saharan Africa and rose only by a miserable 9 percent in Latin America – compared to positive growth rates, respectively of 36 percent and 80 percent over 1960–80. "The emperor has no growth" is how some commentators characterized the actual impact of neoliberal policies. Over this period, some parts of the United Nations reacted. The ILO attempted to organize a major international conference on adjustment policies. The Economic Commission for Africa kept up a steady stream of criticisms, but its voice was treated as marginal, at least in Washington and by many donors. From 1985, UNICEF argued for "adjustment with a human face" and gradually made some headway in broadening the immediate concerns of the World Bank to include education and health and social protection. But the economic core of macroeconomic policies continued, increasingly under the heading of the Washington consensus.

The 1990s: The Human Development Paradigm

In 1990, the UNDP launched the *Human Development Report* (HDR), with Mahbub ul Haq – the distinguished economist and one-time Pakistani minister of planning and finance – as the project director. From

the beginning, the HDR challenged the priorities of structural adjustment. "It is short-sighted to balance budgets by unbalancing the lives of the people," the report proclaimed (34). In careful analysis and with well-crafted sound bites, it sent out positive messages about the need for changes in strategy and longer-run priorities: "Reversals in human development during adjustment can be avoided through careful policy management" (56); "Promoting faster economic growth at the expense of equity can damage the invisible bond between the people and the government" (50). The HDR argued for more attention to environmental issues. The report also brought back the theme of redistribution with growth: "Growth with equity is the best recipe for accelerated human development" (62). Three key points should be emphasized:

1. The human development paradigm and the HDR established once again the UN's leadership in broad matters of economic and social development. The HDR provided a robust and comprehensive analytical framework for development strategy.

2. Human development values and priorities linked directly to the UN's founding themes peace and human security in place of war and conflict; economic and social development to achieve higher living standards; and human rights for all.

3. Although the human development paradigm has made headway in development thinking and in the media, neoliberal economic analysis has remained at the core of economic policy making, globally and in most countries. Even within the UN, and in spite of some 140 countries having prepared over 600 national Human Development Reports analyzing their own individual country situations and policy needs, most UN specialized agencies have failed to recognize, let alone adopt, the human development approach as a broader framework within which their own operations can be situated.

The Millennium Development Goals and the Current Global Economic Crisis

The UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 adopted the so-called Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs were endorsed by the 147 heads of state and government attending the summit and also by representatives of most other governments and many major international NGOs. For the first time, UN goals also received the formal support of the World Bank and the IMF, in part the result of the involvement of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in the early stages of their formulation. Since then, the MDGs have formed the consensus core of international development

strategy, receiving repeated endorsement by donor countries and being incorporated in national strategies.

Although widely welcomed, the MDGs are far from providing the comprehensive development framework or strategy of either basic needs or human development. Several key elements are missing: a macroeconomic strategy; concern with employment, inequality, or strategies of redistribution; and a framework for democratic participation. Moreover, although the World Bank has provided a creative range of support for the MDGs, the close involvement of the IMF has usually meant that macroeconomic strategy has followed much of the economic orthodoxy of the Washington consensus.

Nonetheless, progress toward the MDGs after 2000 was considerable, especially in China, India, and other Asian countries. In autumn 2007, however, the global economy plunged into crisis, which began in the United States and spread rapidly to all other regions of the world. Much of the blame was due to insufficient economic regulation within the major developed countries, especially in the financial and banking sectors – and to the dogmatic promotion of neoliberal policies by the IMF and World Bank in many developing countries. The financial crisis obviously has had negative consequences for the MDGs.

The UN is planning a review of progress in September 2010, when only five years will remain until the target date for completing the MDGs. This will be a critical occasion to consider what has been achieved, or not achieved, and what needs to be done during the final phase. This will be an exercise of considerable technical, political, and media significance, requiring leadership from within the United Nations and from governments in all regions of the world. Unless the exercise is conducted with political skill, development sensitivity, and media awareness, there is a major risk of serious public disillusion with development goals and international poverty reduction efforts.

Assessment and Conclusions

One of the major conclusions of the United Nations Intellectual History Project is that over the years the world organization's contributions to economic analysis and strategy have been of higher quality and have often achieved more influence than many realize. As the title of the project's first book indicated, the UN has often been "ahead of the curve." The UN approach to development has been multidisciplinary and country-based – in part because the main UN development agencies have been country-based, with country-oriented programs.

Equally important, but still frequently unrecognized, the United Nations in its economic and social development work has often been ahead of the World Bank and the IMF. In contrast to them, the UN from the beginning has recognized the importance of employment and the need for development strategies that include actions to moderate inequalities. The UN specialized agencies have always prioritized issues of employment and social justice, health and education. The UN has also done important work on fairer trade, agriculture, and industry, although usually with less influence.

With the creation of the Human Development Report in 1990, the UN's intellectual leadership in development strategy was restored, incorporating into development strategy commitments to human rights, participation, inclusive democracy, disarmament, and environmental sustainability.

In the 1970s, the UN took a major step intellectually and operationally in pioneering the themes of environment and development, basic human needs, and redistribution with growth, showing how they needed to be an integral part of national development strategies worldwide. In the 1980s, with the political swing to the right, the UN was largely marginalized. The world body, however, was critical of the narrowness and human neglect of economic adjustment policies. But with the creation of the *Human Development Report* in 1990, the UN's intellectual leadership in development strategy was restored, incorporating into development strategy commitments to human rights, participation, inclusive democracy, disarmament, and environmental sustainability. In some of these areas, the UN has also made pioneering contributions to development thinking and analysis in universities and research institutes. Except at the beginning, when some of the pioneers in development studies had worked for substantial periods within the UN or closely with it, the world organization's influence has been over a narrower field. Even so, the UN has clearly had a major influence in academic work on human rights, basic human needs, employment strategies, redistribution with growth, environment and development, adjustment with a human face, human development, disarmament and development, and human security.

In spite of these creative contributions, the UN's work is still too often relegated to the margins of mainstream international policy, which continues to be largely shaped by the Bretton Woods institutions. This historical record suggests that this is a mistake. Ideas have been among the UN's most important contributions. This should be better recognized and closer links between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions could strengthen both.

Group discussions during an ADfB project seminar on the Thai-Burma border in 2009.

Another Development for Burma

Reflections on 10 years of support to Burma's democracy movement

Matilda Hald

It has been an extraordinary year in Burma's modern history. After half a century of oppressive military dictatorship, the country appears to be opening up. The quasi-civilian government that came to power through widely criticised elections in 2010 has initiated a broad range of reforms, both politically and economically. Although it is too early to tell whether Burma has taken its first steps in a transition to genuine democracy, the international community has responded optimistically to the situation. The progress has been considered substantial enough to merit a new approach to engagement, including suspension of sanctions, increased aid and technical assistance. Foreign investors, technical experts, international NGOs and aid workers are now pouring into the country.

Times of change in Burma?

During 2011 and the first half of 2012, some remarkable changes took place in Burma. Hundreds of prominent political prisoners have been released, media censorship has been somewhat eased, economic reforms have been introduced, and, most notably to the outside world, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) was allowed to contest – and win – the by-elections held on 1 April 2012. The democracy icon's popularity had not waned during her 15 years of house arrest – her party won 43 of the 44 parliamentary seats contested.

Undoubtedly, however, the path to democracy in Burma is still very long. Hundreds of political prisoners remain in prison, there is no independent judiciary, the fundamental problems of impunity and lack of accountability remain and the ceasefire agreements currently being negotiated between the government and ethnic nationalities have yet to achieve national reconciliation and lasting peace. Furthermore, NLD's by-election victory gave the party less than 7 per cent of the parliamentary seats, and it remains to be seen whether the next parliamentary election in 2015 will be free and fair. Even then, military rule will be entrenched in the constitution, and the military's veto power will keep an elected government from making constitutional changes.

Thus, Aung San Suu Kyi, in her address in May 2012 to the World Economic Forum in Bangkok on her first trip abroad in 24 years, had good reason for requesting 'healthy scepticism' with regard to developments in Burma, instead of the widespread 'reckless optimism'.

What new challenges do transitions bring? What development path will Burma take? And who will set the agenda in the change process? These questions have been at the core of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's Another Development for Burma (ADfB) project. For ten years, the foundation has been supporting actors in Burma's democracy movement in their consideration of the long-term development of their country and to prepare for transitional challenges.

Project rationale

In the late 1990s, exiled Burmese opposition leaders visited the foundation to request support for the struggle for democracy in their home country. Since the popular uprising in 1988 and the following elections in 1990, the situation had been dire. Many activists and politicians had been forced to flee the country and were now working in exile, while many of those who stayed were held as political prisoners. The movement had its supporters and the foundation, not being a donor but rather a facilitator of meetings of minds and ideas, considered carefully what role it could play.

It became apparent that most of the efforts of the democratic forces were, understandably, devoted to the immediate struggle against military rule – both by advocating international pressure on the regime and by mobilising a people's movement inside Burma. Less attention was given to forward-looking discussions on the country's development and preparations for an open and democratic society. It was recognised that after more than 30 years of isolation, Burma would in fact have a unique opportunity to develop its own approach to development, avoid mistakes and, instead, draw on the successes of other countries. The unsustainable development path taken by most countries of the world wouldn't necessarily have to be replicated.

After thorough consultations with a variety of groups in the democracy movement based on the Thai-Burma border, ADfB gradually evolved as the biggest project in the history of the foundation. The backbone of the project became a seminar series, which raised different perspectives on development and transitional challenges, with the aim of strengthening engagement by both the leadership and grassroots of the movement with long-term development considerations.

In a sense, the project idea built on the experiences gained by the foundation from its activities in Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1974 and in cooperation with the Foundation for Education with Production, it had organised a number of seminars focused on the formation of educational institutions and policies for post-independence

and post-apartheid democratic societies in Southern Africa. Two particularly important seminars in this series were the 1985 seminar on 'Another Development for SADCC' and 'Another Development for Lesotho' in 1987.

The Burma initiative grew into a considerably longer commitment, lasting for 10 years, and will wind down by the end of 2012. Over the course of its lifespan, a great variety of capacity-building and information-sharing seminars and workshops have been organised for and by activists in the border-based democracy movement. Defined as a process and a platform, the project was initially not restricted to a pre-set plan but was rather allowed to evolve organically with strong ownership by local partners. Some concepts and ideas remained key aspects of the project over the years and those will be discussed below.

ADfB project activities 2003-12

The project has been a platform through which seminars and publications have been facilitated. All activities listed below have been undertaken with the support of and facilitation through this platform, but not necessarily in the name of the project.

Seminars and workshops

Nineteen seminars in Thailand on development perspectives, policy alternatives for different thematic sectors and transition challenges, with international resource persons. Participants were mainly from the border-based democracy movement, including both leadership and grassroots. A few seminars were co-funded by the Open Society Foundations.

Some 20 local workshops and training sessions on development challenges and sustainability perspectives, organised by local ADfB coordinators and working groups, partly or fully financed by the project, for communities in Burma (Kachin, Mon, Karen and Arakan states) and Thailand.

Eighteen public events in Sweden with visiting Burmese guests from the democracy movement, organised or co-organised by DHF, to highlight the work of the democracy movement. An additional 30 lectures and presentations by the DHF Burma project coordinator in Sweden.

Publications produced through the project

Another Development for Burma (2004). Seminar publication. Printed in English, Burmese and Mon.

Accessible Alternatives: Ethnic Communities' Contribution to Social Development and Environmental Conservation in Burma (2009) by Burma Environment Working Group (BEWG). Printed in English, Burmese, short version in Kachin and forthcoming in Karen.

An Introduction to Development (2010), Zaw Min. Printed in Burmese.

Burma's Environment: People, Problems, Policies (2011) by BEWG. Printed in English and Burmese.

Education for Sustainable Development (forthcoming 2012), Thein Naing. In Burmese.

Other thematic material produced

Post-Nargis Analysis: The other side of the story (2008). Report produced by 19 civil society groups on the Thai-Burma border, as a result of a project workshop on the role of international financial institutions in Burma.

Five short documentaries about the Dawei deep seaport and special economic zone (2011, 2012).

Ten short documentaries based on themes and case studies of the publication *Accessible Alternatives* (2011).

Various reports from seminars on topics such as economic policies for Burma, the role of international financial institutions, gender justice, health and education. Distributed electronically in English and Burmese.

Articles on development and environment issues in Maukkha Education Magazine (2011–2012).

Planning ahead – the need to be prepared

The importance of planning ahead for a transition to democracy was one of the driving concepts of the project from the start. Memorable and formative presentations during the early seminars were those by Emilia Pires from East Timor. Ms Pires was the head of the East Timor

Khin Ohmar, local coordinator of the ADfB project for several years and one of the driving forces in its conceptual development.

national development planning commission and she shared important experiences with the exiled Burmese opposition leaders.

The independence movement in East Timor had started planning for the nation-building process before actual independence, and the diasporas played an important role. East Timorese overseas, both politicians and technocrats, had come together to discuss the future path of the country in response to an appeal by imprisoned leader Xanana Gusmao in 1998, well before the independence referendum. After the country gained independence from Indonesia in 2002, the reconstruction process started with thorough consultations. The country adhered to democratic principles as it set out to create a national development plan. A nationwide participatory consultation process was implemented, headed by Xanana Gusmao, who had become the first president of independent East Timor. Out of a population of 800,000, approximately 38,000 people from all walks of lives participated in developing the national development plan.

Khin Ohmar, local coordinator of the ADfB project for several years and one of the driving forces in its conceptual development, was inspired by the East Timor case. After spending a month as an intern with Emilia Pires, she noted:

> This people's participatory method was such an inspiring and effective approach that the Burmese democracy movement in exile should look up to as a model in its preparation towards democratic change in Burma. Such an approach encourages and motivates people to participate in the nation building process. It provides them with an opportunity to raise their needs and concerns and tell the world how they envision their country's and young generations' future. The process gave the people a sense of ownership to their country's development plan, encouraging them also to feel a sense of responsibility to participate and implement the plan, together with the government. (Khin Ohmar, Internship report, 2004)

The East Timor planning process was the inspiration for a participatory and bottom-up approach in the ADfB project. Project activities rested on the belief that policy development should not be a matter for leaders only. With strengthened capacity, civil society actors and grassroots activists can be empowered to raise their concerns with regard to policy development. Although academic and technical expertise is needed in policy development, practitioners and activists from social movements and civil society groups have valuable experience and knowledge that should be taken into account.

Exploring sustainable development models

Frankie Abreu, local project coordinator in 2010-2012 and the initiator of the community-outreach process.

Inspired by the East Timorese planning process, ADfB activities addressed the questions of what development priorities the seminar participants would like to see in a future Burma. The approach from the foundation's side was never to promote a particular development model, but rather to give Burma groups space to learn and discuss. However, in the spirit of the concept 'Another Development', a starting point was that mainstream development models have often failed to create equal societies that ensure all people's rights, wellbeing and participation, and have further had devastating impacts on the environment. ADfB thus aimed to explore alternative development perspectives and policy options that would ensure social equity, environmental sustainability and an improved quality of life for the people.

Discussing 'alternative' development perspectives or conceptualising sustainable development for Burma was clearly not alien to many of the seminar participants. In particular, community-based activists from ethnic areas had a clear picture of the unsustainable nature of ongoing large-scale development projects and their impact on local communities. Some community-based environmental groups were explicitly working to preserve the sustainable livelihoods that their communities have been practising for decades. In the publication *Accessible Alternatives: Ethnic Communities' Contribution to Social Development and Environmental Conservation in Burma*, the Burma Environment Working Group (BEWG), an alliance that came together and has been supported through the ADfB platform, presented examples of sustainable natural resource management by communities in various ethnic areas in Burma.

During the military dictatorship, this community-based development has been threatened by conflict, militarisation and large-scale development projects. In BEWG's follow-up report, *Burma's Environment: People, Problems, Policies,* the alliance questions the development path that Burma's regime has been taking and elaborates on its threat to people's livelihoods as well as to the country's rich biodiversity and natural resources. The focus on large-scale natural resource extraction projects in the oil, gas, hydropower and mining sectors seems to be continuing under Burma's 'new' government and foreign investment is increasing. In its most recent response to the changing political landscape, including the suspension of sanctions by Western countries, BEWG developed benchmarks for responsible foreign investment. In a press release on these benchmarks, BEWG spokesperson Paul Sein Twa stressed that 'investment in Burma must support genuine peace and national reform and must follow the will of local communities who have long paid the price for resource-driven investments through forced labor, land confiscation, illegal taxes, loss of life, and other human rights abuses.'

BEWG's benchmarks for investors

1. Do No Harm: Investment should not exacerbate natural resource and land-based conflict in Burma.
2. Best Practices or No Practices: Investors should respect the widely accepted global standards for environmental and human rights law while following international best practices in human rights, social and environmental impact assessments.
3. Act Transparently and with Principle: Investors should have a zero-tolerance policy on corruption and should uphold full revenue and contract transparency.
4. Support Civil Society not Impunity: Civil society should be free to fulfil its role without threat of repression or abuse.
5. Empower Communities: Community grievances must be fully addressed in existing and proposed investments.

For a more elaborate version of the benchmarks, see www.bewg.org

Empowering grassroots

In parallel with the development discussions within the democracy movement and attempts to influence policy making, other initiatives facilitated through the ADfB platform have focused on local communities, specifically working to empower grassroots activists and villagers to have a say in the development of their local community. The most ambitious example is a capacity-building initiative related to the planned multibillion dollar project to develop a deep seaport and a special economic zone in Dawei in southern Burma.

In the project-affected area, villagers currently live simple but decent self-sufficient lives in harmony with the local environment. If the project goes ahead as planned, more than 200 square kilometres of unexploited land will be turned into the largest special economic zone in Southeast Asia, including a deep seaport and dockyard, and heavy, medium and light industries. With such changes to the environment, local people lose their livelihood, as well as culture and traditions. More than 30,000 residents from 20 villages will be immediately relocated. Already the initial phase of the project – the construction of a road that will link the Dawei deep seaport with Thailand – is showing signs of the problems common to similar large-scale development projects in Burma and elsewhere: lack of transparency and information to affected

Workshop on the Dawei deep seaport project in Phang Nga, Thailand, in 2011.

people, relocation and land confiscation with unclear compensation systems and poor social and environmental impact assessments.

The project's local coordinator, Frankie Abreu, has worked with villagers affected by the project to build capacity, learn their perspective and give them tools to meet the challenges they will face as their local area is completely transformed. With awareness of potential threats and community-mobilising skills, villagers stand a better chance to adapt to, and mitigate the negative impacts of, the dramatic changes. In a short time, the villagers have increased their understanding of the implications of the project and managed to mobilise regarding issues such as compensation.

This community-outreach initiative shows how ADfB in its later phases has aimed to broaden the impact of the development dialogues held throughout the project so as to truly engage with grassroots and give a voice to those affected by the development path taken.

Strengthening villagers' voices: Components of the ADfB's community-outreach process with project-affected villagers in Dawei

Spreading information about project impact: Through seminars, workshops, dissemination of documentaries and written reports, information about the planned development mega-project and its implications for local people and the environment has been spread and discussed with villagers from Nabule (affected by the industrial estate area) and Ga Mone Thwe (affected by the road link between Dawei and Kanchanaburi in Thailand).

Raising capacity of the villagers to respond: Adding to awareness-raising on the Dawei project, local villagers have learnt mitigation and adaptation strategies, and been trained to do community research to assess the ecosystem and its function in the area. When the villagers can prove their knowledge of the area, the knowledge becomes their power. Community-based research can thus be used as a tool in dealing with assessment research teams, companies and authorities.

Interacting with the assessment team: The local ADfB coordinator and a representative of the affected villagers took the initiative to have a meeting with the research assessment team hired by the company developing the project, Italian-Thai Development (ITD), to raise their social and environmental concerns.

Organising villagers: A village-based organisation, Community Sustainable Livelihood and Development (CSLD), representing 12 villages in Ga Mone Thwe affected by the road construction, has been formed to enable collective responses to the challenges. Among other things, the group has studied environmental and social assessment reports and questionnaires and highlighted shortcomings, as well as managed to secure some compensation after negotiations with ITD.

Public campaigning: Land-confiscation problems are raised through the campaign 'Betel nut tree lover'. The betel nut tree is the main source of income for local villagers in the eastern Dawei region and only some people have received compensation as trees are cleared to make room for the road link. New perspectives on the future challenges to the local economy are spread through campaign messages explaining how betel nut trees have cultural, traditional and religious value, provide job opportunities and allow for equal distribution of wealth.

Solidarity between villages in different areas: Links have been made between villagers affected by the Dawei project and villagers in other areas (in Burma and Thailand) affected by other large-scale development projects. In a special event, representatives of different villages sent rocks to each other to show solidarity with their respective struggles (documented in the short film 'Unheard voices', to be found on Youtube).

Raising awareness in Thailand: As Thailand is the main investor and beneficiary of the project, the ADfB local coordinator and a representative from the village-based organisation have made several presentations and documentary screenings about the Dawei project at Chiang Mai University in Chiang Mai and Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. A solidarity network of civil society organisations is growing in Burma and Thailand.

Diversity of the border-based movement

ADfB activities have been run by activists on the Thai-Burma border in their role as the intermediary between inside groups and the international community and global solidarity network. The abovementioned work of BEWG, as well as ADfB's activities regarding the Dawei project illustrate how border-based actors can both empower inside communities and inform the outside world of their plight.

Since the relevance of the exile movement has at times been questioned in recent years, their role deserves some elaboration. Initially, there were, of course, practical reasons for working with exile groups and not actors inside the country. At the time of the project's commencement it was nearly impossible to organise seminars or bring together different stakeholders inside the country. Although this has changed to some extent in recent years, political activists still have not had the space to engage in development planning inside Burma. In informal discussions with activist leaders inside, many expressed gratitude that the exiles think ahead, since they themselves could not prioritise this under the circumstances.

Apart from these practical reasons, there are also substantial ones. The border-based movement has an important strength for a process like this – its diversity. On the border, organisations from various ethnic nationalities working on different issues can interact and work together. This has enabled ADfB to promote a holistic outlook and bring actors together from different issue-based as well as political groups for

thematically crosscutting consultation. This enabled increased information-sharing and coordination, and a more holistic awareness and vision for the future development of Burma.

Additionally, the East Timor example shows that diasporas can play a role in rebuilding the country when the time comes. As Khin Ohmar reflected in her internship report:

> One important lesson learned from East Timor was the importance to recruit diasporas for the nation's reconstruction process. It is vital for a post-conflict country to have enough human resources to rebuild it and the professional and technocrats living abroad will be great human resource for the country. (Khin Ohmar, Internship report, 2004)

The capacity of exiles, built through this and many other initiatives, can be of great value in rebuilding Burma.

Working on the border has also presented challenges. 'Internal politics' seem to have hampered the possibility of collective planning at times. Such problems are understandable, due to the history of fear, ethnic tension and the regime's divide and rule strategies. These challenges are also probably due to the fact that groups have to compete for grants for individual and organisational survival. It is also important to remember that the pro-democracy movement outside Burma has operated in very difficult circumstances. Although these have not been as acutely oppressive

Project planning meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 2007.

as the situation inside, economic hardships and security threats do pose challenges for the movement on the border.

During the course of the project, tensions between political and social groups also became visible. As one of the issue-based activists once put it, 'We are all against the military dictatorship and work for the people of Burma to be allowed to elect their leaders, but as a social movement we will not support any particular political group. We will continue to push for social justice no matter who runs the country.' While these different perspectives were a practical challenge for a project like this that aspires to the creation of a common vision, they should ultimately be seen as a strength of the movement. Although in times of struggle the movement has been defined as one, different actors will play different roles in a democratic society.

Who sets the agenda in Burma's current change process?

Going back to Emilia Pires and Khin Ohmar's reflections on development planning in East Timor, a fundamental idea of the project was that planning ahead could strengthen the chances of keeping national ownership of the agenda in a transition phase. As Emilia Pires stressed in one of her presentations, important decisions are made early on in a transition process:

> Once the Indonesians left the country and the International Community took over, the reconstruction process began without strong guidance from the East Timorese. The World Bank came in to organise the inflow of aid. Although efforts were made to ensure the participation of the East Timorese in all these processes, the lack of organisation and coordination between the political and technical groups on the side of the East Timorese ensured that we were mostly followers. Development priorities were decided but not in a systematically consensual and coordinated fashion. Many of the East Timorese, particularly the politicians, failed to understand that even though the first few years were mainly addressing emergency and reconstruction issues, decisions were made that set the directions for the future development of the country. (Pires 2004)

Burma has now entered a transition phase, but not in the way many had hoped for or expected. The country is still very far from being a democracy. Nevertheless, a type of transition from an isolated dictatorship to a more open society is taking place – not least through the influx of

foreign investment, aid, people and ideas. The country is opening up, but the democratic opposition is not in charge and many of the border-based activists who have been the driving force in the ADfB project are still in exile. But foreign investors, international financial institutions and donors are not waiting.

The challenges of national ownership in this transition are thus twofold. First, the largely un-elected government remains in a position to set the agenda and guard the national ownership of reforms. According to a recent special report by Reuters, laws are being drafted at great speed by government experts:

> Since taking office in March 2011, the quasi-civilian government has passed 26 new laws, with another two dozen waiting to be approved by the attorney general's office…These often originate with the 'President's Business Advisory Group,' a coterie of about 20 cabinet ministers and private economists. (Szep 2012)

The people of Burma certainly have not given the authority to shape the future of the country to either the regime or its handpicked experts. At the same time, national ownership is also challenged by influential international players, such as bilateral donors and international financial institutions. The same report states: 'The world isn't simply watching. Multilateral agencies – the International Monetary Fund, the World

A group of Burmese activists and leaders visiting the Foundation in 2009, together with DHF Burma project coordinator Matilda Hald.

Bank and the Asian Development Bank – are offering advice, but it is often conflicting, according to interviews with nearly a dozen senior officials' (Szep 2012). Who makes sure that the people's voices are represented in this rapid reform process?

While reforms are orchestrated at an elite level, there is a large democracy movement inside and outside the country that is watching and trying to influence the reform process as well as the international involvement. These democratic forces are not likely to settle for less than real people participation, democratisation and respect for human rights, and they need to be supported in their quest. Large-scale popular participation in the by-election campaigns, in electricity protests, labour strikes and the campaign against the Myitsone Dam also show that the people of Burma are testing their freedom and increasingly claiming their rights. Border-based groups continue to advocate for and support people's participation.

Through initiatives such as ADfB, capacity has been built among both activists in exile and grassroots activists inside Burma. The participation by exiles in the reform process, on their own terms, is crucial both because of their capacity and their networks. Joint efforts by democratic forces inside and outside the country could lead to a real democratisation process as well as social improvements for the people. International support for the democratisation process in Burma is badly needed, but international players – be they investors, technical experts, donor agencies or NGOs – must be cautious about how they move ahead. Meaningful participation by the democracy movement in all its diversity, as well as the general public and grassroots activists, is crucial for real and sustainable change in Burma.

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By the Shwedagone
Pagoda, Rangoon.

The Foundation at a Crossroads

Göran Hydén

Organizations are typically set to move at a comfortable pace. Managers wish to have control over the factors that determine performance. To that effect, they act to combat external threats. In the business world, corporations face threats in the form of new technologies and more efficient competitors. In the political realm, such threats come from policy changes that rearrange premises and redefine the role of organizations. In either case, continued progress, if not survival, calls for diligent choice, often in the form of which road to chart to the future.

In the early 2000s, the Foundation found itself in such a crossroads context. Since its beginning, for some forty years, the Foundation had been used to operate in an autonomous manner with a rather informal relation of accountability to its principal funder, initially SIDA (then Swedish International Development Authority) and since the late 1980s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2005 it was becoming clear that the Ministry wanted to change this relationship by tightening the leash and demanding greater accountability for the Foundation´s performance. This policy change reflected three concerns: (a) a doubt, if not dissatisfaction, among some senior ministry officials over the programmatic direction that the Foundation had adopted since the 1990s; (b) a more general wish in the Ministry to tie Swedish policy think tanks to its own agenda; and (c) a similarly general call in government ministries to relate funding to performance. Some would add to this list the desire of the Ministry to gain greater control of the 'brand name' for Swedish international initiatives that the Hammarskjöld name would give. Regardless, at the root of this challenge was the autonomous status of the Foundation. Staff at the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre on Övre Slottsgatan in Uppsala, the Foundation´s home, were upset arguing that the move by the Ministry not only violated the Swedish law guiding philanthropic foundations but also undermined its role and influence in the Global South where most its activities and contacts were.

I got involved in this complex and sensitive matter not so much by choice as by circumstances. I had served on the Board of the Foundation since 1996. By 2005 I had completed my maximum three terms – each of three years – and expected to step down for good. My planned

Göran Hydén at the What Next Forum in 2006.

departure, however, coincided with the search for a new Chairperson of the Board. The unanimous choice was Jan Eliasson, then Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. Because he was about to take up the position as Chairman of the UN General Assembly, he requested to begin his involvement with the Foundation in 2006 after completing his assignment. At this point, the Board with full support from the staff approached me with an invitation to serve as Chair on an interim basis until Mr Eliasson would take over. The justification was that among members I had the longest institutional memory and familiarity with the Foundation´s *modus operandi*. In April 2006, however, Mr Eliasson was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and stepped down as Chair. At the Board meeting in June 2006, members turned my interim appointment into a permanent one scheduled to end 2008. These three years as interim and permanent Chair of the Board coincided with the Ministry-instigated transition. Life inside the Foundation was unusually turbulent and uncertain. By the time I stepped down in 2008, however, the transition had been largely completed.

This article reflects my personal involvement with the Foundation with an emphasis on the years I was most directly involved in helping to shape its destiny. To put my own role in context, the article begins with an account of my initial interactions with the Foundation in the 1970s and 1980s which fostered my own understanding of the role it could play at the frontiers of development. The second section describes and discusses the programmatic direction that the Foundation adopted in the 1990s, which culminated in the ambitious 'What Next?' project. The third section dwells on the issues of transition. The article ends with some concluding reflections.

At the development frontier

This is not meant as a history of the Foundation. The sole ambition is to offer insights into its work as seen through my own eyes as a participant over a forty-year period. My first contact with the Foundation dates back to 1969 when I was invited to a conference on cooperatives and rural development that it co-organized with the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa in Moshi, Tanzania. I had been doing research on the subject in Kenya, lived and worked in Nairobi at the time. The trip to Moshi, just across the border, therefore, was easy. It was my first time to meet Sven Hamrell and his colleague, Olle Nordberg, the former Executive Director, the latter Associate Director of the Foundation. Although I don't remember much else from that conference, my first impressions of Sven and Olle are still with me. Sven exploded with ideas and had an expressive personality, yet was always anxious to check with others that he did things right. Olle struck me as an exceptionally loyal and hard-

working colleague who also had the task of taking care of the many issues that Sven, in his often uncharted moves, left unsolved. Whether or not this initial impression does justice to the two principal figures in the Foundation during its first thirty years, my overall impression that the two complemented each other very well was never in doubt. I had occasion to witness this at least a couple of other times in East Africa in conjunction with seminars on public administration and public management that the Foundation jointly organized with local institutions.

What I began to realize through these meetings and by reading documents, not the least *Development Dialogue* – the Foundation´s house organ – was how much this two-person team with its very able support staff in Uppsala was capable of achieving. It was not just the volume that Sven, with his ideas and wide network of contacts, was able to produce but also his ability to influence other actors. Perhaps the best example of this was the special issue of Development Dialogue in 1975 titled 'What Now?' It helped influence the international development agenda and shaped much of what United Nations and some of its special agencies set out to do in subsequent years.

Like other organizations of the same type, the Foundation wanted to demonstrate its uniqueness. It was important to show its ability to influence change in a desired direction and thus prove its relevance. Sven was good at identifying issues that spoke to the mainstream at the time but were still bold and untested. He had a good sense of the politics of development and thus what would earn the Foundation a good name. This was evident from the Foundation-organized events in which I had the opportunity to participate. Two are particularly worth mentioning here.

One is the project on 'The State and the Crisis in Africa: In Search of a Second Liberation'. A first seminar was organized in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld´s untimely death in a plane crash outside Ndola, Zambia in 1961. Politically it was a very appropriate gathering to take stock of the effects of the neoliberal economic reforms that had been introduced and implemented in Africa. It was also ahead of its time in covering issues of governance, notably how the state in African countries could be made more responsive and accountable – a theme that has stayed with the international community ever since. Many of the participants in this seminar, e.g. Joseph ki-Zerbo in Burkina Faso (now deceased), Francis Deng and Bona Malwal in Sudan, Chango Machyo and Bidandi Ssali in Uganda and Wamba dia Wamba in the Democratic Republic of Congo, came to play an influential role in the subsequent democratization efforts in their respective countries. A second seminar was held at Mweya Lodge

in Uganda in 1990 with another group of high-profile participants from various African countries, including King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, an exceptionally thoughtful and radical monarch. I believe the Foundation helped launch the concept of a second liberation that came to play such an important role in many African countries that embarked on getting rid of autocratic rulers in the early 1990s.

The other event was a seminar in Kampala in April 1995 with a practical orientation towards identifying the institutional mechanisms that would foster a mode of governance which respects professionalism and the integrity of the public realm. The main focus was a proposal for establishing autonomous development funds that would be free from political interference, yet functioning as public funding mechanisms. The reason for taking funding out of partisan or personal politics was the established practice in African countries of political leaders to grab personal control of funds and allocating them in discretionary and arbitrary manners. This had been identified by the international donor community as the principal challenge to better public finance management and greater effectiveness but before this DHF seminar no practical and locally relevant proposals had been offered how to overcome this institutional weakness. The meeting was co-organized with the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and attended by senior representatives of African governments and NGOs, the private sector, and the donor community. The meeting adopted a final report that laid out the principal parameters of these autonomous funds and their costs and benefits. The proposal was at the frontier of governance tackling as it was the most serious outstanding shortcoming in development management. The enthusiasm for the fund model was clearly there among many in the private sector and the NGO community and some in African government and donor circles. Because it was challenging the conventional Official Development Assistance model of direct monetary transfers from government to government, there was, however, reluctance both in African governments and among donors to take it on. Still, a few such funds were established using the Kampala protocol, e.g. in Tanzania where a Cultural Trust Fund was created with involvement by both government, donors and representatives of different cultural sub-sectors, and in South Africa for the purpose of funding small-scale business people.

There were many other activities that the Foundation pursued in which I never participated but which served to enhance its reputation in the South. One such activity was the support of an 'Education with Production' program in southern Africa centered on its enthusiastic advocate and director, Patrick van Rensburg. It was important because it was not a single event but an activity that continued over many years.

It served as a major challenge to the conventional curriculum with its sole emphasis on book learning that dominated the countries of southern Africa – and it should be added, many other parts of the world. There were eventually tangible results both in Botswana and South Africa.

It is also important to mention the Foundation´s involvement in support of reforming the United Nations. Through membership on the Board, it retained contact with one of Hammarskjöld´s assistants who did not die in Ndola, Brian Urquhart. The latter, together with another UN stalwart, Erskine Childers, was instrumental in helping the Foundation play a strategic role, in collaboration with New York-based organizations like the Ford Foundation and the International Peace Academy, to push specific reforms that responded to the changing nature of the world toward the end of the 20th Century. I was never directly involved in these activities or in the other important project that the Foundation supported: the intellectual history of the United Nations system and its agencies.

The Foundation played a strategic role, in collaboration with New York-based organizations like the Ford Foundation and the International Peace Academy, to push specific reforms of the United Nations that responded to the changing nature of the world toward the end of the 20th Century.

I would like to add here that while I served as Representative of the Ford Foundation for Eastern and Southern Africa, based in Nairobi, I had the opportunity to assist the Foundation with supplementary funding for an exploratory meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, on how to boost indigenous publishing in Africa. This meeting was attended by publishers from East and West Africa and led to a series of follow-up activities over the next fifteen years, also with some continued Ford support, that were critical to developing local publishing houses and how they could improve their management.

My own Ford Foundation experience (1978-85) gave me a better opportunity to appreciate the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and how it operates. The two foundations are different in the sense that Ford only funds activities while DHF is operational, i.e. it both funds and carries out activities, typically in collaboration with a partner organization. Both have the same objective of identifying issues and activities that lead to positive change. They are different again in that Ford is an organization with several hundred employees in New York and around the world while DHF staff has never been more than just a hand full and all based in Uppsala. Finally, Ford is financially independent with funds coming from an endowment set aside originally by Henry Ford II. Although DHF has enjoyed financial support from other sources, not just Ford, its by far dominant source has been the Swedish Government.

I think that the Foundation´s financial status is crucial to understanding its evolution. Particularly striking is the extent to which it was able

to maintain independence despite its financial ties to Government. It is a unique situation that is fostered partly by the corporatist nature of Swedish society, partly by the close personal networks that such a society produces. Let me elaborate. In a corporatist society there is a tendency for broad consensus to exist across institutional lines. Agreement around broad societal objectives generates institutional autonomy within set parameters. The famous 1937 Saltsjöbaden Agreement between government, industry and trade unions is the foundation stone of this approach. It has continued to permeate Swedish society and is at least in part an explanation why the Foundation was able to operate so independently without control by the principal – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that for most of the time between 1962 and today, the country has been ruled by a Social Democratic government is something that reinforced this corporatist tendency.

In the specific case of the Foundation, however, the story would be incomplete without mentioning the close personal relations that developed between Sven Hamrell and the first Chair of the Board, Ernst Michanek. The latter was also the first Director-General of SIDA and given his earlier involvement in shaping the welfare state, the person who formulated Swedish aid policy in the image of this welfare model. Sven had been recruited from the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (now the Nordic Africa Institute) and had a past in a leftist debating club called 'Verdandi'. He was in many respects an ideal candidate. He was enthusiastic with high energy; he was interested in international development issues; and he felt comfortable with the parameters of Swedish aid. Mr Michanek came to trust Sven and appreciated the many often radical initiatives he took in the name of the Foundation. The Foundation´s independence may have inadvertently been enhanced by Michanek´s own busy schedule and inability to keep a constant track of what was going on, but it is also important to mention that during these years it was common practice to let publicly funded bodies like the Foundation enjoy not just narrow operational but also broader political autonomy. Sven´s imagination and Olle´s organizational skills were the direct beneficiaries of this situation.

The close relation with Michanek and his blessing also opened doors for the Foundation to high-level actors in the international arena. As a major and generally respected donor, Sweden had a good reputation in the South, especially Africa. It was seen as less interventionist and Sweden had no imperial or colonial baggage that discolored its reputation. All this meant that the Foundation had access to high-level officials in governments and international organizations and could often call upon them to play key roles in their activities. For instance, in the 1995

Kampala meeting, President Yoweri Museveni was personally present to open it. 'What Now?' symbolizes better than anything else the influence that the Foundation had in terms of influencing the mainstream at the time. It helped boost the reputation and status of the Foundation and I believe it is its single most important achievement.

From What Now to What Next

Life in the Foundation changed in the mid-1990s. Sven retired as Executive Director after 28 years in office in 1994 and Ernst Michanek stepped down as Chairman of the Board the following year. There was never a search for a successor to Sven. It was more or less taken for granted that with his long experience as Sven's trusted colleague, Olle would take over. This happened and a new Associate Director, Niclas Hällström, was hired. At the board level, Professor Göran Ohlin, who had served as Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and been on the Board since 1993, agreed to become the new Chair. Unfortunately, Ohlin never really got a chance to serve in that capacity as he passed away in June 1996. After consultation, a new person, Mr Lars Anell, was brought in as Chair and he served in that capacity from 1997 to 2005. He had a long experience in government and was at the time of his appointment a Senior Vice President in the Volvo Corporation.

These changes had programmatic implications. To be sure, the general objective of partnering with organizations in the Global South in order to highlight critical issues at the frontier of development remained a priority but the international development frontier itself had changed. State-led development was no longer a current theme; the vitality and energy to produce development was seen as lying with civil society.

The Foundation responded to this shift in development paradigm. With the youthful enthusiasm and commitment that Niclas brought to the Foundation, he built on contacts that had already been developed by Sven and Olle with external partners involved in such issues as biodiversity and intellectual property rights, especially as they affect poor farmers in the South. This partnership became particularly significant with the ETC Group, a Canadian NGO, whose director, Pat Mooney, despite a severe eyesight limitation, was an intellectual virtuoso with a very special command of both language and policy substance. The 1983 issue of Development Dialogue titled 'The Law of the Seed – Another Development and Plant Genetic Resources' had set the stage for this close cooperation over subsequent years. A major reason why Niclas was hired as Associate Director was his own interest in natural resource issues and his background as one of the movers behind the establishment of the Centre for Environment and Development (CEMUS) at Uppsala

University. It was evident, therefore, that he would take a programmatic lead in this field while Olle, in addition to being overall in charge, would be responsible for other program activities of the Foundation.

Once the World Social Forum was formed in 2001, the Foundation saw itself more and more drawn to its agenda.

Two major things happened with the Foundation program while I served on the Board, one by default, the other by design. Program development to a very large extent reflected initiatives taken by the secretariat, i.e. the Executive Director and his Associate. Within the secretariat, Niclas was the engine pushing forward on all cylinders with the help of a network of civil society activists who increasingly identified themselves as anti-establishment. Once the World Social Forum was formed in 2001, the Foundation saw itself more and more drawn to its agenda. At the same time, other program activities were slow to develop, reflecting partly Olle´s preoccupation with overall management issues, partly his caution and procrastination. Olle´s qualities included prudence and attention to detail, sometimes bordering on perfection. Unlike Sven and Niclas, who were ready to step on the gas pedal, Olle would choose the brake to ensure that nothing would go wrong. Given that many substantive issues were politically controversial and partners in the South would not necessarily interpret them in the same way as the secretariat, Olle always engaged in extensive consultation before making a decision. It was a virtue that probably saved the Foundation from some potentially unpleasant confrontations. At the same time, his predisposition contributed by default to skewing the program in the direction of Niclas´ priorities.

The other thing that happened was the crystallization of the program toward a more explicit focus on 'Another Development', a concept that had been coined in the wake of the 'What Now?' initiative but had been since used rather intermittently. The Board supported this program concentration because members had lamented that the activities which the Foundation pursued were too scattered. On reflection, it seems the concept of another development went through three incarnations. In the first years after 'What Now?' it was still focused on alternative policies and actions meant to be taken by governments and inter-governmental organizations. The Foundation spoke to the establishment and expected it to consider other possibilities. The second incarnation began in the 1980s with an emphasis on support for alternative science. The message was still addressed to policy-makers but activities entailed a different composition of actors. During these years, the Foundation took advantage of its long-standing connections to the scientific community that had been boosted by the sequential presence on the Board of two strongly-minded rectors of Uppsala University – Torgny Segerstedt and Martin Holmdahl. The third incarnation emerged especially in the early 2000s when the Foundation´s association with civil society activists

became predominant. This is the time that the concept was redefined in advocacy terms and took on a more distinct ideological character. Sheila Coronel, a Philippine journalist and activist was elected to the Board. When she stepped down, she was succeeded by Praful Bidwai, an Indian with a similar background in journalism and public activism. These appointments confirmed the Foundation´s interest in closer ties with not only civil society at large but specifically those organizations that were ready to challenge establishment-oriented ideas and practices.

It was in this latter context that the Foundation with Board approval decided to embark on an ambitious project titled 'What Next?' Drawing on the centrality of the 'What Now?' activity in the earlier stages of the Foundation, it was deemed appropriate to revisit the development field and sketch future scenarios based on global trends in the early 21st century. Several persons, including myself, were invited to write background papers for the project, most of them subsequently published in Development Dialogue, Issue No 47 in June 2006 (What Next volume 1: setting the context). The basic premise of the project was the perceived existence of a widespread disaffection with the state of the world but the simultaneous presence of a multitude of small-scale initiatives for positive change pursued by radical civil society organizations. Another development, therefore, was coterminous with the views and practices of these actors.

'What Next?' was initiated with a view to being completed in 2005, the thirty-year anniversary of 'What Now?' Being very ambitious and involving a broad range of actors, many of whom failed to keep to deadlines, the project was delayed. Its culmination came only in September 2006 with a special forum in Uppsala dedicated to the What Next agenda. Over three hundred participants from around the world attended this highly participatory and appreciated event. It taxed the Foundation´s financial and staff resources, but it was deemed a unique gathering in which representatives of alternative development scenarios were free to engage in discourse without feeling the heavy hand of the establishment. The follow-up, however, proved less successful. Unlike the What Now project, a single document summarizing the main conclusions and principles regarding an alternative development was never published nor was the alternative future scenario that a group of authors led by Pat Mooney had drafted. Instead, it led to two more Development Dialogue issues on specific themes: No 48 (September 2006) on carbon trading, and No 52 (August 2009) on the case for pluralism. Although these separate issues contain much interesting and relevant information, I am personally disappointed that a more concise and powerful statement could not come out of the What Next project. It never produced the political punch that was anticipated.

The transition

The transition that began in 2005 was driven by three concerns that had emerged to affect the Foundation: its own program orientation; its accountability to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and, its readiness to show results.

For a long time, it seems the Ministry had paid little attention to what the Foundation was doing. As a minute item in its budget and with limited visibility in the Swedish public arena, it was left alone as long as no one publicly criticized it in a manner that could be embarrassing to the principals. Because the Ministry had more important matters to attend to, the long leash that had been allowed to roll out during the Michanek days was left untouched. To be sure, Alf Samuelsson, the State Secretary for Development Cooperation in the non-socialist government from 1991 to 1994 had challenged this arrangement but with Michanek still in control, the attempt fizzled out.

It is not quite clear what alerted senior ministry officials in 2005-06 to take a closer look at the Foundation´s program but the message that was communicated to the secretariat once Jan Eliasson had been selected as Chair was that the Foundation had lost its sense of direction. Although the Ministry in the early days of the Foundation's life had indicated that it should not focus on Hammarskjöld's work in the United Nations but rather his work in developing countries, the message from the Ministry this time was that the Foundation should devote itself to the 'true' legacy of Hammarskjöld which in its view meant his work in and for the United Nations. It should be involved with the official development and security issues at global and national levels. It was clear that the Ministry had its own strategy to enforce this. Eliasson as Board Chairman would provide the contacts and network and it encouraged Professor Peter Wallensteen, a respected professor of peace and conflict studies at Uppsala, to apply for the vacant position as Executive Director following Olle´s retirement in 2006. He was definitely very qualified for the position but his declaration in discussions with Olle and Niclas prior to being considered for appointment that he would completely overhaul the program caused a serious tempest in the secretariat. Olle and Niclas expressed their opposition to Peter and an intense informal exchange – by mouth as well as email – between Peter and the two of them took place, eventually leading Peter – who held the Dag Hammarskjöld Chair in Peace Studies at the University – to withdraw his candidacy. The leadership of the ministry seemed stunned. Annika Söder, the State Secretary, asked how it was possible that members of the secretariat had such influence on appointment matters.

This was a relevant question to ask but one that would have been superfluous with consideration of how the Foundation´s mode of operation had been allowed to evolve in the shadow of the Ministry´s own slackness when it comes to oversight. The secretariat had always been quite autonomous with the Board acting more like a rubber stamp. Although it had become more assertive in the 2000s it still met only once a year and most members, either because of living overseas or being too busy with other matters, paid little attention to management issues. The program orientation, therefore, was determined by the secretariat. When the Ministry unexpectedly began to question this orientation, it was a shock that angered the secretariat and took the Board by surprise.

With Eliasson and Wallensteen no longer under consideration, a fresh start was needed. As mentioned above, I was confirmed as Chair for two years and the Board proceeded with finding a successor to Olle. In October 2006, the Board appointed Dr Henning Melber, at the time Research Director at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, as the new ED. Henning had a long-standing interest in Dag Hammarskjöld and his work stemming to a large extent from his upbringing and political identity rooted in Namibia, once a U.N. Trust Territory. Henning had no explicit agenda but was clearly interested in responding to the challenge provided by the Ministry that the Foundation needed to develop its program in a new direction. Although he had his own contacts in the 'alternative development' community, he showed little interest in the elaborate network that Niclas had developed and that formed the core of the What Next activities.

This disagreement over program orientation within the secretariat became a painful and also demoralizing issue during the transition. Henning and Niclas rarely communicated with each other. As Chair, both informally and formally, I became the intermediary. I found myself in a quandary. On the one hand, I wanted to give full support to the incoming ED whom I had been responsible to hire; on the other, I had a lot of respect and sympathy for the work that Niclas and Olle had carried out. The program legacy of the Foundation weighed heavy on my shoulders. Henning fell back on what he considered to be his mandate by the Ministry and confirmed by the Board that he should take the Foundation in a new direction. Niclas had invested so much in developing his own program network and believed that by moving in the direction proposed by the Ministry, the Foundation would lose its exceptional status as a partner with organizations in the Global South interested in another development. Both were right and it was so frustrating for them as well as for me as Chair that they could not find agreement. Even the assistance of a management consulting firm failed

to produce a positive result. This stalemate dragged on for over a year before it became necessary to nudge Niclas towards resigning, a move that he understandably initially rejected. His move to a Swedish natural resource NGO was completed only after I had stepped down as Chair.

The Foundation´s accountability to the Ministry had been raised in conjunction with an official review in 2004 conducted by Ambassador Bengt Säve-Söderberg on how the Ministry could make better use of Swedish think tanks for its own policy work. His report incorrectly identified the Foundation as a public institution (myndighet) similar to the Nordic Africa Institute or the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute (Utrikespolitiska institutet), overlooking the fact that by law it is a philanthropic organization (stiftelse). Reference to this status was initially used by the Foundation to resist the Ministry´s attempt to pull the Foundation closer into its orbit. The secretariat, supported by the Board, argued that it is not a think tank in the conventional sense of the word and that its main role was to serve as a partnering organization seeking out collaborators in the South with interest in alternative development strategies.

This position, however, became increasingly untenable after Henning´s appointment and his interest in following up on what he saw as his mandate to take the Foundation in a new direction. A non-socialist government had come to power after the 2006 elections but its position was similar to that taken by Annika Söder and her colleagues. This became clear as I joined Henning in several meetings at the Ministry, at least a couple of times with the State Secretary, Joakim Stymne. These discussions were conducted in a friendly manner but it was evident that the Ministry would not budge on a new relationship that involved a formal and tighter accountability relation than had been the case before. An issue that arose in these discussions was the Ministry´s interest in seconding one of its own officers to the Foundation on a contractual basis. This appeared at first sight as a way of keeping a closer eye on what the Foundation is doing and met with some suspicion but it was also interpreted as a positive sign that the Ministry was now more interested in its work. The subsequent secondment of one of its officers with close knowledge of the Foundation certainly did not cause any friction and was in fact much appreciated by the staff that had taken over after Olle and Niclas.

The Ministry also insisted on a new approach to programming that would allow for monitoring and evaluating performance in a systematic manner. This was something that the secretariat had never been asked to do before. Earlier, the secretariat had often 'sniffed out' new initiatives through contacts in its network rather than some sort of annual

plan. During my time on the Board and before I became Chair, calls for an explicit program strategy and a sense of what to prioritize were made. Reports by Olle and Niclas to the Board in the early 2000s followed this formula. The Board, however, never insisted on standardizing this to the point where a specific form of project design would become a precondition for approval.

This changed with the Ministry´s insistence on greater focus on results. Funding in the future would increasingly rely on being able to demonstrate that what it sees as meaningful results had been achieved. To this effect, the Ministry made it a precondition that the Foundation (like all its financial beneficiaries) must prepare requests for money according to a log-frame model. By identifying an overall purpose and a set of specific objectives, followed by proposed activities to achieve these objectives, it would be possible to more systematically know not only outputs but also outcomes and impact. To get itself familiar with this mode of planning activities, the secretariat had to call on outside assistance to learn and practice it.

It has since been institutionalized in the Foundation´s program planning although I personally have my doubts that this is a meaningful and helpful way to make the Foundation more effective. It may help Minis-

From 1967 to 2012: Sven Hamrell, Henning Melber, Olle Nordberg and Niclas Hällström.

try officers to make a quick read of what its beneficiaries are doing and achieving but it is a poor fit for the Foundation whose work really isn´t best assessed and measured in the context of a narrow log-frame model. There are so many intangibles that not only influence implementation but also determine outputs and outcomes. The urge to standardize, in my view, has in this case more drawbacks than advantages.

Conclusions

The Foundation made the transition. It is now on a new path. It is no longer the body that Sven and Olle created. It is no longer in search of another development as defined by civil society activists. Nor is it planning large and ambitious projects like 'What Next?' This does not mean that it has turned its back on civil society, but it approaches such organizations in a more instrumental manner, assessing how their cooperation with the Foundation will enhance what is, if not a mainstream, nonetheless a more establishment-oriented perspective on the issues that concerned Hammarskjöld the most while heading the United Nations. This reorientation reflects both Ministry directives and the interest of the current ED. Although Henning has spent much of his professional life in Africa and has been socialized to a large extent by his membership in the anti-colonial liberation movement of Namibia since the mid-1970s, he is more comfortable in promoting projects in cooperation with other research-based partners. He has also been more anxious than his predecessors to ensure that the Foundation is visible on the Swedish scene, e.g. through organization of seminars and other events in Stockholm and Uppsala taking advantage of official visitors.

Some people familiar with the Foundation over the years have expressed regret about the changes that have occurred. Others have appreciated it. This is inevitable and reflects a reality that I experienced during my days in the Ford Foundation. During that time, Ford shifted from providing support for strengthening public administration in governments to funding civil society organizations. This was seen by many as a step away from the influence it had established in governments. At the same time it eventually became clear that the new direction in support of organizations that would strengthen democracy and human rights was the right one. Several years after the Ford Foundation began its support of governance in the early 1980s it turned into a mainstream phenomenon in the international donor community. An organization that wants to be on the frontline while still remaining relevant must every now and then shed its skin and reinvent itself. The more it can do so on its own rather than being pushed by circumstances, the more likely that it will make a meaningful contribution to its cause.

The longest serving staff member: Olle Nordberg, Associate Director and Executive Director, who retired as Senior Advisor in 2007.

What Next Forum at Uppsala Castle, 2006

Convening Thinkers and Doers: Sweden's Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation[1]

Ted Trzyna

'A good cash flow of ideas'

'We have a good cash flow of ideas,' Sven Hamrell says. He stresses the point by folding his arms and grinning at me over his glasses. He is sixtyish, of medium height, round face, thinning black hair, quiet eyes. He speaks with a lilting Swedish accent.

For more than twenty years, Sven Hamrell has directed the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, an organization concerned with issues of international development cooperation. 'Development' is a word often surrounded by polemic; in its highest sense it means assuring people in every corner of the world of the means of survival and the elements of human dignity. The foundation was created in 1962 as Sweden's national memorial to Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations from 1953 until his death in a plane crash on a mission to the Congo.

Hammarskjöld was a remarkable man. His biographer, Sir Brian Urquhart, a Briton who worked closely with him and was UN Under Secretary General for many years, wrote on the twenty-fifth anniversary

1 A chapter from *The Power of Convening: Collaborative Policy Forums for Sustainable Development: Proceedings of an international workshop* held at Claremont, California, October 5-7, 1989

of Hammarskjöld's death that his 'integrity, force of character, and intellect were combined with exceptional diplomatic skill, ingenuity, and persistence...I know of no other political leader who so effectively turned his intellectual gifts to the solution of practical problems.' Hammarskjöld was also a very private man who had a strong mystical side; he left behind the manuscript of a spiritual diary to be published after his death (called *Markings* in the English edition, it has sold over a half million copies).

Meetings may seem frail weapons to use against poverty, ignorance, and injustice, but properly done they have power to clarify issues and mobilize people.

The headquarters of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation are in Uppsala, forty-five miles directly north of Stockholm. Uppsala is one of the oldest towns in Sweden, and its university is the oldest in Scandinavia. The foundation's offices are at the edge of the university campus in a wood mansion dating from the 1730s. Down the street is 16th century Uppsala Castle; a short way in the other direction is a tall Gothic cathedral. It is appropriate for the foundation to be located in Uppsala, because Dag Hammarskjöld grew up in Uppsala Castle as the son of the local governor and graduated from Uppsala University.

An organization created as the official memorial to a respected world figure has a kind of instant dignity. The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation also gains from Sweden's special role in international politics, a role that is far more important than its population of eight million would indicate. Historically neutral, Sweden does not belong to any of the world's power blocs. But for years the Swedes have had an activist foreign policy, promoting arms control, championing human rights, and taking part in more UN peacekeeping operations than any other country. The Swedes have had a strong interest in international development. Since 1975, their national policy has been to set aside an amount equivalent to one percent of the gross national product for aid to developing countries. They haven't always succeeded, but Sweden consistently ranks with the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark as one of the top donor countries in the world.

'In touch with the Universe!'

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation holds conferences, workshops, and seminars on issues facing developing countries. Meetings may seem frail weapons to use against poverty, ignorance, and injustice, but properly done they have power to clarify issues and mobilize people. The foundation holds from two to six meetings each year, both in Uppsala and developing parts of the world, and disseminates the results in a well-edited and attractively printed English-language journal called *Development Dialogue: A Journal of International Development Cooperation*. The journal is regularly sent to about eight thousand key people and

organizations in the developing world and another six thousand in other countries; another five thousand or so are distributed to people who have a special interest in a particular subject. There are also occasional books and reports, and some material has been issued in other languages.

Sven Hamrell has been the foundation's director since 1967. His original plan was to be an academic scholar. He went to the United States to study political science and philosophy at Bowdoin College in Maine and stayed on to do graduate work at the New School for Social Research in New York City. This was in the late '40s – intellectually exciting times at the New School. While there, he got to know such figures as the leftist political writer Dwight Macdonald, literary critic Lionel Trilling, and the great conservative political philosopher Leo Strauss. (This exposure to diverse opinions probably helped give Hamrell an unusual ability to respect different points of view and a propensity to look for common ground.) He headed the African Institute in Uppsala before coming to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. When he looks at friends of the same age who pursued conventional academic careers, he considers himself lucky: 'They are now university administrators, I am in touch with the universe!'

To Americans, Swedes sometimes seem slow to warm to new acquaintances. There is a saying that a Swede is like a bottle of ketchup. First you get nothing, then nothing, then it all comes at once. Hamrell requires little shaking. He is animated, enthusiastic, open, candid. And, unlike many people in this line of work, he is a homebody, traveling only two months out of the year. He speaks often of his wife, Sonja Lyttkens, a mathematician and painter, and their five children.

Before Hamrell took its reins in 1967, the foundation conducted traditional training courses in diplomacy, economics, international law, and development planning. This soon began to change. First, Hamrell started organizing comprehensive projects that included research, meetings, and dissemination of results. Then, gradually, he began focusing on alternatives to the accepted ways of doing things. It was beginning to be clear to many people in the late '60's and early '70's that the problems of developing countries were all too poorly understood and that conventional development assistance had helped little on the ground and, in fact, often actually aggravated poverty and destroyed natural resources. During this period, the foundation started to explore new approaches to nutrition, child care, rural development, refugee problems, and international economic cooperation, and looked at the potential for film and correspondence instruction.

This early experience crystallized in what was called the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project on Development and International Cooperation. It was carried out as a crash project in less than five months to contribute to discussions at a special session on development of the United Nations General Assembly. Nonetheless, it was a serious and major undertaking, involving 120 leading scholars and policy-makers from many countries and major meetings in Uppsala, The Hague, Algiers, and New York. The project synthesized and gave structure to important earlier work, but drew conclusions based on its own studies as well. It was directed by Marc Nerfin, a Swiss who headed the International Foundation for Development Alternatives.

Since the mid-'70s, the foundation has concentrated on elaborating the theory and practice of 'Another Development' in health, law, education, finance, energy, urban renewal, community participation, human rights, and many other fields, and in specific countries and regions of the developing world.

The main report of this project, which was called *What Now: Another Development,* forms the intellectual basis of the work of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The report is written in plain and forceful language. What it calls 'Another Development' is development that 'is (1) Need-oriented – being geared to the satisfaction of man's needs, both material and nonmaterial; (2) Endogenous – stemming from the heart of each society, which defines in sovereignty its values and the vision of its future; (3) Self-reliant – relying on the strength and resources of the society which pursues it, rooted at the local level in the practice of each community; (4) Ecologically sound – utilizing rationally available resources in a harmonious relation with the environment; (5) Based on structural transformations – originating in the realization of the conditions for self-management and participation in decision-making by all.'

These were meant to be very general guidelines, and it was understood that, as with any list of principles, there would be conflicts among them. Hamrell sees 'Another Development' as cutting across all of the usual ideological categories, including capitalism and socialism.

Since the mid-'70s, the foundation has concentrated on elaborating the theory and practice of 'Another Development' in health, law, education, finance, energy, urban renewal, community participation, human rights, and many other fields, and in specific countries and regions of the developing world.

Success stories: Information policy

I am sitting with Hamrell in a cozy lounge on the second floor of the foundation's headquarters. This is my second trip to Uppsala and it is early fall; through a large window I can see red leaves dropping from some maple trees in a courtyard. The house has spacious offices, a conference room with a couple of dozen chairs around a long table, and a small library containing a selection of international documents and journals of political opinion. On the walls are sketches by Hamrell's artist wife, bright

woven pieces from Africa and South America; and some photographs by Dag Hammarskjöld of Swedish mountain and coastal scenes.

I ask Hamrell what accomplishments he is most proud of. The foundation's work in information policy is one. In 1975, when they were about to release the report, *What Now: Another Development,* Hamrell and Nerfin weren't sure how to go about getting the right kind of publicity. Their original idea was to hold a traditional press conference at the United Nations in New York, but they thought the reporters from Western countries who dominate the UN press corps would pan the report or ignore it. They decided instead to hold a special seminar limited to journalists from developing countries.

Then, Hamrell and Nerfin discovered there were only a handful of journalists from the developing world who regularly covered United Nations affairs. They ended up paying travel expenses to New York for ten journalists from Algeria, Chile, India, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Venezuela. Presumably, the journalists sent home some good articles. More importantly in the long run, they got to know each other and agreed on a statement that eventually led to change.

The journalists' main finding was that there was a 'near-monopoly' of international communications by transnational corporations, and that such companies dominated, or at least influenced, almost all communications media in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. What this means is best shown by example. In a paper prepared for the New York seminar, Fernando Reyes Matta of the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies reported on a study he made of a representative sample of sixteen leading newspapers from fourteen countries in Latin America. He determined that 62 percent of the international news items they printed came from UPI, AP, and other North American sources, and another 32 percent from European agencies. Reyes chose November 25, 1975 for his study, the day on which Suriname became independent from The Netherlands. None of the papers he surveyed considered the event important enough to send a special correspondent. Most of them simply printed a UPI dispatch, often on an inside page. A key Brazilian paper, *O Estado de São Paulo,* gave more importance to stories about a New York jewelry robbery, the situation in the Western Sahara, and the development of the Soviet Far East – even though Brazil has a common border with Suriname. Reyes asked: 'How is it that the declaration of independence of a country as large as Uruguay or Ecuador... received so little attention in the Latin American press?' Moreover, he claimed, there was a consistent bias in the content of news about Latin America coming from press agencies in the industrialized countries: colonial stereotypes were perpetuated; conflict

was emphasized (it has more 'news value' than cooperation); economic news stressed the protection of foreign investments, the flow of natural resources to the outside world (bauxite in the case of Suriname), and other issues of interest to North Americans and Europeans. Reyes concluded: 'Whereas the region is significantly ignorant of its own realities, it is flooded by information which is either irrelevant or has little bearing on its future. Similarly, there is much ignorance about what is happening in other Third World regions.'

The journalists recommended setting up an information service to serve developing country needs. One eventual result was a daily news bulletin covering issues before the United Nations from a developing-country perspective. This *Special United Nations Service,* also known as the 'Yellow Sheet,' was started in 1981 and published for almost a decade by Marc Nerfin's Geneva-based International Foundation for Development Alternatives, in cooperation with a consortium of developing-country journalists, Inter Press Service. Regrettably, it has now ceased publication for lack of funding.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation held more meetings on information policy over the next few years, including two conferences that explored how to encourage homegrown book publishing industry in Africa. African book publishing has been dominated by big European publishing houses that have not always been sensitive to cultural differences (the 'Africanization' of western textbooks was summed up by a Nigerian librarian as follows: 'although Jack and Jill may be metamorphosed into Okeke and Ada, they may be found still drinking their pint of milk every morning'). Again, the foundations' involvement wasn't limited to convening a meeting or issuing a declaration. Hamrell, following up on conference recommendations, helped set up an independent revolving fund in Kenya that is providing guaranteed loans to aspiring indigenous publishers. The foundation is represented on the board of this organization and will continue to look for ways of being of assistance in the same way in other African countries.

The influence that transnational corporations have over communications media in the developing world has sometimes been an excuse for imposing government controls. The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has consistently worked for pluralism and diversity in communications. 'This implies,' Hamrell has written, 'that the means to communicate – be they editorial, technical, or financial in nature – should be available to all sectors of society, and that no particular group, whatever its values or constituency, should be in a position to control a predominant share of the flow.' He thinks his organization has had a positive influence on the sometimes-acrimonious international debate about government control of the media.

But influencing a debate about abstract principles is one thing; having an effect on the ground is quite another. In Africa, the foundation is trying to encourage 'autonomous' publishing in a continent dominated by one-party states and military dictatorships. There was little discussion at the foundation's 1984 seminar on African publishing about the problems of state censorship or self-censorship from fear of reprisal. For those at the meeting, 'autonomous' publishing seems to have meant passing economic control to local shareholders or government authorities; 'democracy' meant cultural independence. Words sometimes signify different things in the developing world. It will be interesting to see whether the new loan fund can help to start a few truly independent publishing houses in Africa. Perhaps the foundation can only plant some seeds.

Success stories: Health policy

Unlike other policy issues, health issues had not been an active concern of the larger community. The foundation's project aimed at breaking down the barriers.

Another success story Hamrell is fond of relating is a 1977 meeting on global health. By that time, the international community had at least talked a great deal about other basic needs – food, housing, and education – but health had not become a priority in the same sense. The foundation thought that health should be viewed as an integral part of individual and social development. The key would be direct community involvement in health decisions. These were somewhat radical ideas. Health has been the exclusive preserve of a professional class, the medical profession. Unlike other policy issues, health issues have not been an active concern of the larger community. The foundation's project aimed at breaking down the barriers.

Hamrell brought together seventeen carefully selected people for a five-day seminar on 'Another Development in Health' in Uppsala in June 1977. The participants included social scientists, medical doctors, and policy-makers from Argentina, Guinea-Bissau, India, Mexico, Mozambique, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the United States, and Zambia, as well as the World Health Organization. The seminar was directed by two M.D.s from Sweden and India.

The papers presented there illustrate how the foundation conducts its meetings; the speakers represented a diversity of viewpoints and drew largely from practical experience: Valentina Borremans, a Mexican colleague of Ivan Illich (who had worked with him on his book, Medical Nemesis, a highly critical analysis of western health care, argued that there are as many kinds of health as there are cultures; she called for letting people determine their own health needs, rather than trying to impose 'universal health' which creates a dependency. Eleuther Tarimo, a senior Tanzanian health official, talked about his country's experience with an official health policy of self-reliance, and the potential

(and limits) of traditional medicine. D. Banerji, a professor of medicine from India, related how colonialism destroyed India's traditional health culture and imposed a western system of medicine that was inappropriate to the country's needs; he linked people-oriented health services to a 'just social order.' Zafrullah Chowdhury, a Balgladeshi M.D., told how his pioneering rural health center links health care to nutrition and family planning. Other speakers gave accounts of projects in rural Finland and a black ghetto in Chicago.

The participants concluded that there should be a 'redefinition' of the health-care concept: 'Health is a human condition which cannot be 'delivered' by health-care systems. No lasting improvement can be achieved through development of medical services alone. Health is the responsibility of the individual, the community, and the government as a whole. It is therefore ultimately a political question. In some countries, significant changes in health will be possible only through fundamental social and economic change.' Their statement also called for 'total trust in people's own ability to cope with their health problems, to express their felt needs, and to decide their health-care priorities. Trusting the people means that health care must start with the people. It means respect for people's own healing practices until better alternative methods which are acceptable to them are found.'

It is rarely possible to trace the intellectual descent of a policy decision to one source, but Hamrell believes the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's 1977 seminar had a crucial role in changing the direction of international health policy.

These were not entirely original ideas (Ivan Illich, for one, had been thinking along these lines for several years), but Hamrell's timing was excellent. The seminar served as a catalyst, bringing some important thinkers together with a few decision-makers who were ready to listen to new approaches. Among those present was Halfdan Mahler, a Dane who was then Director-General of the World Health Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations whose annual budget of about $375 million is directed mainly toward helping developing countries improve their health-care systems.

The following year, WHO held a major intergovernmental conference on primary health care, in Alma-Ata, in then-Soviet Kazakhstan. The conference ended with the delegates voting for a major shift in WHO's focus, away from a traditional preoccupation with traditional medical issues to devoting more attention to social and environmental causes of illness and promoting indigenous health resources. The 'Declaration of Alma-Ata,' as it became known, also included the statement that 'The people have the right and duty to participate individually and collectively in the planning and implementation of their health care.' These are now among the basic principles that guide the World Health Organization.

It is rarely possible to trace the intellectual descent of a policy decision to one source, but Hamrell believes the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's 1977 seminar had a crucial role in changing the direction of international health policy.

'We have a lot of friends and we drink together'

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has a budget of about $750,000 a year and – at least until recently – few worries about raising funds; it has an endowment and regular appropriations from the Swedish government. But the organization is able to accomplish many things with this money and does so with a staff of only two professionals (Hamrell and associate director Olle Nordberg, who has been there nearly as long) and two full-time and one half-time secretaries.

This is even more remarkable because the staff is constantly shifting focus from one subject to another. In one recent year, for example, the foundation held a workshop in Kenya on publishing, a seminar in Uppsala on pharmaceuticals, and a meeting in Lesotho on development in southern Africa. It also helped to organize three separate workshops in Chile and Brazil on economic aspects of 'development on a human scale.' Two numbers of *Development Dialogue* were issued, totaling 365 pages, as well as a French translation of papers on women's role in development.

Hamrell prefers a small organization. That way, 'there are no personnel problems – we all know each other,' he said. Smallness also gives flexibility; none of his projects has really failed, he explained, because he can make adjustments quickly. He and Nordberg work hand in glove ('He knows everything I know and I know everything he knows') and they spend a full hour every day having coffee with the secretaries to share information.

When I first met Hamrell, I asked him how his little group was able to do so much. He was only half-joking when he replied, 'We have a lot of friends and we drink together.'

'Choosing the right people is half the job'

The foundation seems more like a club than an institution, although it has the usual board of trustees, distinguished advisory committee, and other formal trappings. Continuity is an important part of the formula. Many of the same people keep appearing in projects year after year: Marc Nerfin, for example; Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef,

who runs the Development Alternatives Center in Santiago; and several Swedes. 'We keep in touch all the time,' Hamrell said. 'We are loyal to each other. People remember their past history of working together. This is extremely valuable.'

The seminars and workshops are at the center of the process. Again, Hamrell likes to have a small group in which people can get to know each other. Twenty is the ideal size, he thinks, although he has had as many as thirty and as few as fourteen.

What we want is 'thoughtful practitioners and practical-minded scholars,' always with a broad spectrum of viewpoints. A typical meeting will include people from government and politics, universities, independent institutes, and voluntary associations.

'Choosing the right people is half the job,' Hamrell told me. Who is invited depends on the matters to be discussed. The mix is important. What he wants is 'thoughtful practitioners and practical-minded scholars,' always with a broad spectrum of viewpoints. A typical meeting will include people from government and politics, universities, independent institutes, and voluntary associations; there may also be journalists, church people, or doctors. Candidates are chosen mainly through the foundation's network. Hamrell has tried to be more systematic by asking for nominations from institutions, but this hasn't worked out very well.

The invitation list rarely includes people in top government positions. 'We leave that to the large international organizations,' Hamrell said. However, when big names will help, the foundation has no trouble attracting them. In 1985, a seminar on 'Another Development' in southern Africa was opened and attended by King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho (Moshoeshoe, who was educated at Oxford, later asked the foundation to put on a special seminar in the royal palace on 'Another Development' as it applies to the particular needs of his country.) And in 1986, three former presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela helped the foundation launch a new nongovernmental organization called the South American Commission for Peace, Regional Security, and Democracy, which works to reduce the military expenditures of South American governments to make more funds available for social purposes (this was done in cooperation with the Latin American Institute for Transnational Studies).

The foundation's meetings usually last three or four days, although Hamrell has been experimenting with 'phased seminars' that bring the same group together several months apart. The sessions are held in pleasant settings with good food and drink. Speakers are asked to draft 'lead papers,' which take positions on issues and usually suggest some action to be taken; these are meant to stimulate discussion. The draft papers are reviewed by outside experts before the meeting.

The goal is always to have a frank exchange of opinion that is rarely possible in large or official forums. Hamrell also tries to achieve a consensus. 'This is not as difficult as one might think,' he told me, 'but we must be absolutely honest and we always take great care to ensure a democratic process.' The foundation will not reveal what goes on at a meeting unless the speakers agree to it; this enables participants to speak candidly and is especially important for those from countries with authoritarian regimes. The agreed 'summary conclusions' are edited for style back in Uppsala and then sent out to those who attended the meeting for final approval. These are eventually published in *Development Dialogue*, but their main purpose is to help the participants think. 'They have more impact on the people who participated than on the world,' Hamrell said. 'I'm not sure they are very much used. I don't see them quoted very much, actually.'

In fact, the foundation gets little direct feedback. I suspect this is mainly because of the shifting nature of its program; the organization works as a catalyst in one field and then moves on to another. It never stays around long enough to be perceived as a resource on any single subject. Hamrell and his colleagues like to follow up on seminar recommendations – and can be quite aggressive in doing so – but only to a point. They avoid making continuing commitments. They would rather encourage other groups to take action, or help set up a new organization, as they did in the case of the African book publishing funds and the South American peace commission. 'We do our thing,' Hamrell explained. Outreach 'becomes a full-time job.' He would rather leave that to others.

When I asked Hamrell how he decides what to do next, he replied, 'We basically work on hunches and intuitions. We use our network, and visitors come all the time. There are really too many good ideas. But, you know, I think if I tried to explain the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, I might spoil it. The foundation's process is extraordinarily complex – very, very complex. And if we tried to inquire too deeply into how it works, into the secret of our success, it would not be a good thing. There is an intangible chemistry about it, a mystery. It wouldn't be good to try to cut it apart.'

'Mystery,' 'loyalty,' and 'democracy' are words that Sven Hamrell uses often. If he were still alive, Dag Hammarskjöld would no doubt approve of the organization that bears his name.

Henning Melber at Dag Hammarskjöld's Backåkra. Dag Hammarskjöld himself was very interested in tourism and was once the vice president of the Swedish Tourist Association.

Tourism, Development and the Foundation

Andrew Wigley

In 1969 and 1970, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation ran two four-week workshops, some of the first of their kind anywhere, to help equip African officials charged with building tourism sectors. This was a departure from the foundation's previous capacity-building programmes geared towards governance and law-making and heralded a progressive expansion of its work and remit.

Given the importance attached to the workshop and to this new and exciting sector, the foundation hosted civil servants from across Africa, and particularly East Africa, which was seen as an emerging international tourist hotspot. The 1960s had been the 'decade of development' and tourism was seen by many to have a part to play. The United Nations christened 1967 the International Year of Tourism, and its catchy tagline *Passport to Peace* reflected the optimism that tourism fostered greater understanding among peoples.

By running the seminar, the foundation's objective was to acquaint participants with the most up-to-date developments and trends in international travel and tourism.

Why Tourism?

Travel was part and parcel of the European colonial adventure. Colonialism, it has been argued by Edward Said and others, was a form of tourism and the foundations of modern tourism in Africa were laid by European colonialism. The alluring appeal of the 'other' and the 'exotic' had found its expression in art and literature throughout history and was a compelling by-product of empire building. Travel had been the preserve of the few – the adventurous, the privileged and the wealthy. That began to change in the second half of the 19th century when the British entrepreneur, preacher and social reformer, Thomas Cook, seized on the interest aroused by empire and began offering Britons 'package tours' to the Holy Land and Egypt.

In 1880, the Egyptian government gave Thomas Cook exclusive control of all passenger steamers up and down the Nile. Such was the com-

pany's commercial influence, that writer and journalist G.W. Steevens quipped that Egypt's 'nominal governor is the Khedive, its real governor...is Thomas Cook'.

Thomas Cook's travel business became an institution in the British empire and had huge commercial success. Travel, Cook believed, was an agent of democratisation. His excursions were conducted on the principle of 'the greatest benefit for the greatest number at the lowest cost'. Yet until the Second World War, overseas travel defiantly remained a pastime of the wealthy.

Hilde Vanstraelen

From 1945, tourism consistently grew its share of the world market by 10 per cent year on year. By the end of the 1960s, the sector was firmly established as one of the largest economic activities in the world.

It wasn't until the postwar years that Thomas Cook's vision of travel for all began to be realised. Writing in *The Times* in April 1946, Stanley Adams observed that 'the urge to travel is sweeping the people of this land and other war-weary lands like an epidemic'. From 1945, tourism consistently grew its share of the world market by 10 per cent year on year. By the end of the 1960s, the sector was firmly established as one of the largest economic activities in the world, with an estimated value of $18 billion dollars. By 1970, it was estimated that 6 per cent of global receipts were generated by tourism.

Tourism's postwar boom can be largely attributed to two impulses. First, significant technological advances began to transform the scope of and opportunity for travel. In particular, it was the advent of the jet passenger aircraft that revolutionised travel. The de Havilland Comet was the first commercial jet airliner, and commenced scheduled service between London and Johannesburg in 1952. Countries, destinations and resorts that had previously required days to reach by air were now accessible in a fraction of the time.

Second, Americans had an enormous appetite for travelling the world and spending their much-sought after dollars. This 'soft diplomacy' was part of Washington's postwar policy to establish firmly America's influence in a new era of superpower might. Such was the recognition that tourism would play its part in securing Western interests in the Cold War that Roosevelt and Churchill discussed it during the Second World War. Post war, the U.S. Marshall Plan placed some emphasis on stimulating economic recovery through 'the efficient and economical medium of tourist travel'. This self-interest was spelled out by President Truman's undersecretary of commerce, C.V. Whitney, when he stated, 'we realise that under present circumstances greater stress should be placed upon the stimulation of American travel abroad. This will do much to create much needed dollar exchange'.

Tourism in Africa

Africa was no exception to the American and European appetite for travel. In the early postwar years, a flourishing tourist industry existed in South Africa and North Africa. France had successfully established seasonal tourism in its protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia: French elites would journey across the Mediterranean to decamp for the winter. The tourism economy was established by colonialists for colonialists. Tourism took hold, therefore, where there were significant colonialist communities. By its very nature, it was elitist: Africans had neither the finance nor the cultural capital to invest in this new sector.

The emergence of postwar colonial tourism was, perhaps, most apparent in East Africa. The British-governed East Africa Commission largely left the development of tourism to the private sector. The East Africa Travel and Touring Association (EATTA) was established in 1946 to represent the industry's interests and lobby government on issues such as the import for tourism rentals of American automobiles considered more reliable than British vehicles in dealing with the rough African bush. Strapped for cash, the British authorities resisted the move strenuously, not wanting to make dollar payments with a devalued sterling. The stand-off continued for a number of years until EATTA succeeded in highlighting the harm it was doing to holiday travel in the region. Another challenge in the immediate postwar years was the insufficiency of hotel accommodation, which meant that the region was unable to handle sizeable inflows of tourists. The region's tourism sector effectively soft-pedalled until the late 1950s, by which time more hotel accommodation had become available and other infrastructure was starting to be put in place.

The Belgian Congo offers a contrasting story. Not discouraged by its own dearth of hotel accommodation, the Belgian Congo embarked on a sustained campaign through the 1940s and 1950s to promote its tourism industry. Armed with sophisticated marketing literature and tourist offices spanning 11 countries on three continents, the Belgian colonial authorities were keen to showcase tourism in the 'model colony' with a view to highlighting both the natural attractions of the country as well as the social and economic achievements of colonialism. A distinctly politicised tourist proposition promoting the Belgian empire to domestic and international audiences, this was statecraft. Yet, a combination of lack of hotel accommodation and tight visa controls kept tourist numbers to fewer than 12,000 in 1957, compared to 60,000 in East Africa.

An important aspect of colonial Africa's tourism development was the emergence of the national park. Africa's first national park was established

by the Belgian colonial authorities over a vast area spanning 2,000,000 acres in the Great Rift Valley. The Prince Albert National Park (today known as the Virunga National Park) was established by royal decree in 1925, followed soon after by the Kruger National Park in South Africa. Many more were to be established, often with the dual mandate of fostering scientific research and accommodating tourism, insofar as the latter was compatible with nature conservation. From the outset, tensions existed between conservationists running the national parks and those exerting political pressure to allow increased numbers of tourists into an area dedicated to the primary well-being of animals.



With tourism on the rise, the 1950s saw a plethora of national parks established across Africa and swelling ranks of tourists – colonial and extra-territorial – coming to the continent largely to shoot game on camera.

With tourism on the rise, the 1950s saw a plethora of national parks established across Africa and swelling ranks of tourists – colonial and extra-territorial – coming to the continent largely to shoot game on camera. With conservation and greater understanding of the causes of the massive depletion of Africa's wildlife, game-hunting became less fashionable and was increasingly criticised, although specific tourism programmes furnished shooting expeditions, notably led by the Belgian Congo, which, among other initiatives, hosted its International Big Game Hunting Competition in 1956.

By the 1960s, expectations continued to be raised about tourism's allure and prospect for future financial returns. Faced with declining earnings from the export of agricultural products to developed countries, with rising populations and an urgent need for accelerated economic growth and structural change, African countries were searching for new channels for supplementing their foreign-exchange earnings from traditional exports. Tourism was viewed as a panacea for some of those enormous economic challenges. It also allowed newly independent African nations to begin building their profile and standing in an increasingly crowded marketplace: airlines, national tourist offices and other flag carriers were to play their part in the diplomatic offensive. This was a clear continuation of the Belgian colonial authorities' policy to use tourism as part of a wider effort to 'brand' the nation.

It all seemed so easy. Of course, the ease with which it was possible for a nation to set itself up as a global tourism destination was illusory. The notion that small investments could immediately create a lot of employment and guarantee quick returns was, on reflection, implausible but not uncommon in the 1960s. Foreign revenues, it was argued, generated by tourism promised to play a decisive role in economic development. This glib assessment overlooked the heavy investments required primarily in infrastructure, an infrastructure, moreover that would benefit tourists and only tourists. In addition, the bigger the

ambitions and plans, the greater the costs. Scales of economy in tourism simply didn't work in quite the same way as in other industry sectors.

International policymakers struggled to grasp the opportunities and impacts of a sector that spanned transportation, hotel, infrastructure and hospitality as well as the environment and conservation. This was compounded in Africa by the very serious lack of skilled economists and policy experts in the post-independence years. Some African countries fared better than others, but the continent's main colonial legacy was a debilitating dearth of 'human capital'.

Consequently, the strategic expertise, investment and principal revenue-earners in Africa's tourism industry were rarely Africans. Rather, they were Westerners, often former colonials who still controlled, or had significant interests in, the sector. For example, by 1970 in Kenya, of the more than 60 safari firms operating in Nairobi, only one was wholly African owned. Hotels were often owned by international chains and managed by expatriates. The employment opportunities from tourism for Africans often took the form of low-skilled service roles. As a result, the economic benefits were all too modest.

The nagging doubt for many African leaders was that tourism, in its many guises, served as another form of neo-colonialism, a concern expressed by Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere, when he opened a public debate in February 1970 about the compatibility of tourism with his policy of socialism and self-reliance.

The seminar and its proceedings

DHF hosted its first tourism seminar in 1969, which was also dedicated by the UN as the International Year of African Tourism. Yet the UN, which served to provide expertise for capacity building, was ill-equipped to advise on how these new African countries might manage and leverage the sector. Until the UN's World Tourism Organisation emerged in 1974, sector expertise was largely split across a number of UN bodies, including the Economic and Social Commission, UN Development Programme and the UN's International Civil Aviation Organisation.

Planning for the seminar began in earnest in the autumn of 1968 when the then director of the foundation attended the UN's inter-regional seminar on tourism development in Switzerland. This allowed him to talk to experts in tourism. Crucially, Robert Gardiner, the then executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), was

convinced by DHF's seminar proposal and made ECA resources available to the foundation.

These included Vojislav Popovic, one of the few UN experts on tourism, who was based at the ECA in Addis Ababa. Popovic played a key role in delivering the seminar, leading many of the discussion sessions. From the outset, it was agreed the purpose of the seminar was to look at very practical aspects of tourism planning and development. This included exploring contemporary trends in world tourism and the key characteristics of the main tourism-generating markets. A heavy focus of discussion was the United States.

Popovic told participants that in 1967, 145 million Americans took a vacation. Most holidayed in the US, but 18 per cent of the population (20 million or so) travelled overseas. This, he argued, presented enormous opportunities for Africa. Popovic went on to observe that the tourist attractions that appealed to the European public did not have necessarily the same effect on American tourists', explaining that the US did not lack fine beaches, high mountains and beautiful lakes. US tourists, he cautioned, might show only a limited interest in such attractions in Africa, but they were genuinely 'interested in people, their way of life, both modern and traditional, old customs, folk dances and songs, old architecture…and with good promotion a considerably larger number of American tourists may become equally interested in wildlife'.

Popovic also advised his African audience that the pattern of American travel differed considerably from European tourist travel. A stay on a beach at the end of a charter flight, with a short visit to a game park or the nearest city, would hardly appeal to American tourists. 'When they start on a trip overseas they are likely to visit a range of countries and stay in each only a few days. During such a short stay in each country they visit only the main highlights', he explained, recommending that this should be kept in mind when planning facilities and programmes for American tourists and promoting travel in the North American market.

The point Popovic was making was that cooperation would best serve the region's tourist industry, rather than viewing neighbouring countries as competitors. In this, he was touching a contentious issue indeed.

East Africa's tourism development had kicked off in earnest in the 1920s. At the time, Kenya was the hub of much of that traffic, owing to its sizeable colonial population. Unlike Uganda, it had access to the coast, and Mombasa was the region's principal port of entry. Tanzania had only recently become a British mandate following the First World

War and had a smaller colonial community. The EATTA's establishment to represent the tourism and travel sector in the region mirrored the founding by British colonial authorities of the East Africa Commission, which was a 'body-corporate' with executive powers designed to co-ordinate key economic and infrastructure activities at an intra-regional level. The commission, which had its seat in Nairobi, was composed of the governors of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and was chaired by the governor of Kenya.

In other words, until decolonisation East Africa's key political and economic decision-making was anchored in Kenya, which also served as the region's transportation hub. In the early 1960s, over 70 per cent of East Africa's tourists were visiting Kenya, although statistics are unreliable about how many of those tourists then travelled on to other countries. In an era of independence, this created a sense that tourism to the region benefited Kenya disproportionately. Consequently, Tanzania pulled the financial plug on EATTA in 1965 after concluding it did little to serve its own tourist industry. This rumbling irritation played its part in the 1977 closing by Tanzania of its border with Kenya, thereby dealing a heavy blow to Popovic's ambition to encourage East African countries to work in concert to build region-wide tourism.

Another sign of the programme's innovative quality was the decision to dedicate the last week to a study trip to Tunisia, considered to be in the vanguard of tourism development in Africa.

The seminar also examined how tourism development and economic planning were interconnected in the tourist-receiving countries, as well as devoting time to 'the product"', in other words resorts, hotels, air transport services, excursions facilities and the like. Financing of tourism projects, the role of the government in tourism development, marketing and promotion were all addressed during the four week seminar.

Radosaw Marczak

Another sign of the programme's innovative quality was the decision to dedicate the last week to a study trip to Tunisia, considered to be in the vanguard of tourism development in Africa. The purpose was to illustrate by practical example some of the problems that had been discussed over the previous three weeks. The Tunisia leg of the programme included visits to different types of hotels, a study of various types of holiday resorts and lectures on the financing of the country's tourism industry.

Funded entirely by DHF, 16 representatives of government ministries and other tourism authorities arrived in Uppsala in 1969 from Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Their contribution was a reflection of Africa at the time. Ivy League-educated economists rubbed shoulders with less experienced, less educated civil servants, but all charged with the common purpose of shaping tourism in their home countries. Not a great deal is known

Justin Sloan

Not a great deal is known about the Africans who attended the seminar although, for several reasons, the most memorable participant was a representative of the Kenyan Tourism Development Corporation (KTDC), Barack Hussein Obama, father of the 44th US president.

about the Africans who attended the seminar although, for several reasons, the most memorable participant was a representative of the Kenyan Tourism Development Corporation (KTDC), Barack Hussein Obama, father of the 44th US president.

Obama had completed university education in the United States, first at the University of Honolulu before going on to study for a PhD in economics at Harvard (he didn't complete his PhD but graduated with a Masters). His talents were quickly spotted back in Kenya, where he worked for the ministry of transport and then the ministry of finance before joining the KTDC. A young Olle Nordberg, then an intern at the foundation, was dispatched to Stockholm airport to meet the KTDC participant. He remembers Obama bounding off the plane and boldly announcing he wanted to meet Sweden's Princess Christina, who had studied at Harvard's sister college, Radcliffe. Obama is remembered for his big personality and loquacious style.

Like other participants, Obama was invited to make a presentation to the seminar on tourism development in Kenya. He spoke about the role of KTDC, and highlighted a number of sensitive challenges for the Kenyan authorities. First, sufficient accommodation continued to be a pressing issue. Visitors to Kenya rose at an average of 20 per cent per annum between 1961 and 1967, and growth was forecast to continue at a similar rate until 1974. Demand was fast outpacing accommodation. Private sector investment in new hotel builds was slow, so KTDC invested considerable sums to foster confidence in the tourist sector and hoped it would serve as an economic catalyst. Accommodation was a recurring theme in many of the presentations given by the participants.

Second, Africanisation. Obama spelt out how the tourist industry was mostly in the hands of expatriates or non-indigenous residents and explained that 'we cannot depend on these investors for the development of tourism which happens to be such an important industry to Kenya'.

Third, 'lack of enough qualified staff' at the KTDC presented a problem in trying to undertake the necessary research and planning.

His assessment stood in contrast to that presented by the Rwandan participant, the then director general of the ministry of tourism and information. Rich in natural resources, Rwanda had compelling tourism attributes, albeit in a difficult neighbourhood. Leveraging those assets required both bold thinking and risk-taking, the director-general explained, but there were few detailed proposals about how that might be achieved. One of the seminar leaders remarked in a footnote on the

lack of rigour in the presentation to the effect that 'the paper presents some twisted ideas about economic development. The reader should not believe that all of them can be found in Rwanda'.

It is difficult not to conclude that there remained a considerable disparity in capacity from country to country.

When the seminar ended in Tunisia at the beginning of September 1969, it received overwhelmingly positive feedback during the evaluation session. One criticism reported by participants was that the negative impacts of tourism weren't addressed in the programme. This comment highlights a revealing difference of opinion when compared to the less critical enthusiasm placed on tourism by the mainly European organisers of the seminar.

The seminar was repeated in 1970, covering a very similar curriculum, although the study trip was to Spain, whose tourist industry was undergoing significant growth.

Conclusion

Today, tourism is a mixed story in Africa. While in North Africa it is the most important generator of economic development and jobs, sub-Saharan Africa has a long way to go to capitalise fully on its tourism potential. Issues of safety, security and health continue to affect its development. Without those elements, tourism flounders.

The seminar hosted by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in 1969 and 1970 was both an initiative of its time and yet a complete departure from the foundation's previous areas of work. It was a pioneering project and provided a blueprint for subsequent training curricula organised later by various UN institutions and others. With the benefit of hindsight, the seminar could have benefited from a more critical analysis of the impacts of tourism. However, it stands as a tribute to the foundation and its seminar leaders in its recognition of the need to provide African civil servants specific training and expertise in an area where almost none existed.

Rio de Janeiro's slum. 1986.

© Photo Claudio Kling

'Guerrilla Operations for the Survival of Mankind': the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Global Civil Society in the Age of Third Worldism

Victor Nemchenok

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF) was established in 1962 as a non-governmental organisation in memory of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. In just over a decade, however, it had become a major intellectual focal point of international development advocacy. What prompted this evolution and how was it shaped and sustained? And why is it meaningful? DHF's history reflects significant changes in international political life during the 1970s, a decade of immense turmoil when the developing countries came together as a 'global South' to mount a vigorous challenge to the industrialised states. Non-state actors seized this 'Third Worldist' moment to forge a 'global civil society' of intellectuals, social scientists, advocates and policymakers that promoted a more equitable international economic order and a greater role for the individual within it. As one of these actors, the foundation helped formulate a new 'alternative development' agenda based on the satisfaction of 'basic human needs', whose primacy continues to resonate today.[1]

Origins and Context

During its early years, the foundation engaged primarily in educational seminars for African civil servants. By 1970, it had staged 27 such seminars on international law, export promotion, development finance and planning, regional economic cooperation in Africa and the structure of the UN system and other international organisations. These 'conventional training exercises' were technical in nature and limited in size and

1 I would like to thank the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation for allowing me access to the archival collection on which this article is based.

scope, although the foundation made a modest attempt to reach a wider audience by issuing some of their content in published form.[2]

By the 1970s, however, DHF began seeking a new direction. Sven Hamrell, the foundation's director, and Olle Nordberg, his assistant, thought it necessary to shift away from the specialised work of technical training towards policy-oriented activities. Although it would take several years for their thinking to crystallise into an 'alternative development' framework, their desire for new departures was no doubt influenced by the big changes taking place in the international development arena. As Hamrell had seen first-hand at the Columbia Conference, developing nations were increasingly challenging the orthodoxy of the 1960s. They were dissatisfied with existing development paradigms as well as with their role in their formulation and implementation. 'The Third World was coming up as [a] great actor that had to be listened to and understood', the DHF realised. As Third World development practitioners and their allies in the industrialised countries searched for and grappled with new ideas about education, health, nutrition, communication and other topics, Hamrell and Nordberg thought DHF could meaningfully contribute to their work through 'the promotion of the social, economic, political and cultural progress of the developing countries'.[3]

Despite the absence of a clearly defined vision, the foundation gradually transitioned to a broader set of topics. While some of its trustees continued to favour the narrower approach of training public officials from poor countries, others expressed enthusiastic support for new initiatives. From 1971 to 1973, Hamrell and Nordberg received approval for seminars on 'Nutrition as a Priority in African Development', 'Communication – An Essential Component of Development Work', 'The Dilemma of Quality, Quantity and Cost in African Child Care' and

2 "The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation: A Short Description of Its Activities," pamphlet, April 1999, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Archives (hereafter DHF). See, for example, Sune Carlson and Obasanmi Olakanpo, *International Finance and Development Planning in West Africa* (Uppsala: Svenska Bokförlaget, 1964); Lars Olof Edström, *Correspondence Instruction in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Uganda* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1966); Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, *Lectures in Export Promotion* (Geneva: International Trade Center UNCTAD/GATT, 1967); Georges Abi-Saab et al., *The Structure, Role and Functions of the UN System* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1969); Yash Ghai et al., *The Legal Aspects of Regional Economic Integration* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1969); Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, *Studies in Adult Education in Africa* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1969); Hans Blix, *Sovereignty, Aggression and Neutrality* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1970); Franjo Gasparovic et al., *The Development and Promotion of Tourism in Africa* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1970).

3 Interview with Olle Nordberg, Uppsala, Sweden, 9 September 2010; Ernst Michanek to Maurice Strong, 15 October 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 11.10.1973-31.12.1973, DHF; Ernst Michanek to Kenneth Kaunda, Amir Jamal, and Leopold-Sédar Senghor, 25 October 1973, ibid.



Hamrell and Michanek described the communication and education seminars as 'pioneering effort[s]' in fields 'of rapidly increasing importance

'Problems of Education and Training in Emerging Countries'. Three trustees in particular – Ernst Michanek, the director-general of the Swedish International Development Authority, Bernard Chidzero, the director of UNCTAD's Commodities Division and Andrew Cordier, the dean of Columbia University's School of International Affairs and, for a short time, the university president – embraced these topics on account of their increasing importance in international development.[4]

DHF's foray into these topics engendered 'an integrated approach' embracing multiple disciplines and perspectives. The seminar on nutrition, for example, entailed 'a systematic effort to provide an opportunity for African representatives of ministries of agriculture, education, health, finance and planning to meet some of the leading international authorities in the field and, in this way, to enter into an interdisciplinary discussion of nutrition as a priority in African development'.[5] Such an approach significantly broadened the purview of international development work and reflected a new-found desire to shape its content and to influence the thinking of policymakers. It led Hamrell and Nordberg to package the foundation's activities in a way that 'focus[ed] attention on outstanding innovations in specific African countries' and 'transplant[ed] them to other countries, where they can be made replicable'.[6]

Indeed, the potential to make a mark on new ideas was a key factor in whether or not to include a given seminar in the foundation's work programme. Michanek and Cordier supported the nutrition and education seminars because they 'would make a significant contribution to th[e] search for new ideas' in both fields. Hamrell and Michanek described the communication and education seminars as 'pioneering effort[s]' in fields 'of rapidly increasing importance'. And the foundation had chosen an opportune moment to affect the education-development nexus in its work because of UNESCO's publication of the Faure Report. This had emphasised 'the need for new alternatives in education and training in the developing countries, combining methods of low-cost education with training for future employment'.[7]

4 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 4 December 1971, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 2 December 1972, DHF.

5 Sven Hamrell to John Waterlow, 25 January 1973, Korrespondesn Kronologisk Ordning 1.1.1973-31.3.1973, DHF.

6 Sven Hamrell and Olle Nordberg to Patrick van Rensburg, 26 January 1973, ibid.

7 Ibid.; Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 2 December 1972, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 15 December 1973, DHF. The Faure Report, named for Egar Faure, the chairman of the International Commission on the Developmet of Education, was published as *Learning to Be: The World of Education Today and Tomorrow* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972).

Hans Blix, Andrew Cordier, Bernard Chidzero and Ernst Michanek joined the board in the 1970s, as did UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart (below).

UN Photo/M

The foundation hoped to affect development thinking, despite a small cadre of full-time staff and an average annual operating budget of only Kr.849,000, because of the robust networking efforts that permeated all its activities. On a general level, this outreach started with a board of trustees comprising a group of accomplished politicians, administrators and civil servants. Former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson had sat on the board in the 1960s. Hans Blix, Andrew Cordier, Bernard Chidzero and Ernst Michanek joined in the 1970s, as did UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart.The foundation also sought to promote its work through a high-level international honorary committee, which included UN Secretaries-General U Thant and Kurt Waldheim; Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Léopold Senghor of Senegal; Amir Jamal, Tanzania's minister for commerce and industry; Robert Gardiner, the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa; political activist Alva Myrdal; Sadruddin Aga Khan, the UN high commissioner for refugees; UNCTAD Secretary-General Gamani Corea; Lal Jayawardena, Sri Lanka's secretary of the treasury and of the ministry of finance; Shridath Ramphal, the secretary-general of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and Hernan Santa Cruz, head of the International Development Centre in Paris.

Hamrell, Nordberg and the DHF secretariat likewise emphasised networking in their everyday activities. In arranging seminars, they partnered with organisations such as the Ethio-Swedish Clinic in Addis Ababa or the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, both to use their resources more efficiently and to reach larger, more diverse audiences. So as to cultivate the interest of public officials in developing countries, they reached out to government ministries for the nomination of competent individuals to participate in their events. In conjunction with the seminars and publications, Hamrell and Nordberg carried on a voluminous international correspondence in which they promoted the foundation's work programme; asked for reviews of its publications in magazines, newspapers, academic journals and radio and television programmes; and introduced development specialists from other organisations to the work of their acquaintances outside the foundation.[8] Their outreach gradually placed DHF at the heart of a transnational network of thinkers and practitioners that made up 'the dominant current in "development" into and beyond the 1980s'.[9]

8 The DHF has maintained an extensive record of its incoming and outgoing correspondence that is organized both chronologically and geographically. Although a fire at the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre in April 1982 damaged some of this material, the collection is remarkably complete, allowing scholars a window into the networking process and a better understanding of how the DHF and similar organizations constructed a development-based global civil society.

9 Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith* (New York: Zed Book, 2008), 144, 15f.

Perhaps because of the prominent role of its networking and outreach activities, DHF approached alternative paradigms from a perspective that valued 'dialogue' in its overall orientation and within individual projects. Hamrell proposed the communication seminar to the board, for example, as an effort 'to break away from the traditional concept of information…as a monologue directed at the public', and to replace it with 'communication as a continuous dialogue between those acting and those being acted upon' within a larger development framework 'in which activities and decisions are constantly subjected to the feedback received from the field'.[10]

To facilitate this process, the foundation began issuing its own journal, *Development Dialogue*. The journal 'owes its existence', the early editorials explained, 'to the growing awareness in the Nordic countries of the need for a free and frank discussion of what can be done to counteract the widening gap between the rich and the poor parts of the world'. DHF decided to produce the journal after a conference on Nordic aid in Uppsala in April 1970, at which development specialists affiliated with the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish aid agencies complained of the insularity of the discussion of international development in their countries. Previous assistance efforts had stifled 'meaningful dialogue with the recipients of our aid contributions', they argued, and provided no opportunity for the Nordic programmes to receive 'comments and criticism from the developing countries'. They also took little cognisance of their own aims and priorities. *Development Dialogue* aimed to be an intellectual meeting place where the developing world's views could be shared 'for the benefit not only of the Nordic countries but of the international community as a whole' and where 'the widest possible participation of representatives from the developing countries' could promote genuine international cooperation.[11]

The first two issues, which were produced on an experimental basis in 1972-73 before the trustees approved *Development Dialogue* for permanent publication, succeeded in attracting significant Third World participation. They included a discussion of nutrition as a development priority by the Ghanaian Fred T. Sai, an assistant secretary-general of the International Planned Parenthood Federation; a commentary on Indian development policy by India's Minister of Finance Y.B. Chavan and I.G. Patel, the ministry's permanent secretary; an article on agricultural development in Bangladesh by Swadesh Bose, acting director

10 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 2 December 1972, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 15 December 1973, DHF.

11 "Editorial," *Development Dialogue* (1973), 1-2; "Editorial," *Development Dialogue* (1972), 1.

of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Economics; a statement on the debilitating effects of development debt by Ghana's former minister of finance, J.H. Mensah; and Bernard Chidzero's analysis of tied aid.[12] The journal rounded out these contributions with sustained attention to the nature, quality, distribution and aims of the four Nordic aid programmes, much of it quite critical of existing efforts.[13] The first two issues had succeeded, Cordier and Michanek noted approvingly, in establishing 'an excellent forum for worldwide development cooperation' – one that highlighted the new importance of social equality, income distribution and welfare in international development efforts.[14]

Basic Principles of Development Cooperation

Marc Nerfin, a key figure in the preparations for the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, reached out to Hamrell for help with his own project concerning Tunisia's former minister for state planning, Ahmed Ben Salah (below to the right).

The foundation's desire to deepen its connection to Third World causes, debates and people received a serendipitous boost when Marc Nerfin, a key figure in the preparations for the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, reached out to Hamrell for help with his own project concerning Tunisia's former minister for state planning, Ahmed Ben Salah. From 1958 to 1962, Nerfin had worked as a schoolteacher in Sfax and as a commentator for 'Radio-Tunis'. Firmly believing that 'only Tunisians themselves could invent their own way toward socialism', Nerfin carefully studied Tunisia's 10-year development plan for the 1960s, which served as his entry point into the developing world's struggles for socioeconomic change. He continued to follow national events after Ben Salah's arrest and imprisonment on charges of treason in May 1970, and was naturally eager to interview Ben Salah when the latter fled the country in February 1973. Ben Salah agreed to speak with Nerfin. In search of a suitably secure interview location, the two began networking with Ben Salah's German and Austrian political contacts, several of whom had spent the Second World War as exiles

12 Y.B. Chavan, "Indian Policy for Economic and Social Devleopment," *Development Dialogue* (1972): 3-14; Fred T. Sai, "Nutrition as a Priority in National Development," *Development Dialogue* (1972): 20-28; J.H. Mensah, "Some Unpleasant Truths about Debt and Development, *Development Dialogue* (1973): 3-16; Swadesh R. Bose, "The Strategy of Agricultural Development in Bangladesh," *Development Dialogue* (1973): 29-42; Bernard Chidzero, "Commodity Aid and Tied Aid," *Development Dialogue* (1973): 97-99.

13 In *Development Dialogue* (1972), see Leif Vetlesen, "Norway's Assistance to Developing Countries," 34-41; Just Faaland, "Norwegian Development Aid Efforts and Policies: A Critique," 42-47; Gus Edgren, "Growth and Equality - the Dual Aim of Swedish Development Aid," 52-64; and Marian Radetzki, "How Best to Achieve the Objectives of Swedish Bilateral Aid?", 65-76. In *Development Dialogue* (1973), see Wilh. Ulrichsen, "Denmark's Assistance to Developing Countries," 63-67; Knud Vilby, "The Illusion of the Unequivocal Concept of Assistance," 68-74; and Ilkka Ristimäki, "Finland's Development Co-operation," 79-87.

14 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 2 December 1972, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation - 15 December 1973, DHF.

in Sweden. The process culminated with Ernst Michanek, who introduced Nerfin and Ben Salah to Hamrell and secured Hamrell's summer home in Lövdalen for their conversations. [15]

After completing these in early September, Nerfin and Ben Salah met with Michanek and Hamrell to discuss the possibility of 'redefin[ing] the goals, scope and content of development, the potential for concerted action by progressive Third World and industrialized countries, as well as the role of an informal network of committed individuals and organizations working at the interface between research and decision-making'. The conversation proved timely. Seven months earlier, the Swedish government had appointed a high-level Royal Commission on International Development Cooperation to study how best to achieve the objectives of Sweden's foreign aid programme. Because the 'overriding objective' of Swedish assistance was 'to supplement the development efforts of the developing countries', the commission was explicitly instructed to seek out the views of Third World representatives and scholars on North-South relations generally, and on the causes of underdevelopment in particular.[16]

The foundation had already planned to participate in the royal commission's work as part of its own reorientation towards a broader spectrum of activity. In December 1972, Hamrell and Nordberg proposed to the board of trustees an ambitious seminar entitled 'Basic Principles of Development Cooperation' as part of the foundation's 1973 work programme – one that Hamrell thought would 'either make us or break us!' The seminar would facilitate a discussion of current development efforts among individuals from countries receiving Swedish assistance, the Swedish ministry for foreign affairs and the royal commission to create in the long term 'the preconditions for a continuing dialogue between the partners in the development effort'. Michanek enthusiastically endorsed the idea. Future development debates were likely to focus on the aid relationship, he thought, and the commission might well find the seminar's deliberations useful to its own inquiry. Chidzero also supported the seminar, hoping it would help globalise

15 Marc Nerfin, *Entretiens avec Ahmed Ben Salah sur la Dynamique Socialiste dans la Tunisie des Années 1960* (Paris: François Maspero, 1974), 9-12; Interview with Olle Nordberg, Uppsala, Sweden, 9 September 2010. For the details of the ten-year plan, see *Perspectives Decennales de Développement, 1962-1971* (Tunis: Sécretariat d'État au Plan et aux Finances, 1971).

16 Marc Nerfin, "Provisional: Project Director's Report on the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project on Development and International Cooperation," undated, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 6 December 1975, DHF; "Confrontation of Co-operation? A Dialogue on Development and Independence," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1974), 3.

the foundation's activities, which had hitherto focused exclusively on East Africa, by involving representatives from Bangladesh, Botswana, Chile, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, North Vietnam, Tanzania and Tunisia in the deliberations.[17]

Nerfin had met many of the individuals in his extensive network during his time as the chef de cabinet to Maurice Strong (pictured below), the secretary-general of the Stockholm Conference.

UN Photo/Grunbaum

After his meeting with Michanek and Hamrell in Lödvalen, Nerfin began to advise the foundation on its preparations and connected Hamrell with his own extensive network of Third World contacts. He had met many of these individuals during his time as the chef de cabinet to Maurice Strong, the secretary-general of the Stockholm Conference. The conference had attracted major criticism from the developing countries, who viewed environmental concerns as a decoy for meaningful development cooperation. To disarm this criticism, Nerfin had gathered 'a group of eminent and representative intellectuals of global reputation' in Founex, Switzerland, to reconcile environmental concerns with development activism. Among those he invited from the developing world were Gamani Corea, the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, Uruguay's Enrique Iglesias, Egypt's Samir Amin and H.M.A. Onitiri of Nigeria. Following the conference, these individuals decided to formalise their connections in the 'Third World Forum', an association of the South's development thinkers and activists, which included Nerfin as an honorary member for his 'proven solidarity with Third World causes'.[18]

Hamrell learned of the Forum through brief correspondence with David Hopper of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) in Ottawa, which had financed its initial meeting in Santiago in April 1973, and with Iglesias, whom the Forum's organisers elected as the first chairman of its steering committee.[19] Nerfin's involvement with the seminar, however, allowed Hamrell to recruit for the seminar Iglesias, Haq and other 'prominent international experts such as Havelock Brewster and Valentine Omulu Opere from UNCTAD; Carlos Martinez Salsamendi, Cuba's director-general for bilateral cooperation; Ato Tekalign Gedamu, Ethiopia's minister of state and the head of its planning commission; the

17 "The 1973 Dag Hammarskjöld Seminar on 'Basic Principles of Development Co-operation: A Dialogue between Donors and Recipients," undated, Seminar Files, The Basic Principles of Development Co-operation – 1973, DHF; Sven Hamrell to Goran Sterky, 5 October 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.8.1973-10.10.1973, ibid.; Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 2 December 1972, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 15 December 1973, ibid.

18 A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1, "Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972," 37; Samir Amin, *A Life Looking Forward: Memoirs of an Independent Marxist* (New York: Zed Books, 2006), 225, 227.

19 Sven Hamrell to David Hopper, 15 June 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.4.1973-31.7.1973, DHF; Sven Hamrell to Enrique Iglesias, 31 July 1973, ibid.

Tanzanian Ibrahim Kaduma, director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam and a former secretary of the treasury; Mosharraf Hossain, a member of the Bangladesh planning commission; and J.K. Grewal, deputy economic adviser in the Indian ministry of commerce.[20] Hamrell also invited to the meeting Pedro Vuscovic, Chile's minister of economic affairs under Salvador Allende and the author of its 1970 economic plan. He admired Vuscovic's attempt to bring socialism to his country democratically and thought him ideally suited to evaluating the success of Swedish aid in promoting economic and social equality.[21]

The seminar organisers urged participants to express themselves freely. Torsten Nilsson, the former Swedish minister for foreign affairs and chairman of the royal commission, observed that 'representatives from developing countries have frequently criticized the rich countries for demanding too much influence on the development policy of the recipient countries'. He hoped the participants would 'influence the policy of…Swedish development assistance' through their own 'arguments and information'.[22] Believing that the seminar could help satisfy the Third World's 'demand for increased influence', Hamrell and Nordberg encouraged participants to provide critical feedback. Hamrell asked Kaduma and Salsamendi to present 'problem-oriented account[s]' of Tanzanian and Cuban experiences in their aid relationships, stressing that critical comments on negative aspects would be 'particularly valuable' to the royal commission. He told Haq, who was to deliver the keynote address on the relationship between development and independence, 'not to mince words in attacking the conventional "pillars of wisdom" in development thinking', and expected Brewster to 'be very outspoken in [his] criticisms of the protectionist policies of the industrialised countries and on the issue of non-tariff barriers'.[23]

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20 "The 1973 Dag Hammarskjöld Seminar on the Basic Principles of International Development Co-operation, Appendix 1: List of Participants," December 1973, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 15 December 1973, DHF.

21 Sven Hamrell to Pedro Vuscovic, 4 October 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.8.1973-10.10.1973, DHF; Sven Hamrell to Marc Nerfin, 9 October 1973, ibid.

22 Torsten Nilsson, "Words of Welcome," 12 November 1973, Seminar Files, The Basic Principles of Development Co-operation – 1973, DHF.

23 Sven Hamrell to Mahbub ul Haq, 27 September 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.8.1973-10.10.1973; Sven Hamrell to Ibrahim Kaduma, 5 October 1973, ibid.; Sven Hamrell to Mahbub ul Haq, 16 October 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning, 11.10.1973-31.12.1973, DHF; Sven Hamrell to Carlos Martinez Salsamendi, 23 October 1973, ibid.; Sven Hamrell to Havelock Brewster, 26 October 1973, ibid.; Sven Hamrell to Stig Andersen, 8 November 1973, ibid..

The ensuing discussion amply fulfilled Hamrell's vision. Over three days in mid-November 1973, the participants debated development and dependency, coordination of aid and trade policy and the role of intergovernmental organisations. They also dissected specific issues such as the organisation of specialised UN agencies, problems of implementing foreign aid programmes and the employment of more technical assistance experts from developing countries.

The newfound prominence of the Third World in the international system, however, dominated the discussions. The industrial countries consistently disparaged the concerns of poor nations about the injustices of the international order, Haq argued, without realising 'that the Third World *is* the future international order'. He went on to caution them to begin 'fashioning policies to come to some reasonable accommodation'. The South constituted the dominant majority of the global population, raising doubts over whether, and how, the North's 'shrinking minority' could continue 'to control the economic, financial and political destiny of the world'. The dependence of the rich countries on Third World petroleum implied ever-larger resource transfers to oil producers, auguring 'a major change in the balance of power' and 'a painful transition' to international economic equality. In such a world, Haq insisted, rooting himself in a Keynesian framework, the rich would increasingly need Third World markets to sustain expanding production and their own prosperity. 'World financial power', he prophesied, 'is likely to change dramatically right in front of our eyes' and the rich would do well to recognise the shift, 'so that we can all shape the international order in a way that' promoted 'mutual accommodation and harmony' instead of 'bitter confrontation and catastrophe'.[24]

Building on Haq's presentation, his counterparts emphasised that the Third World's nations, politicians, diplomats and people now had to demand a larger role in political and technical development partnerships. At the multilateral level, Enrique Iglesias contended, this meant channelling and managing international cooperation within the United Nations, which offered the best hope for 'build[ing] up a real, true world order, internationally conceived and aiming at benefitting the whole of humanity'. International cooperation was 'a very delicate instrument' that entailed not just resource transfers, but also 'the transfer of influences, styles of life' and 'types of societies'. To allow the Third World equal input in the discussion and negotiation of energy, population and environmental questions, these issues were best broached within UN institutions, which typically enjoyed the widest level of membership and without which the developing countries 'cannot really achieve a

24 Mahbub ul Haq, "Development and Independence," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1974), 7-8.

certain balance of power'. The same thinking led Iglesias to advocate significant reforms of the World Bank, the IMF and other intergovernmental financial organisations. These institutions lacked balance and universal legitimacy. Because of their narrow membership, their behaviour and 'economic rationale' uncritically mirrored the lifestyles and economic structures of their major donors. To engage in significant cooperation that afforded Third World countries a meaningful voice, they had to embrace wider membership and to reduce to a minimum the inordinate political influence of the industrial countries.[25]

UN Photo/PB

The Swedish foreign minister argued that 'the developing countries' own development policies [and] their own priorities must determine the direction and design of assistance'.

More importantly, these organisations had to adopt new performance criteria, Iglesias argued. Their 'traditional, conventional criteria' were 'market-oriented' and valued profit over social reform. They were ill-suited to evaluating the development plans of countries whose 'priorities [were] very different from market-oriented economies'. This was particularly true of those countries that sought to implement income distribution measures in response to the imbalances, shortages and difficult structural adjustments they experienced in implementing the strategy of the Second UN Development Decade. To incorporate the concerns and values of the Third World into their activities, these organisations had to develop a style of analysis that went beyond cost/benefit calculations.[26]

The seminar's Nordic participants agreed on the importance of what the developing countries had expressed at the 1973 Algiers Conference of the non-aligned countries as the need to 'transition from passive submission of claims to the affirmation to rely first and foremost on their own resources, individually and collectively…and to organize their development by and for themselves'.[27] In laying out the goals of Swedish foreign assistance, Lennart Klackenberg, the Swedish undersecretary of state for international development cooperation, emphasised that his country sought to extend aid without regard for its own political or commercial interests. For emphasis, he cited a parliamentary debate on foreign aid held earlier that year in which the Swedish foreign minister had argued that 'the developing countries' own development policies [and] their own priorities must determine the direction and design of assistance'.[28]

25 Enrique Iglesias, "The Case for a True World Order," *ibid.*, 75, 76-77; "Iglesias' and Nerfin's Additional Remarks," Seminar Files, Basic Principles of Development Co-operation – 1973, DHF.

26 Iglesias, "The Case for a True World Order," 76-77; "Iglesias' and Nerfin's Additional Remarks."

27 Economic Declaration of the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, Algiers, 5-9 September 1973, reprinted in UN Document A/9330, 66.

28 Lennart Klackenberg, "Swedish Development Co-operation: Principles and Policies," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1974), 14, 16.

Third World participants seized on this point forcefully. 'Only we know what we want', Ibrahim Kaduma declared on behalf of the group, 'and we should be quite prepared to go hungry if the food…being offered is on terms that are unacceptable to us.' Ato Tekalign Gedamu agreed: 'You cannot use your money as the whip to change the course of events'. Nerfin, strongly sympathetic to Third World demands, noted that foreign assistance was most efficient if it matched the receiving society's aspirations and its 'national project' – a concept he termed 'the Iglesias principle'. To this he added the 'Haq principle': a donor could exercise influence only if it unambiguously supported existing indigenous efforts. In the absence of a 'real system' of national development, Iglesias warned, foreign aid became 'a detrimental force' that simply burdened the recipient with unnecessary debt.[29]

Indeed, in response to Ernst Michanek's query about how Sweden could fully reconcile its own policy goals with a partner's development priorities, the group developed a nuanced understanding of the donor's role in development cooperation that recast economic 'leverage' as moral influence. Every donor had a right to choose whom to help based on considerations of the recipient's strategy, goals or the kind of society the donor itself believed to be superior. National development plans were sufficiently complex, moreover, for donors to be able to find a single component worth supporting. Assuming that aid givers and recipients were well matched within this framework, donors could exert influence in the form of ideas and advice rather than through a 'frontal attack' of foreign dictates and tightened purse strings.[30]

Haq expressed these ideas in the language of preferences. Donors and recipients both exhibited a spectrum of preferences, from 'progressive' to 'reactionary'. After several decades on the receiving end of international development aid, developing nations had gained a fairly accurate understanding of donor preferences that allowed them to approach development aid like a 'shopping list'. If they desired assistance with public health, education and family planning projects, for example, they would seek help from Sweden, whose foreign aid programme was known to value these areas. Alternatively, they could approach the World Bank 'knowing [its] inclination for big projects and power and highways', or USAID for public works programmes. This approach would rationalise development cooperation, obviating the donor's impulse to influence the development process directly.[31]

29 "Discussion," *ibid.*, 46-48; "Record of Discussion," undated, Seminar Files, Basic Principles of Development Co-operation – 1973, 9, 19 DHF.

30 "Discussion," *ibid.*, 43, 47; "Record of Discussion," ibid., 8, 15, 19.

31 "Record of Discussion," 10-11.

Furthermore, by clearly signalling its aid preferences, a 'progressive' country like Sweden would more significantly influence other donors – particularly the United States and other large donors of the 'DAC club'. Haq offered no supporting logic for this contention, but his counterparts seemed to agree that Sweden could and should seek such influence. Nerfin thought that past development assistance, corrupted by less progressively-minded donors, had strengthened minority groups and promoted inequality. Sweden could fashion 'a better world order' with a selective approach that might shape the attitudes of other countries. This was especially important, noted Haq, given the growing emphasis on 'helping the poorest 40 per cent of the world population – the small farmer, the urban poor, [or] the landless laborer'. Donors lacked the appropriate institutions, structures and practices for reaching this segment of the Third World, and the seminar hoped that Sweden's own programme preferences for social and economic equality could spur other rich countries to action.[32]

The seminar similarly insisted that donors had to encourage developing nations to build their expertise and capacity to execute their own development programmes, rather than allowing foreign technical advisers to administer development plans. There had been little improvement in this area, Nerfin remarked, because the experience and 'accumulated knowledge' from the previous quarter century 'remain[ed] heavily concentrated in the donor and UN agencies'. Mosharraf Hossain welcomed the participation of foreign advisors in areas 'where there is a definite shortage for [the] kinds of skills that you do not yourself possess' and where they could impart their knowledge to local partners. As local expertise grew, the South's technical experts had to replace their counterparts from the North. Haq believed that many developing nations already had sufficient expertise, and he encouraged Swedish technical assistance to be used to recruit experts from developing countries and to support 'developing country consultancy firms, whether [operating] at home or abroad', since they would be 'less expensive, create less sensitivity' and 'import much needed [expertise]' to other developing countries.[33]

When Michanek questioned whether Sweden could efficiently recruit talented individuals from across the developing world, Haq insisted that this was possible if donors better advertised their interest in doing so. Stig Andersen, UNDP's deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa, supported Haq by observing that UNDP had developed a successful process for recruiting Third World experts that could be

32 Ibid., 7, 10, 12-13, 15; "Discussion," 48.

33 "Discussion," 51, 81-82; "Record of Discussion," 29.

placed at the disposal of other donors. Over time, thought Nerfin, such a process could accelerate organically until the South's experts alone enjoyed executive authority in the development process. The UNDP resident representative in a given country would attain centralised co-ordinating and administrative power and, over time, only nationals of that country would serve as representatives. In the final stage, resident representatives would be phased out completely, replaced by a 'co-ordinating unit of the ministry of planning' in the recipient country, which would become 'the real interlocutor of the multilateral system'.[34]

The Founex report and the ensuing deliberations about the development-environment nexus, according to Maurice Strong, showed 'that we urgently require not only a new perception of man's relationship with the natural world, but with man's relationship with man; that the problems of the rich cannot be seen in isolation from those of the poor; that in all respects we inhabit Only One Earth'

The seminar's discussion of greater Third World autonomy in development matters paid homage to the intellectual framework of interdependence that Nerfin, Haq, Iglesias and many of their friends had helped develop in the run-up to the Stockholm Conference, which they described through the idiom of 'Only One Earth'. The Founex report and the ensuing deliberations about the development-environment nexus, according to Maurice Strong, showed 'that we urgently require not only a new perception of man's relationship with the natural world, but with man's relationship with man; that the problems of the rich cannot be seen in isolation from those of the poor; that in all respects we inhabit Only One Earth'.[35]

To flesh out these issues, Strong had commissioned Barbara Ward to pen a book, *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet*, to serve as the unofficial report of the conference.[36] The book's ideas clearly resonated with the participants. Haq explicitly invoked its title when he reflected that 'this was a small planet and that its survival was a matter of interdependence'. Nerfin and Iglesias did, as well. To overcome North-South confrontation, Nerfin believed, the United Nations had to embrace 'the concept of only one earth', which denoted 'a better world order based on equality [and] on co-operation'. Iglesias, in turn, championed the potential of international organisations – devoid of the North's political influence – to 'become real instruments in the achievement of the "only one world" concept'.[37]

34 "Record of Discussion," 31-33; "Discussion," 83.

35 Maurice Strong, "Introduction," in Wade Rowland, *The Plot to Save the World: The Life and Times of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1973), ix.

36 Barbara Ward and René Dubos, *Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972). Enrique Iglesias and Gamani Corea were among the 152 scientists and economists of the "Committee of Corresponding Consultants" to whom Strong and Ward had circulated the manuscript for feedback. See *Only One Earth*, 13-22.

37 Haq, "Development and Independence," 6; Nerfin, "Improving the Multilateral System," 80; Iglesias, "The Case for a True World Order," 77.

In the presence of the royal commission and other sympathetic public officials, Third World representatives hoped to influence the policies required to turn their vision into reality, for as Haq lamented, everyone paid lip service to 'one planet and one world and one humanity', but 'very few practical steps have been taken to translate this concept into real shape'. Workable North-South cooperation called for new approaches. For their part, industrialised countries had to submit to 'enlightened self-interest'. Rather than fighting the coming power shift through protectionism and 'international manipulations', they should reconcile themselves to the end of cheap natural resources, windfall profits and lopsided concessions; to the redistribution of certain polluting and labour-intensive industries to the Third World; and to the need for adjustments that cushioned the impact of advanced technologies on the world's poor. By reasonably accommodating such Third World demands, rich countries could help create 'a community based upon a more systematic sharing of wealth', as Barbara Ward characterised it, and in so doing avoid future confrontation.[38]

The developing nations, meanwhile, had to adopt policies that promoted 'independence' and 'self-reliance', terms that nearly all Third World representatives invoked during the seminar. The Third World, they insisted, had 'to turn inwards and assume the major burden of its own development'. Instead of pursuing Western living standards, it had to evolve lifestyles 'consistent with its own poverty' and a strategy that 'buil[t] development around people rather than people around development' through local resources and indigenous effort. Instead of acquiescing with old patterns of assistance extended by the North's donors on tied or other steep terms, the participants argued that poor countries could band together. The Third World was now in a position…to arrange its own foreign assistance' through the coffers of the oil-producing countries, and to create 'its own trading patterns based on pots and pans and bicycle economies'. These prescriptions did not spell a complete economic break with the North. 'Liberals' on both sides had to continue striving for accommodation, Haq cautioned, especially if they hoped to settle amicably the South's outstanding $75 billion debt burden. Nonetheless, they offered the Third World a new and more assertive basis for its relationship with the rich countries.[39]

Beyond policy measures, Haq, Iglesias and Nerfin believed that the South had to establish a viable, autonomous civil society to advocate its ideas. Haq approached this issue through the lens of self-reliance. 'Our

38 Haq, "Development and Independence," 9-10; Ward and Dubos, *Only One Earth*, 296.

39 Haq, "Development and Independence," 10-11.

countries went from political dependence twenty years ago to economic dependence in the last two decades', and, while receding, 'intellectual dependence still persists'. Was the Third World intellectually bankrupt, he wondered, or simply judged by the West's inappropriate standards? The North's research institutes and development centres studied developing world problems without involving the poor nations themselves. Its thinkers spent more effort on influencing the policies of developing nations than their own governments. Haq proposed a better division of intellectual labour by suggesting that experts from rich countries and poor countries stop dictating to one another's governments and focus on the problems their nations faced within the North-South relationship. This is precisely what he and his colleagues had begun to do when they established the Third World Forum 'to address [them]selves honestly and frankly to our own problems'.[40]

Nerfin and Iglesias, on the other hand, emphasised civil society innovation because of their dissatisfaction with existing institutional arrangements. The UN lacked intellectual clarity. 'You have a discussion and you cook a resolution', Nerfin complained, with the result usually a 'fantastic mess' in which 'you never know who prepared what'. The public information programmes associated with UN agencies amounted to 'mere institutional propaganda' that failed to promote meaningful cooperation. Iglesias concurred by citing his experience with UN's Economic Commission for Latin America, which had achieved some notable success in promoting Latin American integration, industrialisation, coordination and better planning, yet often suffered when national governments coopted it for meaningless resolutions and frivolous requests. Healthy partnership between governments and experts was necessary, to be sure, but an institution had to maintain 'a soul and an identity' to steer the process of change.[41]

Nerfin acted on this analysis by proposing to the seminar the creation of a new 'autonomous, non-official institution or body', a proposal that anticipated the creation of his own development thinktank, the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, some years later. If the 'enlightened countries' – primarily the Nordic countries, together with Canada, the Netherlands, Austria and Western Germany – were willing to donate 0.1 per cent of their aid appropriations to finance it, such an organisation could shape a new development strategy consistent with the basic principles discussed at the seminar and 'to make

40 Ibid., 12; "Discussion," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1974), 52.

41 "Discussion," *ibid.*, 53; Iglesias, "The Case for a True World Order," *ibid.*, 78; "Iglesias' and Nerfin's Additional Remarks," 1, 6, 8.

people better able to understand this concept of *only one earth'*.[42] While this proposal ran counter to Haq's emphasis on intellectual separation, Nerfin's friends endorsed it as giving concrete form to the need to educate public opinion in the North. Flagging public opinion directly undermined 'real co-operation', after all. The Pearson Commission had been established to bolster the will of donor nations to engage in development cooperation, but its work had failed to generate any change, in part because it was predicated on moral appeals for more aid. Through the 'exposition and illustration of the concept of *only one earth*', the participants argued in their official recommendations to the royal commission, the proposed organisation would steer public opinion in the industrialised countries 'towards true co-operation' and a better understanding of how trade protectionism, tied aid and political manipulation hindered global progress.[43]

Swedish development officials were pleased with the seminar's 'salutary effect' on the royal commission, whose final report incorporated many of the seminar's themes. The commission advocated a Swedish development posture that promoted solidarity with the Third World, one that would 'seek to influence other industrialised countries…to support the developing countries'. It urged Sweden to allow recipients of bilateral aid to determine their own priorities, to channel assistance on soft terms and primarily through grants and to raise living standards 'by means of a direct

The commission urged Sweden to allow recipients of bilateral aid to determine their own priorities, to channel assistance on soft terms and primarily through grants and to raise living standards 'by means of a direct attack on poverty and its causes'.

42 "Discussion," 53.

43 Ibid., 53; "Summary Conclusions Addressed to the Royal Commission on International Development Co-operation (Final Version)," undated, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation - 15 December 1973, DHF. Italics denote original emphasis.

attack on poverty and its causes'. While it did not recommend the wholesale untying of aid absent an international agreement among donors, the commission encouraged the government to extend to recipients 'a free choice of goods and services' that would provide them with needed development inputs while strengthening Sweden's balance of payments and employment situation. In multilateral organisations, likewise, Sweden would support Third World positions and encourage internal changes that allowed poor nations equal influence in decision-making.[44]

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation was equally pleased that the Basic Principles seminar had laid the groundwork for broader collaboration with organisations and individuals outside Sweden. Hamrell and Nordberg convinced Nerfin, without whom 'the whole thing might have ended up in a disaster of considerable dimensions', to join the editorial board of *Development Dialogue*. Through the journal 'we might just be able to have an impact on developments over the next few years', Hamrell wrote to Nerfin, 'and this chance should not be missed in a climate which is getting colder and colder'.[45] Indeed, immediately after the seminar the foundation published the seminar proceedings in the third issue of the journal and circulated it to the participants of the Third World Forum's Santiago meeting and to the IDRC, its sponsor. The hope was that the material would help promote an improved climate of cooperation, a change in the balance of world power and development in a framework of independence.[46]

The foundation also sought to strengthen its ties with the Third World Forum financially, with Hamrell playing a role in helping the Third World Forum obtain Swedish funding. During the seminar, Iglesias and Haq had penned a letter to Ernst Michanek on DHF stationary, requesting $100,000 in transitional support for the Forum while it searched for a more permanent financial footing. 'The aims and objectives of the Third World Forum are in line with the liberal and progressive traditions of Swedish aid', they reasoned, and by providing this assistance 'Sweden will be living up to its own convictions that the Third World should be enabled to become increasingly self-reliant, both economi-

44 Sven Hamrell to Stig Andersen, 14 December 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 11.10.1973-31.12.1973; "Extracts from the Report of the Commission on Swedish International Development Cooperation, 1973-77," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1977), 105, 109, 111-12, 114-15.

45 Sven Hamrell to Marc Nerfin, 23 November 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 11.10.1973-31.12.1973, DHF; Sven Hamrell to Marc Nerfin, 21 December 1973, ibid.; Sven Hamrell to Marc Nerfin, 25 January 1974, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.1.1974-14.3.1974, DHF.

46 "Confrontation or Co-operation? A Dialogue on Development and Independence," *Development Dialogue* no. 1 (1974), 4; Sven Hamrell to David Hopper, 23 November 1973, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 11.10.1973-31.12.1973; Sven Hamrell to Marc Nerfin, 23 November 1973, ibid.

cally and intellectually'.[47] Hamrell clearly sympathised with the request: in budget estimates submitted to the board of trustees the following month, he included a sum of Kr.225,000 earmarked for the Forum's inaugural conference in Karachi, Pakistan. He also forwarded original documents explaining the Forum's objectives.[48] In the ensuing debate, Chidzero supported Hamrell by emphasising that the foundation had to strive for 'close and intimate relations with bodies such as the Third World Forum, which represent the current trends of thought in the developing countries'. Michanek and a majority of the board rejected the request on technical grounds, however, since the foundation's statutes allowed it to fund only activities in which it was directly involved.[49]

Undeterred, Hamrell provided Michanek with Haq's edited keynote in early February 1974, asking him 'particularly to read the last two pages, given the author's and Iglesias' request for help with the Third World Forum'.[50] Such prodding seemed to work. In early July, Hamrell informed Iglesias that Michanek and Paul Gerin-Lajoie, the head of the Canadian International Development Agency, had signalled their willingness to help. He advised Iglesias to submit a new request, accompanied this time by a detailed budget, an outline of the Third World Forum secretariat's workplans, and an explanation of proposed auditing procedures. Michanek was keen 'to hav[e] a Chilean as head of the secretariat', he added, and 'a proposal to this effect would facilitate his task in funding the project'.[51] The Forum did succeed in securing Swedish funding, and Hamrell was rewarded for his stewardship of the process with an invitation to attend the Karachi conference in January 1975.[52]

Global Civil Society and Transnational Advocacy

The foundation's entry into development cooperation debates proved exceedingly timely, given the eruption of 'Third Worldism' at the United Nations in the following months. The developing countries had long demanded changes in the pattern of North-South interaction, but their call achieved critical mass only after the 1973 oil price spike. At that time,

47 Mahbub ul Haq and Enrique Iglesias to Ernst Michanek, 13 November 1973, ibid.

48 Budget Estimates for 1974, undated, Board Meeting Files, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 15 December 1973, DHF.

49 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 15 December 1973, Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 14 December 1974, ibid.

50 Sven Hamrell to Ernst Michanek, 5 February 1974, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.1.1974-14.3.1974, DHF.

51 Sven Hamrell to Enrique Iglesias, 2 July 1974, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.7.1974-31.8.1974, DHF.

52 Sven Hamrell and Olle Nordberg to Patrick van Rensburg, 20 December 1974, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.9.1974-31.10.1974, DHF.

Algerian President Houari Boumediène asked UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to convene a conference to explore the problems of raw materials and development alongside the deficiencies in international cooperation. The rich, oil-consuming nations had posited a 'restrictive interpretation' of the oil issue that 'divorc[ed] the situation from the context of general relations between the Third World and the developed countries', he explained. But where they perceived politically motivated market manipulation and extortion, the oil producers saw themselves as exercising appropriate national sovereignty over their domestic resources 'to place them at the service of development and of the advancement of their populations'. Members of OPEC and other Third World nations had to rely, first and foremost, on their own natural resources until 'the existing relationship of domination could be replaced by just relationships founded on equality and respect for the sovereignty of states'. By coupling discussion of raw materials with development, Boumediène's proposal largely diverted attention from the economic plight of non-oil-producing developing countries, which faced extreme balance of payments problems and oversized import bills, and sustained Third World solidarity around the demand for international economic equality.[53]

Boumediène's proposal resulted in the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, from 8 April to 1 May 1974, during which rich and poor nations clashed in their approach to the world's economic ills. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, the former secretary-general of UNCTAD who had relinquished the post days prior to the meeting to become the Venezuelan minister for international economic affairs, chastised the North's 'dreamers' for believing that the postwar economic system was salvageable. That system 'ha[d] ceased to exist', he declared, placing the blame squarely on the developed countries. Their inability to control inflation and uncertainty following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, as well as their wasteful consumption of raw materials, had done tremendous damage to the global economy and to the developing countries. The postwar trade and payments system had 'crumbled' because 'its greatest beneficiaries ha[d] not complied with the rules of the game', growing ever richer while the Third World's terms of trade deteriorated.[54]

The existing crisis offered an opportunity to create a new economic order 'on a more just and more rational basis'. To allocate benefits in a balanced way, this new order had to emphasise raw materials and primary commodities. The great majority of developing countries

53 UN document A/9541, Annex, "Message dated 30 January 1974, addressed to the Secretary-General by His Excellecny Mr. Houari Boumediène."

54 UN Docment A/PV.2213, 2213th Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, 12 April 1974, 17-19.

By the early 1970s, in fact, primary commodity prices were so depressed that a net transfer of real resources was taking place from the developing to the developed countries, with development assistance 'more than offset by the adverse trend in [the South's] terms of trade'.

organised their economic affairs around these resources, and only an adequate solution 'to the problems of raw materials in their relationship to development' could address the drawbacks they were experiencing.[55] Gamani Corea agreed. In a statement to the ad hoc committee of the special session, he explained that the South's terms of trade had deteriorated by 12 per cent from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s. Individual Third World suppliers increased their output of natural resources in a bid to capture a larger share of the global market, but the resulting imbalance between supply and demand drove prices lower. Transnational corporations contributed to this problem, using their 'bargaining power as monopolistic or oligopolistic buyers' to secure below-market prices. By the early 1970s, in fact, primary commodity prices were so depressed that a net transfer of real resources was taking place from the developing to the developed countries, with development assistance 'more than offset by the adverse trend in [the South's] terms of trade'. This situation proved, Corea maintained, that 'the existing international machinery was largely inadequate' to the needs of the developing countries.[56]

The Sixth Special Session marked a new departure in North-South relations, according to Corea. The first General Assembly meeting devoted entirely to economic issues, it sparked a psychological change in the developing countries. The 'unhealthy' patterns of the past, in which developing countries begged for assistance without recourse to any 'instruments of countervailing pressure', now gave way to a more assertive attitude. OPEC's ability to manipulate the international economy awakened the developing nations to the North's dependence on the South, strengthening their desire to gain full control of their natural resources. They were now 'conscious of the power they have to influence world issues…as producers of commodities', Corea noted, and perceived a possibility 'to harness and mobilise this power in a constructive way'. The Third World had 'come to the stage in which supplication and pleadings alone will not do'.[57]

Indeed, the developing countries used the special session to declare a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO) that would 'correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, […] eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries, and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development'. Substantively, the NIEO

55 Ibid.

56 UNCTAD/OSG/52, "Problems of Raw Materials and Development: Note by the Secretary-General of UNCTAD," 4 April 1974, 3-4; UN Document A/AC.166/SR.3, 3rd Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Sixth Special Session, 15 April 1974, 19.

57 Gamani Corea, "The U.N. and the New International Economic Order," *Marga Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (1974), 6-7, 20. Corea also differentiated the meeting from other UN gatherings because the note prepared by his office, UNCTAD/OSG/52, constituted the only official background document submitted for discussion. This was done to prevent "a mass of documentation" and to encourage decisive political action.

embraced previously articulated positions that, repackaged and politically charged following the oil crisis, created a rallying point for the Third World challenge to the North's power. It demanded favourable terms for resource transfers to developing countries, the extension of development aid without political conditions, removal of trade barriers, regulation of transnational corporation activity in host countries and more equitable Third World representation in international financial organisations.[58] It also embraced the 'full permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural resources and all economic activities', price indexation between the South's raw materials and the North's manufactured goods, producers' associations similar to OPEC and the principle of 'collective self-reliance', by which the Third World could gain equal footing with the developed countries in pursuit of international cooperation.[59]

DHF's plans for a follow-up to the 1973 Basic Principles seminar received a boost in the wake of the Sixth Special Session. Nerfin believed that the seminar had laid the groundwork for an effort beyond just 'the enlightment [sic] of the Royal Commission'. He urged Hamrell to explore with the trustees the staging, on the basis of its published material, of 'a high level private meeting of top aid officials' from the 'likeminded' donor countries: Austria, Canada, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and West Germany. Nerfin envisioned 'a long-weekend, private affair, in some countryside government house, restricted to two persons from each country', and without supporting staff, to promote uninhibited conversation. If successful, the meeting would 'give full meaning' to the Basic Principles seminar by cultivating the political will necessary to fashion its themes into sustained development cooperation. Nerfin reprised his earlier thinking by describing the need for 'an ultra-light concertation [sic] mechanism', a small, non-governmental thinktank that would facilitate informal donor-recipient communications, promote 'action-oriented research' on cooperation policy and content and inform bilateral and multilateral policymaking through incisive analysis. 'Something along those lines', he believed, 'may well result in a real turning point in international development cooperation.'[60]

58 UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order," 1 May 1974; Airgram A-4568, State Department to All American Diplomatic Posts and Hong Kong, "Report on the Sixth Special Session of the UN," 5 June 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, P-Reel Printouts, Box 58A, Folder P740058 0101-0200, RG 59, NARA; Guy Erb and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out* (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1975), 185.

59 UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI).

60 Marc Nerfin, "Some Suggestions on the Follow-up to the DH Seminar on the Principles of International Development Cooperation," 18 November 1973, Seminar Files, High Level Seminar on World Development and International Economic Co-operation, DHF.

The DHF secretariat agreed with this course of action. Its proposal to the board noted that the likeminded countries already pursued similar aid policies. Were the foundation to bring them together for an informal exchange of ideas, they might 'exert a considerable influence on the global aid scene, not least through the weight that their combined actions could have on the policies of the international organizations'.[61]

The 1974 'High-Level Seminar on World Development and International Economic Cooperation' took place in Täljöviken, Sweden from 28 to 30 June 1974. The foundation had compiled an impressive, ministerial-level roster of participants: West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Erhard Eppler, his minister for economic cooperation and Uwe Holtz, the chairman of the Bundestag's committee for international development cooperation; Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and Peter Jankowitsch, his representative to the UN; Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs Knut Frydenlund and Arne Arnesen, his undersecretary of state for foreign affairs; Judith Hart, the United Kingdom's minister of overseas development; Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation Gertrud Sigurdsen and Inga Thorsson, Sweden's undersecretary of state for foreign affairs; Jan Pronk, the Dutch minister for development cooperation; Leslie Johnson, the director-general of the Australian Development Assistance Agency; Paul Gérin-Lajoie of the Canadian International Development Agency; and Lennart Klackberg and Ernst Michanek.[62]

As with the previous seminar, Nerfin spearheaded the planning efforts and recruited several 'resource persons' from his network of contacts. Enrique Iglesias and Mahbub ul Haq accepted the invitation, as did Gamani Corea, who had joined them at the founding meeting of the Third World Forum. Nerfin likewise considered inviting Samir Amin, another affiliate of the Third World Forum and the director of the African Institute for Development Planning, but chose Ahmed Ben Salah and Maurice Strong to join instead. He also brought in Juan Somavia, another member of the Third World Forum group, who had previously served as the Chilean representative to the Andrean group of countries. And Ernst Michanek invited Bernard Chidzero and Yashpal Tandon, a Ugandan political scientist with ties to the foundation, to participate.[63]

61 "The 1974 Dag Hammarskjöld High-Level Seminar on 'the Basic Principles of International Development Co-operation,'" undated, Seminar Files, ibid.

62 With the exception of Brandt and Eppler, all of these individuals accepted the foundation's invitation to attend the Täljöviken meeting. However, Frydenlund, Hart, Johnson, Kreisky and Pronk could not ultimately attend. Annex 1 to "Summary Analysis of the Main Themes Emerging From the Discussions," July 1974, ibid.

63 ibid. Although an early draft of the informational memorandum listed Amin as a participant, he was ultimately not extended an invitation. See "Second Draft, 11.4.74," ibid.

The invitation letter and accompanying background memo sent to participants framed the upcoming seminar discussion within a larger intellectual context. The previous DHF seminar had identified an opportunity for 'progressive people in both worlds' to achieve 'dialogue and accommodation' in spite of the growing spectre of confrontation. The Sixth Special Session had, in turn, paved the way for 'a radical reconsideration of development co-operation policies' so they could 'respond more effectively to the new needs of the Third World'. The time was ripe for a private, informal gathering where development ministers and 'authoritative representatives of the Third World' could reappraise development cooperation policy; brainstorm how to achieve 'a concerted course of action' both in content and implementation; and 'renew the essential dialogue' on development cooperation. The seminar would foster an exchange of views 'on the situation resulting from the [sixth] special session' on methods to modernise the process of development cooperation, to tackle institutional change within the UN system and to engage in collective development action.[64]

The foundation also positioned the 1974 seminar as a way to inform the upcoming Seventh Special Session. That meeting, scheduled for September 1975 and already touted as 'the second Bretton Woods', originated in UN resolution 3172, which requested the session to examine the problems of development cooperation and to solidify development as an important objective of UN activity.[65] The DHF secretariat attached excerpts of this resolution as an appendix to its informational memo, going as far as to highlight those sections that referred to 'new concepts' in development cooperation, 'the equality and common interests of all

General Assembly Opens Seventh Special Session on Development and International Economic Cooperation, 1 September 1975.

UN Photo/Teddy Chen

64 Ernst Michanek to Participants, 17 April 1974, ibid; Memorandum to Participants, 17 April 1974, ibid.

65 UN General Assembly Resolution 3172 (XXVIII), "Holding of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to development and international economic co-operation," 17 December 1973.

countries' and 'structural changes to make the United Nations system a more effective instrument of world economic co-operation'.[66] DHF stressed that the 1974 high-level seminar could play a major part in generating new ideas for the Seventh Special Session, which would require meticulous preparation.

Ernst Michanek opened the seminar proceedings with some brief remarks on recent events. The international situation was still 'confused' and needed clarification. The previous special session had been 'the most representative meeting ever held [by] responsible politicians in the field of economic development policy'. The fact that it was convened at the initiative of the Group of 77 testified to the Third World's newfound political power. 'It seems that the governments of the wretched of the earth no longer accept to be de facto marginal [sic] on the world scene', observed Michanek, echoing Martinique philosopher Frantz Fanon. 'They have stated', he went on, 'their intention to become full participants in the decision-making process in world affairs.' The seminar offered participants the possibility to engage in 'real communication between the two worlds' on a plethora of issues: how to calibrate development cooperation to the actual needs of the Third World, how most effectively to support its efforts towards self-reliance, how to promote alternative development through income redistribution and a 'massive attack on poverty' and, importantly, how to get the wealthy nations to 'question [their] own lifestyles' and living standards.[67]

Uwe Holtz carried this line of inquiry further. What purposes would refashioned development cooperation policies serve? Recent debates indicated that Third World elites sought mostly to stabilise their power and increase their profits, he argued, which would not inspire greater enthusiasm among German voters already 'not too much interested in Third World politics'. While the developing nations spoke, furthermore, of a new order 'in cooperation with the developed countries', the NIEO declaration betrayed a more confrontational attitude. Holtz pointed as evidence to a passage that claimed for 'all states, territories and peoples under foreign occupation' the right to 'restitution and full compensation' for the depletion of their natural resources. Who but his constituents and their counterparts in other industrial countries, he wondered, would end up paying that bill?[68]

66 "Annex: Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Development and International Economic Co-operation," undated, Seminar Files, High Level Seminar on World Development and International Economic Co-operation, DHF.

67 Ernst Michanek, "Introductory Statement," 28 June 1974, ibid.

68 Transcript of remarks of Dr Uwe Holtz, undated, ibid. For the relevant passage, see UNGA Resolution 3201, section 4(f).

Despite this blunt analysis, Holtz's preferred approach bore remarkable similarities to the principles elucidated at the Basic Principles seminar. Development cooperation required 'greater and more effective development aid to promote progress for the masses', as well as a reformed economic system that no longer 'discriminate[d] against the Third World'. The poor nations had to 'step up their own efforts' to mobilise resources and implement domestic reforms, for he was unwilling to continue helping those developing countries unable to execute the necessary reforms. The rich nations, for their part, required a searching reappraisal of their political attitudes, public opinion and economic structures. 'Without a restructuring of our economic system[s], there will be no radical change in the relations between the poor and the rich nations', he admitted. Aid donors had to do more to understand what changes were necessary, how they would affect particular industries and what consequences were likely to follow.[69]

Paul Gérin-Lajoie, a proven friend of developing countries through his support of the Third World Forum, also registered some discomfort with the NIEO because of its lack of emphasis on poverty reduction. While he respected the South's call for a new order and welcomed action by industrial countries to implement it, the NIEO fundamentally involved government-to-government interaction. There was a tendency in the world 'to favor the autonomy [and] the self-deciding acts of governments', and, in so doing, to provide those governments with programme aid, general debt relief or budgetary support for their own purposes. For this very reason, perhaps, the NIEO had invoked inequalities, existing injustices and the use of profits from primary resources for the development of the people, while conveniently eliding any discussion of poverty alleviation, resource distribution or the pursuit of equality within country populations. Gérin-Lajoie felt uncomfortable treating the NIEO framework as the new, revamped approach to development cooperation. Its provisions, as well as broader demands for untied and non-earmarked aid on easy terms, failed to ensure that critical assistance would reach the poor masses.[70]

The intersection of poverty relief and international development cooperation came together most clearly in Maurice Strong's pitch for a new 'world commission' to examine the 'imperatives for international cooperation to assure [the] provision of minimum human needs' without transgressing 'outer limits'. Strong explained his reasoning in a short memorandum that he circulated at the seminar. A 'significant percentage

69 ibid.

70 Transcript of remarks by Paul Gérin-Lajoie, undated, ibid.

of mankind', he posited, faced 'imminent threats to their survival'. For the Third World, this stemmed from a shortage of food, shelter, health provisions, energy 'and other ingredients required to support minimally decent standards of life'. The developed countries, on the other hand, had so massively leveraged their technological and scientific expertise they threatened permanent damage to the biosphere. Their accelerated consumption of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and man-made chemical compounds had brought on irreversible environmental changes.[71] 'The more we probe this "outer limits" question', noted Strong, 'the more we realize there is a direct relationship between the need for increased energy production, the need for increased food production, the way in which these needs are met, and the collective risks…of climate-change, of contamination of the food chain [and] the oceans, [and] of changes in the atmosphere.'[72]



Given his personal and intellectual ties to Barbara Ward, Strong's proposal built on the theoretical framework Ward had developed in *Only One Earth*.

There was as yet no policy framework to treat these issues. While the Sixth Special Session highlighted the problems and inadequacies of existing development concepts and goals, it had not proffered a comprehensive set of new guidelines for international cooperation. 'The question of survival', however, '[could] no longer be passed over' in the belief that pursuit of other objectives would unlock the appropriate solution to meeting minimum human needs. Development practitioners and activists had to create a plan of action to meet these needs, which paralleled the seminar discussion on eradicating mass poverty. The focus on how to meet minimum human needs, in fact, could provide a comprehensive basis for international cooperation, which Strong considered 'indispensable to the achievement of all other goals'. The upcoming Seventh Special Session offered the ideal opportunity to unveil this new thinking. If successful, Strong's proposed commission would be able to examine minimum needs in relation to present and projected population levels, to regional and national growth rates, to various levels of foreign assistance and to the development capacity of individual nations. It would be in a position to propose changes in resource flows, transfer methods, the necessary economic and financial measures, trade patterns and the structure of international organisations.[73]

Given his personal and intellectual ties to Barbara Ward, Strong's proposal built on the theoretical framework Ward had developed in *Only One Earth*. It garnered significant support at the seminar, especially from Mahbub ul Haq, who thought it provided an opportunity to

71 Maurice Strong, "Outline of a World Commission on Imperatives for International Cooperation to Assure Provision of Minimum Human Needs," 18 June 1974, ibid.

72 Transcript of remarks by Maurice Strong, undated, ibid.

73 Strong, "Outline of a World Commission," 3-4; Transcript of Strong's remarks, 4.

'synthesiz[e] the problem of poverty' at national and international levels. At the national level, economists had finally accepted the argument that growth absent any distributional requirements produced development patterns 'warped in favor of privileged minorities'. Yet at the international level, they still assumed that growth in the rich countries would trickle down to the benefit of the poor. Strong's proposal could inject 'into the conscience of the international community' an emphasis on mass poverty and, in so doing, strengthen the rationale for international development assistance.[74]

A study of 'minimum human needs' within environmental constraints had the potential to illuminate and improve several different dimensions of development thinking simultaneously. The development community had been struggling since the late 1960s to improve the quality of foreign aid and to cultivate political support in the developed countries for greater assistance. Haq explicitly recalled the experience of the Pearson Commission, which had combined a moral rationale for aid with a poorly conceived concept of 'self-sustaining growth' that ultimately disappointed both donors and recipients. By establishing a direct link between aid and poverty reduction, and by prioritising aid to the poorest nations and to the poorest groups within those nations for the satisfaction of their minimum needs, Strong's proposed study would avoid the Pearson Commission's pitfalls and establish 'minimum human needs' as a strong basis for international development cooperation.[75]

The project would, likewise, shed light on the need for new patterns of resource use in industrial countries. It was difficult to criticise excessive consumption in affluent societies without the ability to link it to a tangible need in developing countries. Strong's framework, however, allowed one to discuss the ownership of two or three cars by a single American household, for example, in conjunction with the need for petroleum in poor societies. 'As soon as you start to talk in terms of physical resources and their alternative uses', Haq asserted, 'these interdependencies and interrelationships come out more clearly.'[76]

Haq was right. The connection between resources, needs and consumption patterns crystallised over the course of the seminar into a major justification for a new international order. Prevailing growth and distribution patterns enabled wasteful consumption in the rich societies, discussants concluded, while 'depriving the poor of resources nec-

74 Transcript of remarks by Mahbub ul Haq, undated, ibid.

75 ibid.

76 ibid.

essary to meet their basic needs'. There was no alternative but to impose 'structural changes' in the developed countries to divert resources from unproductive investment in luxury goods and armaments, for example, into nutrition, health, shelter and educational initiatives that would collectively constitute 'a massive attack on mass poverty'. In contrast to the existing, haphazard collection of 'market mechanisms' that had so distinctly failed to nurture the socioeconomic wellbeing of developing countries, such changes required 'a world plan' based on the 'explicit values and objectives' of alternative development.[77]

The analysis encompassed a broader discussion of power relationships, and while Haq and Iglesias had spoken on this topic at the previous seminar, the ideas acquired greater potency against the backdrop of the NIEO. In spite of the new preoccupation with interdependence, the Third World had to correct the global power imbalance, even by means of confrontation. 'Cooperation between unequal partners' was detrimental, participants agreed, revisiting a theme first expressed at the Columbia Conference on the Pearson Report. Third World's present confrontational posture was worth perpetuating if it produced 'radical changes in the power structures' of the international system. Because of 'the lack of symmetry between industrialized and under-developed economies', poor nations required 'special measures'.[78]

The NIEO resolutions provided an adequate agenda for action, and the participants focused on its most fundamental proposals. They called for a revision of raw material concessions 'obtained in the context of domination and inequality' and an end to individual commodity agreements in favour of a comprehensive commodity programme based on buffer stocks and price indexation. Developing world debt had to be eliminated through 'collective rescheduling, moratoria, and abolition', and the interest on new loans could be subsidised, whether through foreign assistance or some of OPEC's new-found wealth. The new order had to distribute resources more automatically by means of taxes on the use of oceans, on the development of the seabed and on transactions in certain resources.[79]

Of all the proposals that could equalise the power of rich and poor nations, perhaps the most radical and fundamental concerned the UN system. The UN offered the 'only available chance of a better world order', the seminar concluded, and therefore required drastic

77 Confidential Appendix: Summary Analysis of the Main Themes Emerging from the Discussions, July 1974, ibid., 3-5.

78 Ibid., 4, 6.

79 Ibid., 6-7.

reconfiguration. Participants suggested the creation of a new 'UN Development Council' alongside the existing UN Security Council as the only major institutions within the General Assembly. They urged the UN Development Programme to assume full operational control of technical assistance and to subsume the International Development Association. In accordance with these changes, the Bretton Woods 'subsystem' required reform along the lines of universal membership, equal voting power, automatic replenishment of funds for concessional aid, closer cooperation in 'regularising' world trade between UNCTAD and a significantly refashioned IMF, as well as the possible decentralisation of the World Bank.[80]

The Täljöviken seminar closed with a brainstorming session on possibilities for concerted action to implement the above proposals. Future progress depended on a partnership between like-minded countries and certain Third World countries, guests felt, which entailed 'some form of institutionalization of the dialogue' initiated at the meeting. DHF agreed to facilitate an action-oriented network by serving as an information clearing house. Soon after the meeting, Hamrell circulated to the original guest list a letter outlining steps for future action and a confidential summary of the proceedings. 'We have found that a carefully done summation…can have a very good effect', he surmised, 'especially [when] intended to have at least some effect on the policy-making process.'[81]

Hamrell reminded participants that the seminar's goal was 'concerted action by…authoritative individuals both from the industrialised countries and the Third World'. The seminar had resulted in agreement on two courses of action. At the conceptual level, participants would distil the seminar's themes in discussion papers, which the group would then study, refine into 'position papers' and circulate to policymakers. Politically, they would 'pursue the issues raised at Täljöviken in informal discussions' at upcoming international meetings. This was a promising beginning, Hamrell thought, and he hoped it would result in 'more systematic consultations' in the future.[82]

DHF followed the spirit of the seminar by circulating several discussion papers in the ensuing months. Uwe Holtz analysed the requirements of

80 Ibid., 8-9.

81 Ibid., 12; Sven Hamrell to Gerald Helleiner, 10 July 1974, Korrespondens Kronologisk Ordning 1.7.1974-31.8.1974, DHF.

82 Sven Hamrell to Participants, 8 July 1974, "Personal and Confidential," Seminar Files, High-Level Seminar on World Development and International Economic Co-operation, DHF.

official development aid within a new international order. An end to the South's prevailing discrimination in international life required not just changes to the existing systems of trade and finance, he reasoned, but also 'more extensive and more directly emancipatory' aid policies. Because foreign aid constituted a small part of the overall resources the South needed to achieve progress, the 'liberal and progressive forces' in rich societies had to design their bilateral efforts for maximum effect by 'concerting their strategies' – informally, perhaps, 'and outside the structure of present alliances'. Their policies needed to rest on principles of 'emancipation and anti-imperialism' to support Third World reformers who sought to meet the needs of their people and to ensure equitable distributions of income, while avoiding self-seeking military, economic and political gain. Donors had to rationalise their aid contributions by giving more aid on the easiest terms to the poorest countries, while calibrating their assistance to employment creation, labour-intensive industries and the promotion of the South's exports. Likewise, they could not allow transnational corporations and foreign private investment to subvert recipient goals and priorities.[83]



UN Photo/Sophia Paris

Juan Somavia, who submitted two of his own discussion papers to the group, examined the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) and non-state actors in greater depth

Juan Somavia, who submitted two of his own discussion papers to the group, examined the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) and non-state actors in greater depth. Among the constellation of non-state actors in international life – trade unions, churches, foundations, scientific networks and human rights organisations – TNCs deserved the greatest scrutiny because they were the most likely to affect international power relationships. The vast majority of them originated in the North and, in the hands of governments willing to use them 'as new instruments for the exercise of influence', they created greater dependency and deepening power imbalances between the developed and developing countries.[84] Having served as the rapporteur of the 'group of eminent persons' appointed by the UN Secretary-General to assess the impact of multinational corporations on development, Somavia knew the issues well.[85] Developing countries did not possess a reactionary dislike for multinational enterprises, he argued, some of whose capacities, he believed, could benefit their own economic growth. Absent appropriate policy, however, they tended to deepen existing social inequalities, so it was necessary to define appropriately their role in relation to

83 Uwe Holtz, "Official Development Aid," 23 July 1974, ibid., 1-2, 4.

84 Juan Somavia, "The United Nations and Non-Governmental Actors in International Relations," September 1974, ibid, 3, 6.

85 The Group of Eminent Persons met intermittently from September 1973 to April 1974. Its final report was published as UN Document E/5500/Rev.1: *The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations* (New York: United Nations, 1974).

a host country's national development scheme 'in order to maximize [their] benefits and minimize [their] dangers'.[86]

His experience with the eminent persons group convinced Somavia that there was a significant lack of information about the objectives and motivations of TNCs, their institutional make-up and decision-making processes, and their production and finance strategies, all of which contributed to the ill will between multinational enterprises and developing countries. Host governments that misunderstood corporate motivations risked granting unnecessary concessions to attract foreign business activity or, worse yet, overlooking income distribution and social justice initiatives on the assumption that TNCs favoured 'stability'. They were equally likely to conclude agreements in which they did not understand who bore responsibility for strategic export and market-allocation decisions, and to denounce TNC executives when corporate choices ran counter to national development objectives.[87]

To minimise such problems and to cultivate a healthy relationship between international business and national development goals, both sides had to embrace transparency. Somavia suggested that corporations submit a new set of accounting data, similar to the information shared with company shareholders but geared specifically towards measurements that host countries found relevant to their national development goals. The publication of terms of agreement could dispel existing mistrust, allowing host countries to gain equal bargaining power and confidence in their negotiating positions with corporations. For their part, the developing countries needed to clarify expectations and the processes available to adjudicate disputes. Somavia ended by identifying specific areas for further research into this relationship, including methods to ensure corporate accountability to host societies and the types of political and legislative structures necessary to contain corporate power.[88]

Finally, on the basis of Maurice Strong's suggestion for a world commission to explore minimum human needs, Marc Nerfin submitted a more detailed outline for such a project, which sowed the seeds for one of the foundation's most highly visible initiatives, the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project on Development and International Cooperation. His proposal recycled most of the seminar's themes about unjust patterns of resource use, unequal power relationships and the opportunity presented by

86 Juan Somavia, "Transnational Corporations and Information Gathering at the UN," *Development Dialogue* no. 2 (1974), 13. This paper was written in September 1974 and originally circulated, in unpublished form, to participants of the Täljöviken meeting.

87 Ibid., 14, 19.

88 Ibid., 16-18.

the upcoming Seventh Special Session to create a new conceptual framework for international cooperation. Nerfin emphasised that an 'enquiry' into how best to meet the 'inner limits' of man's needs within the 'outer limits' of existing global resources could integrate all the concerns recently voiced in international forums into a unifying whole. As such, the enquiry would illuminate the relationship between Northern consumption patterns and Southern deprivation, define the substance of alternative policies for the satisfaction of human needs, reconfigure prevailing lifestyles in the rich countries, offer a basis for institutional reform of international organisations and promote the political will to implement international solutions to identified problems.[89]

Nerfin envisioned two distinct approaches to these issues – one country-specific and the other global. Country-specific papers would define poverty through studies of adequate food intake, health services and literacy. They would identify the potential for income distribution and socioeconomic reforms, probe the consequences of these measures on national growth priorities and interrogate the alternatives that existed for the provision of public health, education and transportation services. On the other hand, the global approach could help determine 'a new, more adequate' development model by examining the scope for cooperation among Third World countries, as well as the potential to increase their earnings through fairer trade practices and redistributed industrial capacity. In all these topics, the enquiry would pay detailed attention to how the consumption and distribution of resources nationally and internationally, as well as their distribution directly and through market forces, affected human needs.[90]

Because the enquiry would take several years to complete, Nerfin proposed two phases. The first involved gathering facts, reporting on the scope of the enquiry and identifying possible directions for work ahead of the Seventh Special Session. The enquiry had to ensure international recognition through appropriate patronage, networking efforts and capable administration. Whether through Strong's idea of a formal commission or through a more flexible high-level advisory committee, the project required close interaction with 'eminent personalities' representing both rich and poor regions, the broad spectrum of ideological positions and professional and intellectual fields. Harkening back to the Founex meeting and the accompanying seminars he had helped

89 Marc Nerfin, "Täljöviken Discussion Paper No. 4: Outline of an Enquiry into the Imperatives for International Co-operation to Meet Fundamental Human Needs without Transgressing the 'Outer Limits,'" November 1974, Seminar Files, High-Level Seminar on World Development and International Economic Co-operation, DHF, 4.

90 Ibid., 8-9, 10-11.

initiate in preparation for the Stockholm Conference, Nerfin also identified a necessary 'process of consultation' through similar gatherings of 'decision-making and opinion-forming' actors: intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, political parties and members of various parliaments, transnational enterprises and trade unions, and religious organisations. And the enquiry would need an objective and independent 'distinguishable entity', centrally located and politically acceptable to all involved, to provide institutional and administrative support.[91]

As they had promised at the Täljöviken seminar, the participants lent vocal political support to the development cooperation agenda. The most prominent instance of such support took place at the joint UNCTAD/UNEP Symposium on Patterns of Resource Use, Environment and Development Strategies in Cocoyoc, Mexico in October 1974. Maurice Strong began planning the gathering in March when he approached Francisco Vizcaino Murray, the undersecretary of environment in the Mexican secretariat of health, to gauge the Mexican government's willingness to play host.[92] Corea, Haq, Iglesias, Nerfin, Somavia and Strong were among the 32 development and environment experts who, under Barbara Ward's chairmanship, met to add intellectual heft to the demands for a new international order. Like Samir Amin, Ignacy Sachs and Alfonso Santa Cruz, many of the other participants occupied official positions within the UN system, worked in autonomous development centres or had previously contributed to the development-environment agenda.[93]

The most concrete manifestation of the symposium was a final document named the 'Cocoyoc Declaration', which DHF was the first to publish in *Development Dialogue* and in which participants attacked the North's disproportionate use of global resources and its complicity in the South's destitution. The analysis was rooted firmly in the framework previously developed by Ward, Strong and Nerfin, with participants 'recogniz[ing] the threats to both the "inner limits" of basic human needs and the "outer limits" of the planet's physical resources'. The global economic crisis stemmed, however, not from any absolute shortage but from a maldistribution of resources based on 'centuries of colonial control' and the concentration of economic power among

91 Ibid., 6, 11-13.

92 Telegram 1974MEXICO08995, 22 November 1974; Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976; Electronic Telegrams, 1974; RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NARA [accessed 2 August 2011].

93 For a complete list of the symposium participants, see "The Cocoyoc Declaration," *Development Dialogue* no. 2 (1974), 96, where the final document of the meeting was first published.

a rich minority. By preempting the greater share of key resources for themselves at artificially low prices, the industrialised countries mocked the development enterprise. The cheapness of primary materials 'encourag[ed] waste and a throwaway economy among the rich', while accruing to them the value-added from the processing of these resources, which transnational corporations sold back to the developing world in manufactured form at monopoly prices.[94]

UN Photo/Tim McKulka

Beyond inequitable power dynamics, participants attacked the market system for its fundamental incompatibility with the goals of international development to satisfy basic human needs.

The final declaration and the working report on which it was based particularly castigated 'the evils which flow from excessive reliance on the market system'. The participants focused, first, on power dynamics. International factor remuneration was already biased towards the developed countries, which clearly benefited from the combination of expensive capital, financial and managerial inputs available within their borders and from the South's cheap labour and natural resources. The multinational corporations obliterated whatever '"normal" functioning' remained of the market by 'selling to themselves in a closed circuit' and fixing international natural resource prices at artificially low levels. The industrialised world's bid to obfuscate these power dynamics by blaming its economic woes on high oil prices proved both disingenuous and highly ironic, since OPEC's market manipulation illuminated just how much 'relationships of power determine the gains to be made from most market transactions' and the extent to which, 'in the colonial and post-colonial period[,] most of the power has lain with the developed nations'.[95]

Beyond inequitable power dynamics, participants attacked the market system for its fundamental incompatibility with the goals of international development to satisfy basic human needs. 'By their own logic, market mechanisms [were] linked to the affluent peoples and countries of the world', allocating goods and services to those who could afford them rather than to those who needed them most. The quest for maximum revenue discouraged any 'qualitative appraisal' of how production could be organised to achieve social needs. The developed countries mitigated this trend in their own societies with welfare policies and various tax schemes, but these redistributive measures were unavailable in the international marketplace.[96]

Worse yet, from the point of view of the South's needs, the 'rich bias' tended to skew production towards Western lifestyles that the developing countries could not yet sustain. Participants complained that the

94 *In Defence of the Earth: The Basic Texts on Environment* (Nairobi: UNEP, 1981), 110-11, 119.

95 "The Context of Cocoyoc," undated, Barbara Ward Papers, Box 10, Folder 30, Georgetown University Special Collections, Washington, DC, 10, 14-15.

96 Ibid., 16.

South trained brain surgeons and invested in automobile industries when it really needed village doctors and mass transit systems. This 'tendency to downgrade basic social needs' was further aggravated by transnational corporations, whose advertising campaigns artificially stimulate[d] the consumer patterns of affluence through techniques of marketing and publicity and the systematic planning of product changes and obsolescence, even though 'affluence' is still the privilege of not more than ten per cent of the local population.[97]

This line of thinking clearly reflected the influence of Mahbub ul Haq, who had spent the early 1970s reflecting on the Third World's tendency fruitlessly to mimic the lifestyles of the industrialised countries.

The symposium concluded that the existing system, replete with corporate machinations and profit-driven decisions that mired the Third World in unrelenting poverty, 'need[ed] to be replaced'. The Cocoyoc Declaration proposals to this effect replicated much of the Täljöviken discussion. The participants fully endorsed the Sixth Special Session and its major conclusions as a promising start to 'a great tide of international activities'. This tide, they hoped, would continue at an action-oriented Seventh Special Session, where development goals would finally gain 'their rightful place in the United Nations system', and where progressive forces would initiate major structural change for 'the well-being of all mankind'. In line with the NIEO, they called for more foreign assistance, 'rigorously dedicated to the basic needs of the poorest strata of society', as well as the creation of international taxation regimes that would make such assistance automatic. The relocation of research activity and certain productive enterprises to the developing countries would, likewise, provide a welcome change in 'the industrial geography of the world'.[98]

Maurice Strong spoke particularly vociferously about the substantive content of the declaration, insisting that the final text had to stress the 'inherent conflict between the rich and the poor' in the use of resources, as well as 'the evils of the price structure' created by the developed world's 'overuse of resources'.[99] The symposium's working document, which interlaced a discussion of resource management with demands for international justice, seemed equally strident. Given the North's inordinate economic gains 'from early access to cheap resources and

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., 15; *In Defence of the Earth*, 116-19.

99 Telegram 1974MEXICO08793, 16 October 1974; Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976; Electronic Telegrams, 1974; RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NARA [accessed 2 August 2011].

from prolonged preferential use of Third World materials', it argued, 'it should be accepted in international justice [sic]' that the rich nations would have to pay for the cost of the NIEO proposals for increasing the South's control of its resources through nationalisation, the expansion of local processing, the creation of buffer stocks and the development of local expertise. By paying taxes on the South's raw materials and on travel in international waterways and airways, by allowing the Third World a larger voice in multinational organisations, by rescheduling existing debt burdens and by strictly adopting 0.7 per cent of their GNP as the minimally acceptable level of their official foreign assistance, rich countries would finally recognise the applicability 'to global society of the basic concept of distributive justice' – 'that the wealthy should be taxed for the benefit of the poor'.[100]

Participants urged the rich countries to accept these proposals as a measure of their 'enlightened self-interest'. Such global changes corresponded to previous domestic labour agreements at the national level, which had occurred 'at various times and in many communities without a total collapse of order, without enflamed confrontations' and 'without uncontrollable violence or the resort to war'. The acceptance by the rich of 'their obligations under justice' would promote efforts at sustained cooperation. On the other hand, 'interventions, the use of force, subversion, open and covert efforts to undermine local experiments in self-determination and social change' would lead only to chaos and confrontation. 'Obduracy', they warned, invoking Karl Marx, would lead only 'to the common ruin of the contending parties'.[101]

Although the final declaration omitted much of the incendiary language of the working report, thanks to Barbara Ward's edits, it remained a radical document, in part because it called for the prompt adoption by the UN of the 'Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of State'.[102] This was yet another example of 'progressive' support on behalf of Third World issues that the Täljöviken seminar promised to promote. The charter was the brainchild of Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who had lent official support to the symposium and who participated in the deliberations on the final declaration. Echeverria first proposed the charter in an address to the third session of UNCTAD in 1972

100 "Context of Cocoyoc," 17-18,

101 Ibid., 29-30.

102 Ward's papers at Georgetown University contain a copy of the "Context of Cocoyoc" with her textual mark-ups, corrections, and marginalia. Originally intended as a distinct report to be published alongside the Cocoyoc Declaration, the document was significant shortened and molded into the final declaration itself. The final, published version of the Cocoyoc Declaration corresponds to Ward's hand-written notes.

in the hope that an agreement regulating the behaviour of states in certain situations would place the international economy 'on a firm legal footing'. The charter sought to protect developing countries in their nationalisation disputes by defending each country's prerogatives with respect to its approach to private property and the organisation of its national economic structures; to condemn the use of economic pressure in international relations; to shield domestic affairs from the purview of multinational corporations; and to advocate for 'fair prices' and non-discriminatory treatment of Third World exports.[103] UNCTAD III formally adopted Echeverria's proposal, arguing that the existing economic system rested on 'precarious' 'legal instruments' and that, without a charter to protect the developing nations, a 'just order' would never emerge.[104]

The group's decision to demand swift passage of the charter at the Cocoyoc symposium reflects the momentum gained from the NIEO declaration. Echeverria's proposal had stalled in the early charter negotiations within UNCTAD's trade and development board in 1973. Jean-Pierre Martin, UNCTAD's director of external relations, euphemistically observed that the first meeting of the negotiating working group had 'very strong political overtones', so much so that the negotiating parties disagreed on the very nature of what they were negotiating – whether the charter 'should be legally binding or a mere declaration of intent'.[105] The Third World eagerly attempted to guide the process along. At the 28th session of the General Assembly, it requested a final draft of the charter for a final vote at the next session, and reiterated this demand during the Sixth Special Session by including an endorsement of the charter within the NIEO programme of action.[106] A year into the negotiations, however, Martin reported progress so minimal that 'the spirit of compromise' had 'not yet fully prevailed upon the desire to establish negotiation positions'.[107] The developing countries achieved a major victory, albeit a symbolic one, when they forced the

103 Luis Echeverria Alvarez, "Summary of Address Given at the 92nd Plenary Meeting," 19 April 1972, UN Document TD/180, *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Volume 1A, Part I* (New York: UN, 1973), 186.

104 UNCTAD Resolution 45(III), UN Document TD/180, *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session, Volume 1*(New York: UN, 1973), 58. The resolution passed with no negative votes and with overwhelming support from the developing nations and the Netherlands. The major donors abstained, however, including the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Austria, Canada, West Germany, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries. See 58, 17f.

105 Jean-Pierre Martin to ECLA, 21 March 1973, RG 40, Arr. 1842, Box 114, Archives of the United Nations Office in Geneva (hereafter UNOG).

106 UN Resolution 3082 (XXVIII), 6 October 1973.

107 Jean-Pierre Martin to the Executive Secretaries of the Regional Economic Commissions, 26 March 1974, RG 40, Arr. 1842, Box 114, UNOG.

adoption of the NIEO declaration and programme of action, both of which incorporated the principles enumerated in Echeverria's charter proposal. Yet these were vaguely worded documents adopted without a voice vote and lacking the weight of legal authority. At best, they signified non-binding norms of behaviour to which only the more radical Third World nations would subscribe. Consequently, the Cocoyoc Declaration insisted on prompt passage of the charter to safeguard the nascent NIEO and to create the proper basis for further initiatives at the Seventh Special Session.



Svilen Milev

The ideas that the Foundation had helped to foster directly at its seminars and indirectly at Cocoyoc, successfully caught the attention of important political actors.

The ideas that DHF had helped to foster directly at its seminars and indirectly at Cocoyoc, successfully caught the attention of important political actors. After Maurice Strong highlighted the symposium in testimony to the General Assembly's Second Committee at the 29th regular session, the Cocoyoc Declaration was circulated as an official committee document with Mexican, Argentinean, Moroccan, Cuban and Swedish support. Argentina followed suit with a draft resolution that combined references to the NIEO with an expression of 'satisfaction' with the Cocoyoc Declaration. It noted the harmful effects of 'irrational and wasteful exploitation and consumption of natural resources' and the threat they represented to developing countries 'in the exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources'.[108]

US diplomats followed these developments with heightened interest. Stephen Schwebel, a legal advisor at the US State Department, described the declaration as an 'eloquent', 'intelligent' and 'incendiary' attack on market economies, written by a distinguished yet imbalanced group of participants, that implicitly supported OPEC-like cartelisation schemes and unmistakably criticised US policies and lifestyles. He questioned the propriety of UNCTAD and UNEP participation in meetings, partially funded by the United States, which produced 'this kind of propaganda'.[109]

The department quickly sprang into action. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed John Scali, Washington's permanent representative to the UN, that the United States could not acquiesce in any resolution that expressed 'satisfaction' with Cocoyoc because the declaration had

108 Telegram 1974USUNN04688, 2 November 1974; Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976; Electronic Telegrams, 1974; RG 59, NARA [accessed 2 August 2011]. The declaration was circulated as UN Document A/C.2/292.

109 P750184-1690, Stephen Schwebel to David Gantz, Julius Katz, John McDonald, Bernard Oxman, Charles Pitman, and Ronald Stowe, 23 October 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, P-Reel Printouts, Entry P545, Box 184C, Folder P750184 1605-1710, RG 59, NARA.

issued 'a strident call' for change that Washington could not accept.[110] Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll noted that the declaration implicitly adopted the 'limits to growth' thesis popularised by the Club of Rome. More ominously, it 'explicitly espouse[d] the viewpoint and aspirations of the developing countries embodied in the programme of action on the establishment of a New International Economic Order and the LDC version of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties'. He concluded that the organisers had deliberately chosen their guests 'on the basis of demonstrated like-mindedness' in order to promote Third World views.[111]

The department's sober response highlights the success of DHF and its collaborators to gain the attention of international centres of power. After Strong began to distribute the declaration among sympathetic leaders such as India's Indira Gandhi, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Sweden's Olof Palme, the department asked US missions in Santiago, Geneva and Nairobi to convey to Iglesias, Corea and Strong its view that the exercise lacked intellectual balance and to request that they give the declaration 'neutral treatment'.[112] The declaration was fundamentally flawed, it argued, because its interpretation of the North's desire to 'pre-empt' the South's raw materials through deliberately biased market mechanisms exhibited a conspiratorial view of history. Likewise, the declaration seemed to embrace confrontation by overtly supporting OPEC's behaviour, even though 'advocating the diversion of real resources by expropriation through [the] ruthless use of monopoly power of producer cartels' was, the department noted, 'hardly helpful in persuading parliamentary governments to cooperate in the transfer of such resources through trade, investment and development assistance'. And the declaration engaged in 'highly simplistic economics' to criticise market mechanisms, failing to address the role of the market in the creation of distributable wealth and treating production as a quantity divorced from the business institutions that organised it.[113]

110 Telegram 1974STATE249211, 18 November 1974, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976; Electronic Telegrams, 1974, ibid; Telegram 1974MEXICO08995, 22 October 1974, ibid. The resolution's reference to the Cocoyoc Declaration would be acceptable, Kissinger suggested, if the term "satisfaction" was changes to "interest."

111 Telegram 1974STATE252042, 15 November 1974, ibid.

112 Telegram 1974NAIROB09587, 15 November 1974, ibid.

113 Telegram 1974STATE257412, 21 November 1974, ibid.

Conclusion

The 1973-74 period laid the intellectual groundwork for DHF's transformation into a major advocate of 'alternative development' thinking. In the following years, the foundation initiated a series of 'guerrilla operations for the survival of mankind', the most prominent of which was the transnational 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project to identify – along the lines of Maurice Strong's and Marc Nerfin's proposals at Täljöviken – the concrete steps necessary to satisfy fundamental human needs on a global scale, to restructure the UN system and to establish more equitable relationships between developed and developing countries. This collaborative project, which spanned 48 nations in North and South America, Europe, Asia and Africa, and involved 150 people, 14 UN bodies and 24 development research centres, proved overwhelmingly successful.[114] Its final report, *What Now?*, garnered widespread attention from development thinkers, public officials and international civil servants, helping to solidify the concepts of 'another development'.[115]

Equally importantly, the effort fostered a global civil society of activists and organisations that shared the foundation's goals and values. To institutionalise the results of the 1975 Project, Nerfin founded the International Foundation for Development Alternatives. Juan Somavia, a close collaborator, established the Transnational Institute for Latin American Studies. Both aligned themselves closely with the Third World Forum and regional organisations such as the Marga Institute in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Together, the organisations made up the vanguard in developed thinking during the 1970s and 1980s. Their emphasis on people and the satisfaction of 'basic human needs' has become so deeply rooted that even multinational corporations have followed suit, creating their own programmes. Starbucks, for example, sells 'Ethos' bottled water to help provide clean drinking water in the developing world, while multinational corporations such as Coca Cola, Apple and Nike have pledged a portion of their revenues to the Product Red consortium, in recognition of the fact that 'what we choose to do, or even buy, can affect someone's life on the other side of the world'.[116] It is precisely this emphasis on individuals and their livelihoods that DHF and its friends helped catalyse 40 years ago, and it now bears witness to their pioneering work and vision.

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114 Marc Nerfin, "Report of the Project Director," 16 December 1975, Seminar Files, The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project, DHF.

115 Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, *What Now: The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, prepared on the occasion of the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1975).

116 "The (RED) Manifesto," accessed 15 January 2012, http://www.joinred.com/aboutred.

The fire at the Foundation Secretariat in 1982.

Out of the Ashes: Values, Otherness, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Mie-Na Srein

"Let everything be consumed by the fire in the hope that something of value may be left which can be riddled out of the ashes"

Dag Hammarskjöld[1]

Soulemane Doucoure was a janitor at a technology corporation my mother was employed at. When many of us might have passed him by without a second glance, she befriended this young refugee from Mauritania, inviting him into our home for meals, encouraging him to go to school, and eventually accepting him as one of the family. I assure you, there is no shortage of such stories when it comes to my mom. However, the larger point is that with every person my mom encounters, she openly shares her faith, her love, and her compassion. I know she does this because she profoundly values, and loves, human life.

When my mother was 5 years old, a man that shared this very same value, died in a plane crash. His name was Dag Hammarskjöld. He was a Swedish citizen; the second Secretary-General of the United Nations; an international civil servant; lover of art, culture, nature, and humanity; pursuer of peace. For many years before his death he kept a personal journal, which would eventually be published. This book found its way into my hands thanks to a co-worker in a coffee shop that I worked in. My co-worker claimed it would change my life. Needless to say, I read the book. There were no fireworks, no instantaneous self-realizations. However, I concede that he was correct; I didn't know it at that time, 8 years ago, but eventually the content in that little book would indeed, completely alter the course of my life.

I sit writing these reflections from The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF) in Sweden. The DHF was established in 1962 after Dag's death,

1 Dag Hammarskjöld, *Markings*. London: Faber and Faber 1964, p. 56.

in an attempt to, "…in [his] spirit …further promote peace and development in the world."[2] In the simplest of phrasing, the DHF is a small, idea-based foundation that convenes people in seminars and lectures, and produces publications. This increasingly takes place within the context of global governance and human security, development, democracy and human rights.

If you've ever read *Life of Pi* or watched the film *Science of Sleep*, then you will have an idea as to what I mean when I use the words *adventure*, or *journey*, which is exactly what I've been on these past three months as an intern. The truth is, that while all the preceding facts I've rattled off about the DHF are true, they simply do not do justice to just how special it is. The group of warm, laughter-loving, intellectual individuals that work here do not lazily rest on a name. Rather, they conduct constructive dialogue with fierce conviction, true open-mindedness, and deep purpose. The DHF stands steadfast in active commitment to continue the legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld, ensuring that no matter what direction that ideas and opinions might take, they are ultimately rooted in that most precious value: love and respect for human life; love for the other.

The work I completed with the foundation, the conversations I participated in, the rich life histories I listened to, have allowed me to leave this experience personally and professionally enriched. I have learned just how imperative, and what exactly, 'true' dialogue is, which the DHF has demonstrated is the capacity to share one's ideas and convictions while exercising a genuine willingness to listen to another's; I have learned that a small group of dedicated people with limited resources are no less capable of forming a powerful voice; I have learned that there is a power in passion when it is backed by intellect; I have learned that just because we don't see the words 'love' or 'other' in the latest international headline, does not mean they are any less crucial to guiding our pursuit of a world that looks better than it does right now.

I've always wondered why it is, more people don't know Dag Hammarskjöld's name. In a moment of reflection, it's obvious. He wasn't looking to make a name for himself. Extraordinary as he was, he simply lived in a state of otherness, in a quiet pursuit of being self-indifferent, all while facing the constraints of being human. And in this, he has left behind for us, values that have stood the test of fire.

2 Birgitta Dahl quoted in, "Dag Hammarskjöld and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation," *Development Dialogue*, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 2.

Peder Hammarskjöld

Dag Hammarskjöld at the Swedish Ambassador's residence in Peking, 1955.

UN Photo/Kibae Park

An array of motorbikes crossing Long Bien Bridge on the Red River in Hanoi, Viet Nam

From the Network: Security (Re-)Examined

The Crises of Environment and Social Reproduction: Understanding their Linkages

By Maria S. Floro[1]

> "Reproduction (*of capital*[2]) is always mediated via others: it lives only by subjugating the "other" without destroying it at the same time,… using it without (immediately) exhausting it."
> (Brie 2009, p. 17)

Introduction: Pursuit of Economic Growth and the Evolving Crises of Care

The world today faces serious challenges that go beyond the financial crises that have gripped both developed and developing countries in the last few decades. These concerns have to do with the evolving crises on care and environmental degradation. They are critical dimensions of life that mainstream economics has failed to address and in so doing, has promoted economic policies and development strategies, which for the most part, have ignored the long-ranging effects on human maintenance, social reproduction and the sustainability of the ecosystem. As a result, there are growing tensions between the incessant pursuit of (market)

1 I am grateful to the Dag Hammarksjöld Foundation for its support in writing this paper. I would like to thank Henning Melber and the participants of the 2009 seminar in Uppsala, Sweden for their comments and suggestions. This paper also benefitted from conversations with Lourdes Beneria, Metta Sparre, Peter Soderbaum, Thomas Hungerford, Diane Elson, Barbara Bergmann and Mary Hansen.

2 Italics are mine.

economic growth to meet the everexpanding material consumption on one hand, and the ability of societies to care for their people and for the ecosystems upon which they live upon, on the other. Such tensions are being manifested in the crises of care at varied scales and levels: some are of magnitude that are potentially immense; others involve selective disturbances and severe disruptions that undermine the sustenance and quality of life of particular groups of people or species.

There are growing tensions between the incessant pursuit of economic growth to meet the everexpanding material consumption on one hand, and the ability of societies to care for their people and for the ecosystems upon which they live upon, on the other.

The evolving crisis of care for people has to do with the growing imbalances within and across societies with respect to access to care and subsistence necessities as well as the articulated hierarchy in the economics paradigm that bias the use of resources towards meeting the requirements of market production over those of social reproduction. Social reproduction involves the maintenance of and provisioning for human life as well as to the enhancement of capabilities of people as workers, citizens, and stewards of this planet. It involves the undertaking of reproductive or 'care' activities that affect the well-being of both current and future generations such as food preparation, domestic work, subsistence production, childcare, care for the sick and elderly, collection of fuel and water, etc, which are mainly performed using unpaid labor in the household. They are not counted in the Systems of National Accounts (SNA) and conventional social and economic indicators; hence they remain 'invisible' in most macroeconomic models, ignored in standard cost-benefit analyses, and outside the purview of policymakers.[3] The crisis of care is experienced in small and large scales and at localized as well as broader levels in the forms of feeble support to meet adequately the needs of the sick, young, elderly or disabled, chronic stress and long work hours of primary caregivers, stunted lives, as well as everyday struggles to fight hunger, disease, etc.

Similarly, the world is witnessing climate destabilization and increasing fragility of the ecosystem that are closely tied with the rapid consumption (i.e. burning) of fossil fuel and other human activities which have led to active carbon buildup in the atmosphere (Lohmann (2006), Parry et al (2007). The world is already witnessing the likely consequences of climate change in terms of reduced agricultural productivity, more frequent heat waves, stronger storms and more weather-related damage, more intense flooding and droughts, water crises, increased biodiversity loss, and adverse health impacts due to recent warming and precipitation trends.

3 Only collection of fuel and water and subsistence production are included as part of the SNA production activities. These are poorly captured by labor force and household survey questionnaires however.

Drawing from the contributions of feminist economics and ecological economics, this paper explores the interconnection between the crisis of care and the deepening ecological crisis. It argues that there are crucial interdependence between the market economy and the reproductive economy and between the entire human (economic) system and the ecosystems that must be urgently addressed. Building on the extensive work of feminist economists and ecological economists, it demonstrates that an obsessive preoccupation on material economic growth in the economic paradigm inadequately address the care requirements of human maintenance and social reproduction and the vital dependence of human life on the ecosystem, but actively contributes to crisis creation and intensification. The paper also evaluates whether the mainstream economic solution of having 'more and better markets' can adequately address these crises. Finally, it provides an alternative framework based on feminist economics and ecological approaches, for developing gender-sensitive and environment-aware economic policies.

Interdependence of Economic Growth, Social Reproduction and Ecosystems

Over the past few decades, feminist and ecological economists along with the science community have brought attention to the vital importance of understanding the social content of economic actions and policies, and the crucial interconnection between human economic activities and the state of our ecosystem (Cagatay and Elson 2000, Howarth and Norgaard 1993, Nelson 2011, Hahnel 2011, Soderbaum 2008, Costanza et al 2001, Gitay, Suárez, Watson and Dokken 2002, Parry et al. 2007, Sheeran 2011, Bergmann 2011). An overarching fixation on (market) economic growth and the concomittant fetish consumer culture, alongside rising inequality and demographic changes, have put stresses on the delivery of quality care and on the carrying capacity and resilience of our ecosystem. Yet the ecosystem and unpaid care labor provide services that are indispensable to the operation and functioning of the market economy. Economic policies, for the most part, have ignored the ecological dimensions of the material productive activities they promote and the care requirements for the reproduction of labor, assuming that any issue or consequence would either take care of themselves or could be dealt with through market adjustments e.g. development of more efficient technologies, or the development of specialized care service markets. The type of economic growth generally pursued worldwide has not only increased stresses put upon the earth's resource base but also on care labor capacity, which is wrongly perceived to be of infinite supply. The preoccupation of the dominant economic paradigm on material output growth has also lead to persistent failure of develop-

ment processes to reduce inequalities and to deal with the rapid erosion of the diversity and resilience of the life-support ecosystems.

The general proposition that economic growth benefits everyone including the poor and women is premised on the idea that development of markets and increased market participation lead to more opportunities, higher incomes, thus empowering them both economically and socially, especially as consumers who meet their needs and satisfy wants. Economic growth also is assumed to lead to higher quality, albeit fewer, children since higher earnings increase access to education and health services, better nutrition and so forth. Additionally, economists argue that economic growth is good, or is going to be beneficial for the environment. This is based on the notion that when a country has attained a sufficiently high standard of living, people will give greater attention to environmental amenities, leading to environmental regulation and new institutions for the protection of the environment. Such view has been justified by the claim that there exists a positive relationship between per capita income and some measures of environmental quality.

To be sure, a significant component of economic growth has been beneficial in terms of leading to longer life expectancies, decline in infant and child mortality rates, development of green technologies that reduce consumption of fossil fuels and associated carbon emissions, etc. On the other hand, there are aspects of market production activities contributing to economic growth, which are considered 'superfluous', that feed into the 'conspicuous material consumption' and which have accelerated the consumption of fossil fuels and the absorption of labor and natural resources. This has raised the basic question regarding the relationship between human well-being and (material) growth (Ackerman et al 1997, Hahnel 2011, Soderbaum 2008). Put in another way, can we improve the quality of life and attain prosperity without economic growth (Bergmann 2011)?

At the same time, cultural and social norms have evolved alongside capitalist development and the expansion of markets, strongly defining the way that individuals behave, and households, markets, governments and businesses operate. Social and cultural norms often present solutions to problems of uncertainty e.g. future demand for commodities, provision of care services in the future, etc. For example, economic success, social standing, and well-being, which serve as 'raison d' etre' for maximizing profits, working harder and earning more, are defined by higher material consumption – the more commodities one consumes, the better-off is the person, household, community, or country. A socialized belief of the existence of potential vertical mobility often accompanies

this incessant demand for social status goods. And "the greater is the income and wealth inequality, the greater is the amount that must be consumed by everyone beneath the wealthiest to maintain or improve their relative status" (Wisman 2011, p. 10). These social beliefs are nothing new, they in fact have been pointed out by Thorstein Veblen in the late 19th century. They are further reinforced by modern economic theories that promote the fallacious belief that, even when one is above the poverty line and has sufficient means to pay for emergencies, higher levels of income still contribute to increasing well-being (Lane 1997, Hahnel 2011).[4] Not surprisingly, as people become more affluent e.g. in the United States or China, the more rapid is the increase in resource use and associated emissions (Schandl and West 2010).

Not surprisingly, as people become more affluent, the more rapid is the increase in resource use and associated emissions.

Gender norms, which are embedded in households, markets and communities function, have shaped the roles of women and men and their relation to each other. By perpetuating certain beliefs regarding women and men's traits and ascribed roles, gender becomes a stratifier of economic and social life in the way that class, race, religion and ethnicity have become (Cagatay, Elson and Grown 1995). Gender norms help address the coordination problem in social reproduction by providing the basis for a fundamental division of labor in societies – the division between productive and reproductive activities. To be sure, these socially ascribed roles are continually challenged by social and economic changes as well as bypolitical and legal reforms. The evolving character of gender roles amidst these changes is not linear; the interplay of forces that influence gender norms can pull the process towards competing paths. In some cases, there is advancement towards gender equality while in others, there has been a backlash and a movement towards more traditional roles.

Still, an enduring pattern tends to persist. As women increasingly engage in productive activities and become income earners, they (or at least the majority of them) continue to perform their socially-ascribed, gender role of being primarily responsible for reproductive activities i.e. as household managers and care providers. Although there is evidence in time use studies on several countries that men have increasingly taken on more household chores, the bulk of unpaid care work performed at home and in the community still falls on women. This situation inevitably creates stresses and growing tensions as workers, particularly women, try to balance old and new roles. They experience these strains in caring for their households, in their search for jobs and participation in the labor market, in accessing credit, technology and assets even as they continue to perform their socially-ascribed roles.

4 See for example, Travers and Richardson (1993), Ackerman et al (1997), and Gough (1994).

Inability to successfully combine paid and household labor have left many women disenfranchised and disempowered (Floro and Meurs 2009). Instead of replacing time in household care work with time in paid work, and shifting compensating amounts of reproductive work to men, women tend to lengthen their total work time at the expense of leisure and sleep. In some cases, they perform two or more work activities simultaneously in order to cope with the time pressure. The work burden is heightened even more during periods of economic downturns and crises, cutbacks in government expenditures, and fiscal austerity measures.

Market Economy and Social Reproduction

There are important linkages between the market economy and the care economy that require scrutiny and a ttention if we want to understand and address the evolving crisis of care of people. We start by defining the sphere of economic inquiry around the concept of the provisioning of human life that feminist economists have used (Cagatay, Elson and Grown 1995, Nelson 1993). It emphasizes those goods and services that people need in order to survive and to develop their capabilities e.g. food, health care, childcare, care for the sick and elderly, education, water, sewer, housing, means of transport, etc..There are two productive systems that provide them namely the market economy and the non-market (or reproductive) economy that take place in households and communities. The link between them are multi-faceted. First, the labor time spent in growing food for subsistence, gathering fuel and water, doing childcare, sick and elder care and performing domestic chores is co-determined with paid, market work time. Thus, reproductive or care work time directly affect individuals' labor market options as well as their time spent in the labor market.

Second, unpaid (care) labor time also affects the rate at which labor in paid work is rewarded since the so-called monetized opportunity costs are small in the case of unpaid, household work. Third, care or reproductive activities such as domestic chores, fuel and water gathering, subsistence production and care work in the household are crucial to the production of the labor force, generation of knowledge and overall social reproduction. As Nancy Folbre (2008:24-25) puts it: "Children grow up to become workers, entrepreneurs, innovators as well as taxpayers, and the older generation is not the only group that benefits from their existence…..the benefits are realized by all consumers of commodities, whether they have raised children or not". Put in another way, those household members that perform the unpaid work of daily domestic chores and caring activities assume important costs of producing the labor force and social fabric.

Fourth, there are complementarities and substitution between market-purchased goods and services purchased and the non-marketed goods and services produced with unpaid labor. Market-produced goods and services (e.g. vegetables, flour, soap, tools, etc.) are inputs in the household production of meals, clean clothes, etc. Households that can afford them, also make use of purchased goods and services (e.g. restaurant meals, housecleaning, laundry service and daycare centers) as substitutes for household production, thereby reducing the unpaid labor time demanded of the household members.

Finally, the boundaries of the market production and non-market production systems are influenced by economic policies and budgetary decisions which determine public provisioning of services ranging from childcare to healthcare to education, etc. Government policies that stimulate economic growth via market liberalization and privatization induce shifts in the use of labor and other resources from the non-market economy to the market economy. This pattern of economic growth however, does not necessarily reduce the demand for household production of goods and services. For instance, the adoption of neo-liberal policies since the 1980s, has led to the erosion and cutting back of education, health, social protection and other social expenditures, thereby increasing the demand for and burden of the reproductive work performed by women. Tax cuts for the rich has helped keep the luxury goods industry contributing to economic growth.[5] Attempts to balance the demands of market work and the unpaid work in household maintenance and social reproduction have lead to long working hours and chronic stress, especially for many women.

Children grow up to become workers, entrepreneurs, innovators as well as taxpayers, and the older generation is not the only group that benefits from their existence.....the benefits are realized by all consumers of commodities, whether they have raised children or not.

5 As Wisman (2011) points out, the wealthy benefits the most from continuing environmental destruction and thus tends to gravitates towards political and economic doctrines that are supportive of their self-interest (p. 29). Not surprisingly, politics in the US and in other countries is increasingly dominated by people in the higher income strata.

Governments are also involved in the process of social reproduction, albeit in a varied degrees and forms. State subsidies and support of clean water supply, sewage treatments, schools and healthcare, daycare services, pensions, food stamps, unemployment compensation, social protection, etc affects the manner in which care needs are met across various constituencies. The push towards global market integration, market liberalization and privatization of basic services over the last few decades has led to the gradual decline in taxation and a shift of public resources in support of increasing firm or business competitiveness, leading to divestment in services and programs in support of the care economy and social reproduction. Recent trends towards privatization of many elements of social reproduction have both promoted the growth of markets providing such services. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied by the increase in demand for unpaid care work, particularly among those who can ill- afford more market purchases. This has created sharp distinctions between wealthy and poor households in terms of how the care requirements of human maintenance and social reproduction are met.

It must be noted that economic growth has been uneven with several countries undergoing economic stagnation or low growth over a long period now, and others experiencing economic fluctuations that include bouts of downturns and recovery as predicted by business cycles. The gains from economic growth are unevenly distributed across sectors, among households, and between men and women, as with the costs of economic downturns and crises. The economic divide between developed and developing countries continues to persist with a small group of countries remaining at the top of the world income distribution; only a few countries that started out poor have joined that high-income group (UN 2011). This divide also exists within countries across income and social groups. Global economic prosperity in other words has increased, without giving everyone access to the benefits.

These widening income and wealth disparities have created diverse types of 'care arrangements' and have shifted the distribution of caregivers across social classes and even national boundaries. As Razavi and Staab (2011) point out, "demographic variables alone do not determine care needs and burdens. Rather they are filtered through social, cultural and economic factors which shape what is considered to be sufficient or considered 'good care' (p. 17). The adequacy and quality of care received by people within the same country can be very different, which help perpetuate and even exacerbate the imbalances in the process of social reproduction.

For instance, hiring domestic workers or paid caregivers, typically women, is a common solution for middle and upper income families in developing and developed countries (Razavi 2007). The need to balance household and market work is therefore mediated by the seemingly abundant supply of women willing to work even for low wages. Throughout Latin America, for example, domestic workers are approximately 17 per cent of employed women. They are about 9 per cent of all employed women in South Africa, about 9.5 per cent in the Philippines, and are found in 1 out of every 2 Kenyan homes (ILO 2007). Domestic workers have therefore, served as substitute care givers and helped compensate for the lack of collective support from family members. These domestic workers are predominantly women, often from poor communities, rural areas, ethnic and racial minorities, or immigrants.

For the working poor and low-income households, however, hiring domestic help is simply unaffordable, and these households are often compelled to engage their children in both paid and unpaid domestic work to enable the family to meet its survival needs. In many countries, it is typically girls who are removed from school to care for younger children and accomplish domestic tasks, thus contributing to household survival at the expense of long-term education and employment opportunities (Floro and Meurs 2009). These trends enable the persistence of gender inequalities in future generations.

Those poor families with no (other) childcarer at hand, cope by leaving the sick, elderly or children home alone or by taking at least their children to work with them. For example, in Indonesia, 40 per cent of working women care for their children while working (Kamerman 2000, Addati and Cassirer 2008). In Nairobi, 54 percent of poor mothers were found to bring their babies to work, whereas 85 percent of better-off mothers had house-girls (Lakati et al 2002).

Oftentimes, it is the primary caregiver in the household who migrates to the cities or to another country to work as domestic helpers, nannies, nursing home aides, etc, whose own dependents are left behind with other relatives. This leads to a reconfiguration of the division of labor among household members, requiring other female members to take on the responsibility for care. The migration of careworkers of various types represent a form of reallocation of care labor from rural to urban areas, from the global South to the North countries, and from lower-income to higher-income households. The longer-term of the social and welfare implications have yet to be fully understood, and many of these consequences cannot be neatly measured nor valuated in monetary terms.

Income inequality has therefore generated a solution for the increased need for care to those who have the private means to hire the domestic workers, nursing aides or use day care centers and nursing homes. For many women in poor and low-income households, however, their migration from the rural to urban areas, or from their own to the medium and high-income countries, has brought about the formation of transnational families who have to solve their own care needs (Beneria 2010).

Widening inequality is also creating gaps in various aspects of human development across the world, which, although narrowing, remains substantial. The demographic transition from high to low death and birth rates regimes constitutes one of the most remarkable aspects of development. Large gains in life expectancy by more than 17 years since 1970 have occurred in many parts of the developing world. For some countries including Chile and Malaysia, mortality rates have dropped to about 60 percent of what they were 30 years ago (UNDP 2010, p. 31). Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy is more than eight years longer than in 1970. The positive implications in terms of advancement of human welfare are obvious and immediately clear.

A key driver to this increase in life expectancy is the substantial decline in infant mortality by 59 per 1,000 live births in developing countries, almost four times the decline of 16 per 1,000 in developed countries (WHO 2008). However there are huge health gaps across the world population, with eight times more infant deaths per 1,000 live births in developing countries than in developed countries (UNICEF 2008). The general decline in mortality rates has been accompanied by fertility declines in many parts of the world. Overall, the total fertility rate of the developing world dropped from 6.0 births per woman in the late 1960s to 2.9 births in 2000-2005 (United Nations 2007).[6] The decline in fertility rates has been most rapid in Asia, North Africa, and Latin America, regions. Sub-Saharan Africa also experienced significant declines despite its lagging development (Bongaarts 2008).

There are two important caveats to the above demographic trends that impacts (a) the level of care and forms of care arrangements utilized for social reproduction, and (b) the level of natural resources usage especially fossil fuels. First, the averages presented in the preceding paragraphs

6 The twentieth-century decrease in fertility in high-income countries has been explained by a number of factors as cited in Feyrer et al (2008). These are: a) increase in the demand for human capital, which increased the desire of parents to produce 'high quality or educated' children, b) increase in income which increased the opportunity cost of women's time, c) increase in women's labor force participation, d) decline in infant and child mortality rates and e) the availability of effective contraception for women .

hide wide variations in the levels and trends of infant mortality rates and fertility rates between countries. Second, fertility rates in a growing number of both developed and developing countries are moving toward levels below replacement.

There have been dramatic reversals in 19 countries (home to about 6 percent of the world's people) that experienced declines in life expectancy in the past two decades (UN HDR 2010). In nine countries, life expectancy fell below 1970 levels: six in Africa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and three in the former Soviet Union (Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine).[7] In the most affected countries life expectancy is now below 51 years; in Lesotho it stands at 46—similar to that in England before the Industrial Revolution (UNDP 2010 p. 32). In the case of the transition economies, the decline was due to the increase in mortality rates after welfare programs had been reduced or eliminated and social services were privatized.

Overall, the gaps in health between high and low-income groups remain large, especially in developing countries.

A study of 24 developing countries found widening gaps in child mortality between the extremes of the wealth distribution in 11 countries, narrowing gaps in only 3 and persistent gaps in the rest. In the developed countries, recent increases in life expectancy have benefited people who are wealthier and more educated. Overall, the gaps in health between high and low-income groups remain large, especially in developing countries. Infant mortality, for example, is far more frequent among the poorest households across all regions (UNICEF 2008). In the Arab States, East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean infant mortality roughly doubles in the bottom fifth of the income distribution.

A number of high-income and middle-income countries have experienced fertility declines so large that their populations are far below replacement-level fertility. Total fertility rates in 2005 are as low as 1.3 children per woman in Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan.[8] None of the industrialized countries is above the fertility rate of 2.1 children per women that is needed to replace the population at a constant level. Only the United States, New Zealand, Ireland, Iceland, and France have fertility rates above 1.9 children per woman. Hong Kong has the lowest fertility rate in the world at 1.0 child per woman. Birth rates in Taiwan are also at an historic low, with 1.03 children per mother.

7 A major factor in these declines in Africa is the HIV epidemic. Since the 1980s AIDS has slashed life expectancy in Southern Africa, where adult HIV prevalence rates still exceed 15 percent (UNDP 2010).

8 Based on http://unstats.un.org/.

The effect of declining fertility on social reproduction is not so clear-cut. On one hand, lower fertility reduces the care demands of young dependents, tends to improve the household access to health services and education and, more generally, expands opportunities to escape poverty. But it also pose serious, longer-term problems such as declining labor supply, and fewer taxpayers to fund pensions and social security programs, health services and so on, at a time when the elderly population need them due to longer life expectancies.

Interdependence of the Ecosystem and Human Systems

The scope of economic inquiry used in feminist economics is incomplete however. It fails to recognize the important linkages between human systems and the ecosystem of which they are part. Care for people encompasses intergenerational issues concerning relationships and commitments between the current generation and future generations, which inevitably involves the sustainability of our ecosystems. Care provided in households involves commitment that has moral and distributional dimensions. Parents and mothers in particular pay much of the unpaid labor costs of raising the next generation (Folbre 2008). A longer term horizon involving series of future generations requires a much more 'visceral perception of the multi-level interdependence of life however and the moral responsibility it requires is profound for as Nelson (2011) pointed out, future generations cannot give us anything in return for actions we may take out of our concern with their well-being (p. 18). It involves commitment and requires a reexamination of our relations to the totality of the ecosystem in which human systems are deeply embedded. At the same time, there is need to examine in more depth the gendered dimensions of environmental sustainability proposals and collective actions such as provided by Agarwal (2007).

Societies and governments' response to the needs of social reproduction and maintaining the sustainability of our ecosystem have been very slow, particularly in allocating resources, even as both the demand for care services and the imperative to address pressing environmental concerns including climate change have increased. The reluctance of policymakers to value nonmarket work and hence, the goods and services provided by the reproductive economy creates an illusion that the extraction and use of natural resources serve the primary purpose of providing inputs to market production. The absent recognition of these services in mainstream economic analyses and models tends to bias their results and recommendations in favor of commercialization of agricultural land over subsistence production and smallholder farming, dam construc-

tion over livelihoods and cultural heritage of indigenous communities, road widening and highway construction over development of public transport, primary care health centers, or better sewage. Similarly, the predominance of GDP growth as the key indicator for assessing the 'health' of the economy creates barriers towards reallocation of resources from market (material) production use to that of reproduction since such transfers reduce market output, at least in the short run. The heightened demand and increasingly constrained access to natural resources for survival has created social tensions between groups, communities, and countries especially on access to water, arable land and even fossil fuel like oil. Conflicts over resources exist among and within units of every scale. At the smallest unit of analysis, even within households, men and women may have different, and ocassionally conflicting, rather than complementary resource use. In this sense, gender, as with economic power and social strata, determine relative access to resources.

The effect of declining fertility tends to be dominated by the more dramatic growth in per capita material consumption brought about by the growing affluence of the upper classes alongside massive investments in physical infrastructure and increased productive capacity of industry.

The processes of market production and social reproduction – that is the way societies organize themselves to provide for the sustenance and flourishing of life – substantially affect the carrying capacity of our ecosystem in varied ways. On one hand, declining fertility is perceived to be generally beneficial both to the sustainability of the ecosystem and its diversity as it reduces the growth of population size dependent on natural resources. It also reduces women's specialization in reproduction by reducing the care demands.

But the effect of declining fertility tends to be dominated by the more dramatic growth in per capita material consumption brought about by the growing affluence of the upper classes alongside massive investments in physical infrastructure and increased productive capacity of industry. The study by Schandl and West (2010) on the resource use in the Asia-Pacific region demonstrates the important linkages between materials use, climate change and Asian economic growth. They show that rising per capita incomes contributed more strongly to growing material use than did population growth. There is still a considerable range of uncertainty about global warming, the potential impacts of toxic chemicals, etc. and one cannot make prediction of possible outcomes with any degree of accuracy. However, there is growing evidence provided by the science community that increasing accumulation of stocks of waste and pollutants is associated with human activity, and has both localized short-term costs (for example sulfur, particulates, and fecal coliforms) and long-term and more dispersed costs (such as CO_2 emission). The resulting adverse climatic conditions provide feedback effects to the lives and livelihoods of millions of people throughout the world by creating dramatic changes in the form of long droughts,

regular and extreme flooding and typhoons and hurricane and mounting soil erosion. These adverse climate conditions have already affected biodiversity, destroyed factories, livelihoods, infrastructure, shelters, etc and have made it harder to grow the supply of food necessary to meet subsistence needs. There are signs that relations within households and communities are strained by the stress of the effects of coping with enviromental degradation and climate change.

Climate change is likely to make the water situation even more critical. Drier areas will be more prone to drought and humid/wetter areas more prone to flooding (Lohmann 2006, Houghton et al 2001, Asian Development Bank 2009, Field and Raupach 2004). As access to food, water, and other resources become more strained, the number of refugees from fierce competition over scarce resources and natural disasters have risen and so the potential for more conflicts and civil wars, exacerbating the crisis of social reproduction in many parts of the world today.

The worst effects of these adverse climate changes are being felt in the poorer areas and countries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. They are likely to take on the brunt of natural disasters. Severe and prolonged drought has also affected parts of Australia, Latin America and the United States as with the Sahel and East Africa, while many parts of Western Africa and Asia are experiencing record floods, where tens of thousands have perished and production of food crops particularly rice, a basic food staple and source of livelihood for many, has been severely impacted. Rising seas and typhoons have already dislocated several million people in South Asia, with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia experiencing the worst effects (Asian Development Bank 2009). As early as 2008, Asian global warming has been predicted to likely cause declines in rice yield potential by up to 50% on average by 2100. Less is known however regarding the gender dimensions of the ecological crises, which have implications not only on the well-being of women and men in the current generation but also our collective ability to care and provide for future generations. While no one will deny the importance of sustainability of ecosystems, there is much disagreement and even denial about the need to substantially change our economic way of thinking, our decisionmaking processes, our actions and behavior.

The 'health' of our ecosystem is a significant factor that shapes communities' and regions' vulnerability to shocks and risks as well as their capacity to respond. The poor are more vulnerable than other segments of the population; they are more likely to be exposed to sickness from polluted environments and they have fewer resources and instruments to cope.

Dominant Economic Paradigm: Looking at a Mirage?

Dominant economic thinking i.e. the neoclassical economic paradigm has undoubtedly maintained the preoccupation of policy makers and governments on promoting GDP growth and socialized the materialist consumer culture. There is, by now, an extensive literature in feminist economics as well as ecological economics that provide a strong critique of the dominant economic models and theories that serve as foundations for policy formulation and that influence the interaction between (market) production and reproduction processes, and the speed of natural resource extraction and manner of use.[9] They have challenged definitions and expanded our understanding by confronting and dealing with the different forms of exclusions of ecological and care dimensions from most economic discourses as well as the inextricable embeddedness of the market economy within a broader economy of human provisioning, and the latter in the ecosystems of our planet.

The utilitarian concept of profit maximization and "homo economicus" is viewed to operate in a timeless and spaceless world, taking no note of the social setting nor the specific characteristics of space and territories.

Although each body of knowledge focused on distinct vital concerns, there are common flaws and weaknesses of neoclassical economics in the ecological economics' and feminist economics' critique that are worth mentioning in this paper. First, they perceive the use of selfish, rational individuals as the starting point to address the central coordination problem in every society, as problematic (England 1993, Nelson and Ferber 2003, Nelson 2011). The utilitarian concept of profit maximization and "homo economicus" is viewed to operate in a timeless and spaceless world, taking no note of the social setting (e.g. cultural and gender norms) nor the specific characteristics of space and territories (long gestation of renewable resources, limits to non-renewable resources, importance of biodiversity). Further, economic theory rests upon additional assumptions that are not made explicit: the underlying belief a) in the order of species (human systems rule), b) in the 'objectiveness' of social hierarchy (unfettered markets operate on 'one-dollar, one-vote' and hence the interests of the wealthy will often prevail; purchased resources and goods are valued much more than those provided without pay), and c) in the supremacy of markets and of the virtue of competition.

Secondly, the dominant economic thinking fosters the use of analytical tools and methods that idolize market mechanisms and have "culturally masculine" attributes such as autonomy, abstraction, and logic, which

9 The list of such studies are too many to mention here. See: Cagatay, Elson and Grown (1995, 2000), Beneria (2003), Ferber and Nelson (2003), Bergmann (2011), Folbre (2008), Agarwal (2007), Hahnel (2011), Broad and Cavanagh (2011), Lohmann (2006), Soderbaum (2005), Sheeran (2011), Costanza et al (2001), Wisman (2011), Brie (2009), to name a few.

have become the defining characteristics of the economics discipline. Topics such as unpaid work, nonmarket production, and social norms as well as characteristics of connection are considered 'feminine' and largely marginalized (Ferber and Nelson, 2003). The mainstream economic paradigm makes use of the principles of Pareto optimality and Pareto efficiency in the construction of microeconomic and macroeconomic models. It socializes and directs government actions and socializes people's attention to these criteria, with little regard to the social and ecological contexts and consequences. Further, as Taleb (2010) notes, mainstream economics have successfully distracted people away from uncertainty, nonlinearities and size of the consequences, short as well as longer-term. The assumptions used in seeking for Pareto efficient solutions or outcomes involve externalizing the ecological and social spillovers, pushing them into the 'non-market' sphere and hence asserted as being exogenous in optimization behavior. Pareto efficiency uses the criterion of not doing something for your own benefit if it makes another person worse off (Nelson 2011). In so doing, it helps preserve the 'status-quo' and renders the issues of economic and social inequalities including gender inequality as irrelevant.

Economic analysis typically requires some form of economic valuation in order to conduct cost-benefit analysis. A valuation method is required for those resources or inputs provided without pay. For instance, measuring and quantifying the value of a natural resource or unpaid caring and domestic work are done through the use of shadow prices, opportunity costs and replacement methods, contingent valuation, etc. Ecological economists and feminist economists argue that such valuation methods are dependent on the context and the market is not an appropriate context in which to determine the value of ecological services and caring labor. They question the premises behind the current methods of valuation since they conceptually link ecological services, natural resources, and unpaid caring work to market production of goods and services and paid labor time. Economists applying cost-benefit analysis methods, say, on environmental impact assessments or on allocation of time between paid (market) work and unpaid (domestic) work, often get preoccupied in determining shadow prices and discount rates and in predicting the expected lifetime (monetary) benefits or earnings. Such an approach essentially follows the priorities of the market to begin with. (Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin Aligasakis 1995, Nelson 2011, Anderson 1993, Howarth and Norgaard 2003, Ozkaynak,

Devine and Rigby 2003).[10] Moreover, as Hahnel (2011) correctly points out, the cost-benefit analysis , perceived by mainstream economists as the only rational and objective method of making choices including choices on time use or social choices about the environment, is inappropriate "when compensation is unlikely to rectify inequities, when people have rights, and when power differentials bias estimates of costs and benefits,…. when benefits are hard to quantify, and when the consequences of improbable outcomes are very large…." (p. 11)

Several feminist economists have also raised serious theoretical and methodological concerns regarding the conceptualization and valuation method of unpaid caring and domestic work. Himmelweit (1995) for instance, point to the distinctive aspect of the caring activities that include relational aspects which makes it qualitatively different from market work. Moreover, there is an implicit bias in the valuation process as pointed out by Beneria (2003): "When lower-income women participate in the paid labor market, either their workload increases or the standards in home-produced goods and childcare need to be lowered"(p. 159). Such concerns highlight the basic question of how to measure human well-being, health of the ecosystem and the contributions made by ecosystems, habitats, and unpaid caring labor that are outside the market economy.

Third, markets in general are considered in the dominant economic paradigm to be dynamic and able to create solutions to address the crises including the crisis of care and environmental crisis. Shortages in care services, food crises, and environmental problems for example can be dealt with by market mechanism, which is considered a powerful device for discovering new solutions to problems that arise in the course of economic growth. The creation of a market for tradable CO_2 emissions to deal with climate change is one example. Another example is the promotion of market institutions that allocate childcare and elderly care services on the basis of one's ability and willingness to pay.

Technological change, particularly the development of green technologies is often seen as a moderating factor allowing for reductions

10 The main methods for valuing environmental impact utilized in environmental economics include: (1) the current cost of abating or controlling emission indicates the avoided external environmental costs, assuming that an equilibrium exists; (2) current costs of mitigation, assuming that they are an appropriate measure of environmental damage; and (3) estimating the social costs of environmental damage using either the travel cost method, hedonic or surrogate pricing, and contingent valuation in which surveys are used to determine a sample population's willingness to accept payment for damages or to pay for benefits. The value of unpaid labor time makes use of the monetary (economic) value of the good produced, the wage of a hired worker's, or the earnings that the person performing unpaid care work, could receive in the market.

in resource use and mitigation of climate change through improved efficiency in resource use. For example, if oil reserves are continually depleted, this will lead to increase in oil prices, which eventually leads to development of new consumer products such as hybrid and electric cars. Similarly, as life expectancy increases, the demand for elderly care in developed countries has led to surges in migration of domestic and health care workers from the developing countries and development of recruitment agencies. Economic fluctuations and social stresses simply trigger a set of actions such as development of new technologies as well as discovery and utilization of new resources in which dimensions of natural (fossil, land, forests) resources and care labor that were previously of little interest now become (potentially) valuable resources to be tapped and incorporated into the accumulation process.

Similarly, technological change is expected to modify gender roles due to development of labor-saving household appliances as well as to changes in economic incentives and relative prices that lead to increased women's participation in labor market, higher earnings and hence, improved well-being. The development of labor-intensive technologies during periods of export-oriented industrialization in developing countries for instance has lead to the increase in demand for women's labor in export production. For example, the share of women workers substantially increased in the 1970's and eighties in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia where the manufacturing sector has been heavily oriented towards exports. In fact, women provide the bulk of labor in the manufactured export sector.

A number of ecological economists and feminist economists view the belief that technological change, including development of 'green technologies' will address the emerging crises of care to be misplaced. They also see that so-called market solutions mitigate the problems (for some) only in the short-run and on the whole, tend to postpone the crisis, which eventually lead to discontinuities, major disruptions and even collapses e.g. disappearance of communities, extinction of species, etc. Market forces by themselves, do not address the distributional imbalances created by the interplay of social norms, demographic change and economic growth processes. While they have propelled the growth of prosperity, they fail to distribute the gains as well as costs of that prosperity. Wealth distribution affects the ability of persons to meet their subsistence and care needs. It affects their capacity to manage resources sustainably as well. Both social and economic inequalities are likely to continue affecting the demands on the ecosystem and conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, etc (Wisman 2011).

While Market forces have propelled the growth of prosperity, they fail to distribute the gains as well as costs of that prosperity.

Human systems and ecological systems may be able to tolerate such imbalances up to a certain point before behavior and decisions collectively create a shift from one steady state to another, one which is not what we want.

UN Photo/Martine Perret

Paradoxically, hunger and food insecurity afflict many millions in various parts of the world, amid abundance and even food waste in other parts. The availability of relatively cheap hired domestic and care workers enable middle and upper class families, including those in the global North, to enlist a market solution to their elderly, sick and childcare problems. These care workers, predominantly women from rural areas or from the global South, tend leave their own dependents behind in networks of family (unpaid) caregivers, thus enabling them to work unencumbered for long hours and to reduce the cost of their labor. Current trends in family structures and household division of labor including increase in non-marriage and divorce, paid and unpaid (double) work burden of women are exacerbating inequalities in well-being between women and men as well as outcomes among children (the future generation). Human systems and ecological systems may be able to tolerate such imbalances up to a certain point before behavior and decisions collectively create a shift from one steady state to another, one which is not what we want.

Seeking a Way Forward

The dual crises of care for people and care for the environment alert us to the real meaning of sustainability and the serious choices that governments and society as a whole need to grapple with. Addressing these crises will require a far-reaching, systemic change in society's values and consumer behavior, in the way businesses, farms, energy, transport, trade, etc. are organized, in the way markets operate and policies are formulated. They will also require a new way of thinking about economic systems, basically a fundamental change in the way economic concerns

and problems are perceived and how they should be addressed. Drawing from the insights of feminist economists and ecological economists including Nelson (2011), Hahnel (2011) , Agarwal (2007), Beneria (2003) and Bergmann (2011), I explore in the following section on what's required in transforming the current way of economic thinking.

A good starting point is to recognize the crucial interdependence of the productive (market) system and the reproductive economy, and that of the human system and ecosystem. This interdependence operates at multiple-levels and involves dynamic feedback loops. They are complex, multi-dimensional and non-linear, and we only have bounded knowledge about these causal chains, the nature of the effects and their magnitude. Their unpredictability and complexity should not be excuses, however, from integrating the true cost of maintaining the resilience of the ecosystem and of raising the next generation and valuing their future contributions in economic analyses, policy formulation and assessments. This would need a new economic paradigm that incorporates both feminist economists and ecological economists' concerns and that provides a shared understanding of the natural resource and care labor constraints in meeting the needs of societies and the inseparability of the services provided by Mother Nature with the well-being of present and future generations.

Secondly, this new economic thinking must integrate the role of risk and presence of uncertainty in outcomes, no matter the type of intervention or form of change in behavior. For instance, a challenge of existing gender norms of unequal gender relations can raise dissonance and conflict, or they can be accepted or unopposed. Economic processes as well as economic and legal reforms that confront prevailing gender norms i.e. what it means to be a woman as well as what it means to be a man in the household, in the community at large and as market participants may lead to strong opposition and even a backlash, or they may be uncontested. More nuance is clearly required in addressing ecological crisis as well, where the nature of our interdependence with future generations is rather different from the interdependence within the current generation involving care (exchange) relations across gender, class, and national boundaries. Ultimately, the solutions that address the crises of care and ecological sustainability demand from academics, policymakers and the rest of society "a recognition of common humanity and substantive responsibilities for care" that has more to do with commitment than with simply altruism or selflessness. (Nelson 2011, p. 20). It requires a radical shift from the culture of individualism to one of cooperation. A new framework and way of thinking is thus required to reduce the 'complacent irresponsibility' to our global society and to future generations.

Such a framework also recognizes the limits to organization that is driven by competition and incessant pursuit of material prosperity. Baland et al (2007) demonstrate that cooperation often requires collective action at the local, national and global level at a scale that many people have never before attempted. The story of the rationale, self-interested individual shy away from the notion of cooperation and in fact may even find this to be detrimental. Indeed, coordination problems and associated costs abound, making such effort challenging.

But collective actions are required if we have to address these evolving crises of care. These involve coordinated efforts between governments, households, communities and businesses to adequately address the provisioning of care for children, the sick and disabled, elderly, as well as able-bodied adults, without making women necessarily specialize in reproductive activities. A new economic thinking requires re-framing economic questions or inquiry in terms of provisioning for human life and involves developing a framework for reallocation of resources and provisioning of socialized support for care, as well as the equal sharing of responsibilities between women and men. It requires the integration of the costs for raising the next generation along with the costs of maintaining the resilience and carrying capacity of the environment in economic theories, models and methodologies. It requires economic reasoning and development of analytical tools that provides a deeper understanding the gendered, distributional and ecological dimensions of economic options, choices and decisions including economic policies. Such framework requires a better understanding of decisionmaking processes where a more collective rather than individualistic perspective is taken (Baland et al 2007, Costanza et al 2001). This new way of economic thinking can provide a clear plan for transition to renewable energy, for development of a green economy (Hahnel 2011), for government actions in support of care provisioning, promotion of collective actions among communities and businesses based on a shared responsibility for social reproduction and care of the environment, and governmental and inter-governmental actions to prevent ecological damage. Such a new economic paradigm can humbly serve as an instrument for promoting agroecology and organic farming, collective consumption, prosperity without growth, and the 'new Industrial Revolution' that Broad and Cavanagh (2011), Hahnel (2011), Bergmann (2011) and Nicholas Stern (2011) respectively speak of, and for changing household and firm behavior, government priorities, and societies' value systems, habits and norms, which the dual crises of care urgently demand.

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A Word on UN Responsibility towards the Responsibility to Protect

By Phyllis Bennis

"It is when we all play safe
that we create a world
of utmost insecurity."
(Dag Hammarskjöld)

Working in the United States to strengthen UN democracy, UN independence and UN centrality in the world is a tricky business. The United Nations isn't central (to put it mildly) to U.S. foreign policy or to U.S. public opinion. Most of the biggest organizations working on broadly defined UN issues serve as either uncritical cheerleaders or xenophobic detractors. Most civil society advocates working in and around the UN are focused on one or another specific issue – ending poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, girls' education in Afghanistan, protection of endangered environments in Thailand, indigenous rights in Latin America…. Dealing with the UN as an institution in its own right – its constant lack of democracy, its consistent domination by major powers, its all-too-common paralysis, as well as its extraordinary potential – is too rarely on the advocacy agenda.

For civil society, the struggle for information transparency and for access to UN processes – let alone achieving any actual influence in those processes – is daunting. The global conferences that came to characterize UN work in the 1990s represented a few small steps towards engagement with civil society. But even in those circumstances, global civil society, particularly the most active social movements, was largely held at bay, confined to separate venues, sometimes miles away, where forward-looking and strategic discussions were ignored in the formal discussions and those most affected by the issues at hand were excluded from the official negotiations.

Those high-profile conferences began in 1990, with the World Summit for Children, which was quickly diverted from its original goals

and transformed by U.S. diplomats into the World Summit for Desert Storm. The series continued with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference, the 1994 Cairo Population Conference, the 1995 Copenhagen Social Development Summit, and culminated with the September 1995 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing. The 1995 international conference to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) shared many of the features of the General Assembly-sponsored events.

Throughout the late 1990s, other UN agencies served as sponsors or participants in new forms of diplomacy, in which self-selected "like-minded" governments partnered with global civil society organizations to bring into existence new treaties and global institutions. These creative coalitions led to the ban on anti-personnel landmines, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and creation of the International Criminal Court.

My own earliest work at the UN had largely reflected the kind of issue-driven focus on areas of work going on in and around the global organization, rather than on the institution itself. I arrived at the UN as a correspondent for a small left-wing newspaper whose goal was to bring an internationalist, indeed anti-imperialist analysis to our readers. My main area was Palestine and the Middle East – and in those days, the mid-1980s, the UN was the only place in the U.S. where one could discuss political developments with representatives of the PLO. It was also the only place to meet and hear the views of socialist governments such as Cuba or Viet Nam – most of whose diplomats were restricted to small areas of New York in and around UN headquarters – and the small teams representing liberation movements at the UN, including South Africa's ANC and many more.

Even in 1989 and 1990, with all of the global turmoil that accompanied the fall of the Berlin wall and the beginning of the Soviet Union's collapse, the United Nations was not a significant player. Nor, unlike the era of decolonization of the 1950s and 60s, the moment that soon created the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in 1962, was the UN a major venue for the monumental actions that ended the Cold War. The Foundation had taken on the goal of seeking "alternatives for a democratic, socially and economically just, ecologically sustainable, peaceful and secure world in which human rights are genuinely respected." But that was not the kind of United Nations its major powers – most especially the United States – were prepared to accept. So cheering from the sidelines at best, Cold War-driven paralysis at worst, characterized the UN of the period.

UN Photo/John Isaac

It wasn't until the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Washington's decision to use that invasion as a pretext to go to war against Iraq and to do so in the name of the United Nations, that the UN once again emerged at the center of global and especially U.S. attention.

It wasn't until the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Washington's decision to use that invasion as a pretext to go to war against Iraq and to do so in the name of the United Nations, that the UN once again emerged at the center of global and especially U.S. attention. President George H.W. Bush had served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Nixon regime – not exactly a high spot for U.S. respect for global institutions or international law. Stuck at the UN representing a White House which defined bombing Viet Nam back to the stone age as the essence of foreign policy, while obsessed with Enemies Lists at home and about to implode over the Watergate scandal, Bush Senior had plenty of time to observe the UN unhindered by a terrible press of work.

Certainly he couldn't have liked what he saw: decolonization well on its way towards ending colonial occupation of much of the South, the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement and its support for the Soviet Union because Moscow backed the Movement, the first stirrings of what would become the call for a New International Economic Order, all these were shaping the activist voices of the UN. But much of that existed only in unmet General Assembly goals; much of it, despite Assembly efforts, never fully shaped UN programs. Bush, representing the imperialist world's hegemonic power, watched the UN, and saw something else: possibilities.

Almost two decades later, the world would have irretrievably changed. George Herbert Walker Bush would be president, and he would remember the UN. Almost two decades later George H.W. Bush, with the Soviet Union near collapse and a Middle Eastern dictator long backed by the U.S. now in Washington's crosshairs for invading and occupying another oil-rich U.S. ally, would have his chance. He would take the world to war, and he would do so in the name of the United Nations.

For me, that was the moment when I first began to look at the UN as an institution – and specifically at the problem of U.S. domination of the UN. It wasn't hard to spot – the bribes, threats and punishments the Bush (Senior) administration used to insure Security Council backing for an essentially unilateral assault on Iraq were easy to see, easy to identify and relatively easy to document. It was no surprise that Washington was prepared to bribe Zaire with new aid packages, to offer war-wracked Ethiopia and repressive Colombia unprecedented access to weapons and military equipment to assure yes votes, to offer Beijing post-Tienanmen Square resumption of diplomatic legitimacy and renewed development assistance to prevent a Chinese veto, to punish impoverished Yemen with a complete cut-off of U.S. aid because they had the temerity to vote against the U.S. war. But the blatant

character of the bribes and the immediacy of the punishments (a U.S. official told Yemeni Ambassador Abdullah al-Ashtal "that will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast" before he even brought his arm down from voting against war in Iraq) brought the issue of U.S. domination to center stage.

The U.S., as the great Pakistani scholar Eqbal Ahmad once described it, was using the UN as a multi-lateral fig leaf to cover a unilateral war.

The consequences of the U.S. success in waging its 1991 Iraq war in the name of the United Nations would take on even greater significance as the U.S. imposed crippling sanctions, ultimately genocidal in their impact, on the civilian population of that beleaguered country. It became impossible to distinguish the acknowledged war-makers in Washington from the would-be humanitarians in New York – since the brutal sanctions imposed by the first were claimed as their own by the second. Why should anyone have been surprised by the rising Iraqi antagonism towards the United Nations? And why, a decade later, should anyone have been surprised when the UN itself – in the form of the lives of 22 UN staff – paid the ultimate price for being linked to the U.S. wars and occupations? When the UN's headquarters at Baghdad's Canal Hotel was hit by a massive car bomb, killing the 22 and injuring many more, the human consequences of UN collaboration with U.S. wars came home.

But knowing how U.S. domination was undermining UN legitimacy around the world, and knowing the horrific consequences that domination would take, was not enough to make challenging that domination any easier. Taking on the United Nations as an institution – its conflict between democracy and power, insufficient funding for the range of work it is asked to take on, as well as the UN's continuing domination by the U.S. and its allies – remains daunting.

The question of how to shape a campaign of critical engagement with/on/about the United Nations, the kind of work the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has led for over 50 years, has to take into account what the organization actually *is* – an unequal, undemocratic coalition of nation-states for whom sovereignty is primary, as well as an underfunded, simultaneously under- and over-staffed secretariat charged with implementing the whole gamut of activities that those governments order them to do. It also has to take into account what the UN *isn't* – an independent global institution somehow standing above national privilege and committed to and capable of defending and implementing international law and the lofty goals of the UN Charter, most essentially to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

And crucially, it has to assess the impact of what the UN does. That hasn't been done enough. That means recognizing that sometimes UN actions – especially actions taken by the Security Council – even in the name of human rights or disarmament or the rule of law, can have the effect of massively violating the rights of whole populations. This is most consistently visible in the regimes of economic sanctions ostensibly designed to pressure recalcitrant governments to stop enriching uranium or to stop repression against their people, but which soon have the effect of impoverishing, weakening, even starving whole populations.

UN Photo/JC McIlwaine

The lack of accountability in the Security Council for violations of international law reflects a crucial contradiction between the commitment to national sovereignty that shapes most of the UN Charter, and the obligations to defend people articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The lack of accountability in the Security Council for these massive violations of international law reflects a crucial contradiction that has plagued the United Nations throughout its history – between the commitment to national sovereignty that shapes most of the UN Charter, and the obligations to defend people articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The conflict pits the power of governments against the rights of the people of the world.

Throughout the 1990s, the doctrine of "humanitarian intervention" had provided the ideological justification for a host of U.S. and other western military bombings, invasions and occupations of poor, weak countries, mostly in the global south, in the name of defending civilians, reasserting the rule of law or protecting human rights. Even the transparently power- and oil-driven U.S. war against Iraq in 1991 was often justified in those terms. Most of the time, in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Serbia and other venues of "humanitarian interventions," the human rights violations, however exaggerated, were very real. But in virtually all of those scenarios the foreign military intervention not only did not improve the lives of the population suffering those violations but most of the time made things worse – escalating human rights problems into full-blown humanitarian catastrophes in which death, injury, forced displacement all increased, rather than ending.

By the first years of the 21st century, efforts were underway to identify a different approach for the international community to take some responsibility for protecting civilians facing major repression, human rights violations or crimes against humanity at the hands of their own governments. The urgency grew out of a growing global recognition that the failures and insufficiencies of the Clinton-era "humanitarian intervention" framework meant it could no longer provide sufficient political cover for military intervention by powerful northern countries against the weak and impoverished nations of the global South.

While that effort was underway among UN advisers, outside activists and others, the world's turmoil was on the rise. And for almost the first time in its history, starting in the run-up to the Iraq war in the fall of 2002 and until May 2003, the United Nations took on a role directly challenging its most powerful member's demand for UN support for war. U.S. President George W. Bush and his British counterpart, Prime Minister Tony Blair, were determined to repeat what Bush's father had achieved two decades before – getting UN Security Council approval for a war against Iraq. But this time, this Bush failed. The UN stood its ground, defended its Charter, and resisted the pressure.

The campaign provided a new and quite unprecedented model of how the global institution could stand against empire and against its most powerful member states as they careened towards an illegal war. Massive civil society protests against the looming war had already erupted around the world, culminating on February 15, 2003, when "the world said No to war" in scores of languages in 665 cities across the globe. Activists, intellectuals, parliamentarians, artists and ordinary people, crossing class, age, gender, language and other boundaries, took to the streets and flooded their capitals – the Guiness Book of World Records reported up to 14 million people protested on that singular day. They said no to Bush's war, and simultaneously demanded that their governments refuse to endorse the U.S. war in the United Nations. Once again the world's eyes turned to the UN, where Washington and London, eager to ensure Security Council endorsement of a resolution authorizing war, were squeezing Council diplomats with irresistible bribes and threats of dire punishments if their governments refused to toe the U.S. line.

The Security Council was divided, with the U.S. and Britain leading the pro-war camp, France and Germany heading up the anti-war contingent. Each side had its supporters, but six rotating members of the Council were refusing to take a position. Soon dubbed the "Uncommitted Six," they were mostly poor, and all relatively dependent countries who under ordinary circumstances could never stand head-to-head against the U.S. But somehow, with France, Germany, Russia and China providing political support, and growing protests in their own capitals demanding that they refuse to bow to U.S.-UK pressure, they stood their ground. All were threatened with dire consequences. Angola, Cameroon, and Guinea with loss of U.S. economic assistance, Chile with a fatal delay in Senate ratification of a long-sought trade agreement, Mexico with Washington abandoning border and immigration talks. And Pakistan refused U.S. pressure despite fears that Washington could cut aid and reinstate nuclear weapons-linked sanctions that had only recently been dropped.

The willingness of these governments to resist U.S. pressure and refuse to vote for war brought the UN as a whole not only into conflict with the U.S. but into an unusual and mostly unacknowledged collaboration with a rising global social movement committed to preventing the war. It was a moment of enormous potential for the UN, a chance to win back the fading legitimacy and weakened credibility that had plagued the organization for years, particularly as a result of the UN's embrace of the 1991 U.S. war and subsequent deadly sanctions against Iraq. Never had such a unified level of global protest erupted *before* a war even began.

On February 14, 2003, the day before the global mobilization, the Security Council met to hear reports of the UN's two weapons inspectors in Iraq. Both confirmed they had found no evidence of the purported weapons of mass destruction, needing only a few more weeks to conclude their investigations. The French foreign minister responded, urging the Council to remember that the UN "must be an instrument of peace, and not a tool for war." The chamber, packed with 15 foreign ministers present at the request of the U.S. secretary of state, erupted in a thunderous ovation, unprecedented for the diplomatically staid and formal Council.

The next morning in New York, as demonstrators had already broken protest records in mobilizations that had begun almost 24 hours earlier in the south Pacific and followed the sun across the globe, I walked with South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the great actor-activist Harry Belafonte under police escort to enter UN headquarters. We were taken to the 38th floor, where then-Secretary General Kofi Annan had agreed to meet with us. Bishop Tutu opened, telling the SG "we are here on behalf of the people marching today in 665 cities around the world. And we're here to tell you that those people marching in those cities all around the world, we claim the United Nations as our own, we claim it as part of our global mobilization for peace."

On February 14, 2003, the day before the global mobilization, the Security Council met to hear reports of the UN's two weapons inspectors in Iraq. Both confirmed they had found no evidence of the purported weapons of mass destruction, needing only a few more weeks to conclude their investigations.

UN Photo/Sophia Paris

It was an extraordinary moment, imagining the role the United Nations could play in future mobilizations against war.

After that brief meeting, we headed back out into the sub-freezing cold to the massive protest, now more than half a million strong, gathered outside the UN building. We were among scores of activists, artists, politicians, poets, veterans, and so many more to speak through those hours. Then, by mid-afternoon, someone got a message. They scrawled it on the back of a leaflet, and there was a hurried backstage conference of protest leaders to decide what to do. What if the information was wrong, what if it was reversed later? But quickly we knew the people gathered there, shivering in the icy wind off the river, needed to hear it. I was pushed back out on stage to read the brief, two-line report from Associated Press: "Rattled by an outpouring of international anti-war sentiment, the United States and Britain began reworking a draft resolution Saturday to authorize force against Saddam Hussein. Diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the final product may be a softer text that does not explicitly call for war."

Half a million people roared. The U.S. warmongers had lost, giving up the effort to win UN support. The UN had stood its ground, and had joined the global mobilization against an illegal war – just as its Charter says it should. The U.S. would soon go to war nonetheless, but it would do so with the whole world aware that its war was illegal, illegitimate, and unilateral, however many countries were later forced into lending their names to a "coalition of the coerced" to try to give the war some kind of political cover.

For eight months, until its principles collapsed again in May 2003 and the UN endorsed the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the global institution was part of an international movement against war – and in that brief moment it provided a framework, a way of imagining a new kind of internationalism, in which social movements, some governments, and the United Nations itself could unite to stand against empire and the drive for power. It was an idea for the future.

But not everyone saw the value of UN involvement in global movements against war. Another approach was emerging to engage the international community in responding to urgent humanitarian and human rights disasters. In 2005 one of those re-branding efforts got enough traction to achieve General Assembly endorsement – giving the so-called "Responsibility to Protect" a UN imprimatur.

The problems R2P (the latest in the UN's insufferable search for accessible acronyms) was claiming to answer were very real – civilians across much of the world *were* suffering under brutal dictatorships (many of them armed and financed by the U.S.), facing merciless wars involving proxy forces as well as their own governments, and living lives stripped of access to even the most basic human rights. Wars for control of resources and expansion of local and regional power were waged within states far more than between states, often with catastrophic human costs. And earlier efforts by the United Nations and other international actors had largely failed to protect those suffering populations.

The Responsibility to Protect framework differed from humanitarian intervention in two potentially important ways. First, it recognized that the "international community," meaning countries outside of the conflict zone, and generally operating as the United Nations, did bear some responsibility for the human rights and humanitarian crises facing civilians whose governments were either responsible for, or unable and/or unwilling to do anything about it. Second, it officially acknowledged that military force is not always useful, and that it should, if used at all, always be the last alternative, not the first.

But the drafters of the R2P doctrine didn't go nearly far enough. They outlined a series of non-military steps that could be taken to pressure governments deemed responsible – but never pulled back far enough to question the very process through which one government gets targeted and another does not. The debate, every time, went immediately to the question of military force – when, by whom, who gets to decide. They even admitted the likelihood of double standards in "international" [read: U.S.] decisions to determine where R2P should even be considered – but end up essentially throwing up their collective hands. They acknowledge that the framework will simply be ignored when the violator is a powerful veto-wielding member of the Security Council, or, crucially, a strategic ally of one of those members. So no, Chechens should not look to the UN for R2P protection from Russian repression, nor should, of course, Afghans expect any protection from U.S. atrocities. And most obviously, the R2P drafters pretty much admit that Palestinians should have no expectation of UN protection or a UN effort to hold Israel accountable for its violations – since U.S. defense of Israel is acknowledged as simply the way things are when it comes to R2P.

In 2011 and into 2012, the R2P debate emerged out of the realm of theoretical construct into a set of potential justifications for interventions emerging from the Arab Spring. The most dramatic was Libya – although in that case the R2P framework was not asserted until well

into the mobilization for NATO's war. The results were horrific, with unknown thousands of civilian casualties, escalating human rights violations after the NATO assault and a rising threat of Libya splintering into two pieces. And beyond the direct results, the western military intervention essentially destroyed any possibility of a real UN peacemaking role – encouraging, negotiating, or even imposing a ceasefire was thwarted by the UN's direct involvement in the military campaign against Muammar Qaddafi.

A year after the U.S./NATO intervention in what had quickly become a Libyan civil war, there is much talk of Libya as a great "success". Few mention that the civilian casualties, still uncounted, may have reached as many as 30,000, according to the post-Qaddafi National Transition Government. If that figure is even close true, the casualties during Libya's seven-month uprising with NATO involvement, in a tiny population of only about six million, dwarf those of any other uprising of the pro-democracy movements that began in 2011. That should give pause to those supporters of another NATO war in Syria, who are increasingly pointing to the "Libyan success" as a model for potential military intervention in Syria.

Casualties in Syria have been horrifying – the UN estimates over 8,000 killed during the year of violence. But the comparison with Libya is even more sobering – with a population more than three times that of Libya, and after almost twice as long a period of violence, Syria's casualties without NATO after a full year of fighting are less than one-third those of Libya's seven-month battle in which NATO played the starring role. After examining a NATO airstrike in Majer, Libya, on August 8, 2011, that killed at least 34 people, many of them women and small children, and wounded even more, a United Nations report noted it had found no evidence that the site served any military purpose and that "it seems clear that those killed were all civilians." A *New York Times* analysis found that the "questions surrounding NATO's attacks in Majer – the worst known case of the alliance's causing civilian casualties in its campaign to protect civilians – are not just at the center of the struggle for a more complete sense" of the Libya air campaign, but crucial to consider in light of calls in the U.S. "for airstrikes against government forces in Syria, extending the principle of Responsibility to Protect to include another conflict."

Military intervention, especially by outside powers, is always selective. Governments don't send military forces to intervene somewhere outside their own borders, whatever their rhetoric, for purely humanitarian motives. Human catastrophe can certainly play a part – the "CNN

Factor" is a reality in political decision-making in Washington. But unlike people, whose motivation can legitimately be grounded in human outrage and solidarity, government decision-making is rooted in strategic and political calculation, not human rights or humanitarian concern. If that were not the case, we would not have seen the U.S. embrace (including a $60 billion arms sale to the Saudi royals) of Saudi troops storming across the causeway to Bahrain to brutally suppress the popular uprising against Bahrain's absolute monarchy. We would not be hearing those few (luckily, so far, they are very few) voices demanding U.S. intervention in Syria justifying their position primarily by claims that such involvement would weaken Iran.

Outside military intervention always has consequences, and it's rarely good. The U.S.-UK "no-fly zone" in Iraq, often lauded as a huge success, saw more than 700 Iraqi civilians killed under the NFZ bombs.



UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

Military intervention almost never works – and legalization by the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states doesn't make it legitimate, either.

The failure of the Responsibility to Protect concept is not that the United Nations bears no responsibility for people suffering under repression, violence, or denial of economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights. The failure is rooted in the assumption that military intervention, deemed legal because the undemocratic veto-strangled Security Council says it's legal, would work. Military intervention almost never works – and legalization by the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states doesn't make it legitimate, either. The work of determining how to take responsibility to protect people without violating international law and human rights while doing so, remains unfinished.

The United Nations was able to stand defiant of U.S.-British pressure to endorse war against Iraq in 2003 only because millions of people in social movements across the globe brought so much pressure to bear that both individual governments and then the UN Security Council itself were forced to say no to war. Left to its own diplomatic devices, the UN has little hope of resisting the exigencies of war and empire imposed by its most powerful member states. Similarly, it is unlikely the UN, in its current structure, has the capacity to accomplish the task of figuring out how to really protect people from massive humanitarian and human rights crises without violating human rights and international law itself. For such a serious, rights-based approach, one that might have some capacity to save lives without undermining national sovereignty, violating the UN Charter, or bolstering the powers of empire, we will have to continue to look to people's movements and to organizations like the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Would not the former secretary-general, arguably the UN's greatest, recognize that urgent need if he were with us today?

A 50th Anniversary Roundtable Debate

'To Save Us From Hell…'

An Introduction[1]

Henning Melber

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, gave up his life in pursuit of a peaceful solution to the civil strife in the former Belgian colony of the Congo. He was on his way to meet Moise Tshombe, the leader of the Katangese secessionist movement. His death, on the night from 17-18 September 1961, shocked the world and left Sweden in mourning. Fifteen others were aboard the plane, which crashed while approaching the airport of the Northern Rhodesian mining town of Ndola. No-one survived.

Dag Hammarskjöld was finally put to rest on 29 September 1961 a few hundred metres from where we are gathered today. Within weeks of the tragedy, ordinary people throughout Sweden, from school children to pensioners, workers to aristocrats, donated money to establish a foundation in Hammarskjöld's name. On this day 50 years ago, on 2 March 1962, the King in Council laid down the statutes of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. This was a genuine result of an initiative by the Swedish people. The Foundation should therefore be thought of as a public good, especially since we are now funded by taxpayers' money through the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In our work, we consequently remain ultimately accountable to the people of Sweden as well as all those others who care about the legacy of Dag Hammarskjöld. After all, part of our mandate is to bear witness to the values and ethics he lived by and died for through efforts to translate these into current policy-making and to strengthen global governance.

1 This introduction was presented in a shorter version as opening speech ahead of the Roundtable.

It is my honour and privilege as the current Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation to welcome all of you gathered here on this occasion. I will try to introduce and subsequently moderate the round table, for which we have selected a theme that is topical, but which was also among the challenges facing Dag Hammarskjöld. Allow me also to recognise the presence of Sven Hamrell and Olle Nordberg, my predecessors in this position, as well as of Göran Bexell, the current chair of our board of trustees.



Poster for the event.

Four seasoned diplomats, all of whom have more than once been faced with tough decisions in their efforts to mediate peace or at least end the killings, meet here today on this, the 50th anniversary of our Foundation – not to celebrate, but to contemplate. Three similarly committed women join them and add their reflections. Walking in the footsteps of, and inspired by the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, they will share their experiences of and insights into conflict mediation, post-conflict reconstruction and transitional justice. All of them have in common a longstanding commitment to enhancing global justice. Our four main speakers also share the distinction that they are among the 14 persons who have delivered the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture since it was instituted in 1998 in a collaboration between the Foundation and Uppsala University.[2]

Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari delivered the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture on 18 September 2008 – some two weeks before the announcement that he was to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for the same year. He dealt with the fundamental question of whether the international community would be able to meet the challenges it confronted. He then stated, 'the United Nations is still globally the most present 'peacemaking' body – there is no real alternative. It can combine 'influence' and 'persuasion and pressure' from a large number of member states. It also has the ability to support and further legitimize the engagement of regional actors and organisations.'[3] In line with this view, the focus of the following is on the essential role the world body – established after the scourge of two world wars – should and can play in enhancing peace, justice and development.

★★★

2 Unfortunately, Mary Robinson and Noeleen Heyzer, who were also invited to join this round table as former presenters of the Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, had prior commitments that prevented them from joining us.

3 Martti Ahtisaari, *Can the International Community Meet the Challenges Ahead of Us?* The 2009 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2009, pp. 12f.

Ten years ago, at the end of 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) presented a pioneering report. For the first time it coined the concept Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in a semi-official way.[4] The report was strongly endorsed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in light of the traumatic experiences of genocide and other forms of organised mass violence committed in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia, and stressed the indivisibility of the concept of human security, including human rights and human dignity, as a fundamental objective of modern international institutions. It also defined sovereignty as responsibility.[5] As Kofi Annan emphasised at the Stockholm Forum on genocide prevention in January 2004: 'the issue is not one of a right to intervention, but rather of a responsibility – in the first instance, a responsibility of all States to protect their own populations, but ultimately a responsibility of the whole human race to protect our fellow human beings from extreme abuse wherever and whenever it occurs.'[6]

Long-time observers of and actors inside the UN system described the ICISS report as 'perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the UN in the last few years.'[7] The notion of RtoP was finally accepted in principle at the United Nations World Summit in 2005 by the largest gathering of heads of state to date.[8] The subsequent report of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 'Implementing the responsibility to protect' was presented on 21 July 2009 and debated by the United Nations General Assembly on 23, 24 and 28 July. With only a few dissenting voices, the principles adopted in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 document were endorsed. During the debate, the pioneering role of African states in the norm-setting process was acknowledged, in particular their contribution to the evolution of the idea of 'sovereignty as responsibility.' This in turn was in large measure the result of the earlier work of a team inspired by Francis Deng.[9]

4 Originally launched as an initiative by then Canadian External Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, the establishment of the Commission was announced by Canadian Prime Minister Chrétien in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 September 2000, during the Millennium Summit in New York.

5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre 2001, pp. 5, 6 and 8.

6 Kofi Annan, *Address to the Stockholm International Forum*. Stockholm, 26 January 2004 (http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=51)

7 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Thomas Weiss, *UN Ideas That Changed the World*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 2009, p. 174.

8 *2005 World Summit Outcome*. UN document A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, paragraphs 138-139.

9 Francis M. Deng, "The evolution of the idea of 'sovereignty as responsibility'", in Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), *From Global Apartheid to Global Village. Africa and the United Nations*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press 2009, pp.191-213.

The shift from non-interference to non-indifference was considered a crucial contribution to matters of global concern, in that it touched upon fundamental principles of state sovereignty that had been firmly entrenched since the establishment of the Westphalian order. By confirming this shift, the overwhelming majority of member states were responding to the appeal of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who in his speech of 21 July had called upon them to 'resist those who try to change the subject or turn our common effort to curb the worst atrocities in human history into a struggle over ideology, geography or economics.'[10]

Indeed, the advocates of the doctrine would agree that while 'normative change does not necessarily mean action,' the notion of RtoP does indeed represent a 'momentous normative change,' which accepts that 'sovereignty does not imply a license to kill.'[11] The former Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group and one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, underlines the honest motives inherent in a position that is in principle willing to accept external intervention in extreme cases of human suffering: 'But at the end of the day,' he maintains,

> the case for R2P rests simply on our common humanity: the impossibility of ignoring the cries of pain and distress of our fellow human beings. For any of us in and around the international community – from individuals to NGOs to national governments to international organizations – to yet again ignore that distress and agony, and to once again make 'never again' a cry that rings totally empty, is to diminish that common humanity to the point of despair. We should be united in our determination to not let that happen, and there is no greater or nobler cause on which any of us could be embarked.[12]

This, however, does not resolve the core problem of the most appropriate forms of solidarity. The decision about when and how to express empathy with the suffering, if necessary through intervention free of (counter-) hegemonic interests, remains a difficult one. Unfortunately, all too often doubts remain about the intentions of those arguing for or against specific cases of intervention (and the form it should take), as

10 Quoted in: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment*, New York: Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies/CUNY Graduate Centre, GCR2P Report, August 2009, p. 3.

11 Richard Jolly et. al., op. cit., pp. 176 and 177.

12 Gareth Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come...and Gone?* Lecture to David Davies Memorial Institute, University of Aberystwyth, 23 April 2008 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2008/the-responsibility-to-protect-an-idea-whose-time-has-come-and-gone.aspx

several recent examples clearly and sadly illustrate. Not surprisingly, the commonest concern expressed by member states during the General Assembly debate in late July 2009 was the danger of double standards and selectivity. As some states pointed out, however, 'it would be wrong to conclude that because the international community might not act everywhere, it should therefore act nowhere.'[13]

What makes the hard choices even harder is the crisis of legitimacy relating to criteria for or against specific forms of interference. Double standards reign supreme. We should, however, be careful not to explicitly equate the RtoP doctrine with military intervention. This would ignore the fact that interventions can take many different forms, such as sanctions and selective boycotts, naming and shaming or even creating incentives for better behaviour. RtoP, as we should not forget, also means the obligation to protect responsibly. Francis Deng pioneered the whole RtoP debate through ideas he has been articulating since the mid-1990s on 'sovereignty as responsibility.' Others have meanwhile offered as a variation the notion of 'responsibility while protecting.' This has been suggested so as to make interveners more accountable to those who endorsed the mandate for intervention.

Moral condemnations of violations of the fundamental principles of the protection of people, which we hear on a daily basis, sound hollow and hypocritical in light of the geostrategic and other politically opportunistic deliberations that all too often guide both the rhetoric and the decisions. Was there a sufficient response to the violence against

The panel debate was preceeded by a seminar at the Foundation.

13 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, op. cit., p. 2.

the civilian population by regimes in Bahrain or Yemen? Or when tens of thousands of civilians were butchered in Sri Lanka at the end of its civil war in 2009? Did the world respond adequately to the atrocities committed by the junta in Burma? Are we speaking out as much as we should about the continued plight of the Palestinian people? Are we doing everything possible to minimise human suffering in these and similar instances without creating yet more victims?

There are other serious moral and political considerations when balancing the various possible reactions and consequences as part of R to P. Security Council Resolution 1973, resulting in massive, large-scale military intervention in Libya and triggering regime change, was a controversial instance of what the protection of civilian population might mean. The evidence of continued violence in the shadow of the efforts to establish legitimate new structures of government in post-Gaddafi Libya is of little comfort.

The case of Libya exposes a fundamental moral dilemma: in the absence of a standard measure not purely based on speculation to contrast the 'what if' with the 'what if not' scenarios, we are unable to reach a factually based conclusion about whether an intervention reduced bloodshed or increased the number of victims. If saving lives is the ultimate motive for how we respond, then the result can be either initiatives for concerted – even military – action, or the opposite, a high degree of restraint and negotiation. This approach could even translate into all kinds of deals that are a far cry from justice. Justice at all costs, by contrast, might be too high a price in particular circumstances. Is it really the case that the achievement of justice invariably saves more lives than are lost in pursuing it? Luis Moreno Ocampo, the first prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), stated at a conference in The Hague in November 2011 that his mandate is not to seek political compromises but to pursue justice. Others have another task, which might even include agreements at the expense of justice, if only to avoid further bloodshed.

Francis Deng, in his sensible treatment of the implications of his mandate as the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, urged the audience attending his Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture on 10 September 2010 to accept efforts seeking a 'delicate balance between asserting the need for international protection for the vulnerable and the need for constructive engagement on the part of governments.' He acknowledged

> that this is not the approach favoured by those who believe that on these matters we should cry out loud, stand on the mountain-top and preach what is right and condemn what is wrong. However,

> when we do that, we might satisfy our conscience, but how much can we help the people who need to be helped in a practical way?[14]

Justice needs a rule of law that is more than the law of the rulers. When Lakhdar Brahimi presented the Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2002, he placed the rule of law at the core of his reflections. As he emphasised, that law must also have human beings as its focus:

> The Rule of Law was originally a narrow, legalistic concept, meaning that no man is punishable except for a distinct breach of the law, established in the ordinary courts of the land. Over the decades, this concept acquired a much wider meaning, requiring the existence of just laws and the respect of human rights.[15]

Emerging during the era of the Enlightenment, such concept of law ultimately embraced all societies in a global order:

> Today, Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law are important branches of international law, based on the view that the human dimension had to be considered, that people mattered, that they had rights as human beings, and that they needed legal protection. They represent an acknowledgment that laws should be just and that the Rule of Law should have a strong human rights component.[16]

Almost prophetically with regard to what is often referred to as the 'Arab Spring,' he then continued: 'The question of human rights has also mobilised people around the world to be vigilant and vociferous about their own rights, and show concern for the rights of people in other countries.'[17]

The shaping and implementation of normative frameworks since the Rome treaties during the late 1990s have added a new watchdog function to global governance institutions, specifically the United Nations. Dag Hammarskjöld would most likely have been much in favour of these recent tendencies, and of the paradigm shift they have helped achieve since the turn of the century whereby those holding power can no longer invariably get away with literal murder behind the holy cows of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of

14 Francis Deng, *Idealism and Realism. Negotiating sovereignty in divided nations*. The 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2010, pp. 19 and 20 (also reprinted in *Development Dialogue*, no. 55, March 2011).

15 Lakhdar Brahimi, *The Rule of Law at Home and Abroad*. The 2002 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2002, p. 10.

16 Ibid., p. 14.

17 Ibid.

states. But as Francis Deng reflected at the end of his term as Special Representative just a few weeks ago, state sovereignty remains a cardinal principle in international relations. It is:

> a formidable tool which states, whose record of gross mistreatment of their own populations makes them vulnerable to outside scrutiny, assert in pre-emptive self-defence. As recent experiences have shown, unless a state has collapsed, is too weak to resist external intervention, or the national interests of the interveners make the risks of intervention worth taking, this is an adventure that is very costly in both material and human terms. The general response is to avoid it and strive to negotiate with national sovereignty on cooperative bases.[18]

Our collective responsibility has shifted and strengthened the notion of the United Nations being guided by solidarity, a key concept Dag Hammarskjöld so often emphasised. As a trained economist, he was also at all times aware that human rights, peace and social stability required fair economic relations and structures. He stressed the need to empower new states and their governments in the global South, in particular Africa, where during his lifetime the 'winds of change' were blowing, by recognising their legitimate economic interests. He displayed insights into often neglected or deliberately ignored but substantial dimensions of lasting peace and stability. Not always spelt out as clearly, even 50 years later, is the material side of security and development. Put differently, without security there is hardly any chance of sustainable development. Security, on the other hand, requires lasting development. Security and development are mutually inclusive. In a presentation at an internal seminar at the Foundation preceding his Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, President Ahtisaari emphasized this essential link:

> Social and economic aspects often tend to get too little attention in peacemaking as security and the rule of law are seen as first priorities – and often rightly so. However, everyday economic survival and a just society are the most effective guarantees of lasting peace.[19]

While President Ahtisaari did not consider peace negotiations as a tool for socioeconomic development, he stressed that agreeing on practical and concrete economic conditions during any peace negotiation is crucial. Peace talks need to create the framework where these issues can

18 Francis M. Deng, *Making an Impossible Mandate Possible: The Challenge of Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities: End of Assigment Note*. Undated (February 2012), p. 2.

19 Martti Ahtisaari, "What makes for successful conflict resolution?" In: *Development Dialogue*, no. 53, November 2009, p. 48.

effectively be addressed after the peace accord. Maybe one could even say that finding a mutual understanding on money can really be seen as a manifestation of joint political will for peace.[20]

The case of the two Sudans and the continued conflict over who benefits and how from the natural resources and their exploitation seems to be a case in point.



Francis Deng during the seminar.

The official Swedish policy paper on security and development in development cooperation published last year shows a similar awareness of the link between the different aspects and to acknowledge the causalities. It stresses the need to promote peace, security and development by 'contributing to managing an acute conflict as well as to tackling and eliminating its structural causes, while keeping poverty reduction at the foreground.' This might lay the foundation for possible long-term sustainable development. It concludes: 'If real progress is to be made in peace-building, state-building and poverty reduction, there is a need to balance between measures aimed at tackling the conflict and the underlying causes of poverty, and initiatives intended to lead to fast and concrete peace dividends.'[21]

Jan Eliasson was the president of the United Nations 60th General Assembly when the World Summit Outcome in 2005 was adopted. As a former foreign minister, he delivered the annual lecture in honour of the second Secretary-General on 18 September last year, exactly 50 years after Hammarskjöld's untimely death in the wreckage of the plane, which crashed under still not fully clarified circumstances. Jan Eliasson then declared as his main message:

> lasting solutions require that the pursuit of peace, development and human rights must take place in parallel. There is no peace without development; there is no development without peace; and there is no sustainable peace and development without respect for human rights. If one of these three pillars is weak in a nation or a region, the whole structure is weak. Therefore, walls and barriers between these areas must be taken down.[22]

20 Ibid.

21 Department for Development Policy/Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Peace and Security for Development. Policy for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation 2010-2014*. Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden 2011, pp. 17 and 32.

22 Jan Eliasson, *Peace, Development and Human Rights. The Indispensable Connection*. The Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture 2011. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2011, p. 12.

To underline that this is not an insight without precedent, he quoted from Dag Hammarskjöld's speech to the American-Jewish Committee in New York on 10 April 1957: 'We know that the question of peace and the question of human rights are closely related. Without recognition of human rights we shall never have peace and it is only within the framework of peace that human rights can be fully developed.'[23]

★★★

In his own efforts at what has since been called preventive diplomacy, Hammarskjöld emphasised the need to keep an open mind. In his exchanges with the Jewish-German philosopher Martin Buber, he spoke of the need for dialogue in an age of mistrust. On 5 June 1958, the then UN Secretary-General was awarded an honorary doctorate by Cambridge University. His address, with reference to the work of Buber, bore the title 'The Walls of Distrust.' Allow me a quote from this speech, which seems very much to characterise our own world half a century later:

> We meet in a time of peace which is no peace, in a time of technical achievement which threatens its own masters with destruction. We meet in a time when the idea evoked in our minds by the term 'humanity' has switched to a turbulent political reality from the hopeful dreams of our predecessors … The widening of our political horizons to embrace in a new sense the whole of the world, should have meant an approach to the ideal sung in Schiller's 'Ode to Joy,' but it has, paradoxically, led to new conflicts and to new difficulties to establish even simple human contact and communication. [24]

Jan Eliasson, in concluding his speech last year, reiterates the necessary human dimensions guiding our actions if we are searching for solutions. Inspired by the example of his role model Dag Hammarskjöld, he ends with this insight:

> that the holistic approach to solving problems in a world of interdependence has an equivalent in how we as human beings approach these problems. Integrating different aspects, breaking down walls and recognising the mind-expanding and dynamic effects of crossing borders in all respects are relevant both on a policy and a personal level.[25]

23 Quoted from Kaj Falkman(ed.), *To Speak for the World. Speeches and Statements by Dag Hammarskjöld*. Stockholm: Atlantis 2005, p. 154.

24 Dag Hammarskjöld, "The Walls of Distrust". Address at Cambridge University, June 5, 1958. In: Andrew W. Cordier/Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume IV, Dag Hammarskjöld 1958-1960*. New York: Columbia University Press 1974, pp. 90f.

25 Jan Eliasson, op.cit., p. 22.

Dag Hammarskjöld's leadership as Secretary-General represented for Jan Eliasson a model for the future. Hammarskjöld also instituted the function and role of special representatives in his efforts to ensure the United Nations fulfilled its task as envisaged in its Charter, namely contributing to a more peaceful world by seeking solutions to violent conflicts and reducing the risk of other latent conflicts escalating into violent forms. Four of the special representatives active since then are with us today.

The special representatives appointed in the last half a century bear witness to the fact that international policy and diplomacy, like so many other institutionalised forms of bureaucracy and power, is still largely male dominated. However, Dag Hammarskjöld – although he used the generic male form in his speech as was usual in his time – was keenly aware that gender equality was a requirement for meaningful and sustainable development. On 15 October 2007, the late Sture Linnér told us from this stage as co-presenter along with Sverker Åström of that year's Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, that Dag Hammarskjöld

> was a visionary, far ahead of his time. When I started to work under him, there were just two things that he impressed upon me. One was in critical situations never to feel hampered by the UN's bureaucratic practices, but always to act according to my own judgment. The other, and most important, was that wherever I should come to find myself in the future in a UN capacity, I should first of all acquaint myself with the *position of women* in the country. And should I find that the authorities allowed them to freely develop their resources, well then we in the UN should do everything to favour that country for its clarity of vision.[26]

And Linnér added:

> That might sound obvious today, but it certainly was not so 50 years ago. Still today far too few important posts within the UN are filled by women. And not so many years ago, the then Secretary General charged me with the task of chairing a committee with the mission to determine how the organization could best support nursing mothers. Around the table sat 50 men – undoubtedly excellent and well-meaning men – but not one single woman![27]

26 Sture Linnér, "Dag Hammarskjöld and the Congo crisis, 1960-61", in Sture Linnér and Sverker Åström, *UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. Reflections and personal experiences*. The 2007 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2008, p. 28 (original emphasis).

27 Ibid., pp. 28f.

Matters do gradually change, and the UN has initiated visible reforms, not least in new assignments and institutions created and resolutions adopted. I am pleased that in the spirit of this long overdue reform we were able to slightly correct this unacceptable gender bias this afternoon by having with us three women whose track records speak clearly of their competence and commitment. Lena Ag, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Marie Tuma will engage with our main speakers after their initial round of short presentations and before we open the meeting to questions from the floor.

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Paraphrasing Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Dag Hammarskjöld ended an address to the University of California's Convocation on 13 May 1954 with a much quoted conclusion: 'It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.' For him, 'that sums up as well as anything I have heard both the essential role of the United Nations and the attitude of mind that we should bring to its support.'[28] I do hope that 'the boss,' as the staff at the UN fondly and respectfully called Dag Hammarskjöld, would have approved of the theme selected for this afternoon by the Foundation established in his name less than half a year after his untimely death. I am sure he would have approved of the men and women we have invited to discuss this challenging subject, men and women aware of his legacy and acting in his spirit.

Henning Melber and Martti Ahtisaari.

28 Andrew W. Cordier/Wilder Foote (eds), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956*. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1972, p. 301.

Security and Development: Conflict Prevention, Mediation, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Justice

50th Anniversary Roundtable[1]

Martti Ahtisaari: Thank you Henning. It's actually rather nice to be welcomed so warmly here before we have said a word. I have been asked to speak about my experiences as a mediator in the UN context and as the head of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the NGO I established when I left the Finnish presidency.

I joined the UN at the beginning of 1977 and became special representative of the Secretary-General in 1978. My task was basically to start collecting the UN resources so that we could monitor the elections in Namibia when finally we could get permission from South Africa to get to Namibia. I was supported by the so-called Western Five. These were the Western governments who happened in 1978 to be in the Security Council, namely the three permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom and France), Germany and Canada. They were responsible for UN Security Council Resolution 435 in 1978. This was a plan about how to implement the UN presence and transition process in Namibia.

When I started collecting together the team among my colleagues in the UN, Brian Urquhart was in charge of negotiating the composition of the peacekeeping troops and police. It turned out that in the end the police were far more important for us. I had four battalions there and 500 policemen, contingents from Sweden, for instance, and Finnish,

1 The event can also be watched at the web site of the Foundation at http://www.dhf.uu.se/events/public-events/security-and-development-a-roundtable-debate/. The discussion has been transcribed by Sayra van den Bergh.

Kenyan and Malaysian battalions, among others. But then we increased those 500 policemen to 1,500 because that was the only way that we could control the South African police, who were trying to create a lot of havoc for us. We were not actually negotiating anything else with South Africa at that time except the composition of our units.

But we had to help the contact group every now and then, because they were stuck with different issues. So I was a frequent visitor to the frontline states. I remember seeing President Nyerere in Tanzania, where I had been ambassador before I was recruited to the UN, and then Foreign Minister Salim Ahmed Salim, who later became prime minister. I managed to see him three times. In Angola, sometimes the president let me wait a few days before he received me, because I didn't always have such positive things to say. But the contacts were maintained and finally we got to Namibia on the last day of March 1989.

It was a complicated process from 1978 to 1989, because whatever we did, South Africa refused to accept the UN presence in Namibia. It required the pressure of American negotiator Chester Crocker. He came up with the so-called linkage idea that Cuban troops should withdraw from Angola and then South Africa's army from Namibia in return. He was supported in that plan by the Angolan government, by the Cubans and by the Soviet Union, which was very important. And then there were no excuses for South Africa anymore not to allow the UN in.

I came to Namibia at the end of March 1989, and we immediately had a catastrophe on our hands when on 1 April a few hundred fighters from the SWAPO liberation movement came over the border. It was totally contrary to the agreement, which had been negotiated in Congo Brazzaville. Unfortunately, in that incident over 300 Namibians died, I would say in vain, because SWAPO support in northern Namibia was nearly 100 per cent. But when we got over this early disaster, I knew that South Africa would not get out of this peace process, because they could have used it then and there to leave. Then I learned how important it was to have a support group that included the Americans, Russians, Cubans. We also had South Africa there and the Angolan government as well. Without their support, I don't think we would have managed to bring the process under control. So I realised then and there that you need a support group, main actors, which you have to keep in touch with constantly, at the same time as you keep the Secretary-General informed. He had a task force in New York.

We succeeded in spreading throughout the country. I had 8,000 people altogether in my operation there. And Namibians learned to come to

us. We had a very innovative information programme. So Namibians knew what was happening. They didn't trust the local news, but they could trust the UN news when they came. And a month or so after the first disaster we were back to working normally and elections were finally held in November 1989. They were perhaps the best-supervised elections in the world, because I had put the military, against my commanders' advice, at the polling booths because I wanted to see there was absolutely no tricking of elections. And it went very well. And I wish you could have seen those long queues, kilometres long, of Namibians wanting to participate in the first free and fair elections.

The liberation movement SWAPO won clearly, but didn't get a two-thirds majority. This was a positive thing to start with. So that was perhaps the best experience. My advice to the Namibian independence government was that it did not ask the UN to stay. If you want anyone here to help you in training your military or police force, make bilateral arrangements with different governments so we could finish our operation in one year's time. I'm very proud that my wife and I were declared honorary citizens two years later by the Namibian parliament. I dare to say in Finland that if the Finns don't treat me well, I will move to Namibia. Now we have so much snow it wouldn't be at all a bad idea to go there.

Let's move then from Namibia to Kosovo. I was asked in November 2005, after we had just finished the Hudson negotiations in the CMI, to deal with the Kosovo status negotiations. I made my first trip in November to the neighbouring countries. I went to Serbia and I saw Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica. I told him that in light of what had been done unconstitutionally in Kosovo by the police and the parliament, which had resulted in the refugee flows of Kosovo Albanians out of Kosovo, they had lost the right to govern Kosovo. The prime minister's answer to me was that no one had told him so. So I called the contact group again – there was a contact group before I had even started.

That contact group had a meeting in London on 31 January 2006. The NATO secretary general was there, and the Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was there, as well as the Americans, British, French, Germans and Italians. I wanted them to send so-called private messages to Belgrade, Pristina and the Kosovo Serbs. The first of these points read as follows: the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo had led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade's rule was not a viable option.

Everyone except, I think, the Russian Federation presented these so-called private messages to the three parties I just mentioned. So everyone knew in the region what the final outcome of my work was going to be. And everyone supported this. When Foreign Minister Lavrov visited London and Washington, the *Financial Times* in March wrote the following report: Russia and China have told the US that they will not block the independence of Kosovo, the breakaway Serbian province, according to Western diplomats. Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, discussed the issue with Sergey Lavrov in Washington and was told Moscow would not stand in the way of independence. Russia and China would probably abstain in a proposed UN resolution that would grant independence. As we know, this didn't happen.

Kosovo suffered from the fact that UN-Russian relations were deteriorating, because there were issues that were worsening that relationship, and unfortunately Kosovo suffered, became a victim of that process. There was a missile-sealed issue, there were others, and therefore Russia changed its position and didn't want the issue to be handled in the Security Council. That's why Kosovo became independent by unilateral declaration. Eighty-eight countries have recognised that. I would rather stop here, and if we can later on in a discussion say a few words about Aceh, I will do so.

Henning Melber: Thank you so much. Let me turn to Lakhdar Brahimi. When UN peacekeeping operations were institutionalised by Dag Hammarskjöld there were not as many as there are today. Some 10 years ago, the Secretary-General felt it was time to look closer into peace operations, and you chaired the panel that then presented a report, ever since just known as the Brahimi Report. Now looking back over the last decade, what in your view has been its impact and what is the scope for intervention and conflict resolution?

Lakhdar Brahimi: Thank you very much indeed. It's always difficult to follow my fellow elder, Martti Ahtisaari. He is so eloquent and has so much experience. As a matter of fact, when I started working for the UN, in South Africa, Haiti and elsewhere, I asked people who were working on those missions: what is your experience, where have you been? The best qualification has always been the answer: 'Oh you know, I was in Namibia with Martti Ahtisaari.' So if somebody tells you that he or she was in Namibia you know they are good.

We were entrusted with our task as a panel on UN operations at the end of the 1990s, and we really had a strong feeling of failure – failure in Somalia, failure in former Yugoslavia, especially Srebrenica and failure in

Rwanda. So our task was to see how to save peacekeeping. A lot of people were saying in the corridors of the UN in 1996-97 that this peacekeeping department that was created was not such a good idea. That the UN cannot do peacekeeping. Look what has happened in Somalia, look what has happened in Srebrenica, look what has happened in Rwanda. So I think the question we were asking ourselves is, how can we save peacekeeping, how can we do better, so that peacekeeping can avoid the pitfalls that we fell into in these three places? Indeed, how can we reconnect with the successes that were achieved in Namibia and Mozambique in particular.

I would like to confess here that unfortunately we didn't pay enough attention during our work, we worked extremely fast, we had only four months to produce that report. One thing that is missing from our work was that we didn't refer enough to the experience of Dag Hammarskjöld. Hammarskjöld almost singlehandedly invented peacekeeping. First in Egypt, the Middle East and then in the Congo. I think in the Middle East it was a resounding success. In the Congo, for him personally it was a disaster, as he died there. But still if you look back at what was done by Hammarskjöld, with very limited means, very little precedent, as a matter of fact, no precedent at all to go on in the Middle East and in the Congo, you will find that we haven't really done much better, 50 to 60 years later, with all the means that we have at our disposal.

Lakhdar Brahimi

I very much regret that we didn't make this point to challenge ourselves that this man, with so few means, with so little support from the international community and the countries that count, achieved so much. In the Congo, he was not only not supported, he was fought by the Americans, the British, the Russians, the French. Look what he did despite this hostile environment. So with the environment we have, we should do infinitely better than we are doing.

But I think our report, considering the atmosphere that existed in those days, did not do badly. We were told by almost everybody, and I think even some members of our panel, that it was a brave effort but that our report would join the countless other reports in the UN that are gathering dust on the shelves of the organisation. From this point of view, I think it was a very pleasant surprise that this was not the case. The report immediately raised a great deal of interest and gained a great deal of support everywhere. I remember that the press reacted immediately by saying that this was a good and interesting report and that the 58 recommendations we made were worthy of notice and perhaps even of implementation. So that was rather encouraging.

Our panel was formed at the end of February 2000, and we submitted the report in August to Kofi Annan. He put it immediately to the summit, to the Millennium Summit, in September. At the summit, some countries were scratching their heads – is this really what we want? and so on – but they ended up endorsing the report unanimously. After that, as you said, some of the recommendations were implemented, some have not yet been implemented. But what is more important and encouraging is that this has created a process. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs, missions, UN agencies, have all been constantly discussing how to implement or not implement the recommendations of the primary report ever since. And it has continued, as a matter of fact. A couple of years ago, they started a new process, which they initially called 'beyond Brahimi' and then it ended up in a report called 'New Horizon', where one of the issues being discussed is what they call robust peacekeeping, because now you know, I think peacekeeping is established.

One of the earlier points we made was that originally perhaps peacekeeping was thought of as something that may happen from time to time. Unfortunately, we have got to accept that it is now something that is going to stay with us for a long time and that is how we should organise ourselves. Some of the important points we made in this report were a kind of criticism of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We said very bluntly I think – a phrase that has been quoted very often

since then – that when the Secretary-General is asked to submit a report to the Security Council and the Security Council wants to discuss whether they start a peacekeeping or peace operation, the Secretary-General needs to tell the Council what they need to know, not what they want to hear. Because quite often what was happening was that the big boys in the Security Council would go to the Secretary-General and tell him, 'Look, don't ask for more than 3,000 troops, we won't give them to you', and he would say, 'But you know we need 10,000'. Then they would answer, 'No! No! No! Three thousand only', and he would go and ask for 3,000 troops and then you have Srebrenica. So we said, he should ignore that and say, 'This is what is needed.' And Kofi Annan did it almost immediately after that in the Congo.

You remember when at one stage the Congo was invaded literally by all its neighbours? Those neighbours came under pressure from everybody, and said we have agreed on how to pull out from the Congo. But you needed not to be very clever to see that they did not mean it. So the Security Council immediately went to Kofi and said, 'Look this is the agreement these countries have made. Please go and implement it.' And Kofi had the courage to go and tell them, 'No I'm not going to, because they don't really mean it.' And they went back to the drawing board and they came up with another agreement that was implementable.

So, these are a few things about our report and the life it has had. There are a lot of other things, but perhaps we can come back to that later. Thank you very much.

Henning Melber: The ins and outs of peacekeeping, including the wheeling and dealing you just shared with us, unfortunately touch on what Francis Deng had to deal with most of his career in the UN. First with displaced persons, with refugees, and lately with genocide, reconciliation and transitional justice. As we just heard, if you don't put your money where your mouth is, then you are not preventing or reducing violence, you are actually closing your eyes and you allow it to happen again. Now Francis, your assignment as special representative, as advisor for the prevention of genocide, comes to an end mid-year. How would you summarise your insights?

Francis Deng: First of all let me congratulate you on your 50th anniversary. I have been associated with the foundation for 40 of its 50 years, which is quite awhile; from 1972, when I was ambassador in Sweden. I realise that many of you here were not here then.

On your specific question, first of all I want to thank you again for your introduction, and I'm tempted to say that you said it all, and that I can only add very little to the summary you presented on the experiences I have had.

But I think in order to get to the real core of the problems I was dealing with, it's important to see the two mandates together – the mandate on internal displacement as a representative of the Secretary-General on internal displaced persons and the mandate on genocide prevention. When the mandate on IDPs, as we call them, was created, it was a very sensitive issue. You're dealing with an issue that by definition is internal, and therefore falling under the sovereignty of the state. And many governments do not want the UN to get involved in this. So it was a compromise, which I won't get into the details of, but initially for one year, then for two years and then renewed every three years for 12 years. I had to deal with this sensitivity about how you deal with a problem that by definition is internal.

What I should also say about this mandate and that of genocide prevention is we are dealing with countries that are acutely divided. The conflicts that result from that are not just because there are differences, but because of the way we treat our differences, because of the mismanagement of diversity. Some groups are in-groups that enjoy the rights of citizenship and dignity of belonging. Others are marginalised, discriminated, excluded and denied those rights. Once a conflict occurs, then it becomes zero-sum and escalates to genocidal level.

So in essence, what I had to do was, considering the tools existing in the international community, deal with a government that does not want the international community to be involved, when people who are in a vacuum of responsibility need international involvement, and lacking the tools to intervene against the will of the government. I had to use the concept of sovereignty as responsibility, which I had developed at Brookings to deal with post-Cold War developments in Africa, particularly conflicts that used to be seen as part of the proxy wars of the superpowers, but then, with the end of the Cold War, had to be seen in their proper context, and responsibility had to be reapportioned.

As I always said: the first five minutes with a president or a minister were critical in telling them I realise this problem is internal, it falls under your sovereignty, I respect your sovereignty, but I don't see it negatively as a barricade against the outside world. I see it as a very positive concept of state responsibility for its people, and if it needs support, then call on the international community to assist. But should

your people be suffering and dying, and you're not able to help them, the world is not going to sit and watch, they will in one way or another find a way of getting involved. So the best way to protect sovereignty is to discharge the responsibilities of sovereignty.

Now when it comes to genocide, again a very sensitive issue, what I had to do was demystify genocide: instead of seeing it as Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Holocaust, to redefine it as an extreme form of identity-related conflict resulting not from differences, but from the mismanagement of diversity. If we see it that way, then prevention becomes structural early on, before situations escalate to the point where there is denial. We will see that genocide is always denied, and so we only recognise it after the factual happening. So my engagement with governments is to say this is a case of how you manage diversity in a constructive way to promote inclusivity, equality, dignity and respect for all without discrimination. I have to say that this engagement with governments has been very constructive and has been well received by governments, whether dealing with internal displacement or genocide prevention. And this was so in all parts of the world, even in areas where I was told I would probably not be welcome because of sensitivities of issues of genocide.

Lastly, we cannot also disregard the third pillar of the responsibility to protect, or sovereignty as responsibility, which means state responsibility, support for the state, and, should this fail, more robust international involvement. But that robust international involvement, as we have seen in Libya and now the debate over Syria, is not easy. It's extremely costly in human and material terms. But we have to sharpen that threat. But threat, to be effective, has to be credible. And therefore we should emphasise the first two pillars while sharpening our tools for the third pillar.

Lastly, on the question of justice. There's always talk that justice and peace go hand in hand, you cannot separate them, which is true. I used to err on the side of justice and reconciliation in situations where you need people who might be held accountable to resolve situations. I'm increasingly becoming convinced that if we can create a credible situation, those who commit crimes, heinous crimes, will sooner or later be held accountable. Perhaps we will deter those with a criminal mind and in a sense become preventing. But it has to be credible. If we indict people we cannot apprehend and they continue to function awhile, as we repeat these indictments that are not implemented or not acted upon, there is a threat that the achievements that we have had in international criminal justice may lose credibility. I think this is the dilemma we have to face in dealing with whether or not you indict people you still need

in order to resolve situations. I make no firm judgment, but I want to say it's a dilemma. Thank you.

Henning Melber: Thank you very much Francis, and I'm sure that Marie Tuma in her comments will come back to the thorny issue of justice, prosecution and related challenges. Jan Eliasson. I dare to say that second to Dag Hammarskjöld there is only one Mister United Nations in Sweden, and that is you. As a career diplomat, you spent quite a period of your life strengthening global governance, and you continue to do so in your current capacity as special ambassador for the Millennium Development Goals. When I hear your name, I always think about that water glass in front of me. It touches on the issue I have mentioned about your engagements before – those interfaces between security, development, human rights. You use water, which you feel very passionate about, as an example. Now it's not for me to pre-empt your statement, but your example leads directly to the question we raised before: without development, without justice, there cannot be peace. And you always stress the need to integrate political, economic and human rights elements in the international agenda. So what is your advice?

Jan Eliasson: Thank you Henning. I suppose I have to explain *(taps water glass)* for those of you who haven't seen me doing this before – it's a bit of a ritual. This glass of drinking water is a luxury. A dream for 885 million people in the world, and 2.5 billion people don't have sanitation, which is a euphemism for toilets. Three thousand children under the age of five die every day because of a lack of clean water, of diarrhoea, dysentery, dehydration, and I've seen it with my own eyes, in particular in the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Sudan. Do I get 30 seconds extra for that on the time? *(Laughs)* Thank you very much.

Good to be back in Uppsala together with great friends and colleagues to pay tribute to Dag Hammarskjöld in this way. You, in your introduction, actually gave me the key words and hopefully gave us the key words that I wanted to convey.

I was President of the General Assembly and Kofi Annan and I were discussing how to present the big document that came out in September 2005 – I think it had 170 paragraphs. Kofi said "this is impossible, how do we summarise it?" And then we asked a brilliant young man, well he's a bit older now, in the secretariat and he came out with this wonderful sentence, which I want to repeat: there is no peace without development, there is no development without peace, and there is no lasting peace or sustainable development without respect for human rights. This is a very powerful message because it says that if one of these pillars is weak,

Jan Eliasson



the whole structure is weak. There is also another extremely important message, which Martti brought out in earlier discussions, namely that you cannot draw a line between domestic and international issues today.

If you look at these issues, these challenges – peace, development and human rights – at least two of them are related to what we do to our own people. And outside and inside forces have to work together. It's about time that we take away the sharp distinction between domestic and international in the pursuit of peace, development and human rights. That's my main message after many years of experience. In Darfur I saw with my own eyes that the farmers couldn't farm their land during the war, the young people were taken away – development and peace were related. And, of course, the hatred that came from the violations of human rights made the conflict even worse.

So this principle that Kofi Annan and I and Bob Orr formulated in New York was translated on the ground two years later when I was in Darfur. I feel very strongly about this. We need to think in a new way, we need to think in terms of putting the problem in the centre - whether it is water, or any problem that we've talked about at this podium - and then gather the different actors who can influence this problem around the table, and discuss and come up with conclusions about shared responsibility and division of labour.

The UN cannot solve all problems. The regional organisations, EU, AU, cannot solve all problems. Governments cannot do it. We have to involve the private sector, the academic sector and, of course, civil society. Nobody can do everything, but everybody can do something. This has to be said and done in a day and age where there is hopelessness and despair about the hugeness, the size of the problems. Therefore we need to mobilise around the problems. The UN could possibly, with leadership, serve as a catalyst to bring these forces together, putting the problems in the centre, realising that all the issues are interconnected. And then the work should be divided up among ourselves. Otherwise we will not be able to deal with the issues.

To translate this formula of peace, development and human rights is a great challenge, not only for the UN system, but for all of us. We need, for instance, the UN to make sure that we in the field bring the work into one UN, so that we can see all the aspects of the UN that have to do with peace, development and human rights. There is also a need to come back to the marriage needed between the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington and the UN so that the political, economic and social factors are brought together. So I see this as a great challenge, to have in the UN during Ban Ki Moon's second term a mobilisation around the problems and bringing the different actors together around the table.

Generally, I feel that we need not talk so much about UN reform in terms of organisation charts, which some of us have been working with for a long time. We need to think about the way we work and the way we think. This holistic approach that I'm trying to convey here is one I would also want to see, all over the place, not only the UN. We also need action and thinking that much more respects what you, Francis, were talking about in terms of prevention: that we act early in a crisis and that we also accept long-term responsibility. We are stuck in this world with short-term responsibility: quarterly results in the private sector, mandate periods in the political world. We don't accept responsibility for the next generation. The children don't have votes, unfortunately, and the planet doesn't have a vote. Sometimes people ask, when you have an idea and they want to be pessimistic about it, what is your Plan B? Well I usually say when it comes to climate and long-term perspectives, "OK, I have no Plan B, but there is no Planet B either". So, this is only to underline the need for new thinking, holistic approaches, prevention and long-term thinking. That I think would be a great step forward.

Henning Melber: Jan, you didn't use the 30 seconds.

Jan Eliasson: No, I'm saving time for the women! Finally, we hear the women.

Henning Melber: I think no one is better suited to start off the gender perspective than Lena Ag, who is the co-founder and now the head of Kvinna till Kvinna, women to women. I guess when we talk about security and development, you most likely think of the 51 per cent of the world's population who have maybe a quite different take on what it means from the 49 per cent of us who still dominate the panel. So, promoting a gender perspective is for you a daily challenge. What do you have to say?

Lena Ag: Thank you Henning for this opportunity. I believe though that women and men are more alike than separate. But let me start with a quote: 'We cannot achieve democracy and lasting peace in the world unless women obtain the same opportunities as men to influence developments at all levels of society.' So said the Norwegian Nobel committee in December last year when awarding the Peace Prize to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkol Karman.

The 2011 Nobel Prize is a symbolic but important acknowledgment of the link between women's empowerment and peace and security. It is actually based on the same analysis as the UN Security Council did 11 years ago when they adopted Resolution 1325. The resolution stresses the importance of women's equal participation at all levels of decision-making: in conflict resolution, peace talks and the rebuilding of societies after war. It goes as far as to underline women's participation as a prerequisite for peace. Now, during these 11 years since Resolution

Left to right: Martti Ahtisaari, Lena Ag, Lakhdar Brahimi, Henning Melber, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Jan Eliasson.

1325 was adopted, we have seen important normative developments in the area of women, peace and security. We even have global indicators to help us track actual results, such as Indicator 11A: representation of women among mediators, negotiators and technical experts in formal peace negotiations. Or 12A: women's political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions.

Now let me be clear: this mostly normative development is important and positive, but what is the actual reality? In the 21 peace processes between 1992 and 2009, 94 per cent of those present were men. The UN has never appointed a female chief peace negotiator, and it took exactly 10 years from the time that Resolution 1325 was adopted before a woman – one woman! – was appointed as an EU special representative, Dame Rosalind Marsden in Sudan. Around 86 per cent of UN ambassadors are men, and so are around 75 per cent of parliamentarians worldwide. That is what these indicators now show us. The reality is that women are marginalised from decision-making and power hierarchies in large parts of the world, and have to choose other routes to political influence, often via civil society.

When women are actively involved in armed conflicts, they are rarely holding power positions and consequently they will not be invited to the peace table. The result is that peace negotiations are often conducted by a small elite: men with guns talk to other men with guns over the heads of the civilian population, those most affected by conflict. I'm sure that President Athisaari knows things about this, as do the rest of the participants. Jan, I'm sure you can give us some examples from Darfur. Research shows that peace will be more sustainable if negotiations are broadened and include civil society.

Now one good example, as Mr Brahimi mentioned, is the 1992 peace process after the civil war in Mozambique, where women had a major impact, and so is the famous case of peace in Liberia in 2003. Women's participation increases legitimacy and local ownership of the peace processes. Women from civil society often bring different perspectives to the table; for example, knowledge about local problems and situations, security problems when it comes to food and water, when it comes to bringing the children to school, where weapons are hidden. Without a functioning everyday life, peace will not be rooted in the long term.

Kvinna till Kvinna's experiences from many conflict regions in the world show that civil society has a crucial role to play after conflicts in providing meeting places for dialogue, confidence building and reconciliation. I do not have time to go into why civil society is not involved

on a regular basis in negotiations, why this is still not happening and what the obstacles are. It's highly relevant, for instance, in the case of Afghanistan. I will, however, conclude with some thoughts on how to better include women from civil society in peace negotiations in the future. And I'm sure Martti Ahtisaari and Jan Eliasson can provide some additional thoughts on this. Jan has been kind enough to write a foreword to our guidebook on this matter, *Make Room for Peace*.

First, mandates to mediators and negotiating experts should include gender issues to look into the situation for both men and women. Second, make sure that the mediator's team has a gender balance, or at least a gender expert. *(Looks to Ahtisaari)* Did you have that? Gender quotas I think are a good idea. Third, set up parallel consultation processes, so-called Track 2 processes with women and civil society groups. Fourth, women and gender experts need to be involved in every relevant negotiation and the drafting of agreements. That includes security sector reform, property rights and constitution-building processes. Fifth, establish criteria, also for civil society organisations who participate, such as that they represent views and concerns of a wider constituency, that they are willing to engage in a dialogue with all parties to the conflict and that they are willing to support implementation of the agreement by outreach in their own communities.

Henning Melber: Thank you so much Lena, for more than fully meeting the expectations. Angela, you are not only a PhD student with the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, but you also come from an African country, you have long worked actively with a South African-based institution of peace and conflict mediations, and you have your own personal interest in mediating peace processes in the African Union. As we know, when we look at the UN a disproportionate amount of time is spent on discussing African issues, and if you watch TV, then African conflicts feature prominently. Africa is the continent associated with hunger, starvation and civil war. From your perspective, how special is the African case actually, or is it just a kind of a misperception?

Angela Ndinga-Muvumba: Thank you, it's a privilege and an honour to be here with you on this occasion, in this institution and with these men and women. I'm very pleased to be here, and your question is enormously ambitious, given the fact that I'm sitting with people who have been direct mediators in Africa, and in the African conflicts, and also involved in strengthening UN peacekeeping.

I tried to find out whether or not it is the case that Africa is a special case for conflict.

I know that the perception often is that Africa is a special case. And it's difficult to do a kind of count when it comes to mediations, but in the history of the UN's peacekeeping we know that 43 per cent of UN peacekeeping operations have been in Africa. That seems like a lot, but when we think about it, and count and look back, only one UN operation took place in Africa until 1960, in the Congo. Then there was a surge in peacekeeping operations between 1989 and 2011, a period of 22 years. The Security Council mandated 25 operations in Africa. Seven of 15 missions today are in Africa. Based on these numbers, it seems to me if you actually look and count all the peacekeeping operations, that Africa is not a neglected case. It's not a negative case, it hasn't been abandoned by the international community.

Given the fact that Africa's gone through an enormous decolonisation period and a struggle against apartheid, and problems with the frontline states, it seems not special, if you compare it with the Arab countries in the Middle East for example. But I know that for many people Africa has been considered a special case in the sense that there has been a perception that it has been marginalised by the UN. In large part that's due to the inability to prevent the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and to failures in Somalia. But against that background, against those kinds of qualitative failures in peacekeeping, the AU and other regional organisations have by and large taken up regional arrangements to deal with peacekeeping problems and maintain peace and security.

So we know about ECOWAS, which was managing the bulk of peacekeeping in Liberia between 1990 and 1996 and again in Sierra Leone in 1997. And I really believe strongly that the effectiveness of this regional organisation bolstered the confidence of other African governments. The belief was that if these sub-regional organisations could do what the UN had refused to do, or couldn't do, or didn't want to do, then certainly a new AU and new African peace and security architecture could do that. There have been eight AU or sub-regional peacekeeping operations. These operations take place under Chapter 8 guidelines of the UN Charter.

Let me quickly talk about Chapter VIII because it is really relevant for the future of peacekeeping and for the future of maintaining international peace and security, not just for Africa. We know that Chapter 8 encourages regional arrangements, it precludes regional actors from undertaking enforcement without the authorisation of the Security

Council, and the Council must be informed at all times about any intervention, even at its stage of contemplation, so beforehand. But we also know that African governments, through experience have actually been in opposition to this criterion. ECOWAS did not obtain prior UN Security Council authorisation for its Liberia and Sierra Leone peace operations, and even the 2005 Ezulwini consensus of the AU allows the AU to take action and seek UN Security Council authorisation after the fact.

Regional arrangements are also perceived very differently by the AU and the UN. Of course, the AU views its role as very important, as having a comparative advantage, because it can deploy peacekeepers quickly; because it has a regional interest in conflicts in Africa; and more importantly – and I think this is the legacy of Rwanda, Somalia and now possibly of Libya and other places – its member states feel that it can actually deploy into these situations and into these conflicts, much more from *the moral high ground*, even when there might not yet be a peace to keep. The UN, on the other hand, and this is my view to some extent, mainly underscores the principle of universality and legitimacy since the UN Charter actually gives it primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

Furthermore, from the UN side, the Security Council can never just become a rubber stamp for AU decisions. The AU's operating and peace and security budget is really grossly underfunded, and the AU depends almost entirely on external support, even for its peacekeeping. On the AU side, its members are frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the UN Security Council, even for political support, for preventive diplomacy and mediation. There's no African permanent member on the UN Security Council, there is none with veto power. This poses difficulties for African leaders if they are to ever believe that the Council can act in concert with the continent. Much of the UN Security Council's negotiations also take place behind closed doors among the Permanent 5, and the Council is thus viewed as lacking in transparency.

I hate to drop this problem at your feet, kind elders, but I wondered if you in your comments and in your considerations would think about how to reconcile these differences and how to move regional arrangements further along. First of all, how can we develop norms and values globally? Is there a role for the Nordic countries in this context, or the EU? The Brahimi Report actually recommended having rapidly deployable UN peacekeeping capacity: is it a lost opportunity for us? Because I think that having such a capacity at the UN level would circumvent some of this problem at the regional level. And then lastly, based on your experiences

working with the AU and with the UN for Africa and at the international level, how can we reconcile these different positions? Jean Ping, the chairperson of the African Union, has written a report in January 2012 on AU-UN cooperation and he said that although there are a lot of consultations between the two institutions, we have "yet to translate into a common understanding a foundation for cooperation". So, based on your experiences, what can be done about this?

Jan Eliasson: Good, very good.

Henning Melber: Thanks Angela, the perceived neglect of African conflict cases overlooks, of course, the fact that Hammarskjöld lost his life in the Congo, as you mentioned. It overlooks what Martti Ahtisaari represented, and which was a major reason for awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize – the UN efforts to bring independence to a trust betrayed, namely Namibia. And it might overlook the longstanding support by the UN since 1960 against apartheid as a crime against humanity. So there are two sides to that. It corresponds with the maybe selective perspective. This brings Marie Tuma into the picture, namely that international justice institutions only target African despots – as if it's only those who are taken to task. Well, you were involved in Bosnia, as a prosecutor, first in The Hague, and then as a judge, before you moved on and joined the Raoul Wallenberg Institute. You are dealing with the tricky issues touched on by Francis Deng earlier, but from a different perspective, namely the challenges of transitional justice within an environment where you want to end violence and reduce the number of victims. So, in that difficult situation, what in your view is the role of prosecution and of justice, and maybe the ICC?

Marie Tuma: Thank you so much for having the opportunity to be here in order to pay tribute to Dag Hammarskjöld. I'm very honoured to be able to do that. I have 10 years in the courtrooms as a professional prosecutor and also as a professional judge in dealing with the war in the Balkans. Francis Deng said something about the credibility of justice. From the courtroom perspective and from the perspective of the victims of war, I dealt with cases in The Hague and also as a judge in a state court in Bosnia Herzegovina, out in the field, and listened to victims of war everyday in the courtroom. Those were real stories. The victims, after they had taken the stand and given their testimony in court, thanked even the prosecutor or the panel of judges for sitting and listening to the real story and for all those victim statements they rendered in a judgment later on. Not all of the cases ended with a conviction, but many of the cases rendered a conviction of the perpetrator.

In my perspective, the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, located in The Hague, was a success. The international community, when the court was set up in 1993, really didn't realise or think, or could expect that a president, Slobodan Milosevic, would be indicted and also arrested and brought to The Hague. But he was, and he was put on trial, as well as Karadžić and Mladić and others. The ICTY indicted 161 individuals. All of them were arrested, every single one, and brought to The Hague.

When it comes to transitional justice in Bosnia, I was one of 17 international judges from Europe and from the US. We were sitting in a courthouse with eight courtrooms, filled everyday with perpetrators, alleged perpetrators, witnesses, and also families to all the victims who were listening to the statements of the victims. Not always, but most of the time, after a witness ended a statement, the judges asked if the witness wanted any kind of compensation that was possible to receive – economic compensation or some other compensation, such as getting back property, things like that. The witnesses, most of the time, said, no thank you, we would like you judges to hear the story because we have an obligation to do that for our people.

By holding trials and making justice, it's very important not only for the international community but also for the victims, in the case of the Balkans, to try at least to reconcile the ethnic groups in order to hinder further conflict in that area, and also to lift the collective criminal responsibility of a country like Germany after the Second World War, instead of focusing on individual criminal responsibility. Through the trials and the courts, ad hoc international courts, or the ICC in The Hague, the International Criminal Court, which is a permanent court, global jurisdiction is supposed to last forever. Through those courts, there's not any longer impunity, and no immunity. So all perpetrators that have committed war crimes can face justice, and the ICTY in The Hague has shown that that is a possibility.

Henning Melber: After these really rich and deep comments we have quick responses by the four wise men before we open the floor for questions. And Jan is urged to respond to Angela.

Jan Eliasson: I'll try to respond to Angela's questions about regional arrangements. There are two underutilised chapters of this Charter, in my view. One is Chapter 6, peaceful settlement of disputes. It's about the art of diplomacy and peaceful methods of solving problems. The second, I think, is regional arrangements. The founders of the organisation,

those who wrote the Charter, really expected that much more would be done on the regional level before it came to the international level.

We have much to retrieve from this, to bring together the regional organisations and the UN, AU and UN. Salim Ahmed Salim of the AU and I worked together in Darfur, not only out there in the field all the time, not only through common AU-UN peacekeeping , but also after we finished our period together, when we first went to Addis Ababa, to the Peace and Security Council, and then we went to New York to the Security Council to report. This was one example of how we could work together.

However, a word of caution. I think the regional organisations have an important role, and a growing role, but there is always something that we have to analyse, and that is to what degree there is a risk that regional actors are part of the conflict. It's easier that a regional organisation gets involved in such a way that it is perceived as a party to the conflict. Unfortunately that has happened also to the UN recently, which is deeply saddening. We should definitely move along the lines that I was trying to say earlier: division of labour and shared responsibility.

Just one word about women and Resolution 1325. I agree with you, it's really strange, I don't know whether you Lakhdar, Martti, or Francis, ever have negotiated with a woman on the other side. I have never done so. It's incredible. In all the conflicts I've been involved, six of them, I haven't been negotiating with women. But we have tried always to have women in our own delegation of course. Salim Salim and I invited 25 representatives of civil society to the Darfur negotiations when they started in November. This wasn't very well received by some, and some of the civil society representatives were not welcome when they got back. But they came, so at least we conveyed the message.

Henning Melber: I think the dilemma is also that in most cases you negotiate with perpetrators and not with victims, which might be wrong, but that's the situation, and negotiating with perpetrators means almost exclusively negotiating with men.

Lena Ag: Yes, it's true. I mean we are not naïve, of course: it is with the perpetrators and the warring partners and so on. But there are also different steps in peace negotiations where you can broaden out, because it's a matter for everyone basically. Can I make one point? Because I think Jan raised the issue of water with the glass very well, and you talked about the lack of clean water and actually the lack of toilets. You know, I think that sometimes we need putting a gender perspective on issues.

Marie Tuma and Francis Deng.

Let me take now the example of toilets and put kind of my gendered glasses on. You can see in countries that maybe don't have access to toilets, men lining up along the roadways. Women don't do that. Women have to wait for darkness to fall in order for them to be able to go out. And they then maybe also risk being molested and sexually abused, and this actually happens. Furthermore, the lack of proper toilets actually has an impact on education for girls. When you have your menstruation, your period, you maybe just don't go to school. It actually results in you keeping your girls at home. That is putting a gender perspective on issues, and if we don't do that we miss out important pieces of information for us to do the right thing, that is my point.

Lakhdar Brahimi: I agree with Jan that Chapter 6 should be used much more than it is. But another article that is not used as much as it was by Hammarskjöld is Article 99. The Secretary-General has duties and rights that can make a very significant difference if they are used forcefully the way Hammarskjöld did. On Liberia, Jan, the problem is not a question of how we share responsibility between the regional organisation and the UN. For a very long time, the UN refused to look. The UN was not allowed to look at Liberia, and Liberia contaminated the whole region under our own eyes. And ECOWAS, all credit to them, agreed to go there with very meagre resources, and they didn't make a very big impact. So there is a very big lesson there, when we speak about prevention.

We should listen to the countries that are around the place like Liberia, tiny little places. The tendency was that what happens in Liberia is too bad, but it's not terribly important. Same thing by the way in Afghanistan: far away country, if these people want to kill one another, it's too bad, but it's somehow alright. And you've seen what has happened.

Now just to make myself a little bit unpopular, you know, when I was in Afghanistan, your very good friend Sima Samar *(looks at Lena Ag)* was the minister of women's affairs. One day she came and said: can you please help me, these European ministers for women affairs, or whatever other affairs they come from, each one of them arrives here and before leaving says, you know I have an advisor for you, she will stay here to advise you on women's affairs. So she ended up with five, six, seven women advisors from European countries, who knew nothing about Afghanistan, and she didn't know what to do with them. This is not the best way to promote gender issues in countries like Afghanistan or elsewhere. I think we should really listen to the likes of Sima Samar, see what their real needs are and help them to do the job. Now, one organisation, as I told you earlier, a sister organisation of yours, Women

to Women America, sent a very young woman to Afghanistan. She had very modest means, but she immediately hired about six or seven Afghan women, and in one year we had a very effective young organisation, Women to Women Afghanistan, doing very well. When this young woman left Afghanistan she left behind something functioning. That is much better than having six very nice advisors from Sweden and elsewhere advising Sima Samar in Afghanistan.

Martti Ahtisaari: Two points, one based on my experience in 1999 when I was involved in trying to end NATO's bombing in Kosovo and Serbia and the ICC. Kofi Annan called me one day and said that he had been informed by the court that Milosevic would be indicted, and of course we were just planning our trip to Belgrade, to get Milosevic's approval for the plan which we had worked out. We became rather desperate that this was not terribly helpful, but we went. Milosevic knew of course of the indictment, because the announcement was made public. He never raised this issue when we were there negotiating. And we got his approval for our plan. Of course we couldn't have interfered with the courts. Politicians or negotiators have no rol, and should not have touched the court at all, as it was an independent legal authority. But many times afterwards I thought, thank God that the decision was made before. Had it been done after we had been there, Milosevic would have said, why on earth did I approve this, and look what the court has done? So, sometimes we are lucky.

On women in negotiating teams: There are many reasons why women are not on the negotiations teams. I wanted to have somebody who was my colleague in the Namibia operation. I turned to her, because I pick my colleagues very carefully, they have to be the best I can lay my hands on, and she was one of those. She was told by her department in the UN that if she went she could look somewhere else for employment when she returned. When we discussed what we should do, I said you stay in New York, because I don't want to destroy your career in the UN. So sometimes there are different reasons. As a negotiator, I have no authority to influence what is on the other side of the table. It's none of my business who comes from the other side.

What I could do in the case of Kosovo was that whenever I went to Pristina, I saw the women's organisations. They could come, both Serbian speaking and Albanians in Pristina. They could come to the same conference and had no difficulties. They had different views of matters, but we would always see them together with each other, and we did it every time I was there, so we could hear what they had to say on the peace process. So you have ways and means and you are not totally

isolated from women in the peace process. When the peace is signed, then it's extremely important to reinforce the women's organisations in a civil society, because without them I think the peacemaking side is weak. When you have signed the peace agreement, then the real work starts.

My office was involved in Aceh when we made the peace on 15 August 2005. We remain involved up until today in Aceh and Indonesia. I hope that we are out of there this summer. There are still human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission that should be established according to the peace agreement. But I sometimes have a feeling that neither side wants these bodies, because they think that they will end up in court on both sides. They could use the other human rights court in the next region, so that people aren't prevented from going there. But there are sometimes complications that are not dependent on a mediator or outside forces. So you have to keep trying, or then allow informal processes to move forward, but these are not formal bodies.

Francis Deng: The only thing I would like to add relates to regional and sub-regional organisations. From my own experience, a country like the Sudan was extremely sensitive about internal displacement. It was one of the worst cases in the world but with a foreign minister who was sympathetic to my approach. He said, you know people feel targeted if you pick one country, but if we act as a region, then we feel that we're all in the same boat. And we are willing to host a meeting of the IGAD countries in order to deal with this issue of internal displacement. And remarkably, a country that was so sensitive organised a very effective sub-regional organisation meeting to deal with internal displacement and to adopt the guiding principles on internal displacement that they had been very sensitive about.

On the other hand, we have to realise that with the pluses of sub-regional, regional approaches, there is a downside that might have to do with the capacity or lack of capacity or the relations among the members of the region. And depending on the timing and how together they are, these internal relations can in fact interfere with progress. That's why IGAD was the first to initiate the peace process in the Sudan, but they became so divided that it became dysfunctional and had to then bring in external partners. So I think what we have to always think of is how much can we build on the legitimacy of sub-regional, regional approaches, and the capacity of external actors like the UN to have some collaboration.

If I may just add also, perceptions are so important. I remember going to an African country where the prime minister said to me, you know when we heard you were coming with the title of genocide prevention, we worried that you might think that we have genocide in this country. But given the way you have explained it as a challenge of how we manage diversity in a constructive way – yes we do have problems, and we need the UN to come and help us. We have problems of diversity relating to region, ethnicity, religion and we need help. The same when I went to the Asian region, I was told that these people are extremely sensitive about issues of sovereignty, but when I talked to them, again, there was tremendous response, it resonated with them.

I've been very impressed with this discussion here, that there seems to be such a strong support for R2P. Unfortunately, in New York we have both, support and resistance. In a sense, Libya gives some of the supporters of R2P the feeling that now, at long last, R2P is being implemented at all levels. But then others say: you see we told you R2P is intervention, and therefore Syria is now confronting a reverse situation. So I think it is very important for us in a sense to dispel the fact that R2P means third pillar and intervention, and to emphasise that there are two pillars that have to do with engaging governments and that even the third pillar has diplomatic intercession, different degrees of sanctions and as a measure of last resort, military intervention. Military intervention cannot be dismissed, but we have to make sure that we focus our energies on engaging governments early on, going back to prevention.

Questions from the audience:

1) With the abundance of weapons and the international arms trade, any conflicts, even small ones, could become so much worse. Your comments, please.

2) I just wanted to find out from the wise men, there is one concept you keep mentioning, and I think it is more pronounced in the corridors of the UN, which is the international community. Do you think there is a consensus on the definition of this concept of international community? In Libya it meant there was intervention by NATO, but it was the opposite in Bahrain, both in the name of the international community.

3) I would like to direct my question to President Ahtisaari: what can we do in Syria now? Is it always Russia and China we have to accept? Is it always China and Russia that are against us?

Martti Ahtisaari: Arms are all over, and they are available everywhere, so it becomes extremely difficult. One is very lucky, like we were in Aceh negotiations, when the Free Aceh Movement, which had been fighting for independence and then accepted special autonomy, mentioned how many arms they were going to hand over to us. We had to check this with the Indonesian government, and they accepted this was a fair number because the tsunami had hit Aceh so badly that 170,000 people had died and a lot of arms had been destroyed. And then in an open field, everyone could see those arms, the numbers, which we knew, were destroyed. So it can be done, but that simply means that both parties wanted peace. No mediator can negotiate peace if the parties don't want it. So that's why we have to give credit to the parties. We can, as mediators, facilitate these processes, but if the parties don't want peace, there's nothing we can do.

It was implied that the Chinese and Russians are always the troublemakers. That is not true. I give you an example from the Namibia negotiations. It was strongly criticised that the US demanded that Cuban troops would have to leave Angola. It actually broke the Western Five group, but Americans insisted, because that was the only way to get the South Africans out of Angola and stop the fighting between the two countries and also get them into their bases in Namibia. Russia supported this. I very often called this group of countries composed of Angolans, Cubans, Russians, South Africans, Americans and the representative of the UN an unholy alliance, but it worked. Everyone wanted to settle Namibian issues and for us to go to Namibia and supervise it.

If you now look at the Syrian situation, yes, these two countries vetoed the resolution. But as we move forward, I would not exclude a Security Council resolution demanding the possibility to give humanitarian assistance and that everyone accepts it. I would not even exclude that all permanent members on the Council agree on what the end game in Syria should be. Then starts the real work. And I don't envy Kofi Annan, I raise my hat to him that he accepted this task as mediator. But I don't think there's anyone better than him, because he did a remarkable thing in Kenya. It's a different situation, and an extremely complicated one as well. So if the end game is clear, then you can start thinking, how can we get there? Because there are enough complications even if you have an agreement on that with the Arab League and the permanent members.

Francis Deng: On the question of the international community: Increasingly people have been asking the question, what is this international community, who is the international community? Frankly, while the question is a valid one, I think there can be no doubt that when internal situations necessitate external involvement, obviously the external world is what we mean by the international community. But I think there's a legitimate question here.

If the international community does not act, then it is partly because the Security Council is divided internally for a variety of reasons. Almost every culprit out there has some friend within the Security Council to protect them. If the Security Council cannot act, should we just leave the situation and say the international community is incapacitated? Or should we accept that a few strongly motivated countries may decide to do something about it – a coalition of the willing. I know that this is a very controversial issue because it leads sometimes to bilateral or core countries acting under the mantle of multilateral inclusive UN action. But the question can generally be raised: if you have a lot of suffering, people are dying, and the Security Council is not able to act, can we not conceive of the possibility that a strongly morally motivated number of countries that have the capacity may do something about it, or is this to be totally ruled out? I'd be interested in my colleagues here responding to that.

Henning Melber: I'm afraid you have opened a can of worms that we cannot deal with on the stage. Maybe we can discuss this afterwards between us, but unfortunately not in front of the audience.

Lakhdar Brahimi: I'm going to say something on the definition of the international community. When you are speaking about conflict, my

definition of the international community is that it is the countries that have an interest in that situation. In Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is much more important than Canada and Mexico, even though they are part of the international community. What they do is something else.

The second thing is the arms trade. A lot of countries are guilty of that, and I think many European countries are guilty of that, because a lot of arms come from Europe and then are on the open market. That is a very serious one. In Africa it's very cheap to get small arms, and it's not cannons or nuclear weapons that do damage, it is small arms, Kalashnikovs and handguns.

The third thing about China and Russia, you know, the system works with five permanent members who have a veto, but over the last few years it has almost become accepted norm that the only country that is allowed to use the veto is one of the five, not the other four, and that is why that one is now absolutely furious that Russia and China dare to use the veto. They call it obscene and all kinds of words that two countries can stop 13 countries from acting. They have forgotten that a few months ago one country stopped 14 countries from acting. So that is the principle of it: as long as we have this system of five members, I think it is acceptable that even China and Russia and especially if the two of them act together, use the veto. Whether they were right in using it in the case of Syria is a different matter. Although on Syria, I think, the sad aspect of this conflict situation is that practically everybody goes to these situations with two agendas, or one agenda and a half. So the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese, their agenda is an American agenda, a Russian agenda, a Chinese agenda, while the half agenda is the Syrian agenda. And this is where the UN has a huge benefit and a moral position. This is where Article 99 is important: when the Secretary-General goes somewhere, he should have absolutely no agenda except the interest of the country he is asked to help. When I'm in Afghanistan to represent the UN, I don't care about Pakistan, or about Iran or about the United States: my job is to help the people of Afghanistan.

Question: What about the role of the Nordic countries. Is there a Nordic profile and policy?

Martti Ahtisaari: First of all, if you allow me to say to Francis, sometimes it's not when the Security Council can't act that the countries do something. Sometimes the countries who have a problem don't want to internationalise it and they ask a non-governmental organisation. This is what happened when our organisation, CMI, was asked to help in

the Aceh negotiations, because they had had enough of the UN in East Timor already. So I informed the Secretary-General and he was helpful in those negotiations.

To answer your question: if you look at the world today and with all the comparisons between the countries in the world, the Nordic countries, all of them, whatever criteria you use, are always among the ten best in the world. We are an elite group. I said in one meeting and I'm repeating it today, we don't need raw capitalism, we don't need socialism, we need a responsible market economy, the type of system that we have in the Nordic countries. We need egalitarian policies in the world. And I think we Nordics have been very savvy in telling that to the whole world. I would like to tell the Russians and Chinese, don't look over the Atlantic at what is happening in America, come and see the Nordic countries and the system we have.

Jan Eliasson: On the veto powers, I think we need to develop what I would call a veto-free culture. The veto should more or less be seen as a failure. Because this means that the Security Council has not negotiated to the degree necessary. Far too often the threat of the veto is stopping processes. As an ideal scenario, particularly to take into account the fact that the whole continent of Africa doesn't have a seat on the Council and that there's a discussion of legitimacy of the Security Council, I think the veto-wielding powers should be thinking about their responsibility not to wield that veto lightly and unnecessarily.

My last comment is on the international community and the responsibility to protect. I was part of the negotiations of that formula in the 2005 document. Responsibility to protect means that sovereignty is such a precious thing that you must see to it that you protect your own population. Such a responsibility enhances sovereignty. And if countries fail to protect their own population, then the international community has a responsibility to act. There were those who insisted, and I agreed with them, that this responsibility for the international community had to be done on a collective basis.

No individual nation can use responsibility to protect for its own actions, because the text refers to a collective basis. However, the UN Security Council can give a mandate to a regional organisation. The reason I'm still doubtful about coalitions of the willing, Francis, is that if you choose a group of countries you also delegate the important issue of use of force. This is a huge dilemma. When you see the disasters you ask yourself, why doesn't solidarity come out stronger than sovereignty? But I still would be hesitant to have an alliance of countries assume that right. But maybe we should discuss it later and you may try to convince me.

Henning Melber: Before I thank the persons on stage, I would like to thank those invisible ones, the handful that make up the secretariat of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, because if they were not there, we wouldn't be sitting here. And the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation most likely would not have been established 50 years ago if it hadn't been for, among other things, the Dag Hammarskjöld *minnespenning*. That was a remarkable initiative by the Swedish people, the *svenska folket*, that a coin specially minted was sold within weeks of Hammarskjöld's death for, at that time, 10 Swedish kronor. This is the first time, 50 years later – if you ignore the odd announcement on eBay – that this coin is being brought back into circulation. In thanking the seven of you, I am giving each of you one of these *pennings*. And for all of you who envy them, I have good news. Because we have a few boxes of them tucked away somewhere, we also decided that we would release them after 50 years. Ten kronor in 1961 would be 107 kronor today. Now this is your chance, this is the bargain of your life. On your way out you can purchase one of them for just 100 kronor. And you will support the next 50 years of the Foundation. Thank you all!

Notes on Contributors

Lena Ag is the co-founder and, since 2007, the secretary-general of *Kvinna till Kvinna* in Stockholm. This foundation supports women in conflict regions and was the winner of the Right Livelihood Award in 2002. It collaborates with women's organisations that play an active part in peace and rebuilding processes.

Martti Ahtisaari was elected as president of the Republic of Finland in 1994 after a distinguished career with the United Nations and the Finnish foreign ministry. He has subsequently undertaken several further international missions in international peace mediation. Between 2005 and 2008, President Ahtisaari acted as the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General regarding the future status of Kosovo and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2008. He is the chairman of the board of Crisis Management Initiative, an NGO he founded after his presidency. President Ahtisaari gave the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2008.

Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. She has for many years been a writer, analyst and activist on Middle Eastern and UN issues. In 2001, she helped found and remains a member of the steering committee of the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation. She works closely with the United for Peace and Justice anti-war coalition.

Lakhdar Brahimi was ambassador and foreign minister of Algeria. He served as special representative/envoy and special advisor to the UN Secretary-General. He chaired the panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which released the so-called Brahimi Report and is a member of The Elders, a group of elder statesmen created on the initiative of Nelson Mandela and chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. He delivered the Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2002.

Birgitta Dahl, former Speaker of parliament and Swedish minister of the environment and energy, chair of the high level advisory board for sustainable development to the Secretary-General, senior advisor to the global environment facility and member of the panel of eminent persons on United Nations-civil society relations. She was administrative secretary of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (1965–68).

Francis Deng was ambassador and foreign minister of the Sudan. As a distinguished scholar, he has been affiliated with numerous universities and research institutions and has served as representative of the UN Secretary-General on internally displaced persons. Since 2007, he has been an Under Secretary-General the special advisor on the prevention of genocide. He delivered the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2010.

Jan Eliasson is the UN Deputy Secretary-General. He has been permanent representative to the UN, state secretary for foreign affairs, ambassador and foreign minister of Sweden. He was also the president of the 60th UN General Assembly, the first UN Under Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs, a special representative of the UN Secretary-General and special envoy to Darfur. He presented the annual Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture in 2011.

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Henning Melber was executive director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (2006-12), where he continues to serve as senior advisor. He was director of the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) in Windhoek (1992-2000) and research director at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala (2000-06). He is an extraordinary professor in the Department of Political Sciences of the University of Pretoria.

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The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation celebrated its first half-century on 2 March 2012. Its history is also a narrative of commitment to global solidarity and justice. This volume presents a series of portraits of the Foundation as it emerged over the past 50 years as an ideas-based organisation seeking to promote anti-hegemonic discourses and paradigms in support of democracy, security and human rights. The contributions reflect different perspectives on the Foundation's unfolding institutional profile, activities and development. In so doing, they document and celebrate various initiatives to keep the values and legacy of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations alive by applying them to contemporary issues.

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development dialogue is published by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Copies may be downloaded or obtained from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Övre Slottsgatan 2, SE-753 10 Uppsala, Sweden, fax: +46-18-12 20 72, email: secretariat@dhf.uu.se website: www.dhf.uu.se

ISBN: 978-91-85214-68-6

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation