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## Towards a Second Liberation Africa and the World Crisis

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The publication of this issue of *Development Dialogue* has been delayed for reasons beyond the control of the editors. Most of the material was sent to the printer in the autumn of 1987. The delay in the production process has, however, allowed us to include Mrs Chandra Hardy's paper on 'The Prospects for Growth and Structural Change in Southern Africa', which was submitted in March 1988.

*Editorial*

# Towards a Second Liberation: Africa and the World Crisis

'Nations emerging from long foreign rule generally lack an independent administrative tradition and a social structure within which it is easy to build a class of national administrators . . . It is true that in some of the countries concerned, the former administering authority has bequeathed a valuable legacy in the form of an efficient administrative apparatus and sizeable cadres of experienced local officials at many levels. But this is by no means generally so. Even where it is, it does not meet the needs of peoples whose awakening has stirred much deeper feelings of hope and endeavor than were felt under the most enlightened colonial regime.'

These reflections by Dag Hammarskjöld—in a paper published in 1956—testify to the interest that the late Secretary-General of the United Nations took in the emerging nations of the Third World and their future statehood. And it is perhaps significant that they were made at a time when Africa, the last of the Third World continents to be gripped by the drive for independence, began to explore in an exuberant mood the parameters for self-determination. Having been born into a world characterized by an almost unshakeable belief in 'economic growth' and 'progress', Africa's first steps towards *uhuru* were inevitably influenced by the spirit of 'development' that had seized the rest of the world. Compared to Asia and Latin America, Africa was viewed as having a special opportunity of making rapid and steady 'progress' because it lacked the oppressive social structures and cultural impediments believed to exist on the other two continents.

In this climate, the temptation for African leaders to ignore the past and treat their societies as 'clean slates' was understandably great. Often trained in universities in the North, they wanted their countries to catch up with the rest of the world as quickly as possible and without the pains and strains that had accompanied the 'march of progress' elsewhere. Against this background, it is not surprising that the first decades of independence have been a period of endless imitation and experimentation. Applying pet notions from both East and West with a view to bringing Africa into the mainstream of economic development, the continent was treated much like an empty box.

The timespan of a generation later, it is now clear that it was an imaginary expectation that the transfer of power from imperial nations to sovereign African states would usher in a new era and lead to an upliftment in the living standards of the masses of the people and a combination of effective and democratic government. 'Progress' in the sense outlined above has been much harder to achieve than was held out thirty years ago and today Africa—and the rest of the world—are faced with a steadily increasing maldevelopment, i.e. with the costly legacies of the efforts to find shortcuts to 'progress'. Rather than being closer to the industrialized world, it is further away, rather than being more self-reliant, it is more dependent, and rather than being more stable it is more volatile and conflict-ridden.

Much has in recent years been written about the scope of the economic crisis in Africa, highlighted by the fact that with a population growth of approximately 3 per cent per year, Africa managed only a 2 per cent increase in food production during the 1960s and 1970s, the net-effect being that food production at the beginning of this decade was only four-fifths of the 1961 level. Since then—excepting the encouraging new trends reported by Pierre Pradervand in *IFDA dossier 64*—the situation has deteriorated even further, famine having become the most common symbol of African life to the external world, replacing other historically entrenched stereotypes. But it should be emphasized that this is a new and dangerous stereotype, marketed in the industrialized countries by the western media and promoted by many non-governmental organizations in well-intentioned campaigns.

The negative implications of this have recently been highlighted in a report, *The Image of Africa*, from Action for Development: The Freedom from Hunger Campaign of the FAO, which, *inter alia*, points out that the quality of the reporting has not been as satisfactory as the quantity and that the

prevailing image of Africa has been that of 'a continent in permanent need of assistance, of salvation from outside', the Africans having been reduced 'to a level of consumer apprentices incapable of analysing their own problems or becoming the protagonists of their own development.'

The agrarian malaise of Africa extends also to the export sector and has as a consequence led to a steady decline in Africa's share of world trade in commodities like coffee, cocoa, tea and sugar—a decline that is likely to be even sharper when the full impact of the new biotechnologies begins to hit the continent in a not too distant future. The decline in export earnings and the need to spend foreign exchange on the import of grains has we furthermore curtailed imports necessary for the maintenance of the industrial sector. As a result, most of Africa's industries today operate below 50 per cent of their capacities and in many countries have been forced to close down completely.

At well over 200 billion USD, the total foreign debt of the member states of the Organization of African Unity does not exceed that of Brazil and Mexico together, but in the specific case of each country the size of the debt already imposes intolerable debt service charges on these states; relative to the income level of its people Africa's debt is the highest in the world. Africa's debt ratio (the average ratio of debt repayments to exports) has also more than doubled from 15.2 per cent in 1980 to 33.2 per cent in 1987. Thus, debt service payments have increased faster than actual resource flows to Africa and debt service obligations have grown to such excessive levels that hardly any balance remains to finance investment requirements.

These shortcomings in economic and social performance in Africa over the past decades are the results not only of the misconceptions of development indicated above but also symptomatic of an institutional crisis, which has not been given the attention it deserves. Public sector institutions created in the optimistic years after independence have found difficulty in adapting to a situation requiring restraint and belt-tightening. Although this problem is not uniquely African, it is particularly pertinent there because of the dominant position taken by the state in development and the weakness of other institutions in society.

This state-centred approach is at least in part a colonial legacy. Created quite arbitrarily by the colonial powers to respond to their own interests, the modern state in Africa was set up with little or no regard for the ethnic, linguistic, economic or geographic features of the continent. Nor was it created with a view to encouraging political participation and accountability. 'Development' in colonial days was largely controlled by a class of colonial civil servants. For reasons of political control, the colonial authorities were reluctant to promote the establishment of associations outside the immediate tutelage of the state.

Independent Africa inherited this legacy. Initially, as long as government involvement in public affairs and development was relatively limited, the problem was manageable. As the demand for social change accelerated, however, and foreign donors increased their contributions, state participation in development grew rapidly, in some cases almost indiscriminately. The weakness of the private and voluntary sectors were used as excuse for the rapid growth of state involvement in both social and economic development. There was a strong belief—as indicated in the introductory quotation from Dag Hammarskjöld—that through manpower development programmes, institutional shortcomings could be overcome.

Today it is increasingly clear that Africa's problem is not primarily a lack of talent and know-how but the institutional imbalance created in decades past, both prior to and after independence. The excessive, in some cases single-minded, reliance on the state as the principal mechanism of change and development has left most African countries in a corner, from which they have great difficulties extricating themselves.

This combination of artificiality and predominance has placed great strains on governance. Although an African state was a juridical reality in international law, it was not necessarily at the time of independence an empirical reality in national fact. Independence therefore opened a gap between the international legitimacy and the internal marginality of many emergent African countries. The gap often presented a real political dilemma to the new African leaders; they usually could retain European officials only by compromising their national independence and could dispense with them only at the risk of undermining governmental performance. Because of the fragile empirical reality of the African state, power also tended to become highly personalized. Against this background, it is not surprising that the greatest threats to political stability in Africa have come from internal rather than external forces, which is not to deny that external forces have played and continue to play a sinister role in the power politics of many African countries. Illustrative of this whole problematique is the fact that there have been over 150 attempts to overthrow incumbent governments by force in Africa since 1960, a good number of which have been successful. An important reason for this is that personalization and monopolization of power, stemming from the empirical predicament of African statehood, has limited the scope for power sharing and thus forces opponents of incumbent rulers to resort to force.

It was with a view to throwing light on these issues that the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Dag Hammarskjöld in the plane crash at Ndola, asked the Tanzanian publisher Walter Bgoya and the Swedish professor Göran Hydén to organize a small seminar on 'The State and the Crisis in Africa: In Search of a Second Liberation'. The seminar, which is extensively reported upon in this issue of *Development Dialogue*, differed from other meetings on the African crisis in that it gave an exclusive priority to the articulation of an African as opposed to a First World perspective on trends and events in Africa emphasizing the often neglected historical dimension. The objectives of the seminars were to:

- critically and self-critically analyse past development experiences in Africa;
- encourage the emergence of a new alternative African perspective on future developments in the continent;
- identify ways and means of more effectively tapping Africa's largely under-utilized or poorly utilized potential;
- redefine the role of the state in African development and its relation to groups and institutions in society.

The main results of the seminar are presented in the following report, which in a highly readable and pedagogical form opens up the whole issue of 'The State and the Crisis in Africa' for discussion. No attempt shall be made here to summarize the main points made by the African seminar participants in this 'collective reflection' but they all testify to a much deeper historical and intellectual understanding of the issue than was available to Dag Hammarskjöld thirty years ago and to the seriousness and commitment of African scholars and policy-makers in their search not only for short-term solutions to today's economic problems but also for a Second Liberation and, indeed, for Another Development. And it is not surprising that in this search, great importance is attached to 'the Third System', i.e. the people's own organizations that are now emerging as forces of development alongside the two other power groups, the state, which has demonstrated both superpotency and impotence, and the commercial system. As Ernst Michanek pointed out in *Development Dialogue* 1985:1, this Third System of diversified grass-roots movements represents, not least due to the fact that the young

public education system has produced a base of knowledge and conscience in an enormously numerous new generation of youth, 'a power of liberation and development that is now demanding an opportunity to show its strength and ability'.

But while scholars and policy-makers in many independent African states can engage in the struggle for a Second Liberation and Another Development, the members of the Southern Africa Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) are finding themselves in a more difficult situation being under the constant threat of repressive military action and economic destabilization measures by their white neighbour. We are therefore happy to be able to publish in this issue of *Development Dialogue* Mrs Chandra Hardy's remarkable study of 'The Prospects for Growth and Structural Change in Southern Africa'.

In her introduction, Chandra Hardy describes the growing economic problems of South Africa, which she characterizes as 'a weakening giant'. Of special interest in this section is the information she provides on the economic benefits South Africa derives from its trade with the SADCC countries—net earnings from this trade during the past decade have amounted to roughly 10 billion USD—and the arguments she advances in support of the effectiveness of international economic sanctions by showing how even the limited sanctions now applied contribute to increasing the costs of maintaining the policy of apartheid.

The second major part of her paper analyses the dependence and vulnerability of the SADCC countries and the effects of the South African policy of destabilization. The magnitude of the latter problem is evident from the fact that the economic cost of destabilization exceeds the total of all foreign loans and grants made to the SADCC countries between 1980 and 1984. Moreover, the annual costs have been rising from less than 1 billion USD in 1980 to an estimated 4 billion USD in 1985.

The third and concluding part of Chandra Hardy's paper formulates under the heading 'Towards collective self-reliance' a number of priorities in response to the worsening crisis in the region. Thus, the SADCC countries need to increase food production, to rehabilitate alternative access routes to the sea, to have an emergency programme in place in cases where miners are expelled, to rehabilitate their manufacturing sectors and to foster stronger interregional ties.

In this daunting task—which has been further elaborated in the Maseru Declaration and the Agenda for Action arising from the Maseru seminars on 'Another Development for SADCC' and 'Another Development for Lesotho'—the international donor community can play an extremely important role provided that the challenges are properly understood and provided that bilateral donors and international aid agencies do not shy away from innovative approaches and can show the flexibility required by the situation, which constitutes not only an African crisis but a world crisis.

# The State and the Crisis in Africa

## In Search of a Second Liberation

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*In commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's death at Ndola, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation organized a seminar on 'The State and the Crisis in Africa: In Search of a Second Liberation', which took place from September 15–19, 1986, at the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre in Uppsala.*


*The purpose of the seminar was to provide a platform for a cross-section of African thinkers and decision-makers to discuss alternative development strategies for the continent's future. It differed from other meetings on the African crisis in two important respects. First, it gave exclusive priority to the articulation of an African as opposed to a First World perspective on the course of events in Africa by providing an opportunity for concerned Africans to deliberate among themselves on ways and means of reversing the trend towards disillusion and cynicism on the continent. Second, it encouraged a discussion of the state and the crisis in Africa that went beyond the conventional parameters in official African and First World circles. Thus, the seminar was intended to be an occasion at which the participants, in their personal capacity, would be free to 'think the unthinkable' and engage in a frank discussion about the current, depressing state of affairs in Africa, why it emerged and how it might be reversed.*

*The seminar gathered 14 participants and was directed by Mr Walter Bgoya, Managing Director of the Tanzania Publishing House, and Professor Göran Hydén. It was organized in such a way that each seminar session began with an introduction of the relevant papers by their authors, the papers having been grouped in order of presentation according to the analytical scheme serving as the basis for the programme, i.e. the sovereignty, accountability and delivery dimensions of the state in Africa as seen against the pre-colonial and colonial past. As the seminar discussions progressed, the views of the participants converged more and more until there was a consensus on the point that the African state generally speaking was 'besieged, set apart and overloaded' and that this had deep historical reasons.*

*The historical perspective was given in two papers, one by Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo on 'The Pre-colonial State and Society' and one by Professor Wamba Dia Wamba on 'The Colonial State and Its Legacy'.*

*On the sovereignty dimension—'the besieged state'—introductions were given by Dr Francis M. Deng (on territorial integrity), and by Dr Jumanne Wagao and Mrs Chandra Hardy (on constraints imposed by international finance).*

*On the accountability dimension—'the state set apart'—introductions were given by Professor Peter Ekeh (on public finance), Mr Chango Machyo, Minister of Water and Mineral Development, Uganda (on state formation), Mr Bidandi Ssali, Minister of Labour, Uganda (on political rights), and Dr Amandina Lihamba (on participatory pluralism).*



*On the delivery dimension—‘the overloaded state’—finally, introductions were given by Mr A.M. Babu (on the state as economic entrepreneur), and Dr Kimpianga Mahaniah (on managing and sustaining social development).*

*At the end of the seminar, it was generally agreed that the work initiated in Uppsala should be developed further on the basis of a revision of the papers submitted and on the basis of a number of additional specially commissioned papers. This work is now in progress and will in due course be made available to the readers of Development Dialogue.*

*The following report on the seminar discussions by the seminar directors, Walter Bgoya and Göran Hydén, represents the broad consensus of the participants, though none of them necessarily agrees with all the points in the analysis or recommendations. It should also be noted that the participants attended in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of the organizations or governments to which they belong.*

**The crisis in Africa  
is a crisis of the  
state**

The present crisis in Africa is largely an institutional crisis. In particular, it is a crisis of the state. The dilemma facing the African state is that because it was inherited, in many instances just like an empty shell from the colonial powers, the African leaders, in filling this lacuna, have been forced to devote prime attention to defining or redefining power relations while simultaneously being asked to implement often ill-conceived, usually donor-funded, development programmes and projects with unrealistic time horizons. In this situation, it is not surprising that short-term considerations have taken precedence over long-term ones, power over welfare, personal over institutional considerations, and security over development.

But in a situation where not only human welfare but also human life is increasingly at stake on the continent, how much longer can Africa afford to be caught in these contradictions? What are the options for getting out of the present predicament? How can African statehood be enhanced and development accelerated in a parallel fashion?

These are questions that increasingly preoccupy policy-makers both in and outside Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action and subsequent statements adopted by the African Heads of State (including the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery) are indicative of this concern at governmental levels in Africa. They also feature on the agenda of the growing community of non-governmental organizations, African or international, involved in African development matters. Even many donor agencies are taking a second look at what they have been doing in Africa.

While all these efforts are encouraging it is not clear whether the full dimensions of the crisis are realized. There is still a widely held belief that with more money and better techniques, Africa's problems will be solved. But such a 'business as usual' recipe is the surest road to disaster at a time when old relations between ends and means don't hold; action frustrates its own intentions; and new purposes flounder for want of understanding and knowledge. At the same time, it is clear that it is easy to describe the problems in Africa and preach large changes of heart, yet neither description nor exhortation suffices at this time. More respect for the African voice, independent analysis, more frequent dialogue and interaction, and an extension of the number of actors involved in thinking and deciding about public matters are some of the means that need to be considered in the present situation.

In a holistic perspective, the crisis facing the African state today centres on its role as (1) actor in the international arena—the *sovereignty* dimension—(2) determinant of power relations in society—the *accountability* dimension—and (3) executor of policy—the *delivery* dimension. The problematic condition affecting the African state with regard to these three dimensions is that as actor in the international arena it is *besieged*, in its relation to society it is *set apart*, and as executor of policy it is *overloaded*.

In analysing constraints and opportunities to resolve the present contradictions, the seminar participants considered the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial legacies assuming that each contained elements of significance to the present challenge. Out of this analysis grew the rationale for a new perspective.

**The pre-colonial  
legacy**

One of the pernicious effects of colonialism was to implant, notably among the educated, the racist idea that Africa had neither history nor culture or, at best, that if there was one it was of no relevance today. The idea of colonialism as a 'civilizing mission' and the policies colonial powers pursued were calculated to destroy African resistance and to justify the brutality that would not normally be meted out on human beings.

While the need to study Africa's history should not naturally be motivated by an idealism designed to counter colonialist myths by other myths—such as glorifying everything in Africa's past—it should, however, as in all countries, be studied and made to serve objectively and subjectively the present and the future. On this premise the participants analysed Africa's pre-colonial political institutions and arrived at a number of conclusions.

*State and stateless  
societies*

Before colonization African societies were not organized in 'states' in the modern sense. Centralization of power and bureaucratization—two important attributes of the state—had not developed in Africa or they were only at the most embryonic stages. Some of the reasons for this were the rarity of writing, the non-existence of wheeled vehicles which, by limiting long distance travel, limited centralization, the late arrival of fire arms, which prevented state absolutism until recent times, the absence in large parts of Africa of religions with ambitions of universality and the rarity of a unifying language.

This broad generalization of the pre-colonial situation in Africa, should not by any means imply that family and kinship systems were the only social and political structures of importance in this period. The development of productive forces and social formations five centuries ago, in key areas such as iron and copper smelting, cloth manufacturing, leather tanning and dyeing, as well as in trade in these items, was unevenly distributed across the continent.

In Egypt, Nubia, the Maghreb, Ethiopia, the Western Sudan (comprising the famous empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai), the inter-lacustrine kingdoms of East Africa and Zimbabwe, elaborate political-military and economic systems, which bore important similarities with feudal societies, especially in Asia, had developed as early as a thousand years before permanent contact with Europe. But African societies did not anywhere undergo social revolutions such as those that gave rise to the capitalist revolution in Europe in the 19th century.

To the question, 'What then were the fundamental and common traits that existed in the political life of pre-colonial African societies which could be emulated today', there were the following responses. The basic principle in African political life which was ignored by subsequent systems was the socialization of political and economic power. In spite of differences between the village communities and the more centralized kingdoms in West and Central Africa dating back to the 10th century, this principle prevailed. While social differentiation existed within these classless societies, there were no contradictions which could not be resolved without the overthrow of one social stratum by another.

Although there were tyrannies, and abuses of power occurred both in state-societies and stateless societies in the pre-colonial period, there were also ideal principles which governed them.

Community interests invariably eclipsed individual rights but there also existed principles and practices for their protection. The situation was more oppressive for the women although at the same time in some parts of Africa women played important political and military roles. In Egypt, Nubia, Benin, Angola and Ethiopia, in different periods, women ruled and produced some of the legendary names in the military history of Africa.

Religious leaders as well as leaders of secret societies enjoyed privileged positions which also commanded political and economic power and led in the feudal period, for example in Ethiopia, to the widely held idea of the divineness of the rule of the so-called Solomonic line. Nevertheless, the most important postulate of the African exercise of power was the search for an equilibrium between political actors, in essence the application of three great principles:

- Limitation of power
- Sharing of power
- Rule of law

*Limitation of power*

In order to realize the first principle, power was limited by tradition and custom which also assigned roles, responsibilities and power according to age, to the place occupied in the production process and social hierarchy. It was also guaranteed by extensive freedom of expression in the context of well established and scrupulously respected codes. Indeed it was not only the liberty to speak that was given, it was an obligation to speak on behalf of those one represented (family, caste or clan). This right of expression was not without its limitations for the ordinary people, but counsellors, histor-

ians, minstrels and other dignitaries retained full right to express their opinions even if these were unpopular and critical of the rulers.

Yet, another factor limiting power in the African society was the disassociation of political power from economic power. In some societies, the Bambara for instance, the political head of a village (*teng naba*) was different from the soil (economic) chief (*teng soba*). In Buganda, one of the inter-lacustrine kingdoms, the *bataka* clan leaders were the custodians of land for their clansmen while the *kabaka* and his chiefs were the political leaders.

#### *Power sharing*

The second great principle throughout Africa was power sharing. It was always believed that the best way to keep power was to share it with as many groups as possible so that each had interest in its preservation.

In the Mossi empire in Mali, for example, the King was elected by an electoral college made up of non-nobles so that they could observe the principle of neutrality between competing members of the nobility. In some countries (Rwanda and Burundi Kingdoms) elaborate legal procedures existed in which ordinary people were chosen to serve as judges, notary public and 'ombudsmen' on the basis of their knowledge of customs and traditions and because of their personal integrity. Armed force in Africa was only mobilized for action against external enemies, or against rebellions by feudal lords against their king, while before the 18th century the professional army in other continents was first and foremost used for the conquest of domestic power rather than for defence from external enemies.

#### *Rule of law*

Finally, the African 'state' was governed by the rule of law. Law was prescribed by custom and not even the King was above it. In many African Kingdoms, the King was so subordinated to the interest of the people that when he became so old and weak as to be considered harmful to their well being, he was killed in ritual—a measure which would also be taken in case of gross violation of custom and tradition or in case of treachery. In some societies the King was merely the representative of the ancestors in whom power resided or the 'stool', descended from heaven which was the real symbol of authority.

#### **The colonial legacy**

Inquiry into the origin, nature and extent of the crisis in Africa led inevitably to the examination of the dominant institutions in the society which bear important responsibility for the perpetuation of the *status quo* and which are potentially important agents in overcoming it. It was recognized that the most fundamental reality from which the present features of the

crisis originate is the inherited colonial state, its methods of conquest, legitimation and perpetuation in the different phases of colonization. It was further recognized that far from negating the effects of the slave trade which had existed in Africa from the tenth century onwards, colonialism reinforced in many ways important effects of the slave trade particularly in the formation of primary institutions and their chance of enduring.

*Primacy of kinship*

From the tenth to the sixteenth century, Muslim trans-Saharan and trans-Indian ocean slave trade had the impact of dislocating the autonomous development of African societies and institutions. Political systems and social traditions which elsewhere in Europe and Asia provided the setting for the development of 'high cultures' and which were evident in many societies in Africa were destabilized although they were still evident and could have survived that trade. The appearance of European slave traders in the sixteenth century with more efficient weapons accelerated the pace and enlarged the extent of the slave trade. Even the most conservative estimates of the number of slaves taken from Africa, to which must be added those who died from diseases, wars and famines which accompanied that accursed trade, would still provide sufficient evidence of the devastation by and of the lingering effect of slavery. That the most sought after slaves were those in the prime of their lives, able-bodied men and women, is an often ignored significant fact in considering the demographic and economic consequences of the slave trade.

The destruction by the slave trade of the political and social formations which hitherto had provided protection of the individual led to the reinforcement of dependence on kinship systems and kin groups—the most basic units of social organization. The kinship system has remained and retained the function of being, in the absence of a state, the most valued social defense of the African individual.

Furthermore, with very few exceptions, slavery deprived Africa of the possibility of developing the feudal mode of production which in Europe and Asia encouraged political structures and social mores that gave the state primacy in the defense of individuals against external danger and in reconciling their conflicting interest. Under feudalism, submission to legitimate political authorities, and to demands as were made by those authorities, was recompensed by defense and protection of the individual and his property. Rights and duties were established and scrupulously followed and the notion of citizenship took root. Systems of demarcation between public and private interests were evolved in the long history of conquests, regrouping and domination, from small territorial units and different ethnic groups

to larger and politically and culturally more integrated societies in which traditions of leadership and accountability were perfected and firmly rooted. In Africa, by contrast, colonialism did not integrate different societies into larger and more viable systems. It set out to dominate all of them using as its most effective weapon the strategy of 'divide and rule'.

The colonial state distinguished itself by an excessive use of force. Unlike developments in Europe where the state evolved over centuries, colonialism achieved its objective in a very short time because it had the monopoly of arms. Acting without any moral restraint in its use of force, the colonial state first made war on society and thereafter used the same instruments of war to keep society under its domination.

The response by Africans, which also suited the colonial order, was the withdrawal even more deeply into pre-colonial kinship systems in which the individual was protected and fulfilled and to which he/she gave total allegiance. At the same time being so weakened these systems could not individually and separately pose any threat to the colonial order. These features of the colonial state gave rise to the following phenomena:

- State and society were set apart as were their interests.
- The state did not exist in the context of the morality of the African society and was therefore not responsible to it.
- The state was essentially in a permanent situation of war with society which in turn was in a situation of permanent resistance.
- Being amoral, the colonial state would only be dealt with amorally by the society.

Individual and collective behaviour internalized these features of relations between the colonial state and society.

*State and society set apart*

The state-society relations which developed out of the slave trade and colonialism engendered two realms in constant conflict: an amoral and ill conceived civic realm on one hand and a circumscribed community-based moral realm on the other. Attitudes towards organization, management and control of public affairs and resources reflected, and continue to reflect, this basic divergence of interests of state and society. Embezzlement of public funds and disregard for public property are to be understood in part as the defence of self and immediate family/clan against the state. By the same token family, clan or ethnic group will tax itself severely and willingly because the taxes go into a common pot for the benefit of all. In contrast, the colonial state did not take into consideration the interests of the society.

In its exploitation of labour, for example, it paid such low wages that the labourers had to fall back on their families for their livelihood on returning from mines or plantations where they were employed. In the final analysis the labour demanded of the head of the family was to enable him to pay the head tax in return for the individual's freedom and that of his family. Failure to pay the tax made him a real prisoner or permanent fugitive in hiding from the agents of the state.

Taxes were considered a punishment rather than a duty conferring on the tax payer entitlement to social benefits, human and political rights in a free society. Payment of tax did not give the payer the right to question the reason and the manner in which the taxes would be dispensed, reinforcing even further the non-accountability of the state to the individual.

An important question (described by one participant as Lumumba's dilemma) was posed in summing up the historical reality of the African state: can real liberation be carried out within the framework of the colonial state? The question was predicated on the fact that the post-colonial state—examined in the next section—carried on most of the features of the colonial state and was perceived by the citizenry to be performing the same role with more or less perfected instruments and structures.

### **The post-colonial legacy**

Africa's struggle for independence was the outcome of contradictions inherent in the colonial system itself. Having secured territorial boundaries and control of the population, the administration of the state and the organization of production imposed the need to train a small fraction of indigenous people to perform supporting roles. Education was the vehicle through which the state indoctrinated the African colonial servants into accepting as unquestionable the imperatives of the colonial state, essentially, autonomy and hegemony, inviolability and security of territory, in spite of the arbitrariness of the colonial boundaries and diversity of the population.

Where the pre-colonial African society had already advanced towards clearly defined social class formations and, in particular, where the mode of production and social relations had created ruling families/clans, the colonial state instituted 'indirect rule' in order to use them as an intermediary class between the state and the people. The sons and daughters of the 'chiefs' and chiefly clans, religious converts and traders were consequently educated into accepting the basic ideology of the colonial state.

*The post-colonial leadership*

In order to understand the nature of the post-colonial state it is important to look into the condition of the class that led the nationalist independence movement and to see, whether, given the circumstances that had nurtured it, it could bring about the results which the people expected once it took over power from the colonialists.

In the chapter on the Pitfalls of National Consciousness, Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, made the sharpest critique of the African middle classes which led the independence movement and were the architects of the post-colonial state. The educated middle classes, as has already been observed, were drawn from traditional ruling families, land owners, merchants and traders and those who accepted conversion to the religion of the colonizing power. These latter were sent to mission schools where they were taught not only to give God his due but to Caesar as well in proportions set by the mission and the colonial state respectively. Through the education they received and the place they occupied in the colonial state administration, the mostly non-productive role in the economy and its appetite for European goods and culture, the African middle classes lost all but the most superficial links with the people. In the name of the people the middle classes agitated for independence without any concrete notion of what that independence meant for them.

The middle classes—the petit bourgeoisie—were only certain of their immediate interests which were not different from those of the colonial state agents. Abolition of the most naked abuses of the colonial state—inequality of remuneration between equally trained African and European technicians, forced labour, disenfranchisement and racial discrimination in social intercourse—constituted for the petit bourgeoisie the most urgent task of the independence movement. Being numerically small and struggling against western colonial systems which originated from countries practising bourgeois democracy, it was necessary for the middle class to seek the following of the masses of the people so as to swell their numbers and to make it impossible for the colonial state to govern. Such mass following was also important in mobilizing international public opinion and especially the opinion of the progressive people in the metropolitan countries, where their pressure would play an important role in the decolonization. Unity among the people and submerging all class and ethnic differences was of the utmost strategic significance.

The petit bourgeoisie isolated, for maximum concentration, only the contradiction between imperialism and the African people irrespective of classes (the national struggle) and suppressed those other forces which

wished to make this struggle an all-out one against the local and international forces of exploitation (class struggle). The nationalist leaders in their naïvety and lack of proper understanding of the essence of imperialism could formulate such slogans as 'seek ye political independence first and all others shall be added unto ye' as if all others—economic, social and cultural liberation—could be separated and relegated to second place.

Briefly, the class that took over the state on being granted independence by the metropolitan country saw as its mission the replacement of foreign rule by African rule. Approaching the question of exploitation from a racial perspective, the nationalist government leaders legitimized local exploitation carried out by its supporters as 'fruits of independence', and explained away the increasing misery of its people resulting from, among other things, iniquitous laws of the international economic order about which they could do nothing.

The African post-colonial state was exposed to two contemporary international models—the Westminster parliamentary democracy and the Stalinist one-party absolutism—neither of which was particularly relevant to Africa and increasingly criticized even in their respective countries of origin. Trying to make sense of these models, African leaders turned democracy into mockery and allowed it to degenerate into personality cults, factors that invariably contributed to the phenomenon of the coup d'état.

### *Coups and repression*

Not surprising the coup makers always promised to honour international agreements entered into by the overthrown governments. These promises were made basically in order to assure the transnational corporations and other foreign capitalists that their interests would not be touched. The promises made to the people, on the other hand, were seldom kept. The people who always rose in support of the coup—any coup—soon found out the true colours of the coup makers. The state was hardly ever affected by the coups. When coup attempts failed, mass arrests, imprisonment and firing squads became the lot of those caught and those suspected of complicity.

When successful, coups d'état usually led to even worse orders. Not having even the legitimacy of the 'fathers of independence', or any roots among the people, the only way the new regimes could survive was through suppression of the people and physical liquidation of real and imaginary enemies.

Even where 'scientific' methods and modes of analysis were claimed the exhortations and left wing slogans were only designed to conceal the wishes

of the state for unquestioned compliance from the people. Even when the state came about as a result of armed struggle in which tremendous sacrifices were made by the fighters and the entire population, the situation was not better than in those countries where it came about through peaceful means. It was the more disappointing as expectations were high that in those states greater identification of the state and people would be painstakingly nurtured and that out of the experiences of the savage wars of national liberation the state would not betray the people's confidence. The unity that was the liberation movements' strongest weapon against the colonial power, however, did not take long to erode once independence was achieved. What were claimed as ideological differences among the leadership were often smoke-screens for struggles for power and resulted from lack of democracy in the workings of the state. As internal conflicts within the leadership developed, less and less attention was paid to real issues. Contact with the people was gradually lost.

The post-colonial legacy is replete with examples of states' perspectives on problems being too often dictated by one leader or groups of state-supported intellectuals who behave and act as if only their ideas are valid. Because those perspectives are not debated by the people, or at best are only superficially explained, they lack practicability and are almost invariably the cause of great waste of resources, suffering and despair. Stubborn refusal to learn from experiences world-wide (and even of one's own) and preferring instead to invent and propagate new 'isms' which only exist in their minds has made most present day policy makers in Africa forget their people and often side with foreign interests.

It is increasingly evident that policies are being determined solely by concern with the means rather than conditions of development. The former has given rise to preoccupation with structures leading to centralization and expansion of the state bureaucracies and has encouraged a top-down approach to management of public affairs.

**Rationale for a  
new perspective**

The leaders of the mass movements which brought about legal independence in Africa, inherited the totality of the colonial state they had been fighting against. Lowering the 'Union Jack' or the 'Tri-colour', African Heads of State moving to former Governors' residences (thereafter re-named 'Peoples Palace' or 'State House') did not signify any basic change. Rather than question its relevance, the colonial state was adopted and legitimized.

Whereas the colonial state had been run by a small but ruthlessly efficient government bureaucracy, the emergent African state lacked the administrative structures, personnel and the culture necessary for the efficient management and organization of state and society with different objectives from those of the colonial state. 'Statization' of all aspects of the economic, social and cultural life of the people which necessitated the expansion of the bureaucracy was the post-colonial African states' response. It, however, did not increase efficiency. On the contrary, it became a burden to society as more and more resources were required to maintain it.

The African state not only became the 'principal industry', it also sought and succeeded in interfering in the most personal and private lives of its citizens. The African state developed fastest in setting up capacities for repression and in systematically attempting to control and to organize society and individuals so as to gain their unquestioning allegiance.

It is because of these policies of African states in the last twenty-five years that the masses of African people have witnessed stagnation, mass starvation, wars, torture and other forms of repression. Many of these are traceable to the state by the internal and external policies it pursued or by its inaction where intervention was required.

Africa has learned through great pains that the content of independence lay not in the seizing of power from the colonialists, but in how and for what that power was exercised. At the time of independence African households by and large could feed themselves. The African continent was not the major recipient of food aid that it has become, and its prospects for development were no less evident than in the countries of Asia which had been under the same colonial empires.

The political crises beginning with the Congo in 1960 multiplied in the sixties and seventies. These crises and conflicts were to result in Africa's inability to organize internal political and economic policies which would make them economically self-sufficient and independent actors in the community of nations.

As the crisis deepened, so did theories to explain its origin, nature and magnitude and to propose 'appropriate' paths to development. Various schools of thought sprung up and many theories were advanced to explain Africa's underdevelopment. Too often African policy-makers accepted these theories without questioning their validity even when their own empirical experiences were enough to expose their inadequacy. The pro-

ponents of these theories who are mostly western and form part of aid packages have become the intellectual mentors of those policy-makers.

'Development studies' is itself in a crisis because from its inception after the Second World War as a branch of economics, not a single country can be shown to have developed on any of the numerous models it has produced. On the contrary, 'development studies' has itself become another opium for the people, designed—as they often were—to stop the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America from investigating the real causes of their underdevelopment. At the same time, the establishment of multilateral institutions like the IBRD, the IMF and the OECD and the EEC pursued a strategy which opened up the African economies to further penetration through much sought-after investments which in reality meant further exploitation.

Participants in the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation Seminar on the State and the Crisis in Africa were agreed that the crisis is not only about balance of payment problems and inadequate or misdirected external aid. The political and social upheavals, internecine wars, the enormous African refugee problem, extensive migration of African labourers within and outside Africa, authoritarian one-partyism (whether by proponents of capitalism or various brands of 'socialism') encompass broader moral and political issues.

Understanding of the root causes of Africa's underdevelopment, namely European capitalism through its slave, colonial and neo-colonial phases, while being necessary in raising the consciousness of the people, is too often used by the state intellectual apologists, to exculpate themselves from the responsibility of conceptualizing new paradigms within which the people could be mobilized to make their own history. For much too long, Africa's intellectuals in their typically middle class superficiality, have harped on everything negative in the political, social and cultural life of Africa as being the result of external pressures or constraints. By so proselytizing, the implication is that the correction of these wrongs will also have to come from outside.

Twenty-five years of independence have given us rich experiences, even if, for the most part, they were of a negative character. But they provide a platform for an in-depth process of thought and action, geared towards the creation of a new domestic order that is culturally relevant, morally justifiable, economically vibrant and politically geared to real liberation. That process can only be meaningful if it starts with inward looking consciousness.

Starting from a holistic view of the state and bearing in mind its role as (1) actor in the international arena—the *sovereignty* dimension—(2) determinant of power relations in society—the *accountability* dimension—and (3) executor of policy—the *delivery* dimension—the seminar participants deduced from the information presented above, the problematic condition affecting the African state with regard to these dimensions. In thinking about the future, participants organized their discussion so as to be able to identify (a) a new perspective, (b) constraints to its realization, and (c) means to change the existing order.

In this concluding section, we will return to the African state as *besieged* in the international arena, *set apart* in its relation to society, and *overloaded* as executor of policy.

**The besieged state**  
*Autonomous and  
integrated develop-  
ment*

*New Perspective.* Although there has been much talk about self-reliance and integrated development since African countries became independent, little has been done to foster a process that builds on local resources and serves to integrate sectoral efforts. Africa has remained standing with its back to its own hinterland. Seminar participants stressed that the economic crisis in the past few years provides an unusual opportunity for rethinking—and reorganizing—the continent's economies. To be sure, the economic performance of African countries has varied and some are better off than others, yet every country shares a debt burden and unfavourable terms of trade that gives them little choice but to reconsider past policies. Seminar participants stressed that African government leaders must discover the potential of the domestic economy and society. Donors and other international organizations must adjust their approach to Africa in such a way that local initiatives are encouraged, local know-how tapped, and local institutions developed as counter-measures to the overwhelming legacy of externally induced and controlled interventions, whether by public or private institutions.

*Constraints.* Seminar participants recognized that putting the new perspective into practice will be constrained by three principal factors: (1) existing production structures; (2) lack of differentiation in the African economies; and (3) foreign debt.

The existing production structures reflect the colonial priorities: production of raw materials and other commodities in demand in Europe and other industrialized countries. As a result, African countries tend to produce similar products, compete for the same markets, and often end up depress-

ing terms of trade to their own disadvantage. Because African economies are essentially non-complementary, there is only limited scope for intra-African trade, in spite of the political rhetoric to the contrary. African countries continue to produce what they do not consume and consume what they do not produce. As a result they are extremely exposed to changes in the international market prices and other external variables. In the 1980s, in particular, commodity prices have been generally low while prices on imports, especially for the manufacturing sector, have gone up. The inevitable outcome has been escalating debts. While these debts in absolute terms may at first glance appear modest, they constitute heavy burdens. Foreign debt service makes up several per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and, on average in sub-Saharan Africa, over one quarter of export earnings.

*Means to change.* Policy options for African countries are limited but governments must not be discouraged by the predicament of their countries. Participants identified at least three measures that ought to figure more prominently on African policy agendas in the future: (1) accelerated domestic capital formation; (2) development of sector linkages; and (3) promotion of intra-African trade.

A precondition for autonomous and integrated development is that people rely on their own diligent labour, behave frugally and invest in the creation of new productive resources rather than consuming and dissipating capital produced. Productive activities must also be better linked to each other—whether forward or backward. For instance, enhanced food production, production of clothing material and clothes, as well as the provision of better housing will strengthen the domestic market. This process is likely to take time to realize but it should be given priority as a means of reducing export dependency and vulnerability to changes in the global economy. By building a strategy of industrialization on the agricultural sector, greater complementarity between rural and urban based production can be achieved. This principle could also be applied in regional African contexts. Investments have to be rationalized and made to serve more than one country. Food banks and other strategic institutions for inter-state transfers should be seriously considered.

*Greater African assertiveness*

*New perspective.* Although African countries are weak by comparison with most other countries, there is great need for taking the necessary action to assert their position more forcefully in international fora. It is a matter of (1) developing common positions on key issues; (2) enhancing analytical skills; and (3) strengthening negotiating abilities. For instance, what would

happen if the African governments jointly developed a carefully prepared position on what to do with the continent's debilitating external debt?

*Constraints.* There are several constraints to effective action on this issue, but most of them lie within the realm of what can be overcome. Participants identified the following: (1) poor selection of delegates to important conferences; (2) inadequate negotiating skills; and (3) lack of training and experience in substantive fields.

Selection of delegates, particularly to international conferences, are often made as a reward for political work or as a means of providing an occasion for vacationing. Lack of individuals with negotiating skills is another constraint. African negotiators did very well in the constitutional conferences preceding independence. Why is the continent so short of skilled negotiators today? One explanation is that there is a shortage of competent individuals with adequate experience in a given field. The political emphasis in the past two decades has been to produce 'generalists' rather than specialists. As a result African countries have often failed to put up the necessary competence and know-how to serve official negotiators in various international fora.

*Means to change.* The principal means to change identified by seminar participants was intra-African cooperation. Speaking with one voice on key issues of common concern needs to be further encouraged and so do greater cooperation aimed at fostering a sense of commonness. For instance, in the early 1960s, Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians were foremost East Africans. Today the East African is an 'endangered species' and it requires a renewed commitment and a new perspective to restore such an orientation.

*Reducing aid  
addiction*

*New perspective.* Participants agreed that most African countries have become addicted to foreign aid, have lost a sensible perspective on what it can—and should—do, and that, as a result, foreign aid must be treated as much as part of the problem as part of the solution to Africa's current development crisis. The besieged nature of the African state has recurrently been reinforced by the international donor community through interventions that have often been ill-conceived, poorly designed, and inadequately executed. Africa, therefore, needs a greater independence from the donor community. It needs to put its foot down and accept that the answers to Africa's problems lie with the Africans themselves, including those many individuals and groups that are not part of government structures, and not with the donors, however much professional expertise they might be able to mobilize in their support.

*Constraints.* Africans have been brought up worshipping all things foreign. This colonial—or neo-colonial—mentality is deeply engrained in the African mind. This dependency mentality is further fostered by the lack of public debate about 'who we are', 'where we should be going' and 'how to get there'. The absence of an intellectual atmosphere for discussion of issues of national concern tends to reduce the African to a subservient being, always anxious to take the easy road.

*Means to change.* Awareness of the need to develop an independent mind and a new social consciousness that stresses self-reliance will only be achieved through greater respect for intellectual work. Culture has vanished as a significant variable in Africa because of the emphasis by foreign donors on achieving 'development' (measured in tangible material terms). Political slogans and 'faddish' ideas must be allowed to give way to more serious research and more critical debate of issues that affect Africa's present and future.

*Sanctity of borders*

*New perspective.* Participants recognized that the besieged nature of the African state also stems from its inherited colonial boundaries. The latter have become taboo to touch. Much effort and much money have therefore been devoted to defending them, although they are to many Africans artificial and arbitrary. Nobody was ready to suggest that the official OAU position on the sanctity of the present territorial boundaries should be changed. Still, participants emphasized the need for greater respect for cultural and social diversity within these boundaries. Uniformity is not necessarily the same as strength. However, it should also be mentioned that some participants felt that African nations are facing certain dangers in clinging to the idea of single nation sovereignty in a world where the increasing power of EEC and other regional organizations tend to make this idea old-fashioned.

*Constraints.* The multiplicity of ethnic, racial and religious groups in African countries poses a special challenge. In colonial days, it was tackled by using the principle of 'divide and rule'. Although African leaders usually do it in the name of 'national unity', they very much follow the same principle. The artificiality of the borders is often used as an excuse to clamp down on groups that wish to assert their cultural identity.

*Means to change.* Greater respect for sub-nationalities and other minorities within each African state should be scrupulously developed so that national unity ceases to be a pretext for prosecution of those who want to protect their rights. Border issues can be settled more amicably and at less cost to

Africa if special efforts are made to develop a political climate in which inter-state action can be promoted. African countries do not have the military resources to resolve or monitor inter-state conflicts but they can take the necessary political and diplomatic steps to ensure that the risk for such conflicts is minimized. Prevention is usually better than cure.

**The state set apart**  
*Limitation of power*

*New perspective.* Participants accepted that at the time of independence and in the years immediately thereafter, the emphasis on national consensus was understandable. Building the new state encouraged such an outlook. Experience has shown, however, that the ambition to achieve maximum consensus often backfires: people are alienated; underground opposition is encouraged; and, political instability, often violence, becomes the end result. The political formula adopted at independence, therefore, has become an albatross around Africa's neck. Instead of serving as an engine of growth, the state has become one of the greatest obstacles to progress in Africa. The notion of limitation of power, however, is not new to Africans. It was practised in pre-colonial society. Many of these values have survived at the level of local governance. The new perspective called for by participants invoked these customary African values and principles and emphasized the need for establishing a state that reflects local standards of fairness and dignity in a dynamic context. Sometimes, these standards may coincide with universal values, at other times they may not. The point is that there must be an opportunity for ventilating the question of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair, and to whom.

*Constraints.* In both colonial and post-colonial years, African countries have got used to the practice of 'unlimited government', i.e. the use of power without restraint. As a result, most individuals are intimidated. The emphasis on the state as the principal development actor has further reinforced an attitude of apathy. People simply sit back and do not engage in civic affairs. Africa has become a continent without participation, although nowhere has the concept been more widely embraced by political leaders. Instead of using their 'voice' option and register their opinion, people prefer to use their 'exit' option, i.e. to withdraw from public affairs.

*Means to change.* Having registered considerable disillusion with the way African countries have been governed since independence, participants identified the following means to change the existing order as being of highest priority: (1) free and fair elections; (2) right to recall political representatives; and (3) strengthening non-governmental organizations.

Participants agreed that the sovereignty of society (people) over the state must be established. This can only happen through the introduction of more democratic practices. Periodic elections to a national assembly of contestants picked by committees of the ruling party must give way to multi-party democracy permitting all patriotic parties to freely organize and participate in free and fair elections at all levels of representation. The most crucial level, because it is close to the people, is the village community. If the representatives to the district level assembly are elected from the village councils which in turn are elected directly by the people from among trustworthy, honest and respected individuals, political representation will begin to take on a different character. Patronage politics will give way to open and democratic practices. Another important measure to limit power and give meaning to democracy among the people is their right to recall representatives when they are deemed to have abused their mandate. If politicians who seek office only for their own enrichment and aggrandizement can get away with it, people will have no trust in the political system. If, on the other hand, these politicians are under pressure by those people who elected them, greater accountability will develop. Practices along these lines have been attempted in some countries, e.g. in Uganda by the government of President Yoweri Museveni in spite of the extremely difficult economic and political situation in that country. Finally, participants emphasized the need to develop fully the features of a civil society, notably the right to form and operate associations whether religious, cultural or professional, with a view to participating in public affairs openly. The rights of assembly, press, speech, etc. have not been respected. Non-governmental organizations should be strengthened as development is too important a matter to be left in the hands of a few politicians and government officials only. 'The spirit is too great for one head', participants agreed, citing an African proverb.

#### *Sharing of power*

*New perspective.* A collateral to the need for limiting power of government leaders is the importance of making arrangements for greater sharing of it. The African state has remained set apart from society after independence because of excessive concentration of power in the hands of a small group of people drawn from a ruling political party, the civil or military service.

*Constraints.* The principal constraints identified by participants related to the legacies inherited from years of over-centralized and over-politicized rule. These legacies encourage the notion that politics is just another lucrative profession—in some countries perhaps the most lucrative—and make individuals regard it merely from the vantage point of their own interests. The interests of either the state or the society at large are ignored.

Sycophancy, corruption and other ills in the African state systems are bred in this climate.

*Means to change.* Decentralization and debureaucratization are essential means to change the present situation. By decentralization is not meant the transfer of power to lower levels of a centrally controlled government. Such an exercise, as experience from many African countries suggests, only multiplies bureaucratic structures. It enhances state capacity for oppression. Decentralization, therefore, must in the future entail strengthening various forms of local government as well as non-governmental organizations. Only by reducing the stake at each level and in every public institution will there be a way of bringing about greater democracy.

#### *Rule of law*

*New perspective.* Fed up by the abuse of power in so many African countries, participants registered the need for greater emphasis on the rule of law. Desirable leadership behaviour will not come about voluntarily. Thus, those institutions that enforce the laws of the land must be strengthened. No individual, including the Head of State, should be above the law. While participants recognized that strengthening the rule of law is a complicated and sensitive process, they argued that there is a limit to what individuals living in societies where that principle is ignored, can take. Thus, every African must work hard to ensure that political and civil liberties are not arbitrarily ignored by politicians, bureaucrats or others with power and influence.

*Constraints.* The tragedy of much of Africa is that the way political systems have been run since independence has led to the institutionalization of a pattern of behaviour among leaders that goes contrary to the notion of rule of law. Politicians almost invariably see themselves as being above the law and are ready to violate laws in order to protect their own interest or persecute somebody challenging their position. The result is that the secret police—sometimes also the army—has become a major instrument of control and defence of the state against real or imaginary enemies. Trials, particularly of political challengers, have usually made a mockery of law.

*Means to change.* Participants identified at least three important measures that should be taken to change the present situation: (1) limiting the term of office; (2) promoting people's self-confidence; and (3) enhancing respect for life and property. Limiting the term of office of all state and party leaders is a first and important measure to take, particularly in one party states. Respect for rule of law will not be achieved unless the top leader is himself subject to rules about the use of power. Limiting the time in office is

one way of creating greater opportunity for holding politicians accountable. Promoting people's self-confidence through civic education and involvement in public affairs will enhance their ability to resist the tendencies towards the rule of individuals rather than the rule of law. A special challenge in many African countries will be the 'demystification' of the gun, i.e. the development of the conditions under which the gun—and other means of state coercion—will be employed responsibly and in the name of protecting the law only. Finally, participants agreed that as part of this process, authorities must be made to show much greater respect for human life and property than has been the case to date. This will come about only if there are constitutional means to hold people in power accountable. The opportunity to express a vote of no confidence in an individual leader in circumstances when he (or she) has violated the law was suggested as one possibility.

**The overloaded state**  
*Balancing private  
 and public owner-  
 ship*

*New perspective.* Respect for private property may be a prerequisite for greater respect for public property. Based on Africa's disappointing experience of nationalization and management of the public sector, participants were agreed that at the present stage of development in Africa, a better balance between private and public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange is needed. Problems to date have been caused not only by lack of skilled manpower but, above all, by a lack of responsibility towards public property among state managers. The result has been a catastrophe for Africa: loss of the potential for accumulation and reinvestment, destruction of already acquired capital—machinery, vehicles and equipment—underproduction of consumer goods and therefore hardships for the people and loss of the trust in public institutions. The most important precondition for social progress is the steady accumulation of investible surplus and development of productive forces. Bearing in mind the low levels of capital formation and the high demands for consumption, to prevent private ownership of the means of production, and thereby limit the extent of that sector's contribution to the creation of wealth and income cannot be defended by invoking the principles of socialist direction of society. To do so amounts to not much more than demagogy. In the initial phases of creating an independent national economy for countries which do not have a strong and developed capitalism and where the supervision of enterprises therefore is limited by the lack of advanced technical and conscious cadres, the private sector can play a catalytic role so long as the parameters of its operations are clearly spelled out and incentives and reasonable profits are guaranteed by the state. This situation is aggravated by the lack of good traditions for conducting the international affairs of the

state, for maintaining a proper balance between the state and society and for executing state policies.

*Constraints.* The principal constraint is obviously the legacy created by an almost unlimited growth of the public sector in the past. People continue to expect the state to be the sole agency responsible for improvement in their welfare. As a result, they overload the state with demands and give priority to consumption over production. Although there is pressure to retrench the state sector, little has been done and many political consequences are potentially hazardous.

*Means to change.* In order to change the existing order and to make planning a more broadly based activity, representatives of different tendencies, ideologies and professions in society should constitute politically independent Planning Commissions, along the lines of an independent judiciary. These commissions would work with government but would above all be charged with ensuring that the people retain control of their economic activities and safeguarding their interests against the periodic changes of government and the possibility of retrogressive policies. The setting up of these commissions presupposes a new political thrust by the state—outlined above—that promotes and safeguards democracy and popular emancipation. A Planning Commission would also play a key role in the development of the productive forces, in deciding on the levels of investment and consumption, location of industries and order of priorities in the different sectors of the economy.

*Greater involvement  
by NGOs*

*New perspective.* The state cannot serve as the sole entrepreneur in Africa and it has to share the burden of development with other institutions in society. Of special interest are the non-governmental organizations which have proven effective in mobilizing people and resources on a self-reliance basis. As one type of organization that empowers people, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a vital role similar to that of pressure groups by establishing lines of communication between state agencies and the people. Being less bureaucratic than government institutions, NGOs normally respond more quickly to appeals and demands from the people and do not have the same internal obstacles as large bureaucracies. NGOs, as suggested above, are an important aspect of civil society and one means by which power can be diffused and shared. As service agencies they often achieve better results than other organizations because they rely on voluntary participation and thus enjoy usually higher levels of motivation.

*Constraints.* The greatest constraint is the unwillingness of government

leaders to recognize the contribution made by NGOs. Although it is clear that the state cannot deliver all educational, health and many other social services, government leaders feel uncomfortable about NGOs because they cannot directly control them. They tend to be outside their patronage. Thus, political leaders tend to ignore them, or if they become too prominent and influential, to put difficulties in their way. In some extreme cases, the state may even destroy them.

*Means to change.* Participants were convinced that NGOs will achieve greater recognition in Africa as they continue to outperform state agencies in various sectors. By demonstrating their capacity, they create an opportunity for offloading the state in a manner that would be helpful to society. NGOs do not have to be a problem for the state. Their presence outside the state sector usually provides government ministries with opportunities to link up with local activities that benefit all—the government as well as the people.

*Greater flexibility  
in policy*

*New perspective.* African governments, often prompted by donor agencies, have been too much inclined to adopt single-track solutions to all problems. Instead of recognizing the value of diversity, they have often pursued uniform policy solutions although they are clumsy and inappropriate. Participants agreed that greater flexibility is needed both in policy outlook and in organizing delivery of state action. Public officials must be encouraged to seek solutions that are creative and appropriate for each time and location rather than developing a 'blueprint' and attempt to implement it across the country.

*Constraints.* The principal obstacles to greater flexibility are existing bureaucratic interests and the mentality of many officials that one policy solution is more efficient and easier to monitor. Force of habit, notions of self-worth, and loss of face often obstruct or slow down judgement and decision-making. Another important obstacle is the lack of articulation of views by others than political leaders. Greater flexibility may become a reality if NGOs and other organizations are allowed to raise their voice and articulate views on policy.

*Means to change.* Proving the viability of alternative solutions to state policy is an important means to change the existing outlook. State officials must be made to realize that they do not automatically have the only solutions to society's problems. For instance, in the education and health sectors, new combinations of private and public resources to serve the people should be developed and tried out. Instead of paying for everything—usually the

common practice of patronage politics—governments should provide matching support and reward communities or institutions that have mobilized local resources and an initial instalment.

*Greater participation* *New perspective.* Although there has been much talk of participation in Africa in the past two decades, little has happened. If anything, popular involvement in public affairs has declined. Participants stressed the need to ensure that in the future policy processes really start from the people, then go to parliament, and finally back to the people again. Policy-making must not be the prerogative of officials only.

*Constraints.* Greater participation in policy-making is usually obstructed by the reluctance of state leaders and institutions to share power and delegate authority. Starting with the Head of State, who rarely seeks or follows the advice of individual cabinet ministers, the state works in a military fashion with orders being transmitted from top downwards except when secrecy makes even this impossible. Seniority is almost always an excuse for thwarting original ideas from juniors.

*Means to change.* Participatory modes of policy-making can be evolved by strengthening institutions willing to encourage more democratic practices within state institutions as part of broader democratic practices within society at large. Participants in the seminar realized that this is a difficult and far-reaching measure that would only become reality in conjunction with the other measures discussed. It entails reforms in both the economic and political sphere, including breaking the spell of the present neo-colonial order. More than anything else, it holds back Africa's creativity and potential to develop on its own.

## Participants

A.M. Babu (*Tanzania*); Walter Bgoya (*Tanzania*); Francis M. Deng (*the Sudan*); Peter Ekeh (*Nigeria*); Chandra Hardy (*Guyana*); Göran Hydén (*Sweden*); Joseph Ki-Zerbo (*Burkina Faso*); Amandina Lihamba (*Tanzania*); Kimpianga Mahaniah (*Zaire*); Bona Malwal (*the Sudan*); B. Chango Machyo w'Obanda (*Uganda*); Bidandi Ssali (*Uganda*); Jumanne Wagao (*Tanzania*); Wamba Dia Wamba (*Zaire*).

## Another Development for SADCC and for Lesotho


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*As the crisis in southern Africa has deepened over the last three years, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has co-sponsored two important seminars on the development problems facing the region. The first, 'Another Development for SADCC', which was held in the Royal Palace in Maseru, Lesotho, November 18–22, 1985, gathered participants from most of the countries of southern Africa.*

*The main objective of that seminar was to urge countries in the SADCC region to examine the concept of Another Development and the alternative strategies it advocates in different sectors. A first report on the results of the seminar was published in Development Dialogue 1987:1, containing both the Opening Address, 'Alternative Strategies for Development—A Clarion Call!', given by His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho, and the Agenda for Action elaborated on the basis of the seminar discussions. An extensive coverage of the proceedings is now available in a book, Another Development for SADCC, published in December 1987 by one of the co-sponsors of the seminar, The Foundation for Education with Production, Gaborone, Botswana, with the assistance of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.*

*As readers of Development Dialogue 1987:1 will recall, the Maseru Declaration on 'Another Development for SADCC', unanimously adopted by the seminar participants and printed as part of the Agenda for Action, recognized that 'conventional policies are becoming increasingly incapable of satisfying the basic needs of the people of the region' and that 'a new approach, based on the ideas of Another Development is desperately needed'. It acknowledged, moreover, that 'the more development policies emphasize self-reliance, the greater will be the options for effective action by the Front Line States. They will also be less vulnerable to "the strategic applications of economic levers" and other destabilization efforts by Pretoria'. The Declaration went on to emphasize that development strategies in the contemporary situation of southern Africa should 'complement and reinforce the SADCC region's contribution in support of the national liberation struggles of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia as well as the efforts to transform the existing pattern of regional relations'. To further these objectives, the Agenda for Action developed a thirteen-point programme to be implemented in the SADCC countries by governments, by the private sector and by the people's organizations in support of the Maseru Declaration.*

*At the end of the seminar, it was recommended that an appropriate follow-up would be to have the ideas of Another Development—as expressed in the Maseru Declaration and the Agenda for Action—assessed under the conditions prevailing in individual SADCC countries and to have the recommendations in the Agenda for Action adapted to the internal situation in each country with due regard to its regional context and relationships.*



## Another Development for SADCC

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Available from The Foundation for Education with Production,  
P.O. Box 20906, Gaborone, Botswana. Price GBP 5.

- The cost to the SADCC states of further destabilization measures by South Africa.

*For the past decade, South Africa has pursued an aggressive strategy of military, political and economic measures designed to prevent SADCC states from supporting anti-apartheid groups and from reducing their dependence on South Africa. This strategy is likely to be reinforced over several years and will prevent economic recovery in the SADCC states, induce increased military spending and raise the likelihood of open conflict.*

- The criteria for the selection of priority investment projects.

*The objective of the SADCC states is to achieve a greater degree of complementarity in their output growth rates and to reduce their exposure to hostile action by South Africa. However, there are pronounced differences among the countries in the extent to which they are likely to be affected by sanctions, and the gains each may obtain from the investment projects chosen. Therefore, the criteria for the selection of projects require the formulation of a regional development strategy.*

- The role of the international community in promoting economic development in the region.

*The growing intensity of the struggle in South Africa and between the SADCC states and South Africa coincides with a prolonged period of crisis in the world economy and a period of re-examination of the appropriate strategies to promote development. However, the ongoing policy dialogue cannot be divorced from the growing problems within South Africa or from intra-SADCC objectives and conflicts. Donor assistance must therefore be made more responsive to SADCC efforts to forge a more self-reliant and cooperative development strategy.*

*Chandra Hardy ends her paper, which shows that sanctions are effective and can be made even more effective, by pointing out that one must also understand that 'the crisis in southern Africa has moved beyond the issue of sanctions. A process of political and economic disintegration is under way in the region's largest economy, which will remain as long as the policy of apartheid is enforced. The dependence of the SADCC states on South Africa is so great that this deterioration further depresses their living standards and raises political tensions.'*

*Chandra Hardy is a Senior Economist at the World Bank. She was born in Guyana and is a graduate of the London School of Economics. She has lectured and written extensively on development issues. The views expressed in this paper are her own.*

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**South Africa:  
a weakening giant**

The past two decades have witnessed a progressive deterioration of the South African economy. During the 1960s, output growth averaged 5 per cent per annum; in the 1970s, this growth rate fell to 3 per cent. Since 1980, it has fallen further to 1 per cent per annum, and much of the growth which has taken place has been in the government and services sector, while output in agriculture, manufacturing, mining and construction has fallen.

Unemployment among the white population—once a rarity—has doubled to 3.5 per cent of the labour force despite a steady exodus of prime-age workers. In 1985 net emigration was 12,000. Among the black population, the average unemployment rate is given as 30 per cent but it is as high as 50–75 per cent in some areas, and with the labour force growing at over 3 per cent annually, the economy needs to grow at 5 per cent per annum just to keep unemployment from getting worse.

The decline in output growth is mirrored in the steady decline in the country's growth potential. During the 1970s, South Africa registered levels of savings and investment comparable only to Japan and the oil-surplus countries, but as incomes have fallen and the burden of taxation has increased, South African whites have had to dig deeper into savings in order to maintain their customary life-style. Personal savings have fallen from 12 per cent to less than 2 per cent of incomes compared with 5 per cent in the US and 16.5 per cent in Japan. Corporate savings have stagnated with the deteriorating business climate, and foreign capital is now flowing out of the country. In 1985 and 1986, the net outflow was estimated at \$5 billion annually or 6 per cent of GDP which was the average level of foreign investment flowing into the economy in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, investment has fallen from the phenomenally high levels of 30–33 per cent of GDP in 1979/80 to 20 per cent in 1987. The structure of production is so capital intensive that substantial increases in investment are required to achieve faster rates of economic growth, and it is difficult to envisage under the present circumstances how the required increases could be financed.

Besides the decline in investment and capital productivity, there are other more deep-seated reasons for believing that the prospects for an early return to high rates of economic growth are not good. Apartheid has created structural obstacles to growth in the low purchasing power of the black population and in the acute shortages of skilled labour. Low demand is worsening the problems resulting from the country's weakening currency and rising production costs. And lastly, the declining profitability of mining and manufacturing is causing increased financial and balance of payments difficulties.

In good years South Africa's well-developed agricultural sector produces enough grain to feed its population and export up to 400,000 tons to neighbouring countries. But in order to reduce the sector's reliance on black labour and the number of blacks living in white areas, the government encouraged the development of large commercial farms which are very capital and import intensive, and the sector requires huge price supports and budgetary transfers. The domestic costs of agricultural inputs have doubled since 1980 and an increasing number of farmers are unable to service their debts and are being threatened with foreclosures. Similar problems affect the industrial sector. The profitability of manufacturing has been declining since the mid-1970s because of rising costs and slowly growing white incomes. The disinvestment by foreign transnationals has in fact been going on since the late 1970s, only the pace has increased over the past two years, and the principal motivation for disinvestment has been economic not political.

The mining sector which is the foundation of South Africa's wealth and its apartheid policies has also been plagued with difficulties including strikes and work stoppages. South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold but for every ton of gold produced some 100,000 tons of ore have to be moved from depths of up to two miles below the surface of the earth and milled at considerable cost. If ore bodies like these existed in the United States, they would probably not be worked, and if black miners were paid half the wages of white miners, these mines would be uneconomical. Gold is still the backbone of the economy, accounting for 70 per cent of mining output; 50 per cent of exports and 12 per cent of total output, but the declining role of gold in the economy is evident from the steady fall in the volume and the quality of the gold mined and from the reduced share of gold in government revenues. In 1980 gold and corporate taxes accounted for nearly half of government revenue; by 1987 this had dropped to 28 per cent, and the share of gold had fallen from 27 per cent to 10 per cent. The difference had to be made up by a rise in personal taxation.

Despite the size and apparent diversity of the economy, South Africa is largely a primary commodity producer and is as vulnerable as its poorer neighbours to adverse trends in the world economy. Foreign trade accounts for 50 per cent of total output and close to 80 per cent of its export earnings come from gold and other minerals. Industrial exports are only about 15 per cent of the total, and most of these are sold regionally. Its principal imports consist of capital and intermediate goods, and over the past decade it has experienced deterioration in its terms of trade. Since 1980 the rand has depreciated by 50 per cent against the US dollar, reserves have declined

drastically and controls have been ineffective in stemming the flight of capital. The commodity concentration of exports and the heavy reliance on a few export markets suggest that South Africa is extremely vulnerable to the imposition of trade sanctions. But so far the strains in the balance of payments have come from problems on the capital account. In September 1985, South Africa announced that it was unable to meet service payments on its external debt of \$30 billion, of which \$14 billion was due in one year. Since then a part of the payments falling due in 1990 have been rescheduled for ten years, but this has provided only limited debt relief, and South Africa's access to international financial markets has been curtailed, with borrowing limited to short-term trade credits. Recently the Central Bank was forced into arranging short-term borrowing by pledging part of the country's gold reserves as collateral.

The overall picture is of an economy which used to grow very rapidly, but whose growth rate has now dropped well below what is needed either to sustain employment or to provide a basis for adequate profit levels; of an economy where personal and corporate savings have dwindled in recent years, and where both direct foreign investment and foreign loans have now turned to a substantial net outflow rather than inflow; of an economy where the structure and terms of trade do not offer favourable prospects for a sustained increase in export earnings; and of an economy where the growing limitations on access to foreign technology are likely to increase substantially the costs of qualitative improvements of the industrial structure. This sombre perspective suggests that South Africa's economic system will continue to experience great difficulties.

The steady deterioration in the *structure of the economy* takes on greater significance with the imposition of sanctions. In order to handle its growing payments problem, the Government should, if it follows economic orthodoxy, implement a strongly deflationary policy in which the public-sector deficit, now running at 8–10 per cent of GDP, is sharply reduced. However, it is impossible for the Government to pursue such a policy while simultaneously increasing military expenditure, subsidizing the living standards of the white population and arguing that the living standards of its majority population is superior to that of the population elsewhere in the region. The third of these arguments would be the first to go, but even then, it would still be impossible for the Government to meet the first two objectives. It is here that the pressure coming from sanctions exacerbates existing difficulties. There is, in short, an internal conflict of objectives which cannot be resolved under existing conditions.

*Relations with  
SADCC*

As a proportion of South Africa's total trade, the shares of SADCC countries are not high—less than 5 per cent of total trade is regional. However, African countries purchase 41 per cent of South Africa's exports of transport equipment (the figure would be higher if purchases by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were included); 33 per cent of its export of chemical products, and 6 per cent of its base metals. Textiles are the only commodity for which African countries provide more than 5 per cent of total supply, and most of these come from Zimbabwe.

The small share of SADCC countries in the total trade of South Africa is not, however, a good indicator of the benefits of that trade. In 1984 the net balance of trade produced a surplus for South Africa of US\$1.3 billion, equivalent to 44 per cent of its trade surplus. Moreover, that surplus had been growing rapidly. A rough calculation suggests that net earnings by South Africa from its trade with SADCC has been about US\$10 billion during this decade. This means that South Africa would, to a considerable extent, be cutting its own throat if it were to react in a totally hostile way against the SADCC states. It would not only damage their economies, but it would also severely damage the most profitable part of its external trade in a period of acute foreign exchange scarcity. This does not mean that there will be no hostility. But it does suggest that South Africa cannot maintain a positive trade balance and impose trade cut-offs with SADCC members. The implication instead is that South Africa will do everything possible to prevent the construction and operation of railways and port facilities which would allow SADCC countries to improve their own position, while at the same time seeking to maintain its market share in the SADCC states.

*The impact of  
sanctions*

The imposition of sanctions against South Africa goes back to the 1960s when a number of countries banned the export of arms. This ban became almost worldwide during the 1970s, and an oil embargo was added by the OPEC countries, but the most wide-ranging measures have been taken over the past two years. Apart from resolutions in the United Nations, three groups of countries have adopted programmes of trade sanctions. They are the Nordic countries, the EEC and the Commonwealth. In addition, individual members of the groups have chosen to extend the common programmes in various ways. In the fall of 1986, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly on a bill imposing sanctions on South Africa. The principal items covered by the recent sanctions are foreign investment, foreign loans, various controls on trade and specific limitations on computer sales.

A rigorous application of the trade sanctions imposed by the EEC, the Nordic countries and the US would affect only about 8 per cent of the total

value of South Africa's exports but despite their limited range, sanctions and the threat of sanctions have been effective in raising the cost to South Africa of maintaining its apartheid policies. From 1970-84, the cost of oil imports was an estimated Rand 22 billion (US\$11 billion) over and above international prices, and the threat of sanctions has pushed South Africa into extensive and costly import substituting activities. The country has developed its own arms industry, synthetic fuel plants and engine works running into billions of dollars. The capital investments to install the three SASOL oil-from-coal plants have amounted to approximately US\$3.5 billion, and an attempt to reach the 70 per cent self-sufficiency level in oil would cost a further US\$7 billion. With the limited size of the domestic market and severe limitations on exports, it is most unlikely that these capital intensive undertakings are profitable. Indeed, it has been estimated that the operating losses incurred by the synthetic fuel plants are running at around US\$2.7 billion a year. Since they exist side by side with oil refineries, there is now overcapacity of 50 per cent in the oil producing sector. In addition, the parastatal firms set up to reduce the country's dependence on foreign sources of supply have contributed substantially to its external debt problem. The capital stock of these firms grew by almost two thirds over the period 1978 to 1984 compared with an increase of one quarter for private businesses, and most of the funding was obtained through short-term foreign borrowing.

Trade sanctions have been effective in raising import costs and in forcing South Africa to look for new export markets in Asia. Exports of coal have been sharply reduced and some mines have laid off 50 per cent of their workforce. But the most effective sanctions have been imposed by the international business and financial community. Foreign financing has made an important contribution to investment, especially in the mining and manufacturing sectors, and the availability of foreign technology which came with these flows was a major factor in past high rates of growth. The growing process of disinvestment reflects the climate of uncertainty and low growth. Foreign shareholders have sold their holdings at prices well below those quoted on the Johannesburg stock exchange, and they have converted their rands into foreign exchange at discounts of up to 40 per cent. But despite these conditions, equity sales by the major transnationals have been frequent. The decline in foreign direct investment and the reduced access to new technologies has been costly. Economic growth would have been three times the rate actually achieved over the past five years if investment and capital productivity had remained at their 1980 levels.

The international banking community has also registered weakening confi-

dence in the country's economic prospects. Several commercial banks have publicly declared the country not creditworthy for long-term borrowing, and the maturity profile of South Africa's foreign debt is much shorter than for the highly indebted countries in Latin America. In 1985, half of the debt was due for repayment in one year and despite the recent rescheduling, the debt represents a growing fiscal and financial burden. Since 1980, the debt has quadrupled in local currency, rising from 20 per cent to 46 per cent of GDP, and the debt service ratio has risen from 11 per cent to 28 per cent.

The hardening of political positions in South Africa could lead to increased pressure in the industrial countries to widen the scope of sanctions. A total ban on food and agricultural goods as well as coal, iron and steel imports by the US, Japan and the EEC would affect about 27 per cent of total exports and over 50 per cent of non-gold exports. A ban on oil imports would force South Africa to invest very heavily both in domestic oil and gas exploration as well as in the expansion of synthetic fuel plants. Since it has been calculated that to achieve energy self-sufficiency, South Africa would have to invest some US\$20 billion over the next decade, the total costs of comprehensive sanctions would present an unmanageable burden. The foregoing suggests that the economic costs of apartheid are rising with the imposition of sanctions even though these are being applied on a limited basis. This means that South Africa's relations with SADCC must be viewed in the light of its attempts to sustain an increasingly untenable economic structure.

**SADCC: dependency  
and destabilization**

In 1980 the nine majority ruled states of southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to promote a more balanced and self-reliant regional development strategy based on cooperation and mutual self-interest. It is assumed that an independent Namibia would join SADCC. The southern African region thus comprises the SADCC countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), Namibia and South Africa. It contains a population of 100 million with a total GDP of \$100 billion and exports of \$25 billion, and there is no doubt about South Africa's overwhelming dominance over its neighbours. With a total population of 32 million which is just under half of SADCC's 70 million, the volume of output (\$75 billion) and exports (\$18 billion) is three times larger in South Africa.

Approximately half of the SADCC population is in Tanzania and Mozambique, and another one quarter is in Angola and Zimbabwe. Average

incomes in these frontline states are US\$320 or 13 per cent of the average per capita income in South Africa. But the distribution of income in South Africa is extremely uneven. The white population enjoys living standards comparable to European levels while the majority black population subsists on incomes which are not much higher and are often lower than in neighbouring countries.

The SADCC countries are rich in mineral, energy and agricultural resources but these are largely underdeveloped. Average living standards in the area are not only low but have been declining in seven out of nine states since 1980. Four states are among the 'least-developed countries'—Mozambique, Tanzania, Lesotho and Malawi—and even the higher income countries like Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe have large rural populations living at or around subsistence levels. Six countries are landlocked—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The economies of the SADCC states are highly dependent on foreign trade. The ratio of total trade to GDP is much higher than the 50 per cent for South Africa. In Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the proportion exceeds unity. Tanzania and Mozambique, despite chronic balance of payments difficulties show a ratio of about 22 per cent; for Zimbabwe the ratio is closer to 45 per cent and Angola, Malawi and Zambia have trade to GDP ratios significantly in excess of one half. These countries are not only very open but their vulnerability is greater because they are mainly primary producers with one or two weak commodities accounting for over 80 per cent of their export earnings. Their principal imports consist of food, oil and all categories of manufactured goods and they have been particularly hard hit in recent years by a number of adverse external developments. Import volumes are less than half of their 1980 level and net investment levels are too low to produce economic recovery.

The overall picture is thus of a large and very poor subregion which is labouring under severe difficulties in terms of military conflict, declining terms of trade, drought, and a depressed global economy, as well as other deep-seated problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Several countries have embarked on structural adjustment programmes assisted by donors, the IMF and the World Bank, but even before the issue of the impact of sanctions was raised, the prognosis for growth was not good. For most countries, incomes are projected to lag behind population growth even under the most optimistic assumptions. This means that average consumption levels will remain depressed well into the 1990s. Recovery is constrained under these projections by the slow pace of policy reforms, poor

export prospects and declining aid flows. But the outlook could be much worse. SADCC's dependence on South Africa has increased over the past decade, and the likelihood of continued economic deterioration in and hostile action by South Africa could further depress these economies. A more self-reliant and cooperative development strategy is therefore a necessity not an option for the SADCC states.

The following is a thumbnail sketch of the existing situation in the SADCC states:

*Mozambique's* production structure was largely geared to servicing South Africa. It provided up to 120,000 mine-workers annually and easy access through the port of Maputo, and workers remittances and port revenues were its major sources of foreign exchange. The economy has been in shambles since independence in 1975. The departure of the Portuguese settlers produced shortages of skilled labour in every sector. In 1976, South Africa reduced the number of migrant workers with valid work contracts to 30,000. Two years later, it stopped paying part of the miners wages in gold at below market prices (an agreement which had been in effect for over 50 years), and lastly, South Africa began to divert its own traffic away from Maputo and to disrupt the Zimbabwe-Maputo line. The World Bank estimates that concessional capital flows of at least \$400 million per annum are needed to finance a recovery programme.

*Lesotho* is a 'least-developed country' with an average per capita income of \$190 per annum. Ninety per cent of the population live in the rural areas and depend on subsistence agriculture and/or workers' remittances for their livelihood. Workers' remittances account for 40 per cent of the country's GNP. Lesotho is not favourably endowed with natural resources; only 13 per cent of its land area is suitable for cultivation. Its future thus largely depends on what happens in South Africa. Opportunities exist to use the country's abundant water resources to sell electricity to South Africa.

*Swaziland* has a population of 800,000 and an average per capita income of \$1000 per annum. Like Lesotho, the country is entirely surrounded by South Africa and is effectively part of its economy. It belongs to the Rand Monetary Area and to the South African Customs Union. This means that events in South Africa determine its exchange rate, tariff policies, interest rate and monetary policies. The only relevant macro-policy is fiscal expenditure control. GDP growth since 1980 has been negligible, reflecting the downturn of activity in South Africa, and any major crisis in South Africa is likely to have an amplified effect on Swaziland.

*Botswana* has a population of around one million and an average per capita income of \$910. GDP has grown rapidly over the past decade, at around 11 per cent per annum with the development of the mineral sector. Diamonds account for two thirds of its exports. Botswana has a modern economy supporting 20 per cent of the population and a rural economy of subsistence farmers with 80 per cent of the population. Botswana is also a member of the RMA and SACU and its future growth prospects are closely tied to developments in South Africa. Although the country's land area is large, much of it is arid and not suitable for cultivation. Yields are low because the area is subject to frequent droughts and only about 30 per cent of the subsistence farmers produce enough food for their own needs. Cereal imports have grown from 80,000 tons in 1980/81 to 170,000 tons in 1983/84. The country does, however, have good livestock potential.

*Zambia*, with a population of 6 million and an average per capita income of \$400 per annum in 1985, has experienced declining per capita GDP over the past decade. Copper accounts for 90 per cent of export earnings and in 1984 copper prices were 60 per cent lower than they were in 1974. The lack of diversification and the high capital and import intensity of production has made the economy vulnerable to the prolonged scarcity of foreign exchange. Zambia has with great difficulty been undertaking a structural adjustment programme assisted by the World Bank and the IMF. In an environment of low growth, this programme inflicts hardship on various segments of the population, which has given rise to growing social and political tensions. Unemployment is rising as mining output declines, and the economic decline in South Africa will add greatly to Zambia's difficulties, as will the need to divert more copper exports through Dar es Salaam.

*Zimbabwe* has a population of 7.5 million with an average per capita income of \$740 per annum. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited an economy that was well diversified in some ways and highly dualistic in other ways. A small proportion of the population owned most of the best agricultural land and accounted for the bulk of the country's marketable surplus. Despite its commitment to growth with equity, the government has taken the prudent course of not forcing changes in the current structure of production while at the same time implementing measures to raise the productivity of the small-scale sector in both agriculture and industry. In 1980 and 1981, Zimbabwe experienced high rates of GDP growth due to pent-up demand, liberal wage policies and rehabilitation investments. But real GDP fell in 1982 and 1983 and stagnated in 1984 because of drought and the world recession. The government is undertaking a structural adjustment programme to reduce growing fiscal and balance of payments deficits.

It is also faced with both internal and external security problems and the need to create jobs for a rapidly expanding labour force.

*Malawi* has a population of 6.6 million with an average per capita income of \$210 per annum. After growing rapidly in the 1970s, GDP growth averaged 1.5 per cent per annum between 1979 and 1984, a consequence of drought, recession and transportation problems. Its principal exports are tobacco, tea and sugar which face poor growth prospects, and this means that the country's growth will be constrained by its low import capacity unless it obtains large inflows of concessional aid. Malawi has had to cope with the disruption of its normal transport routes through the ports of Nacala and Beira in Mozambique since 1979. It is estimated that the annual cost to the economy of these transport disruptions is around \$50 million, or 20 per cent of export earnings. These routes through Mozambique are not expected to reopen soon and this forces Malawi to use longer and more costly alternatives.

*Tanzania* has a population of 21.5 million with an average per capita income of \$210. It is a large and predominantly agricultural economy with a good resource base and a relatively equitable distribution of income and wealth, but it has also experienced declining per capita GDP over the past decade. This was a consequence of adverse terms of trade, drought, recession and its failure to adopt appropriate structural adjustment policies at an early stage. Export earnings have fallen to around \$400 million and import capacity is about the level it was in 1975. Until this foreign exchange constraint is removed, recovery will be difficult to achieve.

*Angola* has a population of 8.5 million with an average per capita income in 1981 of \$440 per annum. However, this income estimate is likely to be too high since there has been no recent GDP data available and the value of the traditional exports of oil and diamonds has fallen sharply since 1981. Angola has been in a state of war since independence in 1975 with rebel forces disrupting production, transport and trade in the southern and central provinces. The Benguela railway which is the principal access route to the port of Lobito has been closed since 1975. Angola has abundant mineral and agricultural resources but the country is too poor and politically divided to develop these resources. The end of the civil war is a prerequisite of growth but at the present time the Unita forces are supported by South Africa and the United States.

**Table 1** Some principal features of SADCC/South Africa links (per cent)

Item	Bot	Les	Mal	Moz	Swaz	Zam	Zim
Transport via SA	90	100	60	30	70	60	90
Imports	90	90	45	10	90	20	20
<i>Petroleum</i>	100	100	sig	neg	100	neg	neg
<i>Electricity</i>	40	100	—	60	80	—	neg
Customs revenues *	20	70	—	—	60	—	—
Exports	8	40	6	4	40	1	20
Migrants ('000)	30	140	30	60	20	—	10

\* Share of total government revenue.

*Dependence on  
South Africa*

The central features of SADCC's dependence on South Africa are summarized in the following table. It shows that the most vulnerable countries are Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, whose ties are the strongest. Second, it shows the extreme dependency in transport. Through deliberate action, South Africa has succeeded in diverting most of the traffic away from SADCC ports to its own more costly routes. Third, the most important characteristic of SADCC's heavy import dependence is not its size but its composition. Five countries are heavily dependent on imports of petroleum products and electricity—Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique. Malawi imports petroleum products and Mozambique imports electricity because of the disruption of supplies from its own Cabora Bassa generators. The use of migrant labour remains substantial despite selected cutbacks in recent years. More than half of the labour is in mining and although there have been repeated threats of large-scale expulsion, these workers are of vital importance to South Africa because they are highly skilled in deep shaft work.

The data in the table do not fully reflect the degree of SADCC economic dependence which is both intensive and extensive. South African control manifests itself in numerous ways which are difficult to quantify. An important link for which only partial information is available relates to the involvement of South African business interests. Through their ownership of equity and management contracts, South African businesses control virtually all industrial and mining activities in Lesotho and Swaziland, and a very high proportion in Botswana. They own all the breweries, food processing and grainmilling enterprises in addition to most wholesale and retail trade outlets. The principal shareholders are Anglo-American, Barlow Rand, Sanlam and Delta.

Although less extensive across sectors, substantial links exist with Zim-

babwe and Zambia in value terms. The data available suggest that South African control covers one quarter of total output in Zimbabwe; in mining and manufacturing, the proportion runs as high as 45 per cent. For Zambia, the data show the dominance of Anglo-American in copper mining and ancillary industries. South African interests are involved to a limited extent in Angola and Mozambique. For Tanzania there is no known involvement other than the selling of diamonds, and the information on Malawi is unclear. These linkages contain the risk that domestic output in SADCC states could be adversely affected by decisions reached by the parent companies but they also indicate that a sizable business constituency exists in South Africa with a strong self-interest in preventing further destruction of their economies.

#### *Destabilization*

The SADCC Secretariat has estimated the cost of actions taken by South Africa to destroy and disrupt their economies at over \$10 billion between 1980 and 1984. Nearly half of this was due to war damage and increased defense expenditure; a further \$2 billion was due to lost economic growth. More recent estimates show a 28 per cent increase in these figures, putting the cost at around \$13 billion for the same period. This results from higher estimates of the defence expenditures by Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, and a doubling of the estimated loss of output. To put these numbers in their proper perspective, it must be noted that the economic cost of destabilization exceeds the total of all foreign loans and grants made to the SADCC countries over the five-year period; it is more than one third of their total export earnings and 10 per cent of their combined GDP. Moreover, the annual costs have been rising from less than \$1 billion in 1980 to an estimated \$4 billion in 1985.

The economic cost of destabilization is equivalent to a terms of trade loss of 20 per cent per annum, and it comes on top of existing terms of trade losses and balance of payments difficulties. Adverse terms of trade movements reduce the purchasing power of exports and incomes, increase costs and create large current account deficits. In the absence of adequate compensatory external financing, sharp cuts have to be made in imports, consumption, the provision of government services and investment. All SADCC countries are trying to arrest the steady decline in their economies. But the destabilization policy of South Africa impedes recovery and worsens the balance of payments. It forces expenditure cuts and shifts in spending priorities which have high social and economic costs in countries where average living standards are already quite low, and it means that changing the structure of production will take even longer and will require higher levels of external aid.

**SADCC: towards  
collective self-  
reliance**

The formation of SADCC in 1980 ran counter to South Africa's strategy for the establishment of a constellation of states which would be so economically dependent and vulnerable to reprisals that they would never be a threat. Consequently, the resolve of SADCC to foster greater self-reliance and regional integration is viewed with hostility and met by destabilization. But the hostility of South Africa is not the only obstacle to the achievement of SADCC's objectives. The greater difficulty lies in entrenched attitudes and production patterns. Despite strong ties of history, geography and political opposition to apartheid, the economic links among the SADCC states are few. The bulk of their monetary or non-subsistence production is for export outside the region. Domestic markets are too small for viable industries and intra-SADCC trade currently accounts for only 4 per cent of their total trade. Regional integration will require a major reorientation of economic activities and the establishment of institutions to promote regional trade and investment. Given the scarcity of resources, priority should be given to the four major areas of vulnerability—food security, migrant workers, inter-industry linkages and transport.

*Food security*

The SADCC states have pursued very similar strategies of agricultural development. With few exceptions, most countries have spent little on agricultural investment and support; they have given priority to export over food crops and they have favoured capital-intensive, large-scale farms over the small farmers. As a result, over the past decade, these countries have registered declining per capita food production and growing food deficits. Because of cost, taste and transport considerations, most of the food imports have come from South Africa, which is the third largest maize exporter in the world after the US and Argentina. In 1984/85 South Africa's exports of maize to SADCC and Zaire were estimated at 417,000 tons.

This growing dependency on South Africa's food exports would be economically viable if South Africa was a low-cost producer of food grains; if SADCC countries had a comparative advantage in non-food production; and if the poor had the capacity to purchase food. Since none of these conditions are met, SADCC's agricultural policy must address the short-term need to build up emergency food stocks, and the longer-term need to raise the productivity of small farmers. Zimbabwe and Zambia have had recent success in raising small-holder productivity but the other countries still have a long way to go in this area.

The severity of the food issue is underscored by the fact that despite growing food imports, the total food available in the region was 10 per cent below requirements in the period 1980–82, and UNICEF reports evidence of

growing malnutrition among women and children. The food situation is an immediate crisis for Lesotho and Swaziland, which rely on South Africa for the bulk of their food requirements. It is a less critical but still a serious problem for Botswana and Zambia. Mozambique and Angola are suffering from famine due to drought and the disruption of food production because of strife.

Over the next ten years, SADCC's population will increase by one third. By 1990, the grain requirement is expected to exceed local production by two thirds, and most of it would have to be found internally because of regional transport and payment difficulties. In 1984, the disposal of Zimbabwe's grain surplus of one million tons was constrained by the difficulties of obtaining payment from other countries and by the lack of transport and storage facilities. At present the production, marketing and distribution of food in the region is dominated by South Africa. As a result, in order to provide food aid to Mozambique, international relief agencies have been obliged in some instances to buy grain from South Africa which is delivered by South African truckers and air-freight companies.

Apart from its declining rate of growth, cereal production is very volatile with fluctuations of more than 10 per cent per annum for 7 of the 9 countries. Regional fluctuations are less than national fluctuations, which means that regional stockpiles would be more economic but their utility would be limited by the lack of regional transport and storage facilities. The need for stocks would be lower if the restrictions on grain marketing in the region were removed. The growth of intra-SADCC trade in maize is especially promising because consumers prefer the white maize grown in the region to the yellow maize which is traded internationally. Considerable scope also exists for agricultural trade beyond food, particularly in the areas of livestock production, feed stocks, and food processing. Economies of scale can also be expected in the production of agricultural inputs, machinery and fertilizers.

In response to the limitation of the lack of foreign exchange to pay for intra-SADCC food imports, the EEC has proposed the establishment of a food reserve fund. Donors would be asked to contribute to the fund which would enable deficit countries to purchase food from surplus countries. However, the concept could be expanded to enable the fund to finance other purchases in the region. These exchanges could also take place bilaterally. A German institution provided a grant to Tanzania to buy food from Malawi, and Malawi used the money to buy equipment from Germany. The promotion of intra-SADCC trade is essential to its recovery, and

donors will need to be innovative and less mercantilist in the use of aid to promote regional development. Among themselves the SADCC countries need to expand the scope for barter and countertrade possibilities in the region.

### *Migrant workers*

It has been a long-established policy of South Africa to employ migrant workers instead of the local black population. The migrants did not have to be housed permanently and they could be expected to be politically less defiant since they worked under a constant threat of expulsion. In the neighbouring states, migrant remittances were relied upon as a steady source of foreign exchange. Reliable data on the extent of migrant employment are hard to come by but recent estimates put the figure at between 0.75 million and 1.5 million of which about 360,000 have valid labour contracts. Migrant remittances are estimated at \$1.0 billion or 5 per cent of the GNP of the SADCC states. Until the mid-1970s the flow of migrant labour reflected both the growing demand for skilled labour and excess supply conditions in the SADCC countries.

Several SADCC states have formal agreements with South Africa regarding the employment of migrants. These agreements provide for the deduction of up to 60 per cent of the net pay of the migrants, which is transferred to the authorities in the supplying countries to give to the miners when their contracts are ended. It is not known how many of these agreements are currently operative. But the SADCC countries are caught in a terrible bind. Because of the effects of destabilization, drought and recession, migrant remittances have become an important source of foreign exchange, and the jobs are important for countries with their own growing unemployment problems.

However, the demand for migrant labour has fallen drastically over the past decade. The proportion of foreign to domestic workers in mining has declined by 50 per cent and employers now have to show good cause for retaining any foreign workers. The drop is due in part to the slowdown of output growth in South Africa but it is also a reflection of the displacement of labour in many sectors—for example, telephone operators and stevedores—with the introduction of capital-intensive techniques, and of recent moves to widen employment opportunities for the local population. It is thus quite clear that in the long term, the opportunities for migrant employment will disappear, and given their projected low rates of growth of GDP, this will create severe hardships in the neighbouring states.

Over the past decade, the decline in the number of official migrants was

partly compensated for by the rise in wages, and remittances became the most reliable source of foreign exchange for many countries. For Lesotho, workers' remittances account for 85 per cent of total export earnings and 50 per cent of GNP. In Mozambique, remittances account for 50 per cent of export earnings and 3 per cent of GNP. In the other SADCC countries, these remittances account for 5–10 per cent of export earnings. The official statistics do not, however, tell the whole story since there has long been a steady flow of migrants to the agricultural and service sectors. A large number of these workers also come from Mozambique and Lesotho. In recent years, while the statistics show a sharp decline in official migrants, the number of arrests or apprehensions has been steadily growing, indicating a trend to greater illegal immigration. Altogether, about one million migrant workers in South Africa support up to 6 million people in the neighbouring states and their remittances in kind are a major safety net.

The Southern Africa Labour Commission (SALC) coordinates the flow of official migrants between South Africa and SADCC states. All SADCC countries except Tanzania are members of SALC. One of the objectives of the commission is to coordinate the withdrawal of migrant labour from South Africa but so far only Botswana has prepared such a plan. The majority of the official migrants are skilled workers from Mozambique and Lesotho and, given their current economic circumstances, it is in the interest of these countries to maintain the flow of migrant labour until their economies can productively employ these workers. The Southern Africa Labour Commission should be part of SADCC, and agreements should be reached to give preference to workers from these two countries to renew contracts.

The expulsion of the migrants remains a serious threat despite the strong opposition of the mine owners. Although it is not in the interest of South Africa to expel the migrants, the Government and the mine owners may not have the same political agenda. Expulsion of the migrants is consistent with the Government's policy of destabilization, and contingency programmes need to be drawn up for their resettlement.

### *Manufacturing*

The level of industrial development in the SADCC states is low and uneven. The share of manufacturing in GDP is around 10–12 per cent and the three largest states—Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania—are the least industrialized. Manufactured goods make up 95 per cent of imports in most SADCC states. The main supplier is South Africa (35 per cent) and overseas suppliers through South Africa (46 per cent). About 88 per cent of the imports into Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland come from South Africa.

Only Angola, Zambia and Tanzania get less than 20 per cent of their imports from South Africa. No other country in the region could easily replace South Africa in the supply of manufactured goods, spare parts, freight and forwarding in the short term. This means that if there is a disruption of trade links, the import capacity of the SADCC states would decline even further.

Manufacturing output in South Africa is five times larger and covers a wider range of goods. The disparities are so wide that South Africa has a comparative advantage in most categories of production despite being a high-cost producer. It can undercut local producers in domestic markets and offer better credit terms and more reliable delivery for interregional trade. Under the free trade arrangements of the South African Customs Union, virtually no production for the local market takes place in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. South Africa also has an advantage over suppliers outside the region in terms of transport costs, delivery times and after-sales service. These factors place considerable constraints on the ability of SADCC states to expand industrial output.

In addition to South Africa being a major supplier, South African firms are represented in most economic sectors in the majority of SADCC countries. In Zimbabwe, 25–40 per cent of the productive capital stock is owned or controlled by South African companies. In Zambia, Anglo-American owns the key mining engineering firms which serve the majority state-owned copper mines. Throughout the region, the main freight and forwarding agent is Renfreight, owned by Old Mutual of South Africa. Finally, government-owned corporations in SADCC countries have joint ventures with South African concerns, particularly in mining. The mineral industries in SADCC states depend on South Africa for spare parts, essential inputs and services. Changing this source of supply would be costly and entail long delays.

Industrial development in SADCC states has not been a success. Attention has been drawn to the inefficiency of public-sector enterprises, but there has also been inadequate use of local materials, insufficient attention to appropriate technology, the location of industries and the need for investment in supporting infrastructure. Little attention has also been given to regional or joint-investment projects to overcome the limitations to market size and funding. Industrial policy is still being determined on a national, not regional, basis.

Therefore, considerable further work is needed to assist SADCC in de-


veloping a framework for industrial development. The potential which exists is quite large. An industrial strategy for SADCC would give priority to the development of resource-based industries supplying the regional market; it would promote interregional trade through the strengthening of payment arrangements, the lowering of tariffs between member countries and the adoption of common tariffs against the rest of the world; and it would provide strong incentives for private investment, both domestic and foreign, in the region.

### *Transport*

South Africa's dominance in the region has been reinforced by its monopoly of the transport system. Up to a decade ago, the ports of Mozambique and Angola handled most of the extraregional traffic but, by 1981, 50 per cent of this traffic passed through South Africa. By 1985, the figure was 85 per cent, resulting in increased costs and sharp declines in the revenues of SADCC ports and railways.

The map on the following page shows the transport routes in the region. Looking clockwise at the map of Southern Africa:

1. Lobito-Zambia (Benguela) has been closed by South African and US-backed Unita forces since 1975.
2. Dar es Salaam-Zambia is open and is a key alternative route but the Tazara bridges in Northern Zambia were destroyed by Rhodesian forces in 1979. Moreover, much of the railway runs through remote and mountainous terrain and is vulnerable to sabotage.
3. Nacala-Malawi has been closed by South African backed MNR forces since 1984. The rebuilding of this line is currently under way.
4. Beira-Malawi has been closed since 1983 by the MNR. This line serves Mozambique's only coal mine and the biggest sugar plantations which have been forced to halt production.
5. Beira-Zimbabwe is open and being guarded by 5,000 soldiers. South African commandos blew up a major bridge in 1981 and attacked the line in 1982.
6. Maputo-Zimbabwe has been closed by the MNR since 1984. This line is very vulnerable to attacks but because it avoids the steep gradients of Beira and because Maputo is a better port, rehabilitation of this route is of high priority.



From Joseph Hanlon's *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London 1986.

7. Maputo-South Africa is open but subject to frequent attacks.

8. Maputo-Swaziland is also open but subject to frequent attacks. The Beira and Dar es Salaam routes are thus the only alternative routes for the region and at present they could not carry the estimated volume of 3-5 million tons per annum which would have to be diverted if the southern routes were closed. This argues for investments to reopen at least two other access routes.

The transport infrastructure and equipment of the SADCC states is in a state of disrepair due to the lack of adequate maintenance and replacement of worn-out equipment. Transport costs in the region have a high import content and the chronic lack of foreign exchange has caused frequent delays, breakdowns and unreliable service. Management of the network is also not strong. The South African Transport System (SATS) has served as the effective coordinator of the regional transport system, and provides repair and maintenance to rolling stock and locomotives. SADCC railways are currently using borrowed rolling stock from South Africa railways. The severity of the transport problem is underscored by the openness of the economies of the SADCC states. These countries are already suffering from low import capacity. Further disruption of foreign trade would be extremely grave. Technically, the traffic could be rerouted through Beira and Dar es Salaam but only at great cost, and with improved management and increased military security.

## **Conclusion**

The crisis in southern Africa is deepening. This is largely due to the steady deterioration in economic and political conditions in South Africa. GDP growth has fallen from 5 per cent per annum in the early 1970s to 1 per cent per annum since 1980. Unemployment among the black population averages 30 per cent of the labour force; in some areas it ranges between 50 per cent and 75 per cent. This has led to growing resistance to apartheid and suppression by the authorities, which are undermining the structure of production and the confidence of international investors. The economy needs to grow at 5 per cent per annum to keep unemployment from getting worse but this is not a near-term prospect given the sharp drop in savings and investment.

In recent years, South Africa has experienced increased emigration of skilled labour, capital flight and steady pressure on its exchange rate and level of reserves. In September 1985 a moratorium was declared on its debt service payments pending restructuring of its external debt of \$30 billion. Since about 40 per cent of the debt is due in one year, the debt overhang presents a major problem which is compounded by the unwillingness of banks to lend and the accelerated pace of disinvestment by transnationals. The imposition of sanctions has added to these difficulties. Trade sanctions have adversely affected exports of processed agriculture, steel and steel products, textiles, coal and uranium. But trade sanctions by themselves are not greatly damaging since they currently apply to less than 10 per cent of total exports; they are still voluntary and they can be evaded easily. However, trade and financial sanctions have been effective in raising costs and

reducing profits, and they adversely affect the climate for much-needed investment.

These economic pressures are causing widening political dissension within South Africa. Various business groups support 'political reforms'. They see apartheid as no longer enhancing profit but eroding it. They recognize that higher growth requires widening the domestic market and increasing labour productivity and that neither is possible as long as the majority population is denied access to goods and services now available only to whites. However, political power does not rest with the business community, and there is strong resistance to change among those who identify their interests with the apartheid regime.

The Government employs half the Afrikaaner labour force. They have been guaranteed a high standard of living by the state, and they have seen this guarantee depreciate over the past decade. Unemployment among whites has doubled to 3.5 per cent of the labour force; their real incomes have fallen and they are being taxed heavily. Until recently these groups were shielded from the harsh consequences of apartheid but they see the shield crumbling and they are desperately afraid of a possible change to majority rule. They are supported by the military which is totally confident of its superiority over the opposition at home and in the neighbouring states, and to a large extent policy is being dictated by this group.

Faced with growing fiscal and balance-of-payments problems, the Government needs to pursue deflationary policies and shift incentives to the tradeable goods sector. Instead, the deterioration in the political situation is forcing the Government to pursue expansionary policies—larger subsidies and increased expenditure on security and aggression. This is causing larger fiscal deficits and lowering the country's growth prospects.

A similar ambivalence characterizes South Africa's relations with SADCC. Since 1980 South Africa has been registering a trade surplus with the SADCC states of \$1.5 billion per annum, or about half of the country's trade surplus. Therefore, it is not in the interest of South Africa to destroy the SADCC states economically. At the same time, the Government wants to prevent domestic protest groups from being supported by the opposition living in the SADCC states. Hence, the destabilization of the SADCC states through military, economic and political actions will continue. But military action is fiscally costly (too many battles on too many fronts) and not effective. The more effective action would be to sever relations with the SADCC countries. There is growing pressure in South Africa for the

establishment of a siege economy such as Rhodesia had under UDI. It is argued that a cut-off would reduce all SADCC states to the condition of Mozambique and Angola, and the ensuing turmoil would produce governments more willing to go along with South Africa. But while all these alarming possibilities can be debated, the more sobering fact is that it is enough to project the South African economy growing at 1 per cent per annum for all the worst-case scenarios to materialize. None of the objectives of the South African Government can be realized at this rate of growth, and the SADCC states will be driven deeper into poverty.

The dependence of the SADCC states on South Africa is overwhelming. South Africa is the dominant economy in the region with a GNP of \$75 billion. The next-largest economies are Zimbabwe (\$6 billion) and Tanzania (\$4 billion) and the total GNP of the SADCC states is less than one third of South Africa's. The nature and extent of their economic linkages varies across sectors and countries, but they describe a region that is closely tied together in terms of the movement of goods and services, capital and labour across boundaries. South Africa is the major supplier of food, oil, electricity, spare parts, motor vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods to the region.

This dependence is not only excessive, it is also unequal. South Africa supplies 30–40 per cent of SADCC's imports, and this market is likely to become much more important as trade sanctions take hold. SADCC countries have also provided a steady supply of skilled miners who are not easily replaceable. But South Africa receives only 6 per cent of SADCC's exports, hence the large trade surplus, and these economies are hostage to developments there, which would be the case even under a post-apartheid South Africa.

This pattern of dependence explains the economic fragmentation of the region. Most SADCC states have stronger economic ties with South Africa than with each other. It has also created production structures which are narrowly based—small, advanced, urban sectors coexisting with large, subsistence sectors, and economies which are largely geared to the production of a few primary commodities for export to the industrial countries. These production patterns have contributed to the steady impoverishment of the region. Average living standards are abysmally low and have been declining. To the strains of drought, global recession and terms-of-trade deterioration must be added the heavy cost of destabilization, guerrilla warfare and refugees. The prospects of low growth in the world economy, and the process of disintegration which is under way in South Africa will

further depress living standards in the region. Therefore SADCC countries have no alternative but to develop more self-reliant development strategies.

As a group, SADCC countries have the resources to sustain much higher levels of development. Individually, each is too constrained by its factor endowment to develop its own resources fully. Regional integration is thus an essential component of a more self-reliant strategy. This does not mean de-linking with South Africa, which in any event is unrealistic. It means the restructuring of the SADCC economies to provide a more equitable set of linkages. Consideration has been given to the imposition of sanctions on South Africa by SADCC states. Such action would further weaken their economies and provoke retaliation. SADCC's primary task must be to minimize the adverse impact of the crisis on the peoples of the region.

It is easier to define collective self-reliance than to implement it. The obstacles of cost and hostility from South Africa are formidable but there are also internal obstacles. First, destabilization has forced shifts in expenditure towards large infrastructure projects and defence which are taking up a growing proportion of austerity budgets. This has exacerbated tensions among groups which have benefited from existing linkages or relate their declining living standards to opposition to apartheid. Subversion among these groups is part of the campaign of destabilization. Second, self-reliant development strategies must necessarily be more broad-based and this argues for more participatory political systems than currently exist in the SADCC states; third, regional integration is possible when it moves from the drawing board to being acceptable at the grass-roots level. This requires attitudinal changes which must be fostered at the primary school level and supported by cultural exchanges.

Collective self-reliance is therefore a long-term process but a start has to be made and it would be good to begin with the areas of acute vulnerability. In response to the worsening crisis in the region, the SADCC countries need to increase food production; to rehabilitate alternative access routes to the sea; to have an emergency programme in place in case the miners are expelled; to rehabilitate their manufacturing sectors and to foster stronger interregional ties. But these tasks cannot be accomplished without the assistance of the international donor community.

The SADCC Secretariat is actively seeking foreign private investments for the industrial sector, and it has requested donor assistance for an emergency programme which addresses these priority problems. One estimate of

the three-year programme puts the total cost at \$6 billion, which is equivalent to the total export earnings of the group. The international donor community thus has an important role to play in the region. The SADCC states are poor; some are desperately poor. Levels of investment are not sufficient to maintain existing capital stock, let alone finance recovery. This means that the required restructuring will not be possible without additional concessional assistance. Donors have shown a preference in the past for national projects which do not reflect current priorities. Therefore, attitudinal changes, flexibility and innovation are also required from bilateral donors and international aid agencies.

The crisis in southern Africa has moved beyond the issue of sanctions. A process of political and economic disintegration is under way in the region's largest economy, which will remain as long as the policy of apartheid is enforced. The dependence of the SADCC states on South Africa is so great that this deterioration further depresses their living standards and raises political tensions. Many observers are already alarmed at the growing militarization in the region and the possibility of open military conflict. The restructuring of the economies of the SADCC states is crucial to minimizing the impact of these developments.

# Employment and Educational Innovation in Zimbabwe

By Dzingai Mutumbuka

*The educational policies of Zimbabwe have since independence been characterized by the emphasis given to experimentation and innovation. As was evident already at the Seminar on 'Education in Zimbabwe—Past, Present and Future', organized in Harare in 1981 by the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in cooperation with the Foundation for Education with Production, the future of education in Zimbabwe would be different from what it had been in the past. A conscious effort would be made to move away from mechanically allocating resources to conventional academic studies, towards introducing practical skills in the syllabuses, with a view to preparing pupils and students better for future employment and even having as a final objective the combination of education with production throughout the educational system.*

*In order to implement this policy, a Curriculum Development Unit was established within the Ministry of Education and this Unit has over the past six years researched and developed syllabuses for science, agriculture and technical subjects, based on Zimbabwe's industrial, commercial and technical priorities as assessed after independence.*

*The Curriculum Development Unit has furthermore developed a practical science kit, which contains all the necessary apparatus and consumables needed for classroom experiments, produced at low cost and largely locally designed and manufactured. Since results from public examinations indicate that students using these kits do as well or better than students learning science in conventional laboratories, the Ministry of Education is now in the process of developing similar units for Agriculture, Home Economics, Fashion and Fabrics, Woodwork, Metalwork, Technical Drawing and Building.*

*But technical innovations of this kind are only part of Zimbabwe's educational agenda. 'Education should also recognize the need to introduce support structures or organizations for school leavers who, although they already have skills, have no means of utilizing these skills', writes the Minister of Higher Education, Dr Dzingai Mutumbuka, in this paper. 'By this', he continues, 'I am suggesting that school leavers should have access to community workshops where there are tools and advisors, to community co-ops which supply material at cost, with some sort of credit facility, and to community systems for marketing goods or arranging for transport and services'.*

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*gree in Chemistry and Geology at the University of Rhodesia and his Doctorate in Chemistry at the University of Sussex in England. After lecturing for two years at Trinity College in Dublin and later at the University of Zambia, he joined the armed struggle in Zimbabwe in 1974. He was appointed Minister of Education and Culture at Independence in April 1980, and is a member of the ZANU(PF) Politbureau and Central Committee.*

*Dr Mutumbuka's contribution to this issue of Development Dialogue was given as a paper to a Seminar on 'Another Development for Lesotho', organized in Maseru, Lesotho, December 14-18, 1987, by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Foundation for Education with Production and the Matsieng Development Trust.*

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A very sobering story was recounted to me recently by a teacher who met a former student by chance in the street one day and started to talk. The teacher remembered the student as a bright hardworking boy who had done well academically, and who had also demonstrated a very considerable ability and skill with woodworking. He asked the young man how he was getting on, and where he was working.

The young man's reply really shocked him, for he announced that he was a cigarette vendor. He bought cigarettes and sold them one by one outside beerhalls. The teacher asked him why he was not using his skills with woodworking and suggested that he should make chairs or stools and sell them. The young man said that he had tried very hard to do this. He had spent days borrowing tools, days trying to get a loan to buy wood, and having made a few pieces of furniture, had spent weeks and weeks trying to sell them. The effort involved in making and selling was so great, with so few results, that he had abandoned the idea and now made enough to live on by selling cigarettes.

I am sure that there is not one education system in the world which sets out to train school leavers to be cigarette vendors outside beerhalls. No syllabus would reflect this as an objective. However, from the young man's point of view, his good academic education and substantive skills training were of no real benefit to him in seeking employment. True, he utilized certain initiative and ingenuity in becoming a self-supporting member of society, but of what benefit was his education and training? Did the State, the boy's parents, and the boy himself invest so much in education with a view to

producing a cigarette vendor? Of course we can argue that the young man could in time save sufficient money to purchase tools and materials and return to his woodwork—we can speculate about several interventions which may happen to ensure that he finally utilizes his skills and potential. We can also say that the curriculum he followed did not prepare him for the world of work, and if it is the curriculum we blame, then our questions must relate to our present concepts of education, and also be directed to our present practices.

The question really is: how many of our youth are involved in retail activities instead of production activities? For education, if it is to be successful, must attend not only to political and cultural needs, but must address itself to becoming relevant in terms of employment and career opportunities. Thousands and thousands of well educated students—well educated in the conventional sense—leave schools every year and then start the long and arduous process of looking for employment or further training. Thousands are unsuccessful. This I believe is a situation which we can no longer ignore or make half-hearted attempts to redress. The education system must make genuine changes which incorporate real employment opportunities.

Education is a social, political, and economic necessity and, because it has this status and addresses this reality, Third World countries have made enormous efforts to democratize access to education. Yet, at the same time as impressive strides have been made in making education available, the content of education has remained remarkably static, with a predominantly academic orientation which is highly likely to alienate the recipients from their families and communities. It could be said that such education is viewed as a passport out of a home or community, rather than as a means of bringing knowledge and skills into a home or community. This attitude can, I think, be directly attributed to the academic bias of the curriculum, and to the status given to academic subjects. Manual work and labour appear to have little to offer in terms of social acceptability, despite the fact that most Third World countries have a strong potential for agricultural development and, with improved technology, agriculture offers the greatest opportunities for employment as well as offering knowledge and skills for improving the quality of life and for generating income.

In the context of a Third World country, education is a far more complex issue than in highly industrialized countries. In a Third World country, the curriculum has to reflect the needs not only for pupils, but also meet the specific developmental needs of the country in terms of manpower require-

ments, food security, and meeting production targets for the commercial and industrial sectors.

The demands for increased knowledge and skills are a constant feature of change and development in Third World countries. Moreover, it seems as if every person in such a country is studying something. This has, in fact, been identified as a phenomenon of Third World countries. There is a great and insatiable quest for knowledge and skills which is demonstrated by the fact that nearly everyone we meet is studying. This is something of which education must take more cognisance if education is to be a lifelong process.

Unlike adults, who normally select what they want to know because it serves a definite purpose, school pupils are the recipients of bodies of knowledge which are deemed to be a necessary preparation for adulthood. Adults learn in order to augment skills or knowledge, or they learn new knowledge or skills because these are vital to their progress at work. School-goers are deemed to be starting from scratch with no clear thoughts about what they are learning or why they are learning certain subjects.

In a conventional academic system, the interests and motivations of pupils do not really appear to be a consideration—these issues are supposed to be tackled and resolved after school has been completed. I attribute this attitude to the fact that a conventional academic system of education does not acknowledge any responsibility for or involvement with the student after school. It has no commitment to assisting with job creation, employment or training. It concentrates on producing an end product, which some other organization must now take charge of.

Some conventional education systems are designed to take responsibility for pupils for seven years. Others cater for pupils for nine years. Still others have an 11 or even 15 year study period. These are very long periods of time, and if this time is devoted mainly to the theoretical study of controlled, prescribed content, then surely we are failing to expose the youth of our countries to the real and important experience of skills development and productive work. If a student leaves school after 15 years and cannot wire a plug, or plant or nurture a tree or grow vegetables, surely we have failed to contribute to the child's education. Added to this, what system of values have we induced? Why, for example, do we first teach small children to read and write and calculate, when we should probably first teach them how to sow seeds, nurture plants and trees, and care for animals, water and soil. The principles or pillars of Another Development will surely cause us to ask, in all sincerity, what, during the course of seven or nine, or 11 or 15

years, has education achieved for the average learner? What has the value of the education been, in terms of its response to meeting and identifying needs, or to developing a variety of capabilities or to promoting a creative and useful approach, or to identifying and solving problems and, above all, to recognizing that education does not finish with schooling?

Education is a lifelong process—therefore it is never complete. Access to education must continue in a variety of ways throughout life. Access should include strategies which allow for further skills development, and for practising knowledge and skills, so that the student can transfer these skills to the workplace.

Education should also recognize the need to introduce support structures or organizations for school leavers who, although they already have skills, have no means of utilizing these skills. By this I am suggesting that school leavers should have access to community workshops where there are tools and advisors, to community co-ops which supply materials at cost, with some sort of credit facility, and to community systems for marketing goods or arranging for transport and services. This is surely an economical approach in terms of the investments already made by the state, parents and others, in the long period of formal schooling. Communities have already demonstrated their ability to build schools and to support schools. I believe they would equally accept the challenge of providing organizations to support school leavers in the various ways I have suggested. If this were so, our young cigarette vendor would be making use of the skills which he so responsibly developed whilst at school, rather than standing outside beer-halls selling crushed poisonous weed wrapped in paper. What a useless end to all his efforts, and what a distortion of his efforts to be self-reliant.

Self-reliance is, I think, based on confidence—a confidence founded on recognized achievements and upon the realization that there are structures and organizations designed to support and improve our efforts. Self-reliance is achieved through community support and community cooperation. It comes from the knowledge that we know what we are doing and what we set out to achieve. This, in turn, is based upon an understanding of knowledge and upon skills achieved through practice and experience.

To achieve self-reliance, it is necessary to incorporate into the education system time for practising knowledge and skills, and time for experiences to mature. This allows for the development of a proper interaction between knowledge and skills. To this end, great thought and ingenuity is needed in order to develop strategies for learning which incorporate practical hands-

The 'new content', which combines education and training, is seen as a crucial development in our education system. It goes further than the combination of theory and practice because, in the syllabuses to be introduced in certain selected pilot schools in 1988, there is a well-defined skills training component leading to a National Craft Certificate for successful students. Therefore, the school will become responsible for a definite skills training component. In real terms this means that students will be able to select a certain group of academic subjects, which, when combined with the skills training component, offer a much wider basis for future employment opportunities, for self- or cooperative employment, or for higher academic or skills training.

The schools selected as pilot schools in 1988 will follow syllabuses produced by the National Manpower Unit of the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. However, in the long term, in order to meet changing social and economic developments, it will be necessary to carry out a significant curriculum development programme. The Ministry of Education is therefore planning to form a Curriculum Board, representative of commercial and industrial sectors and relevant ministries and organizations. This Board will be charged with the development of new courses of study to meet the changing needs of manpower and the economy.

Within this framework, it is anticipated that courses of study will be introduced in modular form representing various recognized stages or levels of achievement. For example, some students may find it desirable to reach Level One in, say, typing, and then proceed to look for employment. Other students may seek to study up to Level Three which, for argument's sake, could be the equivalent of 'A' level.

The combination of academic subjects and the skills training, organized into units or modules of study culminating in recognized levels of achievement, should cater for much wider ranges of ability, interest and aptitude. For instance, students can continue to pursue predominantly academic studies to 'A' level, with at least one practical subject: or alternatively students could study a group of academic subjects together with one major technical subject to the 'O' or 'A' level standard. Other students, who may have difficulties or who may be slow learners, can still pursue academic and practical courses to a recognized national level which is within their ability range. The intention is to allow each child the fullest possible opportunity of developing their attributes to their own best advantage.

It is also recognized that career guidance and counselling will have a special

role to play in assisting students with subject choices. The introduction of modules leading to recognized levels of achievement at various stages will allow students to continue their education and training after school, if or when the need is felt to improve their qualifications.

One of the most interesting components of the new structure and content of education will be an attempt to arrange access to technical subjects for a few pilot study group students. These students at present do not have access to technical subjects, for they study in groups under the supervision of a mentor. Therefore, one of the future schemes being investigated is the possibility of creating Open Education and Skills Training Centres which would, amongst other things, cater for pupils in study groups and allow school leavers to return to their studies if and when the need arises.

One additional activity which we are going to pilot next year in a few schools will be to start a parent-teachers body which will have the responsibility of working with the community in placing former students in jobs. In cases where there are no jobs available, this organization will attempt to assist former students to start income-generating activities. In this way, we hope to interest the entire community in responding to the needs of this youth.

We are at the beginning of a very challenging curricular programme which we are pursuing with great commitment. It is our earnest desire to share, to learn from, and to cooperate fully with our neighbouring countries in making education, especially scientific and technological education, really relevant and productive.

The struggle continues.

# Traffic in Armaments: A Blind Spot in Human Rights and International Law?

By C. G. Weeramantry

*During the past few years, the pages of the world press have been full of reports on dubious arms deals threatening peace and global security. What is particularly striking in this context is that while huge arms bazaars can be opened and publicized in the most shameless fashion, international law has not addressed itself to this subject as it has to issues like 'The Law of the Sea' or the environment, and this despite the fact that the armaments industry stands condemned in human rights terms by nearly every norm contained in the human rights discourse. An example of this is the fact that the Irangate arms deal was considered illegal because it violated an American law passed by Congress, not international law and human rights. But there are many other examples of a similar kind, including the legal treatment of the issues raised by the armaments sales by the Swedish defence industries to a number of countries.*

*This 'blind spot' in human rights and international law is forcefully brought out in this article by Professor C.G. Weeramantry who deals systematically and in depth with the subject from the perspectives of the discipline of human rights; the responsibilities of scientists; the traditional principles of international law; possible United Nations action; and alternatives to weapons production. Professor Weeramantry ends his article by expressing the hope that 'in the years immediately ahead international lawyers will combine their resources with lawyers practising within purely national jurisdictions in an effort to deal with one of the most pernicious problems of our century. If we fail to curb it now, it will be increasingly difficult to do so with every passing year and the iron grip with which it leads us towards planetary instability and destruction may never be broken.'*

*C.G. Weeramantry is Professor of Law at Monash University in Australia and served prior to that as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. He has written extensively on several law-related themes such as the apartheid policies of South Africa and the impact of technology on global human rights. His latest book, Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Responsibility, was published by Longwood Academic in 1987.*

*Since this article was written, lawyers from twelve countries have met in Stockholm (April 8-9, 1988) to establish an International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA). Lawyers have thus joined with physicians and architects in creating a professional international organization opposed to*



*nuclear war, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.*

*In pursuing its objectives, IALANA will:*

- *Mobilize lawyers, teachers of law, and judges throughout the world to join in the struggle against nuclear weapons, both as citizens and on the basis of their professional capacity;*
- *Sponsor educational activities, including research projects and legal aspects of the nuclear weapons debate, for professional groups, political leaders and the public at large;*
- *Promote the non-violent resolution of disputes between nations and the development of institutions designed to support the rule of law;*
- *Organize exchanges among lawyers and legal scholars to increase international understanding and knowledge with respect to nuclear weapons and the law;*
- *Support arms control treaties, other international agreements and nuclear-free-zone regimes that contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons.*

*The International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms will, for the time being, have its headquarter in Stockholm. It will have three Presidents. For the first term, they will be Stig Gustafsson, Member of Parliament, Sweden; Alexander Sukharev, Vice Procurator, USSR; and Peter Weiss, Attorney, USA.*

The discipline of international law condemns in the strongest terms such violations of the law of nations as piracy and genocide. It is a punishable offence, accepted as such by international law and national law alike, to sell heroin on the side streets of a city. Yet it is quite legal to organize a carnival of weapons of death in that city's public park. Indeed while the former activity attracts the strongest social condemnation, as indeed it should, the latter attracts the participation of the elite and the powerful. They will be honoured guests at this carnival of death and will be wined and dined by governments themselves.

Each of the articles on display is precision made to kill humans with the maximum efficiency that modern technology can devise and each is exhibited by its proprietor with the same pride in his product and the same flaunting of its virtues as are shown by any hustler at a country fair. Drawn to the spectacle like moths to a flame, the powerful come from across the world to burn up a substantial part of their country's resources in this game of destruction. Terrorists' agents and the wheeler-dealers who live hand-

somely off the multi-billion dollar black market in arms add variety to the scene.

The arms trade, always sinister in its operations and always a threat to peace, has in the past few years reared its head even more menacingly, largely as a result of the multi-billion dollar trade that has grown up around the Iran-Iraq war. This has given a shot in the arm to the industry, setting new profit levels, elaborating sophisticated techniques of transferring arms and money and creating a more self-assured and openly acknowledged species of operator. The global effect of this development has been devastating, for it has meant reliable and easily available supplies of arms to all the smaller wars and to the terrorist movements across the world. Moreover, the industry and its hangers-on, whose levels of expectation have thus been raised, cannot be expected to lie low and accept global peace without doing what lies in their power to perpetuate their present comfortable levels of profits.

Fuelled by government patronage and private greed, as remorseless in its ethics as it is limitless in its appetite, the industry gathers strength with every conflict and with every move towards authoritarianism. Civil or international strife and authoritarianism of every breed are its natural allies, as peace and human rights are perceived as natural enemies. Sir Mark Oliphant, the noted Australian physicist and Nobel laureate, recalls how he questioned the manager of an armaments factory as to what he would do if peace should suddenly break out, only to receive the disconcerting answer that this would cause him sleepless nights.

International law has little to say of this anomaly, giving free rein in this regard to the wishes of the world's rulers. It admits the existence of the problem, but, confessing its incompetence to handle it, tends to put it away from its areas of concern. This seems rather contrary to the track record of international law which has always insisted on a code of higher principles standing above the wishes of governments.

When governments fail to comply with the norms of international law, the fraternity of international lawyers—that invisible college of lawyers across the world who have evolved a set of principles which they consider more obligatory than even the commands of their sovereign state—are not slow to assert their views. It is submitted in this article that as the armaments industry keeps tightening its global stranglehold, international lawyers and human rights scholars should not resign themselves to feelings of impotence but should actively be examining every concept and procedure afforded by

their disciplines to counter it, before it is too late. There is a real danger that present trends will harden into a permanent way of life if indeed they have not already done so. Should that happen, there cannot be a shadow of doubt that global peace would be seriously imperilled, for small wars and terrorist movements contain in them the seeds of bigger conflicts. These lead inexorably in the direction of global conflagration as the major powers begin to get involved. If there is an international duty lying upon all states to act constructively for the preservation of global peace, this duty must begin at the level of the arms trade, for action at a later stage savours very much of closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.

Why have weapons of death been able so far to elude those who should be censuring and controlling them? Why does the new discipline of human rights, now an honoured body of learning in its own right, join with traditional international law in resigning itself to this violation of every canon in its book of rules? What avenues may be explored to place fetters on it?

This article will examine the arms race from the following perspectives:

- The discipline of human rights
- The responsibilities of scientists
- Traditional principles of international law
- Possible United Nations action
- Alternatives to weapons production

### **Human rights**

One avenue of approach is to invoke in the campaign against the weapons trade a substantial body of principles, procedures, rules of law and international sentiment that have grown up around the discipline of human rights. In doing so one has the advantage of the growing prestige and authority of human rights as a provider of norms as well as being an important modern motive force of law reform, both international and national.

This approach becomes all the more compelling when one considers that every provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is violated by this trade, be it the right to life, the right to health, the right to a pure environment or the right to human dignity. It is the legal obligation of every state to ensure compliance within its jurisdiction with the basic principles of human rights. States which are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other international human rights documents

have solemnly accepted this responsibility. They include most of the major weapons suppliers in the world. What are the basic human rights (and therefore the basic legal obligations) which are thus violated? If the violations are serious enough it can be argued that the state permitting them is in breach of its international obligations both to the world community and to its own people.

A convenient starting point is to look at that most basic of all human rights—the right to life.

*The right to life*

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration affirms that everyone has the right to life. To what extent does the arms trade infringe on this principle by providing to those in power the ability to take life away from any citizen of the world?

The ultimate illustration of the denial of the right to life is offered by nuclear weapons and I shall therefore start with some observations regarding these. It should be remembered, however, that on a lesser scale the same considerations apply to all the sophisticated weaponry which is so freely sold today in the arms bazaars that it has become part of the stock-in-trade of the most minor powers and even of terrorist movements across the world.

I cannot do better here than quote the words of President Alfonsín of Argentina at the six nation Summit on Nuclear Disarmament held at New Delhi in January 1983. The President said:

All rights and freedoms as well as all the material goods and spiritual wealth that both men and nations possess have a common foundation: the right of life. This is such an essential attribute that no civilisation, no culture, has ever denied it. However, today we have lost it. In a few minutes a small group of people can destroy everything that each human being on this planet has—beginning with his own life and the life of his kin—and everything a nation has built over the centuries. And all this can be done without hearing our voice, without taking into account our will, without us even knowing about it. How did we get into this absurd situation?

The president was speaking of nuclear weapons, but in the same fashion, in all the dozens of wars occurring across the world, the right to life of those within their orbit is similarly denied by the war lords who wage them. The mounting toll of dead and the refugee camps overflowing with innocent non-combatants who have lost their all in a tussle to which they were not party are mute testimony to all that follows from the denial of the right of life. The arms trade, by making freely available the instruments of death, facilitates this process and magnifies its cost in human suffering in the same

way as the free sale of weapons in a national context heightens the level of internal crime.

*The right to self-determination*

With the right to life we may well couple another major right without which most other human rights are robbed of their true content—the right to self-determination. Here again I will quote the words of another leader at the same summit, Olof Palme, snatched from his life of service to humanity by an assassin's bullet, itself a product of the arms trade.

The principle of self-determination must mean that we, the non-nuclear weapons states, have an equal right to be masters of our own destiny. This right is being circumscribed by the threat of the use of weapons which would bring death and destruction to our peoples. Our message today is that we can never accept an order which in a way resembles a colonial system where the ultimate fate of other nations is determined by a few dominant nuclear powers. We, the non-nuclears, must also have a say.

One does not need to be a nuclear power to cripple, in this fashion, the right to self-determination of the people of smaller countries. The international scene is full of instances of domination of smaller powers by bigger regional powers. This results in the subordination of their foreign policy to the extent of crippling their autonomy.

*The right to development*

The arms trade links naturally with another negation of human rights of an equally far-reaching nature—that of the human right to development. This well known linkage becomes particularly important as we realize increasingly the finite nature of the resources of our planet. Every wasteful use of these resources increases global tension by reducing their availability for the satisfaction of the basic needs of the inhabitants of the planet. President Eisenhower put his finger dramatically on this linkage when he made his famous observation that 'every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in a final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed'.

This economic and material linkage between the arms race and underdevelopment leads naturally to envy and tension in our global village. The vast disparities between the haves and the have-nots on our planet are such as would, in a village situation, where people live cheek by jowl, lead to a riot. As distance shrinks and the world grows closer under the influence of modern technology, those feelings of resentment which physical proximity generates cannot long continue to be absent. We thus grow closer daily to the situation in which a little spark can trigger off a major forest fire. The forest, denuded of its natural nourishment and moisture, has become a

tinder box, ripe for conflagration. The arms race, by absorbing that nourishment and moisture, is setting the scene economically and psychologically for the holocaust which is the ultimate denial of every human right. In the words of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations,<sup>2</sup> 'The very existence and gravity of this threat generates a climate of suspicion and fear between states which is itself antagonistic to the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the international covenants on human rights'.

*Human rights denials within the weapons industry*

It is easy to make out a catalogue of all the basic human rights destroyed or eroded by the armaments industry. In pursuing such enquiries it is useful also to take into account the fact that the armaments industry is in league with the governments of the day and is thus a sharer in the aura of secrecy that surrounds governments. The weapons industry is linked with national security and it is through the argument of national security that most of the secrecy attaching to government operations is justified. These justifications rub off on the weapons industry. Consequently, the denial of human rights, such as the right to information and the right to privacy and freedom from surveillance of those employed in national defence is often practised by the weapons industry as well.

It can erect its secret surveillance systems, shut off areas from public scrutiny, subject potential employees to screening and personality tests, invoke provisions relating to national security and store up information in its data banks in a manner which is totally contrary to the free rights of the society whose freedom it is ostensibly protecting. It even, quite often, becomes a participant along with governments in the apparatus of repression which in many countries is used by the governments of the day to shield themselves from criticism and bolster themselves in power.

*Internal repression*

Indeed, military technology gives governments the ability to use on their own people in peace time the surveillance devices, the techniques of regimentation and even the techniques of interrogation and torture which are part of the technical expertise built up for the purposes of war. In the building of that expertise the laboratories of the armaments industry are willing accomplices of the governments from whom they make their profits.

*Interferences with the democratic process*

Another basic human right eroded by the industry is the democratic right of free and fair representation in the legislature. Under the protection of democracy, the industry maintains powerful lobbyists whose admitted purpose is to influence legislators in favour of the projects which bring

profit to the industry. Such lobbying is a recognized activity in the major democracies, and on Capitol Hill or in the lesser centres of power, the point of view of the arms trade is one of the most important factors influencing the minds and wills of legislators.

It may be said that peace groups likewise have their lobbies. This is indeed true but the financial resources or the steady organisational input available to the two groups cannot be compared. The entire economies of some of the most powerful nations would be thrown out of gear if the arms trade came to a halt and several states in the USA are largely dependent on it. Legislators depend on votes, and prosperity begets these. They are therefore obliged to the arms industry and cannot take an objective view of the global havoc it creates. Unemployment is the spectre that no politician can ignore. Peace groups have no such threats to hold over the heads of legislators.

*Freedom from  
fear*

All that has been said so far is in the realm of physical force and economic power. Assuredly these are denials of human rights, but we must not ignore the psychological aspect. After all, modern human rights were born in the crucible of World War II and the burning desire of the early post-war years that we should have a world free of the spectre of fear. Yet the world we have created is one in which the fear of annihilation haunts the entire global population. The majority of youth see no future for themselves. Repeated surveys have shown that a large part of the younger generation does not expect to live out its life to the biblical life span or even to maturity. Many expect that a holocaust will wipe them away before they see old age. They therefore shape their value systems and plan their lives on this basis.

Indeed there is here a human rights denial that goes beyond even a denial of the right to life. Even if the individual faces the prospect of physical death he or she knows that the species, the nation, the clan and family will survive. The notion of the death of the individual has been with the human species from the beginning and we have learnt to live with it.<sup>3</sup>

Extinction of the species is a different proposition. Life, which is meaningful to the individual even though the individual's death is inevitable, is devoid of all meaning in the context of extinction of the species. That is the prospect that the arms race holds out to the younger generation. This denial of human rights is so basic that we have not yet invented a term for it. There can be no doubt, however, that the expectation of clan-nation-species survival is one of the major factors that gives buoyancy to life and without it life is drained of all content. The void created by its deprivation must rank high in the scale of human rights denials.

*Terrorism*

No study of the arms trade can fail to note its contribution to the epidemic of terrorism now sweeping the globe. Terrorists of this generation are not ill-equipped guerilla fighters with make-shift devices contrived in their forest hideouts. They are armed with some of the most sophisticated weaponry that money can buy. There is often an inter-linkage between the major terrorist movements. Their sources of funds, organized in a global network, run to millions of dollars.

From the standpoint of the arms dealer, there is good profit here as well as the advantages that the war is comparatively small and long lasting. It is large enough to be profitable but small enough to avoid developing into a major conflagration. Its problems are so intractable that it will be of long duration, thus keeping the profits steadily rolling in. With its use of missiles and Kalashnikovs to vast quantities of bullets and hand grenades, the terrorist market is a steady customer of the arms industry and the latter, knowing the lucrative nature of the business, has its agents in touch both with the overseas funding sources and with the local leadership of the terrorist movements.

The peace-loving populations of many countries are thus held to ransom. The freedom to travel is gravely affected by the possibility of bombs in public transport, massacres at airports and hijacking of planes and ships. The right to life in many cities has been threatened to the extent that a citizen setting out to work in the morning has no assurance that he or she will return as usual at night. The right to food and health is denied. Refugees from the areas of conflict pour destitute into refugee camps and have to start life anew, their property entirely destroyed.

The arms industry cannot disclaim its share in all these denials of human rights. Nor is the arms industry so concerned with global welfare that it will keep its hands off trafficking in nuclear material such as spent uranium if it has the chance. The ultimate catastrophe of a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists is probably not far away and was predicted as long ago as 1972 when a leaflet entitled 'Towards the People's Bomb' appeared in London. When that occurs, it will be too late to decry the participation of the arms industry in all these violations of basic freedoms.

None of these dangers are fanciful. They all constitute basic human rights violations and therefore fundamental illegalities to which the states that countenance them are party.

*Strengthening the internal use of human rights within nations*

If the assertion is correct that the arms trade flies in the face of most human rights, solemnly accepted by nations as embodying the irreducible minimum of norms by which they should regulate their national conduct, and if it is also correct that the majority of the nations have solemnly pledged themselves to the implementation of these standards within their legal systems, we surely have a situation where nations which countenance the arms trade are violating their basic obligations under international law.

In this event there will undoubtedly be procedures available within those legal systems by which such open patronage of the arms trade can be challenged. Human rights law, it must be remembered, is now an accepted part of international law and obligations solemnly undertaken in treaties such as the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights are binding.

Court actions are an obvious means by which these propositions can be asserted. Unfortunately it so happens that in many countries human rights law stands apart to some extent from the main body of lawyers and law, that is, from those who regularly practise before the courts. There is still a feeling on the part of many lawyers that human rights law is not yet hard law but is still largely aspirational. We have long passed that stage and there needs to be more interaction between the two groups and the two subdisciplines.

When the right to a pure environment, or the right to health, or the right to motherhood are menaced by nuclear testing, or when the right to enjoy the human heritage and outer space is undermined by military activities threatening their integrity, or when the right to self-determination is negated by subordination to the politics of nuclear powers, the internal legal system should not remain inactive. It should be gearing up its machinery to tackle these situations. If they do not combat them there may well be no rights for legal systems to defend. Declamatory actions, injunctions, challenges of unconstitutionality, invocations of human rights obligations as binding state obligations, tax and revenue challenges, are some of the means to be explored.

Lawyers should not wait for a Nicaraguan type weapons deal to raise issues of national legality. The resources of constitutional law should be more often used and more actively called to aid, for even constitutional law tends quite often to stand some distance away from the discipline of human rights.

Nearly every major legal profession has within its professional organization a committee on human rights. It may be worth considering whether a

committee on armaments or perhaps an armaments sub-committee of the committee on human rights ought not to be established to keep under surveillance the movement of weapons to and from the country and the illegalities and human rights violations that proceed from this. Legal professions need to realize that there has been so much development in recent years that they cannot continue to function efficiently within the strait-jacket of traditional limitations of professional activity.

**Generating a  
scientific ethic**

Within the significant lacuna already noted in international law and human rights, there is an even more neglected area—the responsibilities of scientists and technologists who assist in the manufacture, improvement and development of weapons. We already have the weaponry to destroy our species several times over. But we still keep improving our weaponry, perfecting its delivery systems, increasing its powers and extending the area of its operation. We are in fact currently concentrating some of our finest scientific brain power on escalating the arms race into the dimensions of space.

The ideas for new weapons do not come out of the minds of our presidents and generals. They come from the brains of our scientists and reach up to the corridors of power from our laboratories rather than down to the laboratories from above. Yet the scientist who does all this is currently permitted to shelter behind the political and military superiors to whom he or she passes on the moral and legal responsibility and guilt. Indeed a large proportion of the world's scientists work not even for governments but for private arms manufacturers. If the preparation and production of weapons of mass destruction constitute a crime against humanity, participants in that enterprise—indeed the king pins in the whole operation—cannot conceivably avoid the position of being participants in that crime.

The Nuremberg principles which held that superior orders are no defence and that loyalty to humanity transcends such considerations as patriotism and superior orders have, strangely, not been applied thus far to the scientific enterprise. The victorious powers after World War II insisted that these principles be adopted as part of the corpus of international law. President Truman himself appeared before the General Assembly to urge their adoption and the Soviet Union gave its strong support to this move. Yet these principles are not today invoked against scientists who give their talents to these enterprises of planetary destruction of global havoc, with full knowledge of the consequences of their actions.

These issues cry out for an answer from the disciplines of international law and human rights. Three trillion dollars spent on nuclear weapons alone, 50 per cent of the scientific expertise of the world spent on the military enterprise but less than 1 per cent spent on problems of poverty, substantial chunks of national revenue in many countries deriving from this traffic in death—all these point to a major error in our perspectives whether as global citizens, international lawyers or human rights specialists. At the centre of this imbalance lies the scientist.

One is met with the argument that science and scientists cannot be interfered with as scientists are engaged in the process of searching after truth. This is supposedly a neutral activity. Knowledge is sacrosanct and its attainment cannot be impeded. The pursuit of knowledge is a fundamental freedom and a human right. To place limitations upon it is to interfere with one of the most sacred of all freedoms.

However, there is no such thing as an absolute right. Each right, however fundamental it may seem, can reach into areas where it clashes with other rights. The right to free contract of a business tycoon can clash with the right to human dignity of a starving employee, the producer's right to free advertising of infant milk-food substitutes can clash with the right to life of African children whose mortality rates escalate with resort to such substitutes. So also with the right to scientific research. There could well be, as in the context of the arms trade, the need for limitations when that right clashes with the right to life of the majority of the population of this planet. The right of uninhibited scientific research into DNA experimentation was curbed by the scientists themselves when they realized the extent of the danger to the human population by the release into the atmosphere of new and dangerous microbes.

Very often the scientist left to his unaided resources finds it difficult to work his way towards an ethic which will guide his conduct when questionable research is involved. It is important that guidelines should be worked out by the scientific community in relation to such matters. In particular, scientists working in the weapons trade ought to be assisted with guidelines worked out by the scientific profession in general. Thus far the scientific profession has not worked out proper codes of ethics in relation to these matters. Indeed, the scientific ethic is at present at a very crude level of development, not having passed much beyond the Hippocratic oath in its generalizations and that too only in the context of the medical profession, with some recent rudimentary extensions into other professions. It is true that engineers and others are today attempting to evolve ethical codes of their

own but these are still at the level of very broad formulations of the profession's general duties towards society and its clients.

Scientists have not yet worked towards an ethic in relation to their work, largely for the reason that their concentration on the search for new information and the belief in the neutrality of science have obscured their vision of its social perspectives. Moreover, scientists have not been alerted by the legal profession to the fact that their work frequently constitutes a direct contradiction of the basic duties laid down by international law in the context of the Nuremberg trials and the developments of these principles that have followed since then.

The armaments industry is so central to these violations that it is indeed necessary that there should be declarations concerning the scientific ethic in relation to work on armaments. These should emanate from scientific bodies but equally importantly from international bodies with sufficient prestige and universality to command respect in their formulations of these ethical principles. With this in view the author has been working towards a Declaration of Scientific Responsibility in relation to scientists who work in the nuclear weapons industry. The Declaration ought ideally to be adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. A circular letter addressed to member states in this regard drew an interesting variety of replies ranging from downright rejection to expressions of strong approval. A further interesting feature of the responses received was that although several states expressed sympathy with the general objectives of the Declaration, there was a reluctance to take the initiative and to sponsor it themselves. This was no doubt due to a variety of economic and other pressures operating especially on the smaller states. However, with the growing global consciousness of the importance of this issue this reluctance can surely be overcome.<sup>4</sup> It may be that the international climate of scientific opinion is also ripe for such a move, given that in the US over 12,000 scientists have pledged themselves to refuse research assistance from Star Wars funding.

The Russell/Einstein manifesto, the work of the Pugwash group, and scientific declarations such as *For the Species and Planet: A statement in support of the Five Continents Peace Initiative*, signed by 50 Nobel laureates, are further indications that significant sections of the scientific community are not insensitive to their moral obligations in this matter. However, there is still a hiatus here, due largely to the unawareness of the majority of the scientific community of the legal and human rights implications of their work and of the applicability to it of the Nuremberg principles.

If the legal dimension is added to the moral, their disapproval of this work can be immeasurably strengthened. With the proposed UN Declaration, an important additional inhibiting factor would have been added to the series of restraints that are now building up against the arms race and the weapons trade. In the words of the Declaration for the Species and the Planet: 'If we are not so foolish as to destroy ourselves, future generations will look back on this day as a critical crossroads in human history when we had the wisdom to break with the working of the past, to adopt a new way of thinking, to choose life and not death'.

*Harnessing technology in the service of human rights*

On the other side of the coin it should be noted that efforts need to be mounted to use all the resources of modern technology for the active promotion of human rights. This is a positive step that can be taken, especially in the context of armaments technology, and there is evidence of a growing consciousness of this need. The author is presently a member of a steering committee appointed by the UN University in pursuance of a mandate issued to it by the UN Human Rights Commission to consider ways in which technology can be used affirmatively to further human rights. The subject opens up vast vistas as yet largely unexplored.

When one considers that every single article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all the other human rights instruments is capable of being violated by modern science and technology,<sup>5</sup> it is not difficult to perceive that science and technology can be used affirmatively to further those very human rights if we only gave thought to it in a more systematic and determined fashion. This subject is further examined below.

**Traditional international law**

The conclusion of illegality reached through an application of human rights doctrine can also be reached through traditional international law.

*Preparation for the use of force*

A central pillar of the current world order is the preservation of peace, in consequence of which every state has the duty to take what steps it can to prevent any violations of the peace and to desist from giving assistance to those who plan such violations. The use of force is clearly prohibited by the UN Charter except in the strictly limited case of self-defence.

If the act concerned amounts to a preparation for the use of force in violation of the UN Charter it is the duty of all states not to be parties to such action and to ensure that such activity does not take place within their jurisdiction. All the more is it important that they refuse themselves to be partners and participants in such activity.

In some of these transactions governments themselves are the suppliers. Other transactions receive the encouragement and blessing of governments. There are others still that are carried out behind the backs of governments, with the governments not concerning themselves sufficiently to track them down. In all of them the governments concerned are in dereliction of their duties under international law to do all within their power to maintain and preserve peace.

*The duty of good faith*

Good faith among nations is another of the central pillars on which international law is built.

What, however, are the realities? In the contemporary world situation these can conveniently be considered in the context of the Iran-Iraq war which has so far taken an estimated death toll of 650,000 with a further one million wounded. The world is agreed that this is a threat not only to regional peace but to global peace as well.

Yet every one of the permanent members of the Security Council is a major arms dealer and every one has directly or indirectly supplied arms to Iran or Iraq. In doing so, they were only five among around thirty countries which had themselves done business with the warring countries.

Admittedly, hard facts and statistics are difficult to obtain but apart from the United States' now well-known involvement, French companies have reportedly shipped more than US \$100 million worth of heavy artillery shells to Iran; the UK Government has supplied US \$50 million worth of Chieftain tank engines and spare parts to Iran 'as resupply under pre-war contracts', China has sold Iran US \$ 400 million worth of arms in 1987 in addition to Silkworm missiles, artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and rocket launchers; and the Soviet Union's East European allies and North Korea are also reportedly involved in the arms trade in the Gulf.<sup>6</sup>

It is true that it seems idealistic to talk of good faith in international relations, but we cannot lose sight of the fact that Good Faith is one of the six fundamental principles on which the International Law of Peace is based (the others being Sovereignty, Consent, Recognition, International Responsibility and Freedom of the Seas), and if Good Faith breaks down in international relations to such an extent that the powers imposing the ban are themselves the suppliers, we might as well write off our system of international law and our hopes for a peaceful world order. It serves a purpose and can create no harm to keep reminding all powers of this fundamental duty lying upon them.

*General principles of international law*

The great powers themselves have recognized that this war endangers world peace and violates sufficient principles of international law for the Security Council to pass unanimously Resolution 598 'demanding' a ceasefire and threatening sanctions if Iran and Iraq failed to comply with its terms.

The very fact that the Security Council could reach a unanimous decision on an arms embargo was itself clear evidence that there were principles ingrained in the international system which could be invoked in support of the proposition that international law did not permit the continuance of arms supplies to feed this catastrophic war. It was not an isolated pronouncement unrelated to the general laws of peace and war. The governing principles would have been applicable even apart from the resolution.

*Self-defence*

A common answer offered by way of justification of arms supply is that international law fully recognizes the right of self-defence. If a nation buys weapons on the basis that they are needed for self-defence, we are asked, 'What is the status or right of the arms supplier to question this?' International law, like human rights, needs to pierce the smokescreen created by this alleged justification.

In the first place it is well to remember that when the arms trade is free to sell to country X, its neighbour or potential rival, country Y, seeks on the basis of self-defence, to balance this new strength in its rival and the arms trade then hauls in a double profit. Country X then adds to its arsenal and country Y replies, much to the further profit of the industry, which grows with every increase in international tension. It is easy and convenient for the arms trade to argue that it is not its business to check the bona fides of the buyer's need.

Everyone engaged in international affairs—and most of all, every arms supplier—knows that an acquisition of weapons which is supposedly for self-defence is often an accumulation of weapons for the purposes of aggression. The argument of self-defence is often speciously invoked when the weapons capability of a given country already far exceeds that which is necessary for purely self-defensive purposes. Self-defence involves the threat of an impending attack and this is seldom the case in relation to many of the countries that are weapons purchasers.

A classic instance of the consideration of this aspect in international law is in relation to the plea before the Nuremberg Tribunal that Germany invaded Norway in order to forestall a contemplated Allied landing there, and that

this was therefore an act of self-defence. The Tribunal was unimpressed by the plea that the question of self-defence was exclusively a matter for the state concerned to determine for itself, and did not consider itself precluded from examining the question whether Germany had been in fact entitled to invoke the right of self-defence in its invasion of Norway. The Tribunal observed, 'Whether action taken under the claim of self-defence was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced'.<sup>7</sup>

If the question whether an act of force was committed in self-defence or not 'must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication' under international law, the accumulation of the means wherewith such aggression can be committed cannot avoid external scrutiny. It cannot be claimed to be a matter purely within the automatic determination of the state concerned. The fact that the act of aggression has not yet taken place should not preclude this inquiry.

This point is made here merely to show that the *ipse dixit* of a state that it is acquiring weapons for self-defence does not necessarily conclude the matter. International law is entitled to probe beyond this process of automatic self-determination by the state concerned.

It should also be added that very often the purpose of weapons accumulation is internal repression. This is patently clear in the case of some of the dictatorships which are to be found across the world. In such instances too, the self-defence argument is untenable in the light of the human rights principles set out in the earlier part of this article.

#### *The principle of state responsibility*

There is also the fundamental principle of state responsibility in international law. State sovereignty is a jealously guarded right, but its corollary is that the state becomes responsible to the international community for the observance of international law within its boundaries. If the international community cannot enter within a state's boundaries to police the observance of its rules, this can only be on the basis that it is the responsibility of the state to do so. The state cannot turn a blind eye on a known breach of the international code and at the same time disclaim responsibility.

#### *Supplies to terrorist movements*

I have not yet referred in this context to the supply of arms to terrorist movements, which again takes place with the connivance of governments. The terrorist network is a major consumer of arms and the last decade has proved that even apparently small scale terrorist groups have massive funds

*Illegality of routes  
of supply and  
payment*

at their disposal. Those funds come from a variety of sources including drug trafficking and various types of crime. Terrorists have direct and indirect dealings with the arms merchants, and a multi-billion dollar blackmarket in armaments is the result. Supply to such groups is clearly a violation of international law.

The means adopted for the transmission of weapons and payments keep growing in sophistication. Weapons intended for a particular country are routed under false documents to a variety of false destinations, using fabricated end-user certificates. The money that pays for them may similarly be routed through banks in a dozen countries, passing off in each case as a faked transaction such as an investment, a gift, or as payment for goods, and all these transactions can be effected by telex within 24 hours so that the buyer pays for his illicit goods and the seller receives payment with a minimal possibility of detection.

Such illicit dealings may be difficult to detect and often pass without detection because the national and international will to detect them is lacking. Their violation of international law is patently clear.

All of this calls for a concerted national and international effort, without which the trade will continue to grow. Irangate has given the public some small glimpses of the devious routes these transactions can take, but only the tip of the iceberg has been seen.

The free and unrestricted sale of the most sophisticated arms is not permitted within a nation state because of the obvious dangers to national law and order. The international scene cannot be any different, yet we all tend to sit and watch while the means of disrupting the peace of the entire global village are being freely distributed.

Principles deeply ingrained in the law of nations cannot be thus lightly ignored, if the fabric of international law is to survive and if indeed we are to give ourselves an even chance of human survival. We cannot watch from the sidelines while these principles are run into the ground especially by those with a prime responsibility for upholding them.

Incidents such as Irangate only compound the confusion, for by stressing the illegality of supplies made contrary to congressional or presidential bans, they convey the implication that all other arms deals are legal.

**Possible United Nations action**

There are many avenues open for making better use of existing international organizations and procedures, and in particular the United Nations.

1. The Declaration of Scientific Responsibility for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This has already been discussed. It should be stressed that this is only an attempt to arouse the scientific conscience and evolve guidelines to help the scientist, and not an attempt to impose restrictions from above. Moreover, it would give scientists an awareness that most of them currently lack, that such activity violates both international law and human rights.

They would also be reminded that the Committee on Human Rights of the United Nations has resolved <sup>8</sup> that the production, testing, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be recognized as crimes against humanity.<sup>9</sup>

2. Article 96(1) of the UN Charter permits the General Assembly to refer a question of international law to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The question of the illegality of unrestricted weapons sales (or some particular aspect of it) as well as the question of the illegality of nuclear weapons are two of the matters which could be thus referred.

It is true that the International Court has no enforcement powers but should the world's highest Tribunal express the view that such activities are illegal, this would have immense persuasive and psychological value. One comprehensive judgement of the World Court can have more far-reaching consequences than dozens of disarmament conferences. We have had over 6,000 of these since the Second World War and they have not been significant in their achievements. Such rulings by the International Court of Justice would also place a very heavy burden on states who violate them, to justify their conduct. There is a growing climate of opinion among international lawyers of the illegality of these activities, and it is not being fanciful to expect some reflection of this in the opinions of the Court.

3. The United Nations could be asked to evolve some machinery for the supervision of arms sales, or a set of guidelines with which such sales should comply. Admittedly, such measures will encounter resistance as a number of the smaller states are regular arms purchasers. I am conscious in making this suggestion that, 'Attempts through the United Nations even to raise the possibility of reintroducing the kind of register of arms transfers published by the League of Nations, let alone to restrict the trade, have met with anger and contempt from the majority of Third World Countries'.<sup>10</sup>

However, the arms trade is now growing to such colossal dimensions and is such an international danger that attitudes on the question could change. Nothing is static in the international world and what we are considering is, though an old trade, one with such dramatically new dimensions that it compels reconsideration.

4. Strengthening the International Court of Justice. The post-war years have seen over 150 'little wars' break out. Some of them may have been small by the standards of the major wars but they have all been fought with arms of some degree of sophistication and in nearly every case a substantial component of the arms used was imported. There can be no question that the armaments industry derived profit from them and in many instances contributed towards keeping these little wars rolling nicely along. There can be no question either that many of these were 'proxy' wars fought between the great powers who kept themselves in the background and tested out their influence against each other at the cost of other peoples' lives and with damage to other peoples' territories.

The various dispute resolution procedures of international law, ranging from arbitration to referrals to the International Court, have, however, scarcely if ever been used in attempting to avoid this bloodshed. On a recent rare occasion when these procedures were invoked in the context of armed conflict, a super power was quick to disclaim the International Court's jurisdiction, thus significantly retarding the process of dispute resolution in situations of armed conflict. The central theme of this article is that international law with all its concepts and mechanisms must be harnessed more actively in relation to armed conflict and all its accompaniments. The recent statement of the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachov, in favour of the prestige and authority of the International Court is heartening in this context.

5. More use of Non-Governmental Organizations. Another source of strength, still largely untapped in relation to the armaments industry, is the combined weight of the non-governmental organizations. There are literally hundreds of NGO's and many of them are deeply interested in this question. The illegality of the arms trade has not as yet been brought to their attention but if it is, there can be no doubt about a powerful response from this group. NGO's are demonstrating increasingly their powers to make an impact on national legal systems, quite apart from the impact they can make in the United Nations itself.

Thus far, the campaign against the arms trade has been based on considerations of morality. If illegality is added to immorality as a basis of objection,

especially on the part of the NGO's who have not hitherto based their protests on this aspect, there can be no doubt that the strength of the opposition will be advanced to a level beyond anything known before.

**Generating alternatives**

There is another—and a rather ironic—point of contact between human rights and the arms trade. Human rights doctrine points out to us the major rights which in a just society ought to be guaranteed to every human being. Among these are the right to work, the right to human dignity and the right to health. There is a real fear in many countries that the cessation of the arms trade could well mean massive unemployment and a loss of many of the basic human rights of the people currently employed in it. It is of course an index of the extent to which we have sunk into the morass of armaments that we should even have to consider this question. But it is an important question nonetheless—a question to which, in the current ordering of industrial society, we must give our attention if we are to free ourselves of the shackles of the arms trade.

To address this question we should make a catalogue of the basic rights affected by such a scenario. Having done so we should examine alternatives—how can we convert our swords into ploughshares by generating alternative economic activities to compensate for the cessation of the sword-making activities? This is an important practical aspect, for merely idealistic condemnations of the arms trade in a world of harsh economic realities will not carry us very far.

An article in *Development Dialogue* ten years ago<sup>11</sup> examined the problem with reference to a company (The British Lucas Company) about half of whose production was for military purposes. The article pointed out that while it was the national policy of most trade unions that there should be no defence cuts, yet none of these unions had ever proposed actual alternative products on which their members could be engaged. The Lucas Aerospace Combined Shop Stewards Committee, an amalgamation of the 13 trade unions within the 17 plants operated by Lucas, produced a plan which did this by asking all members to analyse the skills they possessed and the machinery available to work on alternative products. In this way they generated proposals for approximately 150 alternative products. There seems to be no reason why such procedures cannot be adopted more widely across the trade union movement which after all has such prime concern with human rights.

'Conversion', the name commonly given to the growing discipline of con-

verting swords into ploughshares, has attracted significant attention in recent years. At a symposium on the topic held in the Netherlands in November 1984 by the World Association of World Federalists, Mrs Inga Thorsson, then Under-Secretary of State in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the UN group of government experts on the relationship between disarmament and development from 1978 to 1981, summarized the main conclusion of the group. These conclusions, reached after three years of intensive work, were as follows:

1. The world can either continue the arms race with unabated speed or it can change direction towards a more stable and sustainable economic and political order. It cannot do both because the arms race and the economy compete for the same resources.
2. Every country, irrespective of its economic system or its level of development, would benefit economically from a process of disarmament. There is mutual advantage and direct self-interest for all the countries of the world to be engaged in disarmament. In the disarmament process governments would certainly meet some problems in trying to convert resources from military to peaceful purposes but these are technically and economically solvable. The Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in August 1987 confirms the validity of these conclusions and underlines the importance of concerted work in this direction.

Many steps have been advocated towards this end, including:

1. Preparing assessment of the nature and magnitude of the short- and long-term economic and social costs attributable to the military preparation of each country so that its general public be informed of them.
2. Developing a fuller and more systematic compilation and dissemination of data on the military use of human and material resources.
3. Creating the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning, to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular in Third World countries.<sup>12</sup>

One step that tends to be omitted from most lists of what can be done is the important task of researching, emphasizing and spreading understanding of this basic illegality of the arms trade. Many workers in this trade unthinkingly continue to work in it, for their attention has not been pointedly drawn

to its illegality. If the sensitivity of each worker to this aspect can be heightened, there is every chance that the community pressure of many individual opinions could change psychological attitudes noted by researchers, such as the notion that it is more prestigious to work on a military airplane than on a refrigerator.

These are a few random reflections on the fact that the arms trade has not so far attracted from international lawyers and human rights practitioners the attention it deserves. It is to be hoped that in the years immediately ahead international lawyers will combine their resources with lawyers practising within purely national jurisdictions, to use legal systems, national and international, as a means of containing one of the most pernicious problems of this century.<sup>13</sup> If we fail to curb it now, it will be increasingly difficult to do so with every passing year and the iron grip with which it leads us towards planetary instability and destruction may never be broken.

#### Notes

1. Oliphant, Mark, 'The Social Responsibility of Scientists' in N J Rotblat (Ed.) *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament*, UNESCO/Pugwash symposium, Taylor and Francis 1982, p. 193.
2. General comments under Article 40, paragraph 4, of the Covenant adopted by the Committee at its 563rd meeting (23rd session) held on November 2, 1984.
3. See Schell, Jonathan, *The Fate of the Earth*, Knopf, New York, 1982, p. 183.
4. Weeramantry, C.G., *Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Responsibility*, Longwoods, New York, 1987.
5. See Weeramantry, C.G., *The Slumbering Sentinels: Law and Human Rights in the Wake of Technology*, Penguin, 1983, for a list of such technological violations.
6. 'Who's Who in the Arms Bazaar'. *South Magazine*, November 1987, p. 21.
7. Cmd 6964 (1946) p.30.
8. At its 563rd meeting on November 2, 1984.
9. For a full argument showing how illegality attaches, see *Nuclear Weapons and Scientific Responsibility*, op. cit.
10. Sims, Nicholas, *Approaches to Disarmament*, rev. ed. Lond., Friends, Peace and International Relations Committee, 1979, p. 100.
11. 'Alternatives to Military Production and to Unemployment', *Development Dialogue* 1977:1, p. 31.
12. *Conversion: A Symposium Report produced on the occasion of the WAWF Symposium held at the Netherlands*, November 1984, World Association of World Federalists, p. 16. See also *In Pursuit of Disarmament: Conversion from Military to Civil Production in Sweden*. Report by the Special Expert Inga Thorsson, volumes 1A and 1B, Liber Stockholm, 1984, and volume 2, Stockholm, 1985.
13. See generally Boyle, F.A., *Defending Civil Resistance under International Law*, Transnational Publishers, 1988.

# About a Tragic Business

## The Djuna Barnes/Dag Hammarskjöld Letters

Introduction by Sherrill E. Grace

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*'There can be no question that Hammarskjöld loved public life and regarded the Secretary-Generalship as the most important thing that had ever happened to him', wrote Brian Urquhart in an essay entitled 'Dag Hammarskjöld: The Private Person in a Very Public Office'. Pointing out in the same essay that while some public figures are completely taken over by public life, he emphasized that Dag Hammarskjöld belonged to a different category, namely to those who guard the inner fortress of their privacy as 'the true source of their strength and capacity to bear public office'. Hammarskjöld was in fact seldom as happy as on those occasions when he could escape for a few hours from his many and pressing public duties and devote an evening to his literary, musical or intellectual interests in the company of his friends. As an unmarried man, he was able to lead such a life, dividing his friends in separate compartments, each for a particular sphere of intellectual activity. An extraordinary illustration of how he disciplined himself in order to be able to take advantage of the cultural opportunities available in New York is the following exchange of letters between himself and the American writer Djuna Barnes, which is published here for the first time. It is the more remarkable as a testimony to his personality and character as many of the letters were written at a time (June 1958–May 1961) when Hammarskjöld was under enormous political pressure from the big powers, carrying the ultimate responsibility for the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations both in the Middle East and in the Congo.*

*While these letters trace Dag Hammarskjöld's contribution to the translation into Swedish of Djuna Barnes' play *The Antiphon* and the development of a mutually enriching friendship, they also raise the question why Dag Hammarskjöld was so deeply drawn to this play.*

*The literary historian Sherrill Grace, who has searched out and edited this correspondence, says in her introduction that Dag Hammarskjöld was very sensitive to the parallels between this terrifying play about internecine battles, human cruelty, guilt and greed in a family and the events taking place on the world stage. 'This tragic vision', she writes, 'obviously moved Hammarskjöld deeply. But what must also have seized his imagination was the tight control, the almost icy refusal of complaint, evinced by the language, symbolism and structure of this play. As Markings shows so clearly, Dag Hammarskjöld, like Djuna Barnes, has looked into the abyss of human evil and of death. Like her, he valued the silence, control, restraint and courage required by those men and women who were determined to carry on. In fact, what strikes the reader of Markings, as of Barnes' works, is the stress both placed on human dignity in the face of death and corruption.'*

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On the evening of 17 February, 1961, the curtain at Stockholm's famous Royal Dramatic Theatre went up on one of the most unusual and challenging productions ever staged there. The audience that night was both moved and perplexed, and when reviews began to appear on the following day, the critical verdict was also mixed: Ivar Harrie called it 'victorious . . . one of Dramaten's greatest performances'; Ebbe Linde, however, was scathing and described the play itself as stale, imagist caviar 'complicated and obscure in the extreme'.<sup>1</sup>

The play under the spot-light was a densely written, symbolic, verse tragedy called *The Antiphon* by Djuna Barnes (1892–1982), a little known American modernist, who was a friend and contemporary of James Joyce and T.S. Eliot. Completed by Barnes in July of 1954, *The Antiphon* was not published until 1958. For its Swedish première it was translated as *Växelsången* by Dr Karl Ragnar Gierow (1904–1982), Managing Director of the Dramaten at the time, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. A veteran of the Swedish theatre, Olof Molander, directed the production with stunning sets (on this all the critics agreed) designed by Georg Magnusson. The actors engaged for the production were also impressive: Sif Ruud played the mother, Augusta, opposite Birgitta Valberg, who played her daughter, Miranda, with the four male parts—an uncle and three brothers—played by Olle Hilding, Björn Gustafson, Allan Edwall and Olof Widgren. Hammarskjöld (working from New York), Gierow, Molander and the cast had spared no effort in bringing this demanding play to life in the theatre. According to an enthusiastic Gierow, who wrote to Barnes shortly before the opening night, *The Antiphon* had received 'the longest rehearsal' of any play in the two hundred year history of the Dramaten.<sup>2</sup>

In the more than twenty-five years since the Dramaten's production and the Swedish publication of the translation that same month, very little has been heard of Djuna Barnes or her work, and *The Antiphon* has been all but forgotten by literary and theatre historians alike. However, with the publication of Andrew Field's biography, *Djuna: The Life and Times of Djuna Barnes* (1983), she has begun to receive the kind of serious attention she deserves—the kind she had once received from men like James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Edwin Muir, Karl Ragnar Gierow and Dag Hammarskjöld.

The letters published here for the first time were written by Barnes and Hammarskjöld between June 1958 and May 1961, and they trace the slow emergence of *Växelsången* from Barnes' text, as well as the development of a warm, mutually respectful friendship.<sup>3</sup> The thirty items that follow this

introduction open a window on what Barnes described, in a letter to Gierow on 7 March, 1961, as 'one of the happiest hours of my life'. In addition, they cast further light on the remarkable man who chose to champion *The Antiphon*. The more one knows about Hammarskjöld, especially during those extraordinarily stressful years of the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961, the easier it is to understand Barnes' affectionate admiration for him. And yet, while these letters provide valuable information for the literary critic faced with *The Antiphon* and important facts for the theatre historian, they raise larger, tantalizing questions for biographers: questions, for example, about why Dag Hammarskjöld was so deeply drawn to this play, as he was also to Barnes' brilliant novel, *Nightwood* (1936); questions about what a man like Hammarskjöld and a woman like Barnes, whom most would have dismissed as an elderly, eccentric recluse, could possibly have had in common.

To attempt answers to such questions necessitates a return to the beginning, or a beginning: 5 June, 1958. On this day, Dag Hammarskjöld and the Scottish writer, poet, translator and critic, Edwin Muir (1887–1959), were both receiving honorary degrees at Cambridge University. During the procession they chatted about poetry, with Muir enthusiastically praising a new play that he admired—Djuna Barnes' *The Antiphon*. There is some confusion over when Hammarskjöld first discovered Barnes' work, but his biographer, Brian Urquhart, is certain that he had read *Nightwood* as early as 1948, and his 7 June, 1958 letter to Barnes suggests that he had discovered her play *prior* to the conversation with Muir.<sup>4</sup> In any case, he agreed that this was an exceptional work of art and, encouraged by Muir, he wrote to Barnes as soon as he returned to New York. Thus began the story that would climax on the boards of the Dramaten two and a half years later. Between 5 June, 1958 and 17 February, 1961, Hammarskjöld would find himself increasingly embroiled in the escalating crises first in Lebanon and then in the Congo, but as his letters to Barnes (and those to Gierow) show, he found time to arrange four small dinner parties for Barnes at his East 73rd Street apartment where she would meet with W.H. Auden, Dr Gierow and others of the Secretary-General's 'likeminded' friends such as George Ivan Smith. And he spent many hours re-reading the play and assisting his friend, Gierow, with the translation.

Whether Gierow approached Hammarskjöld, or *vice versa*, about translating *The Antiphon* is not entirely clear, but there is a letter in the Dramaten Gierow Collection dated 25 September, 1957 from Gierow to Edwin Muir inquiring about the play and the possibility of obtaining a copy of the manuscript for production purposes. Gierow, himself a poet with a

particular interest in verse drama, had read Muir's description of the play in *The Bookseller* (a British weekly book trade newspaper), and it was on the strength of Muir's praise that Gierow became interested in *The Antiphon*. Muir had been one of the original seven readers of the manuscript after it was sent to Eliot at Faber and Faber in the summer of 1954. From that point on, he had championed the play against the strong reservations of Eliot and others, but *The Antiphon* was not published in England until January 1958. The earliest data at which either Gierow or Hammarskjöld could have read the published text would be during the early months of that year. By the time Gierow first contacted Barnes, on 3 December, 1958, he had already located a possible translator, the young Swedish poet, Majken Johansson, but he quickly became dissatisfied with the translation produced by her and her co-translator, Mario Grut; therefore, sometime during the summer of 1959 their version was dropped so that Gierow and Hammarskjöld could produce their own.<sup>5</sup>

It is most likely, then, that both Gierow and Hammarskjöld read *The Antiphon* during the winter or spring of 1958 and that, as close personal friends, they exchanged views on the play and shared their mutual liking for it. Therefore, when Gierow rejected the Johansson/Grut version, it was natural to turn to Hammarskjöld for help with the translation. Letters between Gierow and Hammarskjöld, however, make clear that the Secretary-General was pleased to bring his Swedish compatriot together with the author in order to discuss problems in the text, but that he felt Gierow was the chief translator of *Växelsången*.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, a typescript of the translation bearing detailed hand-written changes and additions by Hammarskjöld demonstrates his careful contribution to the final text.

While never underestimating the difficulties of their task, Hammarskjöld remained convinced that *The Antiphon* was a truly great and essentially clear, if complex, tragedy. During their laborious work on the translation, however, Gierow had frequently felt discouraged by the obscure language and symbolism of her poetry: at one point he told Hammarskjöld, in a mixture of jest and vexation, that it took him an hour to translate one line; at another he described Barnes' efforts at clarification as signposts in the middle of the road that one runs into—but which may eventually show the way. In spite of these road-blocks, by the summer of 1960 they had a working translation, and in a letter to Gierow dated 21 June, 1960, Hammarskjöld said how much he had enjoyed Gierow's visit to New York in May and their work on *Växelsången*. 'It may amuse you', he continued, 'that Antiphon warmed me up to such an extent that I suddenly exploded in a translation of (Saint-John) Perse's Chronique'.<sup>7</sup>

Between the summer of 1960 and February 1961, the translators continued to polish *Växelsången* with a view to improving their text for its February publication by P.A. Norstedt and Söner, and in an effort to clarify the dialogue and symbolic puns and nuances for the actors. Barnes was delighted with the handsome book which bore both the names of Gierow and Hammarskjöld as her translators and the dedication to Edwin Muir, but she was anxious about reviewers' comments. Ebbe Linde, who had also been critical of the production, followed up his 18 February *Dagens Nyheter* review of the première with a second fusillade two days later.

In a review article called 'I Språkets Djungel' ('In the verbal jungle', with the Swedish slyly chiming the author's unusual first name), Linde compared several passages from *Växelsången* with the original in order to illustrate how often the translators had misfired. His conclusion, however, was more of an assault on *The Antiphon* itself:

This is not said in order to minimize the dedication and hard work of the translators or to put down the result, which is certainly better than most other people could have produced. But the task was overwhelming, almost like bringing order to the Congo.

Linde had read *The Antiphon* carefully, so that while not especially sympathetic to the play, he recognized its verbal artistry and its intricate puns, which suggested the influence of Joyce. In this he echoed James Burnes Singer, who had reviewed the Faber publication in *The Times Literary Supplement* for 4 April, 1958, and whose serious, sensitive response had greatly pleased Barnes. Singer called the play 'a modern *Oresteia*' in which every word rang 'with the simple necessity of having to be the word', while at the same time warning against performance because 'every philologist would find difficulty in understanding (Barnes') diction at reading'. Linde, therefore, was not far off the mark: translating such a struck Hammarskjöld as apt, for he would not have missed the greed and the events taking place on the world stage. Both 'thee' as tragedy, and Hammarskjöld was above all sensitive to *The*

Despite its complexity and arcane, anachronistic style, *The* personal work with distanced, tightly controlled, yet clear author's private experience. It is a terrifying play about a caught in a web of destructive love/hate relationships &

vicious, crippling past. For Swedes like Hammarskjöld and Gierow, reading it must have seemed a little like entering the familiar worlds of August Strindberg and Eugene O'Neill. Indeed Barnes, like O'Neill, had been influenced by Strindberg, and she had worked with O'Neill during the early years of the Provincetown Theatre.<sup>8</sup> Underneath its iambic pentameter verse and self-consciously Jacobean trappings, *The Antiphon* is, as Andrew Field suggests, about 'what happened down on the farm at Cornwall-on-Hudson' in New York State where Djuna Barnes was born.

Djuna was the second child and only daughter of five children born to Elizabeth Chappell and Henry Budington, who adopted the name of Wald Barnes. Her mother was English, from the town of Oakham in Rutland (now Leicestershire) where the manor house, Burley-on-the-hill, which provides the setting for *The Antiphon*, can still be found. Her father was a New Englander of Irish stock, a free thinker, a biblical patriarch (out of Genesis) in his domestic arrangements, a farmer, a failed artist and, if Field is correct, a man hated by his children, especially by his daughter. Working from evidence in her letters and in the drafts and published texts of three of her works—*Ryder* (1928), *Nightwood* (1936) and *The Antiphon*—Field argues that Wald Barnes, who prided himself on his many mistresses and sexual exploits, tried to rape his sixteen year old daughter. When she resisted, he arranged for a neighbour to rape her in an upstairs bedroom with a younger brother as witness, while he rubbed his hands with satisfaction downstairs and the mother hid her head beneath her apron, refusing to protest or interfere. This 'tale of cold and stupid horror', says Field, 'has always remained the story behind the story in Barnes' writing'. Certainly, something very like this lies at the core of *The Antiphon*; it is what the mother, Augusta, is forced to see through the upstairs window of the doll's house in the second act of the play.

Whatever the facts of such an episode in her life may have been, two things are certain: Djuna Barnes rejected her father, was not close to her brothers and had deeply ambivalent feelings about her mother; she could, moreover, be savage in her refusal to see much goodness in humanity. She left the family farm to study art in New York in 1911, began writing immediately—journalism, poetry, stories, one act plays for the Provincetown Players—and became famous as the most beautiful of Greenwich Village habitués before she sailed for Paris in 1919. During the twenties and thirties she lived in Paris and travelled widely on the continent and in England, and it was during these years that she earned her place in the circles of Joyce, Eliot, Natalie Barney, Peggy Guggenheim, Robert McAlmon, and others of the so-called 'expatriate Left Bank'. Her painful love affair with the

American artist, Thelma Wood, the model for the character of Robin in the novel *Nightwood*, took place during these Paris years.<sup>9</sup> When she returned permanently to the States in 1939—virtually destitute and in very poor health—she at first tried to live with her mother, but after that proved disastrous she moved to the Patchin Place address where she would spend the next forty-two years of her life.

Elizabeth Chappell Barnes died in 1945, and her death seems to have removed the final barrier to Barnes' confrontation with her family's past. By 1947 she had begun work on *The Antiphon* which she believed would be the best thing she had ever written, far better, in fact, than *Nightwood*. Because of the meticulous care she took with the text, and due to a series of health problems (including a threat of terminal cancer), it was more than seven years before a penultimate draft was ready to be sent to 'Tom' in London. When Eliot received the play, however, he was slow to respond. Although he had warmly championed *Nightwood*, he had subsequently urged Barnes to write more prose *not* poetry, so that when he received *The Antiphon* he was frankly dismayed. On the jacket of the published book he is quoted as saying that 'never has so much genius been combined with so little talent'.

Muir, however, not only endorsed the play but also undertook to help Barnes with the pruning and editing of the manuscript prior to its publication. During his term as Visiting Professor of Poetry at Harvard in 1956, he arranged for *The Antiphon* to receive its first public performance—a 'concert reading' that took place on 21 May, 1956 in Phillips House at Harvard, with Eliot and Barnes attending. By all accounts, the reading was a dismal failure, with the only positive result being a further pruning and simplifying of the text. When the play was finally published in 1958, its sales were slim and its impact non-existent, except in Sweden. After Muir's death in 1959, Barnes dedicated all reprints of the play, including the Swedish translation to him.

When Hammarskjöld died at Ndola in September 1961, Barnes was devastated; not only had she lost, by then, two of the best people she had ever known, but she had also lost one of the strongest supporters her work had enjoyed. On 19 September, 1961, she sent the following hand-written note to Gierow:


Grieving the death of a gentle man, who 'walked straight up to fearfulness', I write to you, to offer you my sorrow. If I suffer shock & pain, how must you fare, who are his near & lifelong friend.

We hold him in our heart, with love & pride.<sup>10</sup>

She was escorted to the memorial service at United Nations headquarters in New York and accepted an honorary position on the Board of the then existing American chapter of the Hammarskjöld Foundation, but to all practical intents and purposes, Barnes withdrew into a silence and seclusion that few could bridge, until her death in 1982.

This is not the place to undertake a literary analysis of *The Antiphon*, but perhaps a brief description will illuminate a work that clearly meant a very great deal to Dag Hammarskjöld. Although a brutal violation lies at the centre of *The Antiphon*, the play is by no means about a daughter's rape. Instead, it is about the consequences, for the family, of that double parental betrayal: the father's violence, the mother's acquiescence and complicity. Set in 1939 at the outbreak of World War II, it forcibly recalls Eliot's play *The Family Reunion*, in that it brings the members of a family together in the ruins of their former manor home where, in the space of a few hours, the mother and daughter will destroy each other, the two vicious brothers will skulk away, pleased with the event, and a third brother, disguised as 'Jack Blow', who has engineered the reunion, will be left alone with an aged uncle, his mother's brother.

Although the father, Titus Hobbes, has been dead for many years, his evil genius haunts this family, warping all their lives. His pernicious behaviour has particularly complicated the mother/daughter relationship, which is the central focus of the drama. In Act I, the family members gather without Augusta (asleep in her sons' car outside) in the ruined manor hall, which is strewn with a profusion of broken nursery toys and strange objects that could be props from a period play. Dudley and Elisha, the two cunning brothers, quickly reveal their jealousy of their superior, artistic sister, Miranda, and their contempt for Augusta, from whom they plan to wrest the family property. Augusta dominates Act II when she enters with all her memories of Titus and his handmaids. This act closes with the climactic scene of the doll's house, brought in by 'Jack Blow' to force his mother's memory still further. Tapping the attic window of the house, he insists that she look in until she sees—'As in a glass darkly.../The frightening shadow of the Devil and the Daughter'.<sup>11</sup> Even at this stage the mother dares not name what she sees, but lets Miranda and 'Jack' do it for her. Miranda, of course, remembers herself on her knees, 'Dragging rape-blood behind her, like a snail', and 'Jack' accuses first their father, then their mother, who made herself 'a *madam* by submission', and finally Miranda herself for 'offering up her silly throat for slashing' (*Antiphon*, pp. 185–6). 'Jack Blow' is the conscience of the play; he stage-manages the truth and arranges the confrontation of Act III.



A scene from the Dramaten production of *Växelsången* (*The Antiphon*) in Stockholm, February 1961, showing Birgitta Valberg as Miranda (left) and Sif Ruud as Augusta (right). Photo Beate Bergström.

The third act comprises the 'antiphon' of the title, for in it Augusta and Miranda struggle with each other as if they were two sides of a single person—as, indeed, they symbolically are. When Augusta murders her daughter (dying herself as she does so), she destroys those parts of herself she could not bear to see—her victimization, her guilt, her failure—while at the same time annihilating all chance of escape from the violence and tyranny of the past. In short, the women destroy each other in a tragic fulfillment of the mutual contempt, debasement and self-loathing instilled in them by an essentially misogynist, patriarchal domestic system. The hatred these women felt for the husband and father in the past has poisoned them by negating all chance for a healthy, mutually supportive mother/daughter cathexis in the present.

Although masked, in a sense, by dence literary allusion, Shakespearean prosody, and layers of symbolism, *The Antiphon* is a shattering vision of human relations in the microcosm of what Freud called 'the family romance'. It enacts the incestuous passions and archetypal patterns within the human family and shows them leading inexorably to death with a concentrated Greek purity of pity and terror. It is also a highly theatrical play relying upon the renaissance notion that 'all the world's a stage' and employing, in the doll's house scene, a Hamlet-like 'mouse-trap' play-

within-the-play to catch the collective human conscience as much as Augusta's. The point of this theatricality is to remind us all that we are always, more or less, about such tragic business.

This tragic vision obviously moved Hammarskjöld deeply. But what must also have seized his imagination was the tight control, the almost icy refusal of complaint, evinced by the language, symbolism and structure of this play. As *Markings* (published in Sweden as *Vägmärken* in 1963) shows so clearly, Dag Hammarskjöld, like Djuna Barnes, had looked into the abyss of human evil and of death. Like her, he valued the silence, control, restraint and courage required by those men and women who were determined to carry on.<sup>12</sup> In fact, what strikes the reader of *Markings*, as of Barnes' works, is the stress both placed on human dignity in the face of death and corruption. For both this dignity seemed best preserved through silence. The word 'silence' runs like a refrain through *Markings*, as a sign of friendship that 'needs no words' and as a means of self-preservation (*Markings*, p. 8 and p. 83). For Barnes it signified dignity: 'Silence makes experience go further and, when it does die, gives it that dignity common to a thing one had touched and not ravished'.<sup>13</sup>

Sometime between 13 February and 13 March, 1961, Dag Hammarskjöld inscribed three lines from *The Antiphon* in *Markings*, that white book concerning his negotiations with himself and God:

Be not your own pathetic fallacy, but be  
Your own dark measure in the vein,  
For we're about a tragic business...<sup>14</sup>

These lines were copied, in Swedish, from the *Växelsången* translation, and they crystallize the meaning of that strange play, while pointing to its personal significance for both author and translator. Had she known of his choice, Djuna Barnes would most certainly have approved.

## The Djuna Barnes/Dag Hammarskjöld Letters

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld

Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, c/o Farrar and Straus, 101 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.

7 June 1958

Dear Miss Barnes,

I have just returned from Europe where I met Mr. Edwin Muir. We did not get much quiet time together, but it was well used as we devoted it, to a large extent, to 'Antiphones', joining in admiration for your verse—for my part with the admission that I have still some way to go before feeling that I have grasped what the play has to give.

I take pleasure in bringing you Mr. Muir's warm greetings. Would it ever suit you, I would be most happy to meet with you personally also as a long time reader of 'Nightwood'. You might perhaps send me a line if and when you would feel inclined to get in touch.

Yours sincerely,  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
Dag Hammarskjöld.

To Dag Hammarskjöld from Djuna Barnes

Five Patchin Place,  
New York 11, N.Y.

12th June, 1958.

Your Excellency:

It is more than kind of you to write me that both you and Mr. Muir have enjoyed The Antiphon, and to receive through you, Mr. Muir's greetings.

And of course I should be delighted to meet with you, and await your pleasure.

Yours sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

N.B. But please, not evening dress.

Whenever possible the letters printed here have been checked against the originals. Although the sequence is clear, not all items in the correspondence appear to have survived; therefore, some gaps do appear. Occasional errors in spelling have been silently corrected and dating format has been standardized. Where a reference or a name is not clear from the context in the letter or in the introduction, an editorial note has been supplied.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

10 April 1959

Dear Miss Barnes,

When I was in touch with you last summer you kindly said that you would be glad to come to my place one evening. You may well have wondered why you have not heard anything from me. One reason has been that I have been away a lot; another reason has been that I wished to wait for an occasion which might interest you.

Now such an occasion offers itself as Dr Karl Ragnar Gierow is staying with me. I know that you are in touch regarding the translation and production of 'The Antiphon'. Although I understand that, because of that, he and you may get together for a discussion, I feel that it might please you to have some time together also at a dinner.

If it suits you I would suggest Friday, 17 April at 8 p.m. My address is 73 East 73rd Street. Of course it would be entirely informal, probably only the three of us and perhaps also Wystan Auden. I hope very much you can make it.

Looking forward to seeing you,

Yours sincerely  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

Five Patchin Place,  
 New York 11, N.Y.

13th April, 1959.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

I shall be most happy to dine with you Friday the 17th, at eight o'clock, and to meet Mr. Gierow, and to see again Mr. Auden.

Always sincerely,  
 (signed Djuna Barnes)

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

25 April 1959

Dear Miss Barnes,

May I thank you for the great pleasure you gave us all the other night when you dined with W. H. Auden, Dr. Gierow and myself. As I said, I hope that once you have found your way to 73rd Street, you will come again.

The meeting with you caused me to read again the 'Antiphon'. My impression of this extraordinary work was only strengthened both in the direction of the mastery of the prosody and in the direction of the substance of the vision you project so forcefully in the tragedy. Although I personally find it 'clear'—which, as I said, does not signify that I would re-tell a story which can be told only in your way—my

impression was confirmed that it would serve a very good purpose if you were to send Dr. Gierow the letter you have in mind as a kind of guidance to his actors regarding your approach. As Dr. Gierow so rightly said, one can form a very clear idea of a work of art of this kind through re-reading and roaming through its pages, but for an actor who has to project it, it is easy to go astray, and for a spectator it is necessary to get the impact at the first confrontation. Therefore, I hope warmly that you will carry out our intention to give such general guidance as we had in mind in the simple man to man terms to which the letter would invite.

Looking forward to seeing you again,  
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
Dag Hammarskjöld

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

Five Patchin Place,  
New York 11, N.Y.

28th April, 1959.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

How kind of you to have noticed my dismay. To be asked to explain a verse play is a fearful thing. However I have now written out four pages, which I hope will be of some service to Dr. Gierow. I am mailing them directly to Sweden. I assume he is now there, as he told me he was leaving in a day or so.

It was a great pleasure to meet both of you, and I am sensible both of your generosity towards the play, and his care for its production.

I look forward to seeing you again someday.

Always sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

10 October, 1959

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

It will be a pleasure to see you again, at dinner, Thursday, 15th October, at 8.15.  
With best regards

Sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

October 21, 1959

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

How nice of you to remember my regard for Proust.\* Your attention gives great pleasure. Thank you.

It occurs to me that I may have given both you and Mr. Gierow the impression that I am unwilling to discuss *The Antiphon*. This is not so. I was distressed that Mr. Gierow did not want to question me personally about the play: that he wishes rather that I write out what I meant. This is so much less satisfactory. However, when you yourself come to going over the Swedish translation, do please ask me anything you wish. I very much want to have the work go smoothly; and I am very sensible of my good fortune in having your interest.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld

29 November, 1959

Dear Djuna Barnes,

How kind of you to send me the new English edition of 'Nightwood' with your generous inscription. Thank you!

One of these days, after my recent return from a new long trip, I hope we may realize our plan that you come over here to the UN building.

With gratitude and warm regards,

Yours sincerely  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)\*\*

\* Marcel Proust (1871–1922) was a favorite of Barnes and her library contains several volumes of his work.

\*\* The original holographs of this note and the one below dated 17 February 1961 are in McKeldin Library Djuna Barnes Collection.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

18 February 1960

Dear Miss Barnes,

Today (!) I got your kind letter of 21 October last year, which obviously has followed a somewhat devious road to its destination. Thank you and excuse my involuntary delay in replying.

Next week I am going for a couple of days to Stockholm where I hope to Meet Dr. Gierow. I have got from him some parts of the translation, which seem to me to be very promising. When we meet I am sure to get much more. On my return and as soon as I have been able to study his texts, I hope to get in touch with you so as to profit from your assistance.

I have in no way forgotten our 'date' at the Headquarters building, but as you know I have been away on a long trip to Africa after the end of the General Assembly, and that explains that so far I have not contacted you in order to arrange for this visit.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
 Dag Hammarskjöld

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

18 April 1960

Dear Miss Barnes,

This is just a progress report. I have just revised to the best of my understanding Dr. Gierow's translation of the first act of the Antiphon. Being a perfectionist, he is not at all satisfied, but I can tell you that it is really very good and in part brilliant. The second act will come within the next few days and he will bring the third act with him when he arrives in New York on May 20th.\* So things are well under way.

I have not consulted you regarding my own check-reading of this text as he was coming soon himself and as it is obviously much better for him to discuss all the points with you.

I am looking forward to see you at that time, and apart from the long postponed visit here to the United Nations I hope that you will spare an evening with me at my home.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
 Dag Hammarskjöld

\* According to a letter in the Dramaten Gierow Collection dated 16 April 1960, Gierow had to delay his arrival until May 21st. The two men were to spend their time at Brewster, Hammarskjöld's country retreat outside New York, revising their translation.

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

21st April, 1960

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

Delighted to hear that the Antiphon is falling into shape, and that you are not ill-pleased with the translation of Act I. I do hope Dr. Gierow will discuss the play with me, that we may all bring it to that state of perfection we wish for it. I will bring a corrected copy with me, as I have found other errors!

And 'sparing' you an evening would be my great pleasure; and may I, in paying my respects to you, include my regards to the gentle Mr. Ivan Smith?

Sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

Address: His Excellency, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York.

June 3, 1960

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

May I express again my sense of gratitude and indebtedness to you for your part in the fortunes of my play *The Antiphon*, and my appreciation of the help you gave Dr. Gierow in the translation of the verse, and the honour you have shown the work in taking this trouble in spite of the exigencies of dedicated time.

Now *flemish*—concise Oxford Dictionary: flemish 2, v.i (of hound) make quivering movement of tail and body while searching for trail—'the great stone fly Sarcophagus, at flemish in the ways'. \* I am sure you will agree that to be a lucky find!

With all my best sentiments to you, I remain

Sincerely yours,  
(Signed Djuna Barnes)

\* See *The Antiphon*, Act Three, *Selected Works of Djuna Barnes* (New York: Farrar, 1962) p. 219, and the Christmas telegram that Hammarskjöld sent to Barnes on December 23, 1960.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld

Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

13 June 1960

Dear Miss Barnes,

I appreciate very much your kind letter and your taking the trouble to explain to me the last remaining obscure point. I passed your explanation on to Dr. Gierow. On afterthought, I agree that the explosively condensed series of associations you introduce in the line we discussed is very eloquent. I had a line from Dr. Gierow after his return to Stockholm. He has now gone over the text again with all our corrections, and he is very satisfied with it. This, I am sure, gives you as much pleasure as it gives me.

Looking forward to seeing you again, I am,  
With kinds regards,

Yours sincerely  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
Dag Hammarskjöld

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

Address: His Excellency, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General, United Nations.

15th July, 1960

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

Since your last kind letter I have heard from Mrs. Disa Törngren of Almqvist & Wiksell (June 28th), that 'the translators' have 'expressed a wish that their translation should be published by AB P. A. Norstedt and Söner' rather than with them; indeed I hear from Faber and Faber that the contract with A & W has been returned to them.

Does this mean that I am to have the extraordinary honour of your name, as well as that of Dr. Gierow, as translators of *The Antiphon*? I am of course very reluctant to trouble you with letters or questions, but this good fortune—if I am to have it—quite overcomes me, and I *must* ask if it is true.

I am hoping to hear from Dr. Gierow shortly.

In the meantime, all my gratitude for the favour I have had at your hands, the support of Dr. Gierow, and (the spirit) of Mr. Muir.

Always sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

18 July 1960

Dear Miss Barnes,

Thank you for your kind letter.

It is true that the regular publisher of Dr. Gierow, P. A. Norstedt and Söner, has bought from the other publisher the rights to the translation of *The Antiphon*.

You are also right that—according to Dr. Gierow's wishes and in spite of the modesty of my contribution—we will both figure as translators on the book. I am most pleased to see this happen and it adds to my satisfaction if it gives you pleasure.

More important, however, just before the Congo crisis I managed to run over again, carefully, the whole translation, and to the best of my understanding it is one of which you would be likely to approve could you check it yourself. I think we have come very close to your imagery, your prosody and your atmosphere. And having worked with *Antiphon*, I now share your view that there is nothing obscure in it.

Dag Hammarskjöld

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

2nd October, 1960

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

In this time of outrageous vilification, I have not presumed to write, knowing you to be much too busy. But, recalling a small beast, brought into the room by you, on the occasion of my last visit, and your remark to the general effect that 'all creatures need care, show grief, want affection',\* I hope it not impertinent if I bring to your desk, respectful affection, deep regard, and rejoicing, in an undismayed spirit.

(signed Djuna Barnes)

\* The 'small beast' may well be Hammarskjöld's pet monkey 'Greenback'. After the animal's accidental death, Hammarskjöld wrote a two-verse poem about the loss that is included in *Markings*, pp. 219–20, and reprinted in *Development Dialogue* 1987:1, p. 52.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld

G14CC 8S NL PD WUX NEWYORK NY DEC 23 1960

ALL GOOD WISHES FOR CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR. FEEL 'FLEMISH IN THE WAYS' TO SEE YOUR PHOENIX RISE OUT OF THE ASHES OF OUR TRANSLATION.

DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD  
728P

BY WESTERN UNION

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

KGA127 NDO50/GTG PDNEW YORK NY 24 1148A EST/1960 DEC 24 PM 1 04  
HIS EXCELLENCY, MR. DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, 73 EAST 73 ST NYK

HOW CHARMING TO RECEIVE YOUR GREETINGS PHOENIX AND ASH SALUTE. MAY YOUR CHRISTMAS BE HAPPY AND THE NEW YEAR FIND YOU SLAYING DRAGONS HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN YOUR BOOK. DJUNA BARNES

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

16th January 1961

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

In the end, in spite of his gifts, does one not feel that he has *too much obliged himself*—Miller?—returned, and thank you again for letting me read him.

Faber informs me *The Antiphon* is for February and the Royal Theatre, its book form upon its heels. I am desolated that I do not understand Swedish, but you are pleased with it, are you not?

But where you were displeased (Dr. Gierow told me he had deleted 'one or two things'), can I have these pointed out? I am hoping to have a new English edition, which will correct many errors of the printer and of my own, and I shall not feel quite satisfied until I know the 'irritations' of my Swedish translators!

My very best regards,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Adress: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

18 January 1961

Dear Miss Barnes,

Thanks for your letter. I agree with you on Miller, while recognizing his undoubted merits.

I am very pleased indeed that Antiphon will now have its premiere and I believe you would be satisfied with the translation in its definitive form; that impression was confirmed when I read it again some time ago in proofs.

Finally, there is certainly nothing which 'irritated' your Swedish translators. The only deletion I know about is of one line from page 110 (Augusta). The words 'My short hand-bloom, my borage and my stock' have not been translated as they probably would not tell the Swedish reader anything due to his lack of knowledge and of associations. However, I have sent a copy of your letter and my reply to Dr. Gierow in case there is anything I have forgotten or that he wants to add.

I hope for a chance to see you again, as soon as our African troubles get less acute.

With kind regards

Sincerely  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
 Dag Hammarskjöld

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld

17 February, 1961

Dear Miss Barnes,

On this day, the day of the first public performance of Antiphon, one of the translators, speaking for both of them, wishes to send you heartfelt thanks for your great tragedy and the expressions of our warm friendship and admiration.

Sincerely  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)



Olof Widgren and Sif Ruud acting in *Växelsången* (*The Antiphon*) at Dramaten in February 1961.

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

KGA107/NAA 72 PD NEW YORK NY 18 206P EST  
 DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, 73 EAST 73 ST NYK (18 February 1961)

AMAZED GRATITUDE FOR GRACIOUS MESSAGES HANDSOME BOOK LOVELY  
 FLOWERS AND ENCOURAGING CABLE. BLESS YOU  
 DJUNA BARNES  
 WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
 Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

2 March 1961

Dear Djuna Barnes,

Dr. Gierow has sent me a great number of reviews of the performance of the Antiphon. Certainly, he will write to you himself. In due time I shall try and have the most significant translated for you. However, I wish to give you a brief summary of the impression I gather.

The Antiphon has provoked the greatest interest and is very fully covered by the leading critics. Without any exception, it is recognised as a major work, and there are many expressions of admiration for its superb poetry. Although most of the critics regard the drama as 'difficult', practically all have seized at least part of its deep human and artistic significance. Obviously, the general impression has been very strong.

Only one (or two) of all the critics is hesitant about the production and about the translation, but he was the same in the case of the superb production of 'Long Days Journey', so he acts true to habit. It is obvious that the theatre has done an excellent job; some regard the performance as artistically one of the finest productions ever of the theatre.

It would not be our human world if one did not here and there in the articles see barbs and find paternal advice. This, which reflects the sacred privilege of critics, however, does in no way mar the general impression as I have summed it up for you.

With kind regards,

Yours  
 (signed Dag Hammarskjöld)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

Fifth of March, 1961.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

I am overcome by the magnitude of your thoughtfulness; the flowers arriving exactly on time for the Swedish performance of Vexelsången, the kind inscription in the handsomest job of printing any work of mine has enjoyed, and your last letter giving a report of the general reaction to the play, which cleared the air of my darkest forebodings, for not only had the London Times reported that the play was more or less impossible, but had observed that probably all other countries were rejoicing that they had not attempted it. Time magazine here had been not much kinder: 'U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld was having trouble on another stage. He collaborated on a Swedish translation of esoteric U.S. Writer Djuna Barnes's allusive verse play, The Antiphon, which opened in Stockholm. Critics

thought the play largely unintelligible, though one exonerated Hammarskjöld, explaining that the translation job was 'overwhelmingly difficult—almost like bringing order to the Congo'.

I feared that wrath might descend upon your head, and the head of Dr. Gierow, and on the memory of Mr. Muir, for the honour all three of you have shown me in having the courage to stand for my play, and this troubled me. That your generosity has not been abused, indeed that now, and in Sweden the Antiphon has been rated 'superb poetry' proved I had superb translators. The play is now *our* play.

I could not write before this, I have been ill, and could manage only a wire to you and a cable to Dr. Gierow. I shall be glad to see the translations of clippings, if you have the time—you really are the *most* extraordinary man!—till then, my warmest, kindest thoughts.

Sincerely,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

Shall be interested to hear what the *book* of the translated play brings in from the reviewers.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

15 March 1961

Dear Djuna Barnes,

Many thanks for your kind lines. I have only had time to have a few extracts from the reviews translated. They are all from leading critics.

In view of the very full coverage of the play, there have so far not been any articles on the book, but the theatre critics in Sweden are mostly also one of the literary critics of their papers, and in this way the reviews quoted may be regarded also as reviews of the drama itself.

With kind regards,

Yours  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
Dag Hammarskjöld

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

20 March, 1961.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld,

A thousand thanks for having troubled to have translations made of portions of the press on *The Antiphon*—I can't think how they could have been better—I am waiting on Dr. Gierow for the *two that slew us*—I enclose copies of three clippings without comment, thinking, if you have missed them, you might care to see them.\*

With warm regard  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

20th April, 1961.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

So pleased to have the fine blue bound copy of *Växelsången*, with both my translators names on the spine (which I hope to bring, one day, inside the covers), and to hear that its publisher is happy about all three of us.

The whole history of this play is so astonishing, that I still can't quite believe it.  
With warmest regards,

Always,  
(signed Djuna Barnes)

To Dag Hammarskjöld From Djuna Barnes

17th May, 1961.

Dear Mr. Hammarskjöld:

I send you the latest edition of *Nightwood*, and the Swedish edition of some of my short stories, written long ago (how good the translation I have no idea), thinking you might care to see them. Certainly *Natt bland hästar* has the most extraordinary cover; it could be stud-book for the stallions moonstruck in hell or, (...)\*\*

(unsigned)

\* The three clippings mentioned by Barnes are from the *London Times*, *Time* magazine and *Newsweek*.

\*\* Barnes' writing on the carbon copy is illegible at this point and the letter is unsigned. The original of this item does not appear to have survived.

To Djuna Barnes From Dag Hammarskjöld  
Address: Miss Djuna Barnes, 5 Patchin Place, New York 11, N.Y.

20 May 1961

Dear Djuna Barnes,

I was glad that you remembered me after the long silence from my side and sent me your kind greetings with the Swedish translation of your earlier short stories and with the new edition of *Nightwood*. You are quite right in guessing that I would be interested.

Things here are still a bit too much on the lively side (still?) and therefore I have not got in touch with you. I hope that you have something in your mind, and perhaps even your desk, with which one day you will make your readers—and translators—happy. You should have seen from the reception of the *Antiphon* in far away Sweden and from the translation of your short stories that you have a keenly interested and understanding audience where you least of all might have expected it.

Kind regards,

Yours,  
(signed Dag Hammarskjöld)  
Dag Hammarskjöld

## Notes

1. Harrie's review of the production appeared in Stockholm's *Expressen* for 18 February, 1961 and Linde's appeared in *Dagens Nyheter* on the same day.
2. Gierow makes this remark to Barnes in a letter dated 31 January, 1961. Another illustration of Gierow's enthusiasm is the cable he sent to Hammarskjöld late at night of February 17, after the première. It said, 'Wish your play an end as fine and triumphant as *Antiphon* got tonight'. This cable was followed by a second one, sent to Hammarskjöld the next morning after Gierow had read the reviews in the morning papers. The humorous phrasing of the cable reflects the mixed reception of the play: 'Wish your play much better end than *Antiphon* got this morning. Good Luck'.
3. For permission to publish these letters, I would like to thank Herbert Mitgang, President of the Authors League Fund in New York, and Peder Hammarskjöld. Copies of the Hammarskjöld letters to Barnes, and the originals written to Hammarskjöld by Barnes, are housed in the Dag Hammarskjöld Collection at the Swedish Royal Library in Stockholm. The Hammarskjöld originals, and Barnes' copies of her letters, are housed in the Djuna Barnes Collection in the McKeldin Library at the University of Maryland. For their friendly, efficient help with archival materials, I would like to thank most warmly Dr Blanche Ebeling-Koning, Curator of Rare Books and Literary Manuscripts at the McKeldin Library, Dr Börje Westlund, Head of the Manuscript Department at The Royal Library in Stockholm, and his assistant Kristina Eriksson, who made my visit to the Library in May 1985 straightforward and worthwhile. I would also like to thank Dr Tom Olsson, Curator of Archives and Library at the Dramaten, for his assistance in locating and photocopying letters regarding *The Antiphon* by Dr Karl Ragnar Gierow to Hammarskjöld, Barnes and Muir. These letters provide useful information about the translation of the play. My sincere thanks are also due to the staff of *Dagens Nyheter* who sent me copies of reviews and interviews with Barnes published by their paper in the sixties, and to Gunlög Eliasson from Uppsala University for her invaluable translations of the reviews, interviews and letters written in Swedish. For the research funds needed to visit archives and obtain xeroxes, translations and research assistant help, it is a pleasure to thank The University of British Columbia. The final typescript of the letters was produced with meticulous care by Mrs Doreen Todhunter, whom I can never thank enough. And lastly, for their helpful comments on a draft on this introduction, I would like to thank my colleagues Professors Peter Quartermain and John R. Grace.
4. See Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, p. 40. In the second edition of his 1983 biography, re-titled *Djuna: The Formidable Miss Barnes* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 227–28, Andrew Field states that Hammarskjöld had not read either *Nightwood* or *The Antiphon* when he talked with Muir. It is clear, however, from Hammarskjöld's 7 June, 1958 letter to Barnes that he knew both works; therefore, Urquhart's date for *Nightwood* should be the correct one. All further references to Field's biography are to this second edition.

5. In a letter to Barnes dated 4 April, 1959, Gierow explained that the Johansson/Grut version was unsatisfactory, and by June he was no longer thinking in terms of their work. It would appear that he had begun work on it with Hammarskjöld before the end of the year. On 20 June, 1960, Gierow wrote to Hammarskjöld that Norstedt had bought the publishing rights to the translation of *Växelsången* from Almqvist & Wiksell, who had had a contract with Johansson and Grut, and that the Johansson/Grut version had been thrown out. The agreement to transfer was concluded on 17 June, 1960, according to a letter from Ragnar Svanström of Norstedt's to Djuna Barnes in the McKeldin Collection.
6. In a letter dated 21 June, 1960, Hammarskjöld wrote to Gierow saying that he had heard from Ragnar Svanström of Norstedt's regarding the new publication arrangement, but that he wished to decline the honorarium because he had 'only been a sparring partner' and preferred that Gierow take it or transfer it to Barnes' royalties.
7. Hammarskjöld completed the translation of *Chronique* in August 1960 and it was published in December that year. Alexis Léger (Saint-John Perse) was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1960.
8. The influence of Strindberg on O'Neill was profound and lasting, while Barnes had been particularly impressed by *Miss Julie* which inspired her story 'A Night Among the Horses' (1929), translated into Swedish as *Natt bland hästar*. The Dramaten, of course, had already made theatre history with its 1956 world première of O'Neill's masterpiece *Long Day's Journey into Night*, and Hammarskjöld had been instrumental in introducing Gierow to the playwright's widow Carlotta. See Urquhart's *Hammarskjöld*, p. 41.
9. In addition to Field, see the discussion of Barnes' rue St-Romaine years in Shari Benstock's massive study, *Women of the Left Bank*, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1986.
10. The original of this note is in the Dramaten Gierow Collection.
11. *The Antiphon* in *Selected Works of Djuna Barnes*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1962, p. 185. All references are to this edition of the play.
12. All references to *Markings* are to the English translation by Leif Sjöberg and W.H. Auden, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1964.
13. Barnes made this remark in her column, 'Playgoers' Almanac', for the *Theatre Guild Magazine* (January 1931) n. pag.
14. *Markings*, p. 203 and *The Antiphon*, p. 205.

## Book Review

# Brian Urquhart's 'A Life in Peace and War'

By Erskine B. Childers

Fifteen years after the publication of his outstanding biography of the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, Hammar-skjöld, Sir Brian Urquhart's own autobiography has been published under the title *A Life in Peace and War*. The major part of the book is devoted to his forty years in the service of the United Nations bringing into sharp focus many of the crises that have dominated world affairs since the end of the Second World War: the Congo, Cyprus, Kashmir, Lebanon, Southern Africa and the wars in the Middle East. In dealing with these events he provides penetrating portraits of, among others, Dag Hammar-skjöld, Ralph Bunche, U Thant and Kurt Waldheim and revealing glimpses of political figures like Adlai Stevenson, Golda Meir, Menachim Begin, Yasir Arafat, Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick. But above all, he gives a thoughtful and challenging account of the deep changes in the United Nations System as it has passed from the exuberant enthusiasm of the immediate post war period to the excessive disillusionment of the 1980s.

Erskine B. Childers, Senior Adviser to the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and Director of Information of the UNDP in New York 1975–86 with more than 20 years service in different UN organizations, makes many important points in this searching review of Brian Urquhart's book. One of them is to emphasize two important differences between *A Life in Peace and War* and the many other books by statesmen and foreign correspondents who have covered the same crisis period in their memoirs. 'One difference is obviously that—without violating his UN oath of confidentiality—Urquhart has many exclusively UN facts about famous crises. The other and much more important difference concerns perspective. The memoirs of many luminaries whose national Establishments turned away from the UN when it absorbed its new members from the decolonized South are unilateralist, often hegemonist. Urquhart's are suffused with the multilateral perspective of a United Nations lacking any of the traditional forms of power—only that sacred trust on behalf of humankind at large; only that un-loseable hope.'

The author writes in his personal capacity. His views do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United Nations, or the UN organization with which he is currently associated.



Erskine B. Childers

Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*.  
Harper & Row, New York, 1987.


*Idealism, which is the distillation of human experience, is far more realistic than cynicism or defeatism.*  
(Brian Urquhart, 1987)

Twenty years ago, when Dag Hammarskjöld's family and many other people urged Brian Urquhart to work with the private papers of our lost Secretary-General and write a book about him, he had great reluctance and lack of self-confidence. . . . 'I had never written a book before and was not at all sure I was capable of the task'. Along the crisis-interrupted path towards *Hammarskjöld* he found that 'as the years go by few people remember events accurately, and egotism takes a terrible toll of truth'. It is by now no surprise to find his own autobiography free of such weakness.

*A Life in Peace and War* is beautifully written, filled with evocative sketches of people and places all over the world, and free of any of the pomposity that so often exudes from memoirs in high places. I think the word 'pride' applied to himself occurs only once in the whole book. Long before Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar significantly modified the practice of Under-Secretaries-General almost invariably being outside political appointees, Urquhart was rightly proud to achieve that high rank having worked all the way up the ladder as a career UN civil servant. He did not let it go to his head.

His personal story of UN service gives a richly anecdotal witness to most of the great international crises of the last four decades. The ground has, of course, been trod by previous memoirists. The bookshop and library shelves are groaning with the recollections of statesmen and foreign correspondents about the same world crises. There are, however, two important differences. One is obviously that—without violating his UN oath of confidentiality—Urquhart has many exclusively UN facts about famous crises. The other and much more important difference concerns perspective. The memoirs of many luminaries whose national Establishments turned away from the UN when it absorbed its new members from the decolonized South are unilateralist, often hegemonist. Urquhart's are suffused with the multi-lateral perspective of a United Nations lacking any of the traditional forms of power—only that sacred trust on behalf of humankind at large; only that un-loseable hope.

This perspective does not create uniform views among UN civil servants on the great political and economic issues that reverberate through UN fora and confront UN mediators. There can be torment for the UN civil servant between the maintenance of peace and the agonies of national liberation movements. Urquhart writes frustratedly of them:



Sir Brian Urquhart in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, Uppsala

They have to believe that all their demands can and will be met, that right is entirely on their side, and that therefore all right-thinking persons and governments will be on their side too. They tend to ignore awkward realities by shows of moral indignation. They are allergic to compromise or pragmatic accommodations. . . . However much one may sympathise with them, the world is not like that. Thus serious opportunities are often missed, and frustration and disappointment beget increasing violence and extremism.

But if 'compromise or pragmatic accommodation' requires the surrendering of a cohesive society's right to full national self-determination in its own ancestral homeland, an *ultimate* 'awkward reality' will simply be *more* violence. Not *one* attempt to abridge these rights has ever produced lasting peace.

There is, then, no uniform interpretation of the UN ethos for all international problems. But UN service *does* make for a different *way* of looking at the world; a different, multilateral *mix* of reasons for getting (privately) mad, or sad, about national and international human frailty; a different spectrum along which to use Urquhart's realistic idealism to cling to optimism in the search for conflict resolution.

We shall never know what further contributions to the slow, painful construction of UN conciliation capacity Count Folke Bernadotte might have made. Urquhart describes his assassination while UN Mediator in Palestine as a 'flagrant outrage' and pointedly remarks that 'since his murder and the conspiracy of silence that followed it, I have had difficulty in joining without reservation in the hue and cry over "terrorism"'. But after Hammarskjöld and Bunche—and although he typically makes no such claim—Urquhart became the architect of United Nations peace-keeping everywhere. Pains-takingly adducing each practical lesson from every armistice-observing, truce-supervision, and then peace-keeping operation, he re-invested each in new operations like a creative, careful master-builder.

At the same time, at more arcane levels Urquhart became (my definition, not his) an incisive resident political scientist and behavioural analyst of the Security Council.

A long, frustrated but infinitely cautious vigil finally resulted in the 'UNEF II formula'—the breakthrough in the crucial issues, inherited from the Congo and the 1967 Middle East war, between the Secretary-General's necessary day-to-day executive flexibility in peace-keeping and the overall policy authority of the Security Council.

There is unquestionably in him, and I hope there will yet be out of him, a substantive book developing the philosophy and practical techniques of United Nations mediation and peace-keeping. By definition a rattling good autobiography cannot also be such a book; but there are some wonderful brief summations to be going on with, like this on peace-keeping, which he straightforwardly calls 'the projection of the principle of non-violence onto the military plane':

In the scores of visits I have paid to peace-keeping operations in different parts of the world, they have seemed to me a microcosm of what a reasonable, co-operative international community might be. The soldiers from every corner of the world, with their different racial backgrounds, customs, languages, and military traditions, work together in an atmosphere of friendship, dedication, and mutual support which is deeply moving. If the armies of the great nuclear powers could participate in this civilizing experience—and why not?—we might make an important step toward the realization that in our hazardous times common endeavour must supercede old antagonisms.

The anecdotal minutiae that help make autobiographies a 'good read' are often that, and no more. Urquhart's also include telling glimpses of the background to later earth-shaking events. In 1978 he accompanied Secretary-General Waldheim to Iran, a meeting with the Shah which was 'essentially a monologue' (by him), and among other things a lunch with the Shah's sister Princess Ashraf where Urquhart 'began to feel acutely uncomfortable. There was an overwhelming atmosphere of nouveau-riche, meretricious chi-chi, and sycophancy'. A personal dinner with the British Ambassador revealed that, 'like everyone else (he) still had little inkling of what was shortly to happen'.

The fact that the Iranian revolution came as such a surprise, even in countries that had every means to inform themselves, underlines a heavy responsibility for the UN. Secretary-General Pères de Cuéllar's decision to create a quiet capacity to analyse and forecast potential situations that could lead to international tension and crisis is thus of quite inestimable importance. Our world is *loaded* with them, as though History had implanted hundreds of hidden delayed-action bombs. They encompass the 'traditional' kinds involving, for example, disputed resources. There are the last agonized consequences of the age of empires—national liberation struggles still frustrated; inherited colonial borders defying and dissecting ancient kinships; and enormous gaps in North-South inter-cultural perception. And not least, there are the frustrations building among hundreds of millions of human beings through the distortions of 'development' and 'aid', combined with the failure to date to revise international economic and financial relationships that are not working for anyone, anywhere, but are crushing the South.

An example came to mind in noticing an obvious typing error in Urquhart's recollections of the 1956 Suez Crisis, to the effect that President Nasser nationalized 'the Suez Canal'. He didn't, because he couldn't have: the Suez *Canal* was and always had been sovereign Egyptian territory; what he nationalized was the transnational Suez Canal *Company*. Thereby hangeth a tale that is, of course, sheer ancient history.

In the middle-19th century, Egypt became one of the first few countries in the South politically able to (try to) set out on the path of nationally planned economic development. They tried, among other things, to expand production of cotton as an export commodity. Europe, bulging with capital, was ready with loans—at interest rates up to 12 per cent per annum, and with an ostensibly attractive 'facility' in the form of 'cash discounts', whereby the Egyptian Treasury could contract a loan for 10 million pounds, actually

receive only 7.5 million, but pay the interest on 10 million. Among the unfolding problems in these cosy relationships, the interest rates kept changing—upwards—and cotton prices kept fluctuating, in European exchanges where Egypt had neither representative nor voice.

By 1875, Egypt's over-eager rulers had been totally hornswoggled into bankruptcy. For England, Disraeli swooped, and bought out Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company for a quarter of their original book value (no talk of their then-current market value). The British military occupation of Egypt followed soon thereafter. Although Egypt had invested at least 50 per cent of the entire cost of cutting the Canal, for the next 81 years Egypt's own vessels had to pay whatever tolls the transnational Canal Company levied in order to move through its own territory.

As I hope I have made clear, this has nothing to do with contemporary North-South history.

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Urquhart's judgement of what has happened to the UN Secretariat over its four decades of growth is quite severe. He writes of 'a serious erosion of the standards of international civil service which we had so jealously guarded at the beginning'. He has certainly seen it all. He was literally the second professional recruit (after David Owen of later UN Technical Assistance and UNDP fame) in the new UN Secretariat's temporary offices in Church House, Westminster; and his nostalgia for those exciting days of camaraderie is inevitable:

Our first office, which we shared, had for some forgotten ecclesiastical reason three doors; and I recall an occasion when they opened simultaneously to admit respectively, two London charladies, a consignment of typewriters, and the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia.

In recent years UN-bashing media and politicians in a number of Western countries, incestuously recycling their unchecked epithets, have depicted the growth of UN staff as having created a gargantuan bureaucratic monster. The facts are that, after 42 years, to respond to the entire spectrum of needed international cooperation for 5 billion people in some 160 countries, the staff of *all* the UN System's organs and agencies—all grades, world-wide—amounts to little more than 50,000. That is only 1 UN staffer for every 100,000 human beings alive in the world; less than the civil service for Ireland's 3.5 million citizens; one-third the staff of British Railways.

Urquhart is, however, correct. Even with this moderate expansion relative to humankind's revealed needs, the spirit and standards of international public service have slipped. We simply cannot afford this in the fledgling institutions of Planet Earth, which belong to 'We the Peoples'. Such standards have to be set, and sustained, from the top. What can we learn from Urquhart about the kind of spirit needed?

It is difficult to adduce any one prescription for the origins (or the sustaining defences) of dedication and modesty in high public service. Something it certainly has to do with is upbringing: Urquhart's mother's favourite word was 'worthwhile', and the novelist Iris Murdoch has recalled how 'public service was the natural ideal' at one of his early schools. Something it has to do with is a sense of humour: a delightfully drole wit from somewhere between Dorsetshire and Scotland runs through his book, sometimes effortlessly turned upon himself. An early exposure to the dreadful harm that egotism among decision-makers can do to untold numbers of human beings is surely a confirming influence: Urquhart was deeply, lastingly affected by being unable to stop the disastrous World War II Arnhem airborne landings, in which not only technical miscalculation but macho ambition in high military places played its bloody part.

Something important it also has to do with is the example being available from leaders with a real 'calling' for service. Yet even here, there must be the innate ability to understand not just the words but more importantly the behaviour of such a leader, and to make it one's own... with further radiating effect. It was characteristic that, at the 1986 Uppsala commemoration, Urquhart cited at length the 'tough' self-controlling 'rules' for public service which he had found in Dag Hammarskjöld's papers—and had never forgotten.<sup>1</sup>

He has welcomed, and worked with, every further Secretary-General of the United Nations. He writes that, 'since we in the Secretariat were stuck with whoever the great-powers could agree on, and had no say whatever in the matter, we either had to give up our vocation or make the best of whomever came along. I chose the latter course and have never regretted it'. The sociologist of UN civil service (a much-neglected field) will find quite rich material about this, here and there in the Urquhart autobiography.

As one UN civil servant I am especially grateful for his remarks about U Thant whom I had the privilege to know, and to work for on a difficult confidential assignment in the Congo. Urquhart observes that, 'in the West at any rate, (U Thant) has been virtually written out of history. Very few

people seem to remember his nobility of character, his integrity, or his courageous efforts over the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam war, and other international convulsions... (he) managed to pull the organization together and, by quiet but firm leadership, to bring it back onto a steady course at a time of storm and change'.

To be sure, as Urquhart notes, U Thant was made 'a useful scapegoat' for the 1967 Middle Eastern war... 'which, virtually alone among world statesmen, he tried desperately to prevent'. To be sure, what Urquhart perfectly calls his 'emotionless and moon-faced' mien, his Buddhist quietism and self-effacement, could not excite Western media. Urquhart relates how, for their urgent flight to try to stop the India-Pakistan 1965 war, U Thant declined President Johnson's offer of 'Air Force One' saying 'he would feel awkward with a party of only five in such a big plane'. I remember the indifferent reaction of Western TV people when I made an in-depth one-hour interview with this fine, not at all indecisive Asian, who said crucial things for Planet Earth but, as Urquhart cogently notes, 'in words often much stronger than his tone'.

The real reason for the Western consignment of U Thant to virtual oblivion is that he was the first and to date the only Secretary-General to come from clear outside the Judeo-Christian world, from a wholly different culture—and to look and speak so. Even today unable to acknowledge its intellectual and scientific debt to the ancient 'Third World', many in the West have never quite faced up to the idea that *the world's leader* might be yellow, or brown, or black.

Urquhart has. When Kurt Waldheim was running for a third term in 1981, Urquhart had 'a lot of respect for (Tanzania's Foreign Minister) Salim, with whom I had worked for years, especially over Namibia, and I believe he would have made a good Secretary-General, for he was capable of a broad statesmanlike view'.

Urquhart records great respect for Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar but down the years he has become highly critical of the selection of Secretaries-General:

Although good men *have* been elected, looking for the person with the qualities best suited to this infinitely demanding and important job seems to hold a very low priority for governments. Rather, political differences dictate a search for a candidate who will not exert any troubling degree of leadership, commitment, originality, or independence.

This is one cause of the erosion of the Hammarskjöld spirit in the UN international civil service. It breeds cynicism and skepticism among staff who know that the forward 'calendar' for this, and indeed the election or appointment of all other executive heads in the UN System, is no mystery.

The world is changing at an exponential pace. Even in this time, for the leadership of the international community Dag Hammarskjöld hinted at roles far, far wider than diplomacy, mediation, and peace-keeping. Urquhart quoted him at Uppsala as having realized that he was participating in 'the beginning of an organic process through which the diversity of peoples and their governments are struggling to find common ground upon which they can live together in the one world which has been thrust upon us before we were ready'. It was no accident that Hammarskjöld spoke of 'working at the edge of the development of human society' in an address in 1960 before the University of Chicago Law School, under the title, 'The Development of a *Constitutional* Framework for International Co-operation' (my emphasis).

He clearly perceived the need to overcome the narrow tunnel vision of our inherited post-Renaissance disciplines which have threatened to make archaic something we once called Wisdom—and the problems in proliferating vertical UN intergovernmental institutions these had produced. He could see ahead to needed *convergences*. But for the heart-aching tragedy of what Urquhart insists was an aviation accident (though one that might have been prevented), Hammarskjöld could have become the world interpreter of at least the first among these epochal fusions through the UN—the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights... the 1970s' gigantic UN multi-disciplinary inventories and action programmes for Planet Earth... the convergence of international law with the concept of common-heritage resources for development in the Law of the Sea... the articulated relationship between disarmament and development; and yes, the convergent meaning of European NGOs urging that Hunger be brought before the Security Council as a threat to international peace under Article 34.

What does all this imply for the leadership of the UN? Again, we cannot expect from Urquhart both a lively autobiography and sufficient of his views on such enormous questions. That he has them in him, we know from *Hammarskjöld*. Moreover, as he now modestly acknowledges, 'since the later years of U Thant' he wrote the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the entire work of the UN. There is, however, one provocative reference about the nature of the post, where he asserts that Mr. Wald-

heim's wish for public recognition deprived his Office of 'two qualities which, in its lack of real power, are essential for the Secretary-General—dignity, and mystery'.

This we can readily understand for the roles of good offices, mediation and—let us hope—managing UN supervision of arms regulation under our forty-year dormant Article 26. But can 'mystery' be maintained if the office will also require outgoing *planetary public leadership and education* in a shrinking world?

Hammarskjöld was not given the time to test these questions to the full. He maintained the dignity and mystery, while occasionally (and brilliantly) speaking to the commanding multi-disciplinary heights of 'the development of human society'. There is evidence that he thought the need for dynamic, comprehensive public leadership from the UN could be shared. Urquhart told us in his earlier book that Hammarskjöld hoped for a reorganized Economic and Social Council for 'concentrated top-level debate, half conference and half seminar (with) a different kind of impact on world opinion...from the regular procedures'. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has just proposed a quite similar, cabinet-level leadership role for ECOSOC.

It is lamentable that there is not more *non-governmental* attention to these enormous leadership issues of the future. The stand-back, somewhat disdainful *non-governmental* perception of 'the UN' as merely 'another bureaucracy' has not been surprising, given the general aloofness of inter-governmental institutions and procedures towards NGOs. But we *need* the thoughtful, systematic study (through the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation?) of those who, at heart, know that Brian Urquhart is right when he says in his masterful and profoundly moving Epilogue:

The present tidal wave of irreversible change, the ever-present possibility of a terminal man-made disaster, the complexity, the violence, the sheer numbers, the heedlessness, and the hurry of our times all demand that we manage not only conflict, but also what we used to call progress ...

The United Nations (is) the only global design we have for this daunting task ...

Note

1. See *Development Dialogue* 1987:1, pp. 10–11.

# Cartoons—a Neglected Source of Insight into International Development

By José Havet

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*Ever since Development Dialogue began to appear some 15 years ago, we have attempted to cover as many discussions and aspects of development as possible. Hence, we have published not only political, economic, social and legal analyses of different development issues but also tried to illustrate them by including poems, short stories, photographic essays and works of art. The reason for this has been that many of the problems discussed in the international development debate can become clearer in literary or artistic presentations than in scholarly papers.*

*In this article, Professor José Havet opens up a new area for discussion by bringing into the international development debate the sad humour and sharp satire of cartoonists, emphasizing in particular their independent and unconventional approach to international politics and development issues. Dr Havet, a rural development specialist at the Institute for International Development and Co-operation, University of Ottawa, Canada, presents and interprets a number of carefully selected cartoons and builds his case around them. Ending his provocative essay, he makes a comparison between the jesters of yesterday and the cartoonists of today. 'Originally, royal courts kept a madman who was an involuntary source of humour and satire. Later, he became a voluntary fool, the jester, who was allowed to say and do virtually anything. The jester was useful to the ruler because his sharp remarks and criticism played the latent function of counterbalancing and checking the adulation and hypocrisy that characterize a royal court. Paradoxically, the jester's "crazy" behaviour constituted a privileged way through which the ruler and dignitaries acquired a more accurate perception of reality. Let us hope that the insights of cartoonists will, in the future, be able to play a jester's role for international development specialists.'*

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As a field of research, international development is holding its ground remarkably well in these years of academic recession.<sup>1</sup> The fact is quite astounding if we consider the relative newness of this area of research—it is some 20 or 25 years old—and the sharpness of the mentioned recession in the social sciences. To a large extent, the relative well-being of this field implies that it has reached today an enviable level of institutionalization.

To say that a particular science is institutionalized would mean that a status or set of statuses existed whose occupants' *primary* task is carrying out scientific activities and that this task was carried out in accordance with commonly held norms and values.<sup>2</sup>

Noteworthy among 'commonly held norms and values' of the international development field is a rather systematic neglect of some sources of insight. This is actually true to some extent for any field of study.

## Introduction

Literature dealing with international development shows a general reluctance to resort to humour. Not only is it largely devoid of wit, but specialists also ignore jokes, cartoons and the like as a source of insight or as a topic of research. Similarly, poems and novels are also overlooked. Thus, the specialists systematically neglect certain important sources of insight. To explore why this is so in the case of cartoons is the purpose of the present inquiry.

What is a cartoon?<sup>3</sup> Broadly, it is a mode of mass communication which conveys a message. It is of an artistic nature, is based on humour or satire, or both, and it suggests an organizing frame for how to think about a specific issue. In terms of the psychology of perception, cartoons constitute incompletely closed forms; the reader is invited to induce the meaning of the drawing and in so doing to close the message.<sup>4</sup> In more concrete terms, the cartoons that will be referred to in this paper are humorous or satirical drawings that convey messages in the form of brief stories. They may have captions, and usually appear in newspapers and weekly publications, occasionally on posters, in journals and in books.

More often than not, cartoons demonstrate a didactic purpose that becomes easily noticeable as soon as the irreverence of the humour and satire is overcome. This didacticism frequently reaches the level of aggressive manicheism. The cartoonist sees him/herself as some sort of anarchist rebelling against all oppressive forces; his/her perception is usually that the struggle is overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the forces of evil.<sup>5</sup> All cartoons reproduced in this paper illustrate that aspect, but it is particularly true for Cartoons no. 1, 5 and 6. Cartoonists show by and large a moralistic bent, but they are not simple-minded moralists: their works are often very sophisticated and rely on a fairly high level of knowledge on the part of the reader. See, for example, the cases of Cartoons 1 and 2.

**The 'dual solitudes' of cartoonists and international development specialists**

There exists a situation of 'dual solitudes' between cartoonists and specialists of international development: this situation exists in spite of the fact that several reasons do plead in favour of a much increased mutual awareness of their respective contributions. Such an increased awareness can lead to fruitful developments. For example, one can easily imagine social scientists specializing in international development systematically studying cartoons for what they reveal about elite opinions in Third World countries, or imagine cartoonists more often addressing international development as a topic.<sup>6</sup>

*The scientific approach and 'activism' of international development specialists*

The cartoonist schematizes reality, hence he often makes reference to stereotypes. This being so, one is surprised that there exists no greater awareness of the mutual contributions of cartoonists and social scientists (the specialists in international development are by and large social scientists). Indeed, social scientists frequently construct typologies, especially ideal ones. It may be interesting for scholars to compare their typologies to the stereotypes to which cartoonists make reference. Such a comparison is possible and it could be fruitful. The comparison is possible because these typologies and stereotypes are similar in that they are simplifications of reality. And the comparison may be fruitful because the differences between both are remarkable. Typologies are classifications that derive from critical and systematic research and their purpose is to clarify the nature of the real world referents. In contrast, stereotypes derive from prejudice or unthought acceptance of conventional wisdom, in other words, from uncritical judgements; their purpose is to preserve a comfortable mental picture of one's own group to the detriment of others. Given these differences, it can be of interest, for example, to study the contributions of international development specialists to the debunking of stereotypes in their field. Because of their ambiguities Cartoons 3, 6 and 7 are interesting to consider concerning this problem.

The mutual unawareness of respective contributions of cartoonists and international development specialists is also surprising because of the activist orientation of a majority of these specialists. The problems of international development are very remote from everyday life in industrialized countries. The simplicity of cartoons enable their authors to make simply visible more complicated processes.<sup>7</sup> They provide models and theories in highly abbreviated forms which are an aid to common sense understanding. All the cartoons reproduced in this paper evidence this, especially Cartoons 4, 5 and 7, the former and the latter in a rather didactic style, Cartoon 5 in a more powerful and inspired manner.

Cartoon 1



'We are not sectarian'

*This is a Chadian killed by an Egyptian bullet shot by a Libyan soldier with a Soviet machinegun from a French helicopter whose electronic parts are American.*

Escaro in *Le Canard Enchaîné*, France, 1981. Reprinted in *Remarques Arabo-Africaines*, no 529, 1981, p. 65.

This simple yet striking cartoon requires a rather good knowledge about the complexities of the Libyan case and of the country's foreign relations. Without such information, much of the relevance, hence also the strength of the cartoon, would be lost. Cartoons have the capacity to show us the unacceptable: indeed, aspects of the Sahel tragedy and, even more so of the Chadian problem, are difficult to face.

The cartoonist efficiently suggest this tragedy by showing vultures and only the legs of a victim. Are cartoons escapist devices or means to increase our awareness? A definite answer is impossible because the objectives of cartoons depend on a vast array of variables. However, whatever their objectives, their interpretation opens many different paths. For example, in the case of this cartoon, the immensity and the harshness of the natural environment are well evoked. But the victim is virtually pushed out of that reality, maybe pushed out of history. While the two vultures occupy a central

position in the cartoon, the impression conveyed is that they are not usually key elements of the landscape: they are massive and very visible, yet foreign, which may well illustrate the role played by international foreign actors in Chad.

Also the connotation seems to be that these massive foreign 'actors' were present before, during as well as after (i.e. at the moment represented in the cartoon) the drama. In spite of their foreignness, the vultures' eager interest in the victim leaves the impression of an inescapable and constant burden: the curse continues beyond death. Furthermore, the horizontality of the legs, the landscape and the branch (which has to support the full weight of the birds) contrasts with the verticality of the black mass of the vultures' bodies, another element adding to their foreignness and threatening aspect. All these elements, and the analysis is hardly exhaustive, can provide insights into the broad areas of the different dimensions of imperialism, dependency and alienation, in Chad and elsewhere.

In fact, an increased awareness could benefit both cartoonists and scholars. On one hand, cartoonists could contribute with their insights to the actual research concerning international development, and on the other hand models and theories of international development specialists could provide ideas to cartoonists.

This line of thought can be pursued further. Arthur Koestler has argued that humour, discovery and art constitute three domains of creativity that actually shade into each other.

...all patterns of creative activity are trivalent: they can enter the service of humour, discovery, or art... the emotional climate (of the act of creation) changes by gradual transition from aggressive to neutral to sympathetic and identificatory or, to put it in another way, from an absurd through an abstract to a tragic or lyric view of existence. (The) comic image can be converted to tragic or purely intellectual exercise by a change of emotional climate.<sup>8</sup>

What Koestler is claiming here is that humour is not some sort of subservient intellectual and artistic activity that could be of use to 'science'. He is flatly giving equal status to humour and 'science', and to art for that matter. Within such an approach, an increased mutual awareness actually becomes imperative. And this is what all the cartoons of this paper and their comments intend to prove, the case of Cartoon 5 being especially noteworthy.

*The tradition and institutionalization of social sciences*

Today, it is widely accepted that the problems of international development are basically social problems and that social sciences are best suited to tackle these problems. These sciences may be labelled soft sciences, but they are still 'scientific'. As such, they have reached certain levels of institutionalization, possess theoretical and methodological traditions, and, like any scientific perception of reality, are to some extent ideologically based. Bias occurs whatever the theoretical frameworks and the scope of research activities. In other words, this evolution is logical.

International development scholars are increasingly sympathetic to the cause of Third World countries, respectful of the positive qualities of these societies, and as a consequence, critical of the institutions within industrialized countries which contribute to problems faced by Third World countries. These scholars also show a creativity and an intellectual breadth that are impressive: today they are increasingly influencing other fields of study within the social sciences. In spite of this, obviously, international development studies do not exhaust the social reality of Third World countries.

Cartoon 2



Petronio Caldera in *Novedades*, Nicaragua, around 1970. Reprinted in *Le huitième salon international de la caricature. The Eighth International Salon of Cartoons*, Montreal, Pavillon international de l'humour, 1971, p. 363.

The 'deceptively naive exterior' of this cartoon is noteworthy. It was published around 1970 in a Nicaraguan periodical. The country was then ruled with an iron fist by the Somoza dynasty (1937-1979); a guerilla warfare developed and finally toppled the regime. The cartoon has no caption and merely shows the faces of contemporary world leaders of very different political persuasion (clockwise from top left: Gamal A. Nasser, John XXIII, Nikita Khrushchev, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Eva Peron, Patrice Lumumba, Charles de Gaulles and Jawaharlal Nehru). To mix among them two faceless bearded figures conveys in a subtle way a mes-

sage that is potent indeed if one considers the harshness of the regime: Nicaragua's leaders are also in this cartoon. They are the 'bearded' (*barbudo*) commanders of the guerilla; in other words, the then incumbent President Anastasio Somoza is not the true leader, this as far as the camouflage of the message is concerned. In terms of its interpretation, the cartoon allows for an array of speculations. Among others, it refers to problems of national integration, techniques of counter-state (à la Luis Mercier Vega); as well as to structuralist (theory of dependency, for instance) or culturalist (à la Glen C. Dealy) theories of authoritarianism.

Large gaps remain in this field of study, while certain topics are over-emphasized.


Philosophy, religion, literature, personality types, kinship systems are also aspects of reality. Without moving too far from the variables traditionally stressed in development studies, it is indeed a fact that some aspects of social reality are rarely studied in international development research. Such gaps in our knowledge are not filled or are filled rather reluctantly. For example, the amazing amount of material collected by anthropologists about systems of values have been used scantily by economists. The numerous studies on socialization done by anthropologists and sociologists have not been used intensively by education scholars. The findings of the dependence school do not have a strong impact on local level studies in virtually any of the social science disciplines. The list of examples of this kind could be expanded. These examples do not imply by any means that social scientists in general, and international development specialists in particular, are not utilizing research outside their own disciplines. By and large, they are highly eclectic and borrow from all the social sciences. Examples of different types could have been chosen. There are also gaps and overemphasis within disciplines (geographical studies, for instance). The point is that gaps remain in development studies. Although this may seem obvious, it is worth remembering.

It is not the purpose of this section to present a state-of-the-art analysis of international development studies, and in fact, the problems of gaps and overemphasis of given topics are inherent in all scientific endeavours. However, what is important to underline is that cartoonists are largely unaware of, or at least less influenced than social scientists by, the traditions and institutionalization of social sciences. Because of this, their insights can be refreshing and offer international development specialists original ideas for research hypotheses, which is what all the cartoons of this paper and their comments intend to prove. As was suggested in the introduction to this paper, the same can be said, for instance, of poems or novels.

*The new currents  
within social  
sciences*

For an active minority of international development specialists, traditional hard data approaches and excessive theorizing are viewed as the main causes of many ills and mistakes in the field. It is noteworthy that these specialists represent very different political tendencies. In order to overcome these ills and mistakes, some specialists have placed high hopes in new approaches that have developed in the social sciences, such as the emic or 'new anthropological' approach (in anthropology), the ethnomethodological and the humanist approaches (in sociology) and the social-science-of-

Cartoon 3



In *The New Yorker*, USA, 1940s. Reprinted in *The New Yorker Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Album*, New York, Hayer and Brothers, 1951, no pagination.

This is an American cartoon from the 1940s. It refers to Mexico, the 'U.S. Backyard' par excellence, that has traditionally been the popular culture's yardstick of the U.S. to understand what is a poor country. Today, given the powerful influence of ideas such as endogenous development, appropriate technology and basic needs, it is possible—and even likely—that an informed public may view this cartoon in a positive perspective. The same obviously holds true for specialists; besides the ideas mentioned above, they may stress the functionality of the 'bent' given to the use of technology, the fact that this bent does not hinder the intense and efficient team effort of the railway workers, or that this cartoon is an excellent example of cultural lag à la William Ogburn.

However, it is reasonable to assume that the car-

toonist's perspective was more critical, and that the drawing intended to show a general lack of modernity leading to dysfunctional behaviours. If one remembers that cartoons suggest an organizing frame for how to think about a specific issue, then this cartoon illustrates very well how much such a frame may change in a period of forty years or so. It also illustrates how much, during these same years, development specialists have contributed to the debunking of stereotypes in the field of research. However, even in this case, the crude 'exterior' perspective of this cartoon of the 1940s is still questioning today's specialists and laypersons alike: Has development research, especially in its construction of ideal types, been totally freed of prejudice and stereotypes?

every-day-life approach (in several social sciences). These approaches could benefit much from a study of the insights of cartoonists.

Scholars studying cartoons—as well as caricatures, ‘social’ drawings and the like—have underlined their value as primary sources of information about the fleeting models and mores of foreign societies or passing generations. It is claimed that cartoons are able to offer insights into the ‘unofficial’ attitudes and reactions of ordinary folk<sup>9</sup> and to reflect the moods, flow of events and social attitudes of everyday life.<sup>10</sup> (Cartoons 3 and 5 and, at a deeper level, Cartoon 6 are good examples.) Hence cartoons can be very useful to international development scholars, especially now when so much emphasis is put on basic needs and endogenous strategies of development. In spite of this, there are few references to cartoons among international development scholars.<sup>11</sup> And the same holds true for social sciences in general. However, the works of cartoonists do receive some scholarly attention, particularly by students of popular culture who have developed sophisticated ways to examine such visual works. But the fact remains that seldom have specialists of a given field of study—with the notable exception of popular culture students—carried out systematic studies of cartoons dealing with their field; this also applies to international development.


What is suggested here is that (1) ways of examining cartoons have been devised, (2) cartoons constitute an original source of information, (3) some new approaches exist within social sciences and within international development studies, and that the latter could benefit from the former. In spite of some claims to the contrary,<sup>12</sup> it may be assumed that cartoonists will be pleased by such an increased scholarly attention.

*The themes and problems of international development*

The main hypothesis here is that cartoons are well suited to deal with the themes and problems of international development. Why is this the case?

A first answer to this question could be that these themes and problems constitute a major part of what is often called the world problematique. These themes and problems are of enormous dimensions and appear today as inescapable challenges, not only for the scientific community, but also for governments, mass media, organizations of all types and increasingly for the general public. Not only are these problems staggering and inescapable, they are also of a rapidly changing nature. Cartoons, with their background of satire, violence, absurdity and anguish, are well suited to express the scope and instability of international development, and the actual fear it incites among most of its observers. To satirize what is feared is common: it constitutes a defence reflex against the oppression of reality.<sup>13</sup> Laughter

Cartoon 4



Emery Kelen, USA, 1960. Reprinted in *Focus. Technical Co-operation*, no 3, 1973, p. 2.

This cartoon constitutes a quite explicit critique of international aid policies. Given such a theme, the cartoon's date is noteworthy: 1960! Beyond the obvious denunciation of ethnocentricity, demonstration effect, scientific dependence, alienation and general dysfunctionality, there are other remarkable elements. First, the cartoon directly points at the idea of (in)appropriate technology, this at a time when the concept had not yet been coined. Secondly, at a deeper (subconscious?) level, the cartoon seems as revealing: while the duck's position is unmistakably precarious, the crane's one is not that better. The abnormally long pointed finger, the arrogantly curved neck and the thin legs also convey an overall impression of fragility, a lesser one for sure, but still real.

Furthermore, both birds are standing on the ground; neither of them is in what the reader usually perceives as their natural element, nor consequently are they shown in a genuine position or movement, such as perching on a branch or flying. This produces an impression of artificiality which adequately conveys the message that when the South

and the North are relating—even for aid considerations—there is an intense uneasiness and a diffuse impression that both countries are carrying out an unnatural activity in an unnatural setting, as illustrated by the quabbles existing in industrialized countries over the level and adequacy of international aid and in Third World countries by the denunciations of aid interference in internal matters, of generalized dependence, of the presence of a lumpenbourgeoisie syndrome.

Another element that needs to be underlined is that while the crane's main social attributes are a crown, a bow tie and a book, the duck's attributes only consist of stilts. The former denote knowledge and style, the latter height and strength, which are physical and materialistic in nature; de facto, the duck's attributes are even worse than that: an actual parody of such attributes. These observations could lead to an array of ideas concerning social stratification, to cite just one, the master and servant characterology developed by Albert Memmi (see his work *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1965, p 153).

allows us to dispose of excitations which cannot be consummated in any purposeful manner, i.e. excitations which have become redundant.<sup>14</sup> All the cartoons reproduced in this paper exemplify this, either explicitly such as Cartoons 1 and 6, or in a subtler way as in the others. Actually, all our contemporary reality has become unstable as well as fearful, and modern art tends to reflect this. In this sense, it is interesting to note how much modern painters owe to cartoonists (and vice-versa).<sup>15</sup> If cartoons have influenced modern art, why did they fail—by and large—to be considered by social scientists, and more particularly by international development scholars, as a valuable source of insight? Here is not the place to answer this question, though it is interesting to raise it. As was explained earlier, according to Arthur Koestler, humour and scientific activity are domains of activity that actually shade into each other, hence, the question is more than simply a rhetorical one.

A second answer as to why cartoons are well suited to deal with the themes and problems of international development will be to state that international development offers a fertile ground for cartoons. Several interrelated responses can be given to defend this point.

As already mentioned, there exists today among students of social reality a disenchantment with hard data, and international development constitutes one of the fields where it has been the most extreme and widespread; typical of this disenchantment is the literature dealing with 'failures of high technology', problems created by capital intensive projects and the 'drama' of the Third World's overurbanization, among others. Because of the serious tone of specialized literature, international development with its failures, contradictions and disenchantments, constitutes a fertile ground for satire and humour. A good example of this is the 'importance of imagination' that plagues international development, especially in its policy implementation dimension. There exists simultaneously a tremendous and all-encompassing inertia and an acute awareness in some circles of the large bureaucratic systems that control key aspects of the implementation. All too often, actual policies firmly imply that 'tomorrow will not be different from today'. Whatever the situations and problems encountered, a business-as-usual attitude pervades more often than not the international development world.<sup>16</sup> Cartoons, and notably Cartoons 4 and 7 of the paper, are well suited to express the contradictions resulting from this situation.

Margaret Mead has underlined the fact that during her formative years, scholars who studied 'foreign' societies were motivated above all by exotism. They wanted to discover new systems of values, new perceptions of

Cartoon 5



Kaci, in *Jeune Afrique*, no 1088, November 11, 1981.

Kaci, from Algeria, illustrates in this rather straightforward cartoon the everyday reality of sexual inequality and the impact of the demonstration effect in his country. These phenomena are well known, but several secondary features of the cartoon are worth focusing on. Besides the obvious contrast in the nature and monetary value of the dreamed-about goods as well as in the man's donkey riding vs the woman's walking, it is noteworthy that both protagonists are equally affected by the demonstration effect: the car is big and likely unsuited for local conditions, and so are the woman's shoes; they have high heels, are definitely Western and unadapted to her objective needs. Such an observation may suggest that in spite of sexual inequality, both the man and the woman are faced in their society with similar patterns of social discrimination, an insightful observation if corroborated.

What is also noteworthy is the contrast between the protagonists' expressions: the sleepy man with his sad and skeptic face notably differs from the wide-eyed woman. Does this express the skepticism and indifference bred by power (in the man's case), and the mesmerized dependence or unrealistic hopes resulting from a situation of sexual inequality (in the woman's case)? A third point worth noticing is that the cartoon underlines a dimension of social stratification that remains underresearched in sociology and political science, that is the spatial dimension. The man of the cartoon is larger than the

woman, he monopolizes the donkey, he 'walks' first and his dream is greater in size. In summary, the man not only occupies more space, but also the most relevant space, the left half of the cartoon, and hence, controls the aim and purpose of the march, which is indeed a strong indictment of sexual inequality. But given the man's sleepiness, the cartoonist suggests that the man's as well as the woman's walking makes no sense because only the donkey seems conscious as to where they are heading for. In spite of her wide opened eyes, the woman does not look at anything except her husband's (or father's, or brother's) 'large back'; the man has the possibility (even if he wastes it in the case of this cartoon) to choose the destination toward which they are heading, i.e., the place where social change and hopefully development will take place. This leads to a parallel with what has happened in the Third World since the colonial period: a monopolization by men of activities resulting from modernization.

Again here, as for the other cartoons presented in this paper, the speculations and interpretations are endless. What is most interesting is first that such interpretations and speculations may go far beyond what cartoonists consciously intend, and secondly, that given the cartoonists' remoteness from the traditions and institutionalization of international development research, their efforts are able to provide this research with refreshing ideas.

reality, new ways of life. Today, the motivation is much more political, and 'denunciations' of all types characterize a large part of the specialized literature. This is also the case for the media. Given the cartoonists' didactic and manicheist bent, they are easily influenced by that denunciation syndrome and are actually very eager to emulate it in their messages, as exemplified by all the cartoons in this paper.

In summary, problems related to international development offer convenient topics for cartoonists, first because today these problems are influencing directly or indirectly all aspects of life even in industrialized countries, secondly because the field is beset by impressive contradictions both in research and in policy implementation and thirdly because of the denunciation syndrome that generally characterizes information and comments about these problems.

*The reluctance of international development specialists vis-a-vis humour*

Scholarly reluctance applies not only to potential contributions of cartoons but also to other manifestations of humour. The main reasons for this reluctance apparently have to do with the low levels of institutionalization of social disciplines. Social sciences are by and large poorly institutionalized. This is true of sociology, for example, and Paul Lazarsfeld devoted his last years to study why this is so. In his work, and in those of several other scholars that he inspired in this research endeavour,<sup>17</sup> the reference discipline is often explicitly economics, which is perceived as the *wunderkind* of social sciences. Indeed, in spite of the recent 'recession' in its preeminence, economics has been exceptionally successful in its institutionalization.<sup>18</sup> Given this state of affairs, the relatively high level of institutionalization of international development studies may appear as somewhat contradictory. But it can be argued that it results from the traditional dominance of economists in the field. However, anthropologists, sociologists or political scientists (to consider just these) who are specializing in international development *are* confronted with the low levels of institutionalization of their disciplines, as any of their fellow scientists in the same disciplines.

Social scientists specializing in international development have shown over the last 20 or 30 years an impressive creativity. Their contributions have been both numerous and important. Within the scope of such an intellectual effort, the use of humour either in the prose of these scholars or as a source of insights or even as a topic of research constitutes (sadly enough) an actual threat to the recognition that these social scientists deserve. As a result, it is rare that, for example, publications by these scientists contain cartoons, although there are exceptions. Some journals, such as the *International Social Science Journal*, feature cartoons. Introductory texts in the various

Cartoon 6



Bill Maudlin, USA, 1962. Reprinted by permission of Bill Maudlin in John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricatures*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1981, p. 71.

This striking cartoon indeed enables its author to 'make simply visible more complicated processes'. Its most remarkable aspect is that it allies inner strength with a quite accurate perception of reformist policies carried out in several Latin American countries in the early 1960s. The cartoon is American and dates back to 1962, when John F. Kennedy was president and the Alliance for Progress was less than a year old. The Alliance's reformist drive was to a large extent an answer to the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and to the guerilla war that were then being waged in several parts of the continent. Furthermore, the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis exacerbated the perception of a reformism vs revolution confrontation in the American continent.

Given this context, the cartoon probably tells as much about the inner fears of US public opinion and/or opinion-makers as about social processes in Latin America. The 'reform' of the cartoon is shown as insufficient: one single flower watered by a single drop; the stereotyped siesta position and cigar of the 'Latin' reformist, the uncommitted individual not even looking at what he is doing; the likely inappropriateness of the soil where the flower is grown. The contrast with the revolution-wave is obvious: this is presented as powerful, rough, anonymous (the brutal sea denotes an indiscriminate populace 'without a human face') and inadequate. The wave implies that the revolutionary process

only brings illusions. Illusions of useful water (to irrigate with such salty water leads to a decreasing fertility while—obviously—the 'good' reformist water will not). Illusions of improved living conditions (the movement brought about by the wave is not a 'good' movement: it sweeps everything along its destructive path). In summary, an illusion of social development: the decreased fertility and destructive path hinder life, in this case, especially social life.

This dichotomization recalls the in-group versus out-group analysis of sociologists. Given the cartoon's political context, everything related to revolution has been considered as having out-group attributes. However, given a different context, a case can be made in favour of reversing the attributes; it is this possibility which makes the cartoon so interesting as a source of insight for understanding international development. Actually, without its two keywords and the explicit hat, this compelling but ambiguous cartoon would make an excellent drawing for a psychological projection test. Furthermore, because of the identificatory potential of the two contrasting ideas presented, the cartoon vividly illustrates Arthur Koestler's point that 'the emotional climate (of the act of creation) changes by gradual transition from aggressive (humour, cartoons) to neutral (discovery, science) to sympathetic and identificatory (art)'.

disciplines occasionally contain cartoons, which constitutes in fact a concession to the toughness of the introductory texts market and to the scientifically elementary character of these books. More generally, it is also noteworthy that well established scholars often feel free to be much more humorous than their younger or less renowned colleagues. But the fact remains that in international development studies, the bulk of scholarly production tends to avoid making use of humour either as a didactic device or as a source of information. It must be underlined here that this reluctance vis-à-vis humour, especially by anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists, does not generally imply insecurity on the part of these scholars. By and large, they seem to be rightfully conscious of the importance of their contributions, but the threat mentioned earlier is very real. As far as systematic research on cartoons is concerned, another factor may also play a critical role: such a systematic research requires contest analysis and occasionally multilingual skills that are not necessarily frequent among international development specialists; this last point is especially the case in the Anglo-Saxon world.


#### **The limits of cartoonists' contributions**

In spite of the fact that cartoons present an interesting potential as a mode of analysis of social reality, one must remain aware of the limitations of that mode of analysis, even when properly exploited. After all, if social scientists are not immune from a truncated perception of social reality, neither are cartoonists.

Willy-nilly, cartoonists are members of national elites or counter-elites, especially in Third World countries.<sup>19</sup> A wealth of studies have shown that the real gap in today's world is not so much between Third World and industrialized countries, but rather between, on one hand, the 'poor' of Third World countries and on the other hand, a combination of Third World countries' elites and industrialized countries. Furthermore, all cartoonists are part of the sub-culture of journalist and mass communication professions. In Third World countries, one may advance the argument that if the demonstration effect and related phenomena are strong among the elites, they are even stronger among the journalistic profession. On top of this, cartoonists from both industrialized and Third World countries share identical liberal/progressive/leftist and/or anti-establishment leanings. These similarities between all cartoonists, whatever their country of origin, became obvious to the author while reviewing a sample of some 600 cartoons.<sup>20</sup> A core of similarities between all the cartoons was striking, these being either from western industrialized countries, centrally planned

# arrivals

Cartoon 7



Tom McDonald, in *CAUT Bulletin*, Ottawa, Canadian Association of University Teachers, April 1982, p. 15.

This cartoon criticizes the general pattern of Third World studies and its interpretation leads to several insights, which may or may not be all conscious. First, neither of the cartoon's characters seems to enjoy his moving: for both, it will require adjustments, acculturation and stress. Secondly, in spite of the two of them being in the same study endeavour, no actual interaction occurs, each single-mindedly following 'his' track. Thirdly, the hockey stick vs the spear contrast allows for an interesting speculation: the stick suggests a game, an activity which is not vital in socio-economic terms; the spear is a weapon and suggests economic activities, power and status. In other words, while the Third World student picks up a life style which will only contribute to self-serving upper class crystalization in the Third World, the professor studies vital aspects of it, the implication being that only the professor's activity bears any objective meaning and importance. Fourthly, the difference in the types of anticipatory socializations conveys the impression that the Third World student lacks motivation and will never truly

understand the effects of the industrialized countries, in particular their work ethic, while the reverse is true for the professor. Fifthly, the cartoon implicitly criticizes the key assumptions of the modernization approach. Indeed, a large 'Arrival' sign is visible, but there is no 'Departure' sign, and it is the Third World student who is going towards the 'arrival'. The connotation is that culturally as well as structurally speaking the point of departure is almost irrelevant; only the end result, the hoped for modernization, holds some importance. In the cartoon, as in modernization approaches, the end result is perceived as well defined, stable, clearly circumscribed and—needless to say—as 'higher' than the Third World countries' starting point. Sixthly, the basic pattern of Third World study programmes is viewed as a relatively closed system: it is not the personal effort of the characters that brings them to their destination, but an escalator, a machine which neither the professor nor the student can control.

countries or Third World countries. Any of these cartoons could have been created by cartoonists from any of the 'three worlds'.

In general, jokes tend to be more critical and harsher than cartoons. This fact points towards another weakness of cartoons as a source of original insight: they are intended for public consumption by the mass media. Why is this a weakness? Jokes are harsher because their origin is difficult, if not impossible, to trace. As this is definitely not the case with cartoonists, it necessarily limits their freedom of expression. Cartoonists are easily censored, or forced into public stances which may reinforce an original moralistic bent. In cartoons dealing with international development issues, the omnipresent 'ugly' Uncle Sam could be often interpreted in that manner: an aggressive, yet safe, topic. Needless to say, this type of cartoon is not usually the most original.<sup>21</sup> Cartoonists are easily censored by law or governmental regulation, by their newspaper's editor, by fear of losing their job, or even only by fear of a systematic refusal of their cartoons, and last but not least, by self-censorship.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the irreverence of humour and the nature of the messages allow truly creative cartoonists to be less limited in their freedom than may be expected, even in authoritarian regimes. In particular, cartoons tend to have a deceptively naive exterior that is often a mere camouflage for more complex and critical ideas and opinions,<sup>23</sup> Cartoon 2 being especially remarkable in that respect. In that sense, it is interesting to note that the single feature that probably best characterizes cartoons of Third World countries is that they are the most critical of their own countries, particularly of their elites. Cartoons from industrialized countries tend, by and large, to satirize more frequently the industrialized countries themselves, the transnationals, the inadequacy and dysfunctionalities of international aid and the like (see for instance Cartoons 4 and 7). The main targets of cartoonists tend to be located in their own society.

The conspicuous absence of some themes in cartoons dealing with international development also reveals the limits or their potential contributions. Cases in point are sex and the 'individualism vs communitarism' dichotomy. Despite the recent impact of the women's liberation movement in industrialized countries, there are few references to the women-vs-men issue in these cartoons, and women are rarely represented—Cartoon 5 being an exception. Also, there are few references to love, motherhood, rape or prostitution, analogies that do offer great potential for cartoons dealing with international development. This straight-lacedness about sex can probably be related to the moralistic and/or leftist bent of a majority of cartoonists.<sup>24</sup> Likewise the absence of references to the key issue of indi-

vidualism vs communitarism is noteworthy. By and large, all cartoons refer to western countries and no alternative models is presented, even by the most stridently politically oriented cartoonists.

In summary, despite of the fact that a systematic study of cartoons provides a good source of information for international development specialists, it constitutes a mode of perception of social reality that presents important limitations. This is especially the case in the field of international development because of the demonstration effect and censorship which limit the freedom and originality of cartoonists.

#### One last comment

What roles do cartoons play? Do they increase our awareness or are they escapist devices that allow us to analyse our aggressivity and to adjust better? These questions are relevant indeed, because cartoons often show us the unacceptable. The public would less easily tolerate such messages if they were presented by drawings of an academic style (see for example Cartoons 1 and 7). A new question arises here, about whether specialists need to be confronted with the unacceptable. A comparison with the royal courts' jesters could be useful at this point. Originally, royal courts kept a madman who was an involuntary source of humour and satire. Later, he became a voluntary fool, the jester, who was allowed to say and do virtually anything.<sup>25</sup> The jester was useful to the ruler because his sharp remarks and criticism played the latent function of counterbalancing and checking the adulation and hypocrisy that characterize a royal court. Paradoxically, the jester's 'crazy' behaviour constituted a privileged way through which the ruler and dignitaries acquired a more accurate perception of reality. Let us hope that the insights of cartoonists will, in the future, be able to play a jester's role for international development specialists. This could constitute a first step towards tapping the potential of other sources of insight for their research.

#### Notes and references

1. I am indebted to Shirley Ross and Mireille Lévesque, my research assistants at the Institute for International Development and Co-operation, University of Ottawa, for their valuable research and editing contribution to this paper. Laurence Alschuler and Georges Hénault made insightful comments that helped to correct several errors. I want to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.
2. Cole, Stephen, 'Continuity and Institutionalization in Science: A Case Study of Failure', p. 109 in Obershall, Anthony, (ed.), *The Establishment of Empirical Sociology: Studies in Continuity, Discontinuity and Institutionalization*, Harper and Row, New York, 1972.

3. Some ideas and concepts of this paragraph are taken from Moles, Abraham A., 'Préface. La Caricature comme communication', p. 6-7, in Topuz, Hifzi, *Caricature et société*, Maison Mame, France, 1974. The idea that a cartoon 'suggests an organizing frame for how to think about a specific issue' is from William A. Gamson (in a letter to the author dated from September 15, 1986).
4. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 7, Macmillan's Free Press, 1968, p. 2.
5. Fitzgerald, Richard, *Art and Politics: Cartoonists of the Masses and Liberator*, Greenwood Press, Wesport, Conn., U.S.A., 1973, p. 94.
6. An actual collaboration, although fruitful, remains however difficult to envisage. Cartoonists tend to have an eccentric view of the world and work independently.
7. Dorfman, Ariel, and Mattelart, Armand, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic*, International General, New York, 1975, p. 11.
8. Koestler, Arthur, *The Act of Creation*, Macmillan, New York, 1967, pp. 27 and 45-46.
9. Geipel, John, *The Cartoon. A Short History of Graphic Comedy and Satire*, David and Charles, England, 1972, p. 18.
10. Loosely adapted from George, M. Dorothy, *Hogarth to Cruikshank: Social change in Graphic Satire*, Penguin Press, London, England, 1968, p. 13.
11. To my knowledge, only two books have done so. The first one is Dorfman, Ariel, and Mattelart, Armand, *op. cit.*; this book constitutes and systematic study of a comic strip. In 1981, John J. Johnson published a book analysing in detail cartoons dealing with U.S. perceptions of Latin America; the titles of the book's chapters are revealing: (1) Introduction, (2) the Hemisphere as Monolith, (3) Latin America as Female, (4) the Republics as Children, (5) the Republics as Blacks, (6) the Latin American Nations as Non-Black Males (usually Spanish looking, dwarflike and/or clownish), (7) Social Reform and Militarism, (8) Conclusion. Johnson, John J., *Latin America in Caricatures*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1981.
12. John Geipel claims that 'Most cartoonists have a healthy mistrust for those who subject their work to this kind of scrutiny... They have little time or inclination to examine the reasons why they depict the world and their fellow men in the way they do', Geipel, John, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
13. Topuz, Hifzi, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
14. Koestler, Arthur, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
15. From the 18th century on, there are the cases, for example, of William Hogarth, Francisco de Goya, Thomas Rowlandson, and particularly Honoré Daumier, who has been both an important painter and a prolific political cartoonist. During the 20th century, one can name at random the dadaists, the surrealists, James Ensor, René Magritte, Pablo Picasso. Some of the major exponents of the recent field of 'pop' art use established cartoon style as their primary source of inspiration (Geipel, John, *op. cit.*, p. 37). It is here impossible to try to be exhaustive. The mutual influence is longstanding and diverse. Ralph E. Shikes asks the question: 'At what point does a caricature or satirical political cartoon transcend typical comment and become art?' His criteria remain very

- subjective; ironically, Shikes lists as his last criterion '...when the artist's reputation is secure in art history books', a remark which is consistent with Arthur Koestler's approach. Shikes, Ralph E., *The Indignant Eye: The Artist as Social Critic in Prints and Drawings from the Fifteenth Century to Picasso*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p. xxvi.
16. Some of the ideas and concepts of this paragraph have been loosely adapted from Koestler, Arthur, *The Call-Girls. A Tragi-Comedy with Prologue and Epilogue*, Hutchinson, London, 1972, p. 179.
  17. Students inspired by Paul Lazarsfeld in this research endeavour are, among others, Anthony Oberschall, Terry N. Clark, Suzanne Schadd and Stephen Cole. See in particular, Lazarsfeld, Paul, 'Foreword', p. vi-xvi in Oberschall, Anthony (ed.), *op. cit.*
  18. In a perceptive article, Irving L. Horowitz has pleaded convincingly in favour of the fact that the 'Nobel Prize Should Recognize Unity of Social Sciences', *American Sociological Association Footnotes*, January 1984, p. 1 and 8. He writes 'The Nobel Prizes have again been awarded. (What) is a time of celebration remains for the social sciences an annual moment of intense embarrassment...only since 1969, by a special decree of the Swedish Academy, has one of the social sciences, economics, been considered fit to participate in the Nobel Prize Award System...not one of these areas (of economics) for which awards have been given, would have been possible without research efforts in crucial branches of psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science...One consequence of the present Award System is the virtual disqualification of scholars working in the same research area (as economists), but lacking the presumed legitimacy of economics...Either there should be a single award for an outstanding achievement in applied social science..., or there should be five awards for theoretical contributions in the main branches of social sciences as they are now constituted. I confess to a preference for a single award in the social sciences.'
  19. If this seems to be the case in Third World countries, it is less obvious in industrialized countries. See Desbarats, Peter, and Mosher, Terry, *The Hecklers: A History of Canadian Political Cartooning and a Cartoonists' History of Canada*, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1979. Discussing the case of Canada, these authors state that, 'Because political cartoonists express the anxieties of a segment of the population, the medium is far from elitist' (p. 6). After stressing the fact that newspaper editors are by and large of elite origin, the authors claim that '...cartoonists usually come from more ordinary levels of society...cartoonists were rarely educated men. They earned salaries that enabled them to belong, at best, to the middle class' (p. 17). The book gives the biographies of 169 Canadian cartoonists (pp. 227-254); 105 of the biographies are detailed enough to show that 46 of these cartoonists did not have post-secondary education, 45 studied art with a wide range of extent of studies and 14 had done some university studies in other fields.
  20. The 600 cartoons were collected by Shirley Ross and myself. The sources of these cartoons were as follows: 167 came from newspapers; 259 from periodicals; 106 from books of collected cartoons, either cartoons from one author, or

from one newspaper or periodical, or from one country; 68 came from other sources such as different types of books, posters and journals. The distribution of the cartoons by date and region and/or political regime is given in the next table.

#### Distribution of cartoons by date and region

Dates	Regions and/or political regimes				Total
	USA, Canada and Australia	Western Europe	Third World countries	Centrally planned countries	
1960s and before	68	44	41	31	184
1970s	89	95	75	10	269
1980s	20	75	51	1	147
Total	177	214	167	42	600

The distribution is by and large fairly representative, except for the underrepresentation of the centrally planned countries. Cartoons from these countries are not only more difficult to find, but also less original and quite repetitive. This has contributed to their underrepresentation in this sample, because collectors tried to choose 'good' cartoons, i.e. thought-provoking and perceptive ones (which are very subjective criteria indeed). Within this limitation of the sample, the core of similarity between all the cartoons was striking.

21. See Koestler, Arthur, *op. cit.*, 1967, p. 70. Koestler states that 'The political cartoon . . . at its worst (is) a manipulation of symbols—John Bull, Uncle Sam, the Russian bear—which, once comic, have degenerated into visual clichés'.
22. See Topuz, Hifzi, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–115.
23. Geipel, John, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
24. Another explanation is suggested by Desbarats, Peter, and Mosher, Terry, *op. cit.* They refer to the virtual absence of women among political cartoonists. This seems indeed to be the case, in spite of the fact that there exists a few noteworthy exceptions, the French Bretecher for example, although she is not specifically a political cartoonist. The straight-lacedness about sex in cartoons dealing with international development issues contrasts with the eroticism of comic books, especially in Western Europe.
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